Inspiration and Interpretation Part 3

The author disposes of them by a single a.s.sertion. "What is alleged,"

(he says,) "is a case of the supernatural. _But no testimony can reach to the supernatural._" (p. 107.) The inference is obvious.--Again: "an event may be so incredible intrinsically as to _set aside any degree of testimony_." (p. 106.) Such an event he declares a Miracle to be; and explains that "from the nature of our antecedent convictions, the probability of _some_ kind of mistake or deception _somewhere_, though we know not _where_, is greater than the probability of the event really happening in _the way_, and from _the causes_ a.s.signed." (pp. 106-7.) This merely amounts to a.s.serting that the antecedent improbability of Miracles is so great as to make them incredible. The writer does not attempt to establish this point. "The present discussion," (he says,) "is not intended to be of a controversial kind; it is purely contemplative and theoretical." (p. 100.) And yet, he _cannot_ suppose that the Universal Church will surrender its convictions and reverse its deliberate judgment, at the merely "contemplative and theoretical"

suggestions of an individual, however respectable he may happen to be.

Against his mere a.s.sertion, we claim a right to set the result of Bp.

Butler's careful investigation of the same subject:--"_That there certainly is no such presumption against Miracles, as to render them in any wise incredible_: that, on the contrary, our being able to discern reasons for them, gives a positive credibility to the history of them, in cases where those reasons hold: and that it is by no means certain that there is any peculiar presumption at all, from a.n.a.logy, even in the lowest degree, against Miracles, as distinguished from other extraordinary phenomena[64]."

Professor Powell's objection against Miracles is, in fact, practically that of the infidel Hume; who a.s.serted "that no testimony for any kind of Miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof." He argued that Miracles, being contrary to general experience, are incapable of proof. He maintained also, (with Spinoza,) that Miracles, being contrary to the established laws of Nature, imply, in the very character of them, a palpable contradiction. This latter position seems to be identical with that adopted by Professor Powell.

In a certain place, this author finds fault with "the too frequent a.s.sumption ... of the part of the ... _Advocate_, when the character to be sustained should be rather that of the unbia.s.sed _Judge_." (p. 95.) But what are we to think of the judicial fairness of one who is not only Advocate and Judge in his own cause; but who even turns the Witnesses out of Court; and will listen to no evidence,--on the plea that it _cannot_ be trustworthy; or at least, that it _shall_ be unavailing?--"I express myself with caution," (says Bp. Butler, with reference to arguments against the credibility of Revelation,) "lest I should be mistaken to vilify Reason; which is indeed the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even Revelation itself: or be misunderstood to a.s.sert that a supposed revelation cannot be proved false, from internal characters. For it may contain clear immoralities, or contradictions; and either of these would prove it false. Nor will I take upon me to affirm, that nothing else can possibly render any supposed revelation incredible. Yet still the observation is, I think, true beyond doubt; that _objections against Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence, are frivolous[65]_."

That a certain occurrence or phenomenon "is due to supernatural causes,"

Professor Powell maintains is "entirely dependent on the previous belief and a.s.sumptions of the parties." (p. 107.) He forgets that he grounds his own denial of the possibility of a Miracle, on nothing stronger than "the nature of" his own "antecedent convictions." Thus, the question becomes merely a personal one between Mr. Baden Powell and the Apostles of CHRIST. The reasonableness of the "antecedent convictions" in the one case have to be set against the reasonableness of the "antecedent convictions" in the other. Either party, (according to this view,) has its own "previous belief and a.s.sumptions;" which, in the one case, are known to have produced conviction; in the other, they are unhappily found to have resulted in a rejection of Miracles. But then it happens, unfortunately, that in the case of the Apostles and others, conviction of the truth of our LORD'S Miracles was based on _knowledge_, and _experience of a matter of fact_: in the case of Professor Powell, disbelief is founded on certain "antecedent convictions" only: namely, "the inconceivableness of imagined interruptions of natural Order, or supposed suspensions of the Laws of matter." (p. 110.) He is never tired of repeating that "in an age of physical research like the present, all highly cultivated minds and duly advanced intellects (!) have imbibed, more or less, the lessons of the Inductive Philosophy; and have, at least in some measure, learned to appreciate the grand foundation conception of universal Law:" (p. 133:) that "the entire range of the Inductive Philosophy is at once based upon, and in every instance tends to confirm, by immense acc.u.mulation of evidence, the grand truth of the universal Order and constancy of natural causes, as a primary law of belief; so strongly entertained and fixed in the mind of every truly inductive inquirer, that he cannot even conceive the possibility of its failure." (p. 109.)

I gladly avail myself of a page from the writings of a thoughtful writer of our own, who, half a century ago, reviewed the very errors which are being so industriously reproduced among ourselves at this day,--certainly not with more ability than of old:--"Let us examine a little farther into the weight of the argument derived from the supposed immutability of the Laws of Nature. It has constantly been the theme of modern Unbelievers, that the course of Nature is fixed, eternal, unalterable; and that nothing which is supposed to violate it can possibly take place. Now, we may readily allow, that the course of Nature is unalterable by _human_ power; nay, even by the power of any _created_ being whatsoever. But the question is,--Are these Laws unalterable _by Him who made them_? Proof of this is requisite, before the argument from the immutability of the Laws of Nature can have the least force. We may safely a.s.sert, however, that proof of this is absolutely impossible.--'Facts,' it may be said, 'daily pa.s.sing before us, warrant us in _supposing_ its laws to be unchangeable.' Perhaps so.

But if a thousand or more facts have occurred, since the Creation of the World, in which those Laws appear to have been over-ruled, or suspended, is such a conclusion _then_ warrantable? Even if there had never been a single instance of a Miracle recorded, since the Creation; yet the conclusion would not be just or logical, that no such thing is possible.

But with such a multiplicity of instances to the contrary as are already on record, it is no better than a shameless a.s.sertion, in direct opposition to the evidence of men's senses and experience. Nay, more; the argument is _atheistical_. For, either G.o.d made and ordained these Laws of Nature; and may, consequently, at His pleasure, unmake or suspend them: or else, these laws are self-framed, and Nature is independent of the G.o.d of Nature; which is saying, in other words, that the material Universe is not governed by any Supreme Intelligence.

"This latter opinion appears, indeed, to be the tenet of all who resort to arguments of this kind, in opposition to the credibility of Miracles.

Thus it is said, [by Hume,] that every effect must have a cause; and that, therefore, a Miracle must have a cause in _Nature_; otherwise, it cannot be effected.--But, is not the _Will of_ G.o.d, without any other agency, or predisposing cause, sufficient for the purpose? When G.o.d created the World out of nothing, what pre-existing cause was there, except His own omnipotent Will to produce the effect? Why then is not the same Will sufficient to work Miracles?

"'But,' says another Sophist, [Spinoza,]--'G.o.d is the Author of the Laws of Nature; so that whatever opposes those Laws, is necessarily _repugnant to the Divine nature_: if, therefore, we believe that G.o.d may act in a manner contrary to those laws, we, in effect, believe that He may do what is contrary to _His own nature_; which is absurd and impossible.'

"The reasoning turns upon the supposition that G.o.d is actuated by an absolute _necessity_ of His Nature, and not by his _Will_: or, rather, that He hath neither Will, nor Intellect. Otherwise, it were easy to perceive, that in suspending the operation of His own Laws, G.o.d cannot be charged with doing anything contradictory to _His own_ nature; since He may justly be supposed to have as good reasons for _departing_ from those Laws, as for _framing_ them: and as we know not why He framed them in such a manner, and no otherwise; so He may have the best and wisest reasons for the suspension of them, which it is not for us to call in question. To speak of the Supreme Being as actuated by a kind of physical necessity, and not by His _Will_, is to confound the G.o.d of Nature with Nature itself; which is the very essence of Atheism, and never can be reconciled with any just notions of the Deity, as a Being of intellectual and moral perfections[66]."

_It is by no means inconceivable_, therefore, that the great Cause of Creation, and first Author of Law should interfere at any given time in the established Order of Nature. Moreover, it is irrational, on sufficient testimony, to disbelieve that He has sometimes so interposed.

To deny that this is conceivable, is to make G.o.d inferior to His own decree; to p.r.o.nounce it incredible that the Lawgiver should be superior to His own Laws. "The universal subordination of causation," (p. 134,) we as freely admit as the Professor himself: but then we contend that _everything else_ must be subordinate to the _First great Cause of all_.

Worse than unphilosophical is it to argue as the Professor presumes to do, concerning the MOST HIGH; but unphilosophical in the strictest sense it is. For it is to reason about Him, (the finite concerning the Infinite!) as if we understood Him; we, who can barely decipher a little part of His works! A few more remarks on this subject will be found in my viith Sermon.

We are anxious to know if the whole of the case is really before us. A few more extracts from Professor Powell's Essay seem necessary to do full justice to his view of the matter:--"All moral evidence must essentially have respect to the parties to be convinced. 'Signs' might be adapted peculiarly _to the state of moral or intellectual progress of one age_, or one cla.s.s of persons, and not be suited to that of others.... And it is to the entire difference in the ideas, prepossessions, modes, and grounds of belief in those times, that we may trace the reason why Miracles, which would be incredible _now_, were not so in the age, and under the circ.u.mstances, in which they are stated to have occurred." (p. 117.) ... "An evidential appeal which in a long past age was convincing, as made to _the state of knowledge in that age_[67], might have not only no effect, but even an injurious tendency, if urged in the present, and referring to what is at variance with existing scientific conceptions; just as the arguments of the present age would have been unintelligible to a former."

"In a period of advanced physical knowledge, the reference to what was believed in past times, if at variance with principles now acknowledged, could afford little ground of appeal: in fact, would damage the argument rather than a.s.sist it." (p. 126.)

"It becomes imperatively necessary, that such views should be suggested as may be really suitable to better informed minds, and may meet the increasing demands of an age pretending at least to greater enlightenment." (p. 126.)

There is nothing in the additional suggestions thus thrown out which in reality affects the question at issue. Certain antecedent considerations were before insisted on, which (it was said) "must be paramount to all attestation." (p. 107.) These have been disposed of. The writer now tells us that he does not question "_the honesty_ or _veracity_ of the testimony, or the reality of the _impressions_ on the minds of the witnesses." (p. 106.) It remains to inquire therefore to what natural causes, events which were once thought miraculous, may reasonably be referred; since the so-called Miracles of the imperfectly-informed age of our LORD and His Apostles will not endure the scrutiny of the present age of scientific enlightenment.

But this, unless it be a proposal to open the whole question afresh,--to examine _the Miracles themselves_,--to consider them one by one,--to inquire into their exact nature,--and to investigate their attendant circ.u.mstances,--is unmeaning. For we cannot, as reasonable men, dismiss a vast body of august events, differing so considerably one from another, with a vague inuendo that there was probably "some kind of mistake or deception somewhere, though we do not know where:" (p. 106:) a hint that natural events may have been regarded as supernatural by an unscientific age, (which I believe was Schleiermacher's view:) and so forth. The two miraculous Draughts of fishes,--the Stater found in the fish's mouth,--the stilling of the Storm,--might perhaps, by a little rhetorical sophistry, in unscrupulous hands, be so disposed of. But the _Creative Power_ displayed on the two occasions of a miraculous feeding of thousands,--the giving of sight to a man born blind,--the calling of Lazarus out of the grave where he had been for four days buried;--these are transactions which resist every attempt of the enemy to explain away, as unscientific misconceptions. They may be powerless to produce conviction in some _now_, as they were powerless to produce conviction in some _then_: but they cannot be set aside by an insinuation. There could not have been any mistake when the Five Thousand were fed with five loaves, and twelve baskets full were gathered up; or when the Four Thousand were fed with seven loaves, and fragments enough to fill seven baskets remained over[68]. There was no room for deception in the case of the man born blind; for _that_ case immediately underwent a judicial scrutiny[69]. Lazarus bound hand and foot with grave-clothes required that the bystanders should "loose him and let him go[70]:" but from that moment, neither supposed scientific necessity, nor antecedent considerations, nor the ordinary course of Nature, nor any other creature, will avail to bind him any more!

This may suffice on the subject of Professor Powell's Essay. On the great question itself, I have said something in my Seventh Sermon, to which the reader is requested to refer.--The performance now under consideration abounds in incorrect statements, while it revives not a few exploded objections; but I have considered the only points in it which are material.

Thus the author a.s.sumes "that, unlike the _essential Doctrines_ of Christianity, 'the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever,' those _external accessories_, [Miracles, for example,] const.i.tute a subject which of necessity is perpetually taking somewhat at least of a new form, with the successive phases of opinion and knowledge." (p. 94.) But, (waiving for the moment the impossibility of severing the Doctrines of the Gospel from the miraculous evidence that our LORD was a Teacher sent from Heaven[71]), it requires no ability to perceive that although "opinion" should alter daily, and "knowledge" increase ever so much, yet, events professing to be miraculous, being plain _matters of fact_, are to-day exactly what and where they were many centuries ago. Physical Science may pretend (with Paulus) to explain them on natural principles, truly; and while she does so, the world is sure to give her a patient, even an indulgent hearing. But then she must let it be known _what_ she proposes to explain, and _how_ she proposes to explain it. She must be so indulgent also, as to listen while we, in turn, shew her _on what_ grounds we find it impossible to accept her Theory. "The inevitable progress of research," (says this author,) "must, within a longer or shorter period, unravel _all that seems most marvellous_; and what is at present least understood will become as familiarly known to the Science of the future, as those points which a few centuries ago, were involved in equal obscurity, but are now thoroughly understood." (p. 109.) Such a vaticination as regards Miracles, is, to say the least, premature; and until it can appeal to incipient accomplishment, it must be regarded as nugatory also. I am not aware, that as yet one single Miracle has been struck off the list; yet Miracles have now been before the world a long time, and they have not wanted enemies either.

To begin Divinity with a discussion of the "Evidences," we do indeed hold to be a beginning _at the wrong end_. At the same time, all of Professor Powell's opening remarks, in which he insinuates that the Church would bar, or would stifle discussion concerning the evidences of Religion, are obviously untrue. No scrutiny of Christian Miracles, however rigid, is stopped by the admonition that such narratives "ought to be held sacred, and exempt from the unhallowed criticism of human Reason." (p. 110.) We do not, by any means, "treat all objections as profane, and discard exceptions unanswered as shocking and immoral."

(p. 100.) Neither does the Church think herself "omniscient and infallible;" (p. 96;) though she holds Omniscience to be an attribute of G.o.d; and Infallibility, of the Bible. But she deprecates in the strongest manner vague insinuations and unsupported doubts of the reality of her LORD'S Miracles, sown broad-cast over the land; and she is at a loss to understand how the "difficulties" of any, can be in this manner "removed;" (p. 96;) except by a process a.n.a.logous to that which would cure a malady by taking away the life of the patient. We are not in fact at all disposed to admit that "Miracles, which in the estimation of a former age were among the chief _supports_ of Christianity, are at present among the main _difficulties_, and hindrances to its acceptance," (p. 140,)--although Professor Powell and Dr. Temple say so.

This Essay in fact is full of incorrect, or objectionable statements.

Thus Professor Powell a.s.serts that since "evidential arguments are avowedly addressed to the intellect, it is especially preposterous to shift the ground, and charge the rejection of them on _moral_ motives."

(p. 100.) And yet it is worthy of notice that our LORD Himself a.s.sures us that the reception of Truth depends on our moral, rather than on our intellectual condition. "How can ye believe," (He said to the Jews,) "which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from G.o.d only[72]?"

This writer reasons also with singular laxity and inaccuracy. After quoting the dictum that "on a certain amount of testimony we might believe any statement, however improbable," (pp. 140-1,) he scornfully adds;--"So that if a number of respectable witnesses were to concur in a.s.severating that on a certain occasion they had seen two and two make five, we should be bound to believe them!" (p. 141.) Does he fail to perceive, (1) that mathematical truths do not come within the province of probable reasoning, and (2) are not dependent on testimony?... Again, "The case of the _antecedent_ argument of Miracles is very clear, however little some are inclined to perceive it. In Nature and from Nature, by Science and by Reason, _we neither have nor can possibly have any evidence of a Deity working by Miracles_;--for that, we must go out of Nature, and beyond Science." (pp. 141-2.) Very true. We must go _to Scripture_. We must have recourse to testimony. This is precisely what we are maintaining.... But,--"Testimony, after all, is but a second-hand a.s.surance; it is but a blind guide; testimony can avail nothing against Reason." (p. 141.) True. But this, if it is intended as an argument against the reasonableness of admitting the truth of Miracles, is a mere _pet.i.tio principii_.... Again. "It is not the _mere fact_ but the _cause_ or _explanation_ of it, which is the point at issue." (p. 141.) Admitting then, as the learned author here does, that when CHRIST said "Lazarus, come forth," "he that was dead," (though he had been buried four days,) "came forth, bound hand and foot with grave-clothes[73];"--admitting these "facts," I say,--what other "cause," or "explanation" does the reverend gentleman propose to a.s.sign but the supernatural power of the Divine Speaker?

Far graver exception, however, must be taken against certain parts of Professor Powell's labours, which betray an animus fatally indicative of the tendency of such Essays and Reviews as these. Witness his a.s.sertion that "it is now acknowledged that 'Creation' is only another name for our ignorance of the mode of production;" (p. 139;) and that a recent work on the Origin of Species "substantiates on undeniable grounds the very principle so long denounced by the first naturalists,--_the origination of new species by natural causes_;" (p. 139;) and that the said work "must soon bring about an entire revolution of opinion in favour of the grand principle of the _self-evolving powers of Nature_."

(p. 139.)

One object of the present Essay is to insist that since Miracles belong to the world of matter, "we must recognize the due claims of Science to decide" upon them. We are reminded that "beyond the domain of physical causation and the possible conceptions of _intellect_ or _knowledge_, there lies open the boundless region of spiritual things, which is the sole dominion of Faith:" (p. 127:) and that "Advancing knowledge, while it a.s.serts the dominion of Science in physical things, confirms that of Faith in spiritual." (p. 127.) It is proposed that "we thus neither impugn the generalizations of Philosophy, nor allow them to invade the dominion of Faith; and admit that what is not a subject for a problem, may hold its place in a Creed." (p. 127.)

But the fatal consequences of this plausible fallacy become apparent the instant we turn the leaf, and read that "the more knowledge advances, the more it has been, and will be acknowledged, that Christianity, as a real religion, must be viewed apart from connexion with physical things." (p. 128.) That "the first dissociation of the spiritual from the physical was rendered necessary by the palpable contradictions disclosed by astronomical discovery with the letter of Scripture.

Another still wider and more material step has been effected by the discoveries of Geology. More recently, the antiquity of the Human Race, and the development of Species, and _the rejection of the idea of 'Creation'_ (!) have caused new advances in the same direction."

(p. 129.) ... From this it is evident, not only that the object of Science in thus taking the Miracles of Scripture into her own keeping, is (like an unnatural step-dame) to slay them; but that downright Atheism is to be the att.i.tude in which men are expected to survey that "boundless region of spiritual things" which is yet proclaimed to be "the sole dominion of Faith!"

Faith, on the other hand, does not object to the constant visits of Science to any part of _her_ treasure. She does but insist that all discussion shall be conducted _according to the rules of right Reason_.

Vague insinuations about "a progressing Age," (p. 131,)--"new modes of speculation," (p. 130,)--"the advance of Opinion," (p. 131,)--and so forth, are as little to the purpose, _apart from specific objections_, as sneers at "the one-sided dogmas of an obsolete school, coupled with awful denunciations of heterodoxy on all who refuse to listen to them,"

(p. 131,) are unsuited to the gravity of the occasion. Faith insists moreover that a divorce between the miraculous parts of Scripture, and the context wherein they stand, is simply impossible. The unbeliever who boldly says, "I disbelieve the Bible,"--however much we may deplore his blindness and pity his misery,--is yet intelligible in his unbelief. But the man who proposes to believe _the narrative_ of the Exode of Israel from Egypt, (for instance,) apart from the supernatural character of the events which are related to have attended it; who believes _the history_ of the Gospels, (holding the Evangelists to have been veracious writers,) yet rejects the Divine nature of the Miracles which the Gospels relate; and proposes, after eliminating from the historical narrative everything which claims to be miraculous, to make what remains of that historical narrative, the strength and stay of his soul in life and in death:--_that_ man we boldly affirm to be one who cannot have studied the Bible with that ordinary attention which would ent.i.tle him to dogmatize concerning its contents: or else, whose logical faculty must be so hopelessly defective that discussions of this cla.s.s are evidently not his proper province.

Finally, we are presented in this Essay with the same offensive a.s.sumption of intellectual superiority on the part of the writer, which disfigures the entire volume. "It becomes _imperatively necessary_ that views should be suggested really suitable _to better informed minds_."

(p. 126.) "Points which may be seen to involve the greatest difficulty to _more profound inquirers_, are often such as do not occasion the least perplexity to _ordinary minds_, but are allowed to pa.s.s without hesitation." (p. 125.) (And this, from one of those "profound inquirers," one of "those who have reflected most deeply," (p. 126,) who yet cannot get beyond a resuscitation of Hume and Spinoza's exploded objections to the truth of Miracles!)--Butler's unanswerable arguments, (for the allusion is evidently to _him_,) are spoken of as "a few trite and commonplace generalities as to the moral government of the World and the belief in the Divine Omnipotence; or as to the validity of human testimony; or the limits of human experience." (p. 133.) And yet the author is for ever informing us that his hostility to Miracles "is essentially built upon those _grander conceptions_ of the order of Nature, those comprehensive primary elements of all physical knowledge, those ultimate ideas of universal causation, which can only be familiar to _those thoroughly versed in cosmical philosophy in its widest sense_." (p. 133.) "All _highly cultivated minds_, and _duly advanced intellects_," are supposed to find their exponent in Professor Baden Powell. All other thinkers have "_minds of a less comprehensive capacity_," "accustomed to reason on _more contracted views_." (p. 133.

See also p. 131, _top_.) Is this the modesty of real Science? the language of a true Philosopher and Divine?

Finally, after all that has gone before we are not much astonished, but we _are_ considerably shocked, to read as follows:--"The Divine Omnipotence is entirely an inference _from the language of the Bible_, adopted _on the a.s.sumption_ of a belief in Revelation. That 'with G.o.d nothing is impossible' is the very declaration of Scripture; yet on this, the whole belief in Miracles is built[74]." Now, it happens that 'the whole belief in Miracles' is built on nothing of the kind: but the point is immaterial. By no means immaterial, however, is the intimation that the Divine attribute of Omnipotence is a mere inference from the language of Revelation,--the very belief in which is also a mere "a.s.sumption." _If belief in Holy Scripture_ is to be treated as _an a.s.sumption_,--without at all complaining of the unreasonableness of one who so speaks,--we yet desire that he would say it very plainly; and let us know at least _with whom_ we have to do, and _what_ we are expected to prove. We do not complain, if any one calls upon us to shew that a belief in the Bible cannot be called an a.s.sumption; but it makes us very sad: and when the challenge comes from a Minister of the Church, we are unable to forbear the remark that there is something altogether immoral[75] in the entire proceeding. On the other hand, to find ourselves involved in an argument on questions of Divinity with one _who believes nothing_, is in a manner absurd; and provokes a feeling of resentment as well as of pity.... What need to add that life is not long enough for such processes of proof? "He that cometh unto G.o.d _must believe that He is_!" We cannot be for ever laying the foundation. The building must begin, at last, to grow. And when it _has_ grown up, and is compact as well as beautiful, it _cannot_ be necessary to pull it all down again once or twice in every century in order to ascertain whether the strong foundations be still there!

IV. The next performance is mainly directed against faith in the Church, as a society of Divine origin. "The Rev. HENRY BRISTOW WILSON, B.D., Vicar of Great Staughton, Hunts," claims that a National Church shall be regarded as a purely secular Inst.i.tution,--the spontaneous development of the State. "If all priests and ministers of religion could at one moment be swept from the face of the Earth, they would soon be reproduced[76]." The Church is concerned with Ethics, not with Divinity.

It should therefore be "free from dogmatic tests, and similar intellectual bondage:" (p. 168:) hampered by no traditional Doctrines; pledged to no Creeds: but, on the contrary, should be subject to periodical doctrinal re-adjustments. "Doctrinal limitations" (i.e. the Creeds) "are not essential to" the Church. "Upon larger knowledge of Christian history, upon a more thorough acquaintance with the mental const.i.tution of man, upon an understanding of the obstacles they present to a true Catholicity (!), they may be cast off." (p. 167.) "In order to the possibility of recruiting any national Ministry from the whole of the nation, ... no needless intellectual or speculative obstacles should be interposed." (p. 196. So at p. 198.)

To all this, the answer is very obvious. Viewed as an historical fact, the Church is _not_ of human origin. The Church _is_ a Divine Inst.i.tution. That a Priest of the Church, charged with a cure of souls, should desire her annihilation,--the reversal of the facts of her past History,--her reconstruction on an unheard-of basis, without even Creeds as terms of communion with her,--and so forth; all this may suggest some very painful doubts as _to the objector's honesty_ in continuing to employ the formularies of that Church, and in professing to teach her doctrines;--but it can hardly be supposed to have any effect whatever on the question at issue.

Foreseeing this, Mr. Wilson begins by a.s.serting,--(for to insinuate is not for so advanced a disciple of "the negative Theology,") (p.

151,)--"the fact of a very wide-spread alienation, both of educated and uneducated persons, from the Christianity which is ordinarily presented in our Churches and Chapels." (p. 150.) "A self-satisfied Sacerdotalism, confident in a supernaturally transmitted illumination," may amuse itself in trying to "keep peace within the walls of emptied Churches:"

(p. 150:) but the day for "traditional Christianity" (p. 149.) has gone by. We may no longer ignore "a great extent of dissatisfaction on the part of the Clergy at some portion, at least, of formularies of the Church of England,"--especially at the use of "one unhappy creed." (p.

150.) There has been "a spontaneous recoil" from some of the old doctrines: a distrust of the old arguments: and a misgiving concerning Scripture itself. "In the presence of difficulties of this kind, ... it is vain to seek to check open discussion." (p. 151.)

Why then does not this man proceed openly to discuss? is the obvious rejoinder. Instead of vaguely hinting that either the Reason or the Moral sense is shocked by what people hear "in our Churches and Chapels,"--why has not this writer, first, the honesty to withdraw from the Ministry of the Church of England; and next, the courage to indicate the particular doctrines which offend? To say that "the ordinances of public worship and religious instruction provided for the people of England" are not "really adapted to the wants of their nature as it is,"

(p. 150,) is a very vague and unworthy style of urging an objection. Why does not the reverend writer explain _wherein_ the Doctrine and Discipline of the English Church are not really adapted to the actual wants of Man's nature?

Let every unbeliever however be allowed to state his difficulties in his own way. Mr. Wilson's difficulties certainly take a very peculiar shape.

The increased _Geographical_ knowledge of the present generation has evidently disturbed his faith. "In our own boyhood, the World as known to the ancients was nearly all which was known to ourselves (!). We have recently become acquainted,--intimate,--with the teeming regions of the far East, and with empires, pagan or even atheistic, of which the origin runs far back beyond the historic records of Judaea or of the West, and which were more populous than all Christendom now is, for many ages before the Christian era." (p. 162.) Such a statement is soon made; but it ought to have been substantiated. I take the liberty of doubting its accuracy.

But granting even that the heathen world "for many ages before the Christian era" _was_ more populous than all Christendom now is:--what then? This fact "_suggests questions_ to those who on Sundays hear the reading and exposition of the Scriptures as they were expounded to our forefathers, and on Monday peruse the news of a World of which our forefathers little dreamed." (pp. 152-3.)--And pray, (we calmly inquire,) _Why_ are the Scriptures to be read or expounded after a novel fashion, even though our geographical knowledge _has_ made a considerable advance? To this, we are favoured with no answer. The "questions" suggested are, we presume, the same which are contained in the following sentence. "In what relation does the Gospel stand to these millions[77]? Is there any trace on the face of its records that it even contemplated their existence[78]? We are told, that to know and believe in JESUS CHRIST is in some sense necessary to Salvation. It has not been given to these. Are they,--will they be, hereafter,--the worse off for their ignorance?" (p. 153.) ... "As to the necessity of faith in a SAVIOUR to these peoples when they could never have had it, no one, upon reflection, can believe in any such thing. Doubtless they will be equitably dealt with." (p. 153.)

These last seven words, (which scarcely seem of a piece with the rest of the sentence,) we confess have always seemed a sufficient answer to the badly-expressed speculative difficulty which immediately precedes; a difficulty, be it observed, which does not depend _at all_ on the popular advancement of Geographical knowledge; for it was urged with the self-same force anciently, as now; and was met by Bp. Butler, almost in the self-same words[79], upwards of a hundred years ago. But Mr. Wilson to our surprise and sorrow proceeds:--"We cannot be content to wrap this question up and leave it for a mystery, as to what shall become of those myriads upon myriads of non-Christian races. First, if our traditions tell us, that they are involved in the curse and perdition of Adam, and may justly be punished hereafter individually for his transgression, not having been extricated from it by saving faith,--we are disposed to think that our traditions cannot herein fairly declare to us the words and inferences from Scripture; but if on examination it should turn out that they have,--we must say, that the authors of the Scriptural books have, in those matters, represented to us their own inadequate conceptions, and not the mind of the SPIRIT of G.o.d." (pp. 153-4.)

I forbear to dwell upon the grievous spectacle with which we are thus presented. Here is a Clergyman of the Church of England deliberately proposing the following dilemma:--Either the Prayer Book is incorrect in its most important doctrinal inferences from Holy Scripture; or else, the Authors of Holy Scripture itself are incorrect in their statements.

The morality of one who declares that he finds himself placed between the horns of this dilemma, and yet retains his office as a public teacher in the Church of England,--it is painful to contemplate. But this is only _ad hominem_. The Reverend writer's difficulty remains.

And it seems sufficient to reply:--It is not _we_ who "wrap up the question," but G.o.d. As a mystery we find it; and as a mystery, we not only "can," but _must_ be content to "leave it." Further, it is not "_our traditions_," but Holy Scripture itself which tells us that "by one man Sin entered into the World, and Death by Sin; and so Death pa.s.sed upon all men, for that all have sinned[80]:"--that "in Adam all died[81]:"--that "we were by nature the children of wrath, even as others[82]:" and the like. Scripture, on the other hand, as unequivocally a.s.sures us that G.o.d is good, or rather that He is very Goodness. We are convinced, (in Mr. Wilson's words,) "that all shall be equitably dealt with according to their opportunities." (p. 154.) Moreover, _he_ would be a rash Divine who should venture to adopt the opinion so strenuously disclaimed by Bp. Butler, "that none can have the benefit of the general Redemption, but such as have the advantage of being made acquainted with it in the present life[83]." ... How, in the meantime, speculative difficulties concerning the hereafter of the unevangelized Heathen are affected by the fact that our population now "peruse the news of a World of which our forefathers little dreamed,"

(pp. 152-3,)--it is hard to see. Equally unable am I also to understand how the discovery that a larger number of persons are the subjects of this speculative difficulty than used once to be supposed, can const.i.tute any reason why Scripture should not still be read and expounded on Sunday "as it used to be expounded to our forefathers."

We have been so particular, because whenever any of these writers condescend to be argumentative, _we_ are eager to bear them company. No wish at all have we, in the abstract, to stifle inquiry; no objection whatever have we to the principle of free discussion. And yet, as a clergyman, I cannot discuss such questions as these with a _Minister of the Church of England_, except under protest. I deny that these are in any sense open questions. To dispute concerning them,--e? ? ??s??

d?af???tt??,--one of the disputants must first, at least, resign his commission. It is simply dishonest in a man to hold a commission in the Church of England, under solemn vows, and yet to deny her doctrines. An Officer in the Army who should pursue a similar line of action, would be dismissed the Service,--or worse.--Under protest, then, we follow the Rev. H. B. Wilson, B.D.