History of Dogma Volume II Part 25

[Footnote 663: See my article "Heraklas" in the Real-Encyklopadie.]

[Footnote 664: We have the most complete materials in Zahn, "Forschungen" Vol. III. pp. 17-176. The best estimate of the great tripart.i.te work (Protrepticus, Paedagogus, Stromateis) is found in Overbeck, l.c. The t.i.tles of Clement's remaining works, which are lost to us or only preserved in fragments, show how comprehensive his scientific labours were.]

[Footnote 665: This applies quite as much to the old principles of Christian morality as to the traditional faith. With respect to the first we may refer to the treatise: "Quis dives salvetur", and to the 2nd and 3rd Books of the Paedagogus.]

[Footnote 666: Clement was also conscious of the novelty of his undertaking; see Overbeck, l.c., p. 464 f. The respect enjoyed by Clement as a master is shown by the letters of Alexander of Jerusalem.

See Euseb., H. E. VI. 11 and specially VI. 14. Here both Pantaenus and Clement are called "Father", but whilst the former receives the t.i.tle, [Greek: ho makarios hos alethos kai kurios ], the latter is called: [Greek: ho hieros Klemes, kurios mou genomenos kai ophelesas me].]

[Footnote 667: Strom. VI. 14, 109: [Greek: pleon estin tou pisteusai to gnonai], Pistis is [Greek: gnosis suntomos ton katepeigonton] (VII. 10.

57, see the whole chapter), Gnosis is [Greek: apodeixis ton dia pisteos pareilemmenon te pistei epoikodomoumene] (l.c.), [Greek: teleiosis anthropou] (l.c.), [Greek: pistis epistemonike] (II. II. 48).]

[Footnote 668: We have here more particularly to consider those paragraphs of the Stromateis where Clement describes the perfect Gnostic: the latter elevates himself by dispa.s.sionate love to G.o.d, is raised above everything earthly, has rid himself of ignorance, the root of all evil, and already lives a life like that of the angels. See Strom. VI. 9. 71, 72: [Greek: Oude gar endei ti auto pros exomoiosin to kalo kai agatho einai oude ara philei tina ten koinen tauten philian, all' agapa ton ktisten dia ton ktismaton. Out' oun epithumia kai orexei tini peripiptei oute endees esti kata ge ten psuchen ton allon tinos sunon ede di' agapes to erasto, o de okeiotai kata ten hairesin kai te ex askeseos hexei, touto prosechesteron sunengizon, makarios on dia ten ton agathon periousian, oste heneka ge touton exomoiousthai biazetai to didaskalo eis apatheian.] Strom. VII. 69-83: VI. 14, 113: [Greek: houtos dunamin labousa kuriaken he psuche meleta einai Theos, kakon men ouden allo plen agnoias einai nomizousa.] The whole 7th Book should be read.]

[Footnote 669: Philo is quoted by Clement several times and still more frequently made use of without acknowledgment. See the copious citations in Siegfried, Philo von Alexandrien, pp. 343-351. In addition to this Clement made use of many Greek philosophers or quoted them without acknowledgment, e.g., Musonius.]

[Footnote 670: Like Philo and Justin, Clement also no doubt at times a.s.serts that the Greek philosophers pilfered from the Old Testament; but see Strom. I. 5. 28 sq.: [Greek: panton men aitios ton kalon ho Theos, alla ton men kata proegoumenon hos tes te diathekes tes palaias kai tes neas, ton de kat' epakolouthema hos tes philosophias. tacha de kai proegoumenos tois h.e.l.lesin edothe tote prin e ton kyrion kalesai kai tous h.e.l.lenas. epaidagogei gar kai aute to h.e.l.lenikon hos ho nomos tous Hebraious eis Christon.]]

[Footnote 671: See Bratke's instructive treatise cited above.]

[Footnote 672: The fact that Clement appeals in support of the Gnosis to an esoteric tradition (Strom. VI. 7. 61: VI. 8. 68: VII. 10. 55) proves how much this writer, belonging as he did to a sceptical age, underestimated the efficacy of all human thought in determining the ultimate truth of things. The existence of sacred writings containing all truth was not even enough for him; the content of these writings had also to be guaranteed by divine communication. But no doubt the ultimate cause of this, as of all similar cases of scepticism, was the dim perception that ethics and religion do not at all come within the sphere of the intellectual, and that the intellect can produce nothing of religious value. As, however, in consequence of philosophical tradition, neither Philo, nor the Gnostics, nor Clement, nor the Neoplatonists were able to shake themselves free from the intellectual _scheme_, those things which--as they instinctively felt, but did not recognise--could really not be ascertained by knowledge at all received from them the name of _suprarational_ and were traced to divine revelation. We may say that the extinction or pernicious extravagancies to which Greek philosophy was subjected in Neoplatonism, and the absurdities into which the Christian dogmatic was led, arose from the fact that the tradition of placing the ethical and religious feelings and the development of character within the sphere of knowledge, as had been the case for nearly a thousand years, could not be got rid of, though the incongruity was no doubt felt. Contempt for empiricism, scepticism, the extravagancies of religious metaphysics which finally become mythology, have their origin here. Knowledge still continues to be viewed as the highest possession; it is, however, no longer knowledge, but character and feeling; and it must be nourished by the fancy in order to be able to a.s.sert itself as knowledge.]

[Footnote 673: Clement was not a Neoplatonic mystic in the strict sense of the word. When he describes the highest ethical ideal, ecstasy is wanting; and the freshness with which he describes Quietism shows that he himself was no Quietist. See on this point Bigg's third lecture, l.c., particularly p. 98 f. "... The silent prayer of the Quietist is in fact ecstasy, of which there is not a trace in Clement. For Clement shrank from his own conclusions. Though the father of all the Mystics he is no Mystic himself. He did not enter the 'enchanted garden,' which he opened for others. If he talks of 'flaying the sacrifice,' of leaving sense behind, of Epopteia, this is but the parlance of his school. The instrument to which he looks for growth in knowledge is not trance, but disciplined reason. Hence Gnosis, when once obtained, is indefectible, not like the rapture which Plotinus enjoyed but four times during his acquaintance with Porphyry, which in the experience of Theresa never lasted more than half an hour. The Gnostic is no Visionary, no Theurgist, no Antinomian."]

[Footnote 674: What a bold and joyous thinker Clement was is shown by the almost audacious remark in Strom. IV. 22. 136: [Greek: ei goun tis kath' hypothesin protheie to gnostiko poteron helesthai bouloito ten gnosin tou Theou e ten soterian ten aionian, ein de tauta kechorismena pantos mallon en tautotete onta, oude kath' otioun distasas heloit an ten gnosin tou Theou.]]

[Footnote 675: Strom. VII. 1. 1. In several pa.s.sages of his main work Clement refers to those churchmen who viewed the practical and speculative concentration of Church tradition as dangerous and questioned the use of philosophy at all. See Strom. VI. 10. 80: [Greek: polloi kathaper hoi paides ta mormolukeia, houtos dediasi ten h.e.l.leniken philosophian, phoboumenoi me apagage autous]. VI. 11. 93.]

[Footnote 676: Eusebius, H. E. VI. 14. 8, tells us that Origen was a disciple of Clement.]

[Footnote 677: Clement's authority in the Church continued much longer than that of Origen. See Zahn, "Forschungen" III. p. 140 f. The heterodox opinions advanced by Clement in the Hypotyposes are for the most part only known to us in an exaggerated form from the report of Photius.]

[Footnote 678: In ecclesiastical antiquity all systematising was merely relative and limited, because the complex of sacred writings enjoyed a different authority from that which it possessed in the following period. Here the reference of a theologoumenon to a pa.s.sage of Scripture was of itself sufficient, and the manifold and incongruous doctrines were felt as a unity in so far as they could all be verified from Holy Scriptures. Thus the fact that the Holy Scriptures were regarded as a series of divine oracles guaranteed, as it were, a transcendental unity of the doctrines, and, in certain circ.u.mstances, relieved the framer of the system of a great part of his task. Hitherto little justice has been done to this view of the history of dogma, though it is the only solution of a series of otherwise insoluble problems. We cannot for example understand the theology of Augustine, and necessarily create for ourselves the most difficult problems by our own fault, if we make no use of that theory. In Origen's dogmatic and that of subsequent Church Fathers--so far as we can speak of a dogmatic in their case--the unity lies partly in the canon of Holy Scripture and partly in the ultimate aim; but these two principles interfere with each other. As far as the Stromateis of Clement is concerned, Overbeek (l.c.) has furnished the explanation of its striking plan. Moreover, how would it have been conceivable that the riches of Holy Scripture, as presented to the philosophers who allegorised the books, could have been mastered, problems and all, at the first attempt.]

[Footnote 679: See the treatises of Huetius (1668) reprinted by Lommatzsch. Thomasius, Origenes 1837. Redepenning, Origenes, 2 Vols.

1841-46. Denis, de la philosophie d'Origene, Paris 1884. Lang, Die Leiblichkeit der Vernunftwesen bei Origenes, Leipzig, 1892. Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.). Westcott, Origenes, in the Dictionary of Christian Biography Vol. IV. Moller in Herzog's Real-Encyklopadie, 2nd ed., Vol. XI., pp. 92-109. The special literature is to be found there as well as in Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte I., p. 151, and Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 5th ed, p. 62 f.]

[Footnote 680: See his letter in Eusebius, H. E. VI. 19. 11 ff.]

[Footnote 681: In the polemic against Celsus it seems to us in not a few pa.s.sages as if the feeling for truth had forsaken him. If we consider, however, that in Origen's idea the premises of his speculation were una.s.sailable, and if we further consider into what straits he was driven by Celsus, we will conclude that no proof has been advanced of Origen's having sinned against the current rules of truth. These, however, did not include the commandment to use in disputation only such arguments as could be employed in a positive doctrinal presentation. Basilius (Ep.

210 ad prim. Neocaes) was quite ready to excuse an utterance of Gregory Thaumaturgus, that sounded suspiciously like Sabellianism, by saying that the latter was not speaking [Greek: dogmatikos], but [Greek: agonistikos]. Jerome also (ad Pammach. ep 48, c. 13), after defending the right of writing [Greek: gymnastikos], expressly said that all Greek philosophers "have used many words to conceal their thoughts, threaten in one place, and deal the blow in another." In the same way, according to him, Origen, Methodius, Eusebius, and Apollinaris had acted in the dispute with Celsus and Porphyry. "Because they are sometimes compelled to say, not what they themselves think, but what is necessary for their purpose; they do this only in the struggle with the heathen."]

[Footnote 682: See, above all, the systematic main work "[Greek: peri archon]".]

[Footnote 683: Many writings of Origen are pervaded by arguments, evincing equal discretion and patience, against the Christians who contest the right of science in the Church. In the work against Celsus, however, he was not unfrequently obliged to abandon the simple Christians. C. Celsus III. 78: V. 14-24 are particularly instructive.]

[Footnote 684: In this point Origen is already narrower than Clement.

Free judgments, such as were pa.s.sed by Clement on Greek philosophy, were not, so far as I know, repeated by Origen. (See especially Clement, Strom. I. 5. 28-32: 13. 57, 58 etc.); yet he also acknowledges revelations of G.o.d in Greek philosophy (see, _e.g._, c. Cels. VI. 3), and the Christian doctrine is to him the completion of Greek philosophy (see the remains of Origen's lost Stromateis and Hom. XIV. in Genes. -- 3; other pa.s.sages in Redepenning II., p. 324 ff.).]

[Footnote 685: We must here content ourselves with merely pointing out that the method of scientific Scriptural exegesis also led to historico-critical investigations, that accordingly Origen and his disciples were also critics of the tradition, and that scientific theology, in addition to the task of remodelling Christianity, thus began at its very origin the solution of another problem, namely, the critical restoration of Christianity from the Scriptures and tradition and the removal of its excrescences: for these efforts, strictly speaking, do not come up for consideration in the history of dogma.]

[Footnote 686: The theory that justified a twofold morality in the Church is now completely legitimised, but the higher form no longer appears as Encrat.i.te and eschatological, but as Encrat.i.te and philosophical. See, for example, Clement, Strom. III. 12. 82: VI. 13.

106 etc. Gnosis is the principle of perfection. See Strom. IV. 7. 54: [Greek: prokeitai de tois eis teleiosin speudousin he gnosis he logike hes themelios he agia trias pistis, agape, elpis].]

[Footnote 687: See the preface to the work [Greek: peri archon].]

[Footnote 688: From the conclusion of Hippolytus' Philosophoumena it is also evident how the Socratic [Greek: Gnothi seauton] was in that age based on a philosophy of religion and was regarded as a watchword in wide circles. See Clem. Paedag. III. 11. 1.]

[Footnote 689: See Gregory Thaumaturgus' panegyric on Origen, one of the most instructive writings of the 3rd century, especially cc. 11-18.]

[Footnote 690: Yet all excesses are repudiated. See Clem. Strom. IV. 22.

138: [Greek: Ouk egkrates outos eti, all' en hexei gegonen apatheias schema theion ependusasthai anamenon]. Similar remarks are found in Origen.]

[Footnote 691: In many pa.s.sages of Clement the satisfaction in knowledge appears in a still more p.r.o.nounced form than in Origen. The boldest expression of it is Strom. IV. 22. 136. This pa.s.sage is quoted above on p. 328.]

[Footnote 692: See the beautiful prayer of the Christian Gnostic in Strom. IV. 23. 148.]

[Footnote 693: See Strom. IV. 26. 172: Origen's commentaries are continually interrupted by similar outbursts of feeling.]

[Footnote 694: On deification as the ultimate aim see Clem., Strom. IV.

23. 149-155: VII. 10. 56, 13. 82, 16. 95: [Greek: houtos ho to kurio peithomenos kai te dotheise di' autou katakolouthesas propheteia teleos ekteleitai kat' eikona tou didaskalou en sarki peripolon Theos]. But note what a distinction Clement makes between [Greek: ho Theos] and the perfect man in VII. 15. 88 (in contradistinction to the Stoic identification); Origen does this also.]

[Footnote 695: Gregory (l.c., c. 13) relates that all the works of the poets and philosophers were read in Origen's school, and that every part of these works that would stand the test was admitted. Only the works of atheists were excluded, "because these overpa.s.s the limits of human thought." However, Origen did not judge philosophers in such an unprejudiced manner as Clement, or, to speak more correctly, he no longer valued them so highly. See Bigg, l.c., p. 133, Denis l.c.

Introd.]

[Footnote 696: See, for example, c. Cels. V. 43: VII. 47, 59 sq. He compared Plato and other wise men to those doctors who give their attention only to cultured patients.]

[Footnote 697: See, for example, c. Cels. VI. 2.]

[Footnote 698: C. Cels. V. 43.]

[Footnote 699: One of Origen's main ideas, which we everywhere meet with, particularly in the work against Celsus (see, for example, VI. 2) is the thought that Christ has come to improve all men according to their several capacities, and to lead some to the highest knowledge.

This conception appears to fall short of the Christian ideal and perhaps really does so; but as soon as we measure it not by the Gospel but by the aims of Greek philosophy, we see very clearly the progress that has been attained through this same Gospel. What Origen has in his eye is mankind, and he is anxious for the amendment not merely of a few, but of all. The actual state of things in the Church no longer allowed him to repeat the exclamations of the Apologists that all Christians were philosophers and that all were filled with the same wisdom and virtue.

These exclamations were nave and inappropriate even for that time. But he could already estimate the relative progress made by mankind within the Church as compared with those outside her pale, saw no gulf between the growing and the perfect, and traced the whole advance to Christ. He expressly declared, c. Cels. III. 78, that the Christianity which is fitted for the comprehension of the mult.i.tude is not the best doctrine in an absolute, but only in a relative, sense; that the "common man", as he expresses himself, must be reformed by the prospect of rewards and punishments; and that the truth can only be communicated to him in veiled forms and images, as to a child. The very fact, however, that the Logos in Jesus Christ has condescended so to act is to Origen a proof of the universality of Christianity. Moreover, many of the wonderful phenomena reported in the Holy Scriptures belong in his opinion to the veiled forms and images. He is very far from doing violence to his reason here; he rather appeals to mysterious powers of the soul, to powers of divination, visionary states etc. His standpoint in this case is wholly that of Celsus (see particularly the instructive disquisition in I. 48), in so far as he is convinced that many unusual things take place between heaven and earth, and that individual names, symbols etc.

possess a mysterious power (see, for example, c. Cels. V. 45). The views as to the relationship between knowledge and holy initiation or _sacramentum_ are those of the philosophers of the age. He thinks, however, that each individual case requires to be examined, that there can be no miracles not in accordance with nature, but that on the contrary everything must fit into a higher order. As the letter of the precepts in both Testaments frequently contains things contrary to reason (see [Greek: peri archon] IV. 2. 8-27) in order to lead men to the spiritual interpretation, and as many pa.s.sages contain no literal sense at all (l.c. -- 12), so also, in the historical narratives, we frequently discover a mythical element from which consequently nothing but the idea is to be evolved (l.c. -- 16 sq.: "Non solum de his, quae usque ad adventum Christi scripta sunt, haec Spiritus sanctus procuravit, sed ... eadem similiter etiam in evangelistis et apostolis fecit. Nam ne illas quidem narrationes, quas per eos inspiravit, absque huiuscemodi, quam supra exposuimus, sapientiae suae arte contexuit. Unde etiam in ipsis non parva promiscuit, quibus historialis narrandi ordo interpolates, vel intercisus per impossibilitatem sui reflecteret atque revocaret intentionem legentis ad intelligentiae interioris examen.") In all such cases Origen makes uniform use of the two points of view, that G.o.d wished to present something even to the simple and to incite the more advanced to spiritual investigations. In some pa.s.sages, however, the former point of view fails, because the content of the text is offensive; in that case it is only the second that applies. Origen therefore was very far from finding the literal content of Scripture edifying in every instance, indeed, in the highest sense, the letter is not edifying at all. He rather adopted, to its widest extent, the critical method employed by the Gnostics particularly when dealing with the Old Testament; but the distinction he made between the different senses of Scripture and between the various legitimate human needs enabled him to preserve both the unity of G.o.d and the harmony of revelation. Herein, both in this case and everywhere else, lies the superiority of his theology. Read especially c. Celsum I. 9-12. After appealing to the twofold religion among the Egyptians, Persians, Syrians, and Indians--the mythical religion of the mult.i.tude and the mystery-religion of the initiated--he lays down exactly the same distinction within Christianity, and thus repels the reproach of Celsus that the Christians were obliged to accept everything without examination. With regard to the mythical form of Christianity he merely claims that it is the most suitable among religions of this type. Since, as a matter of fact, the great majority of men have neither time nor talent for philosophy, [Greek: poia an alle beltion methodos pros to tois pollois boethesai heuretheie, tes apo tou Iesou tois ethnesi paradotheises] (l.c., 9). This thought is quite in the spirit of antiquity, and neither Celsus nor Porphyry could have any fault to find with these arguments in point of form: all positive religions have a mythical element; the true religion therefore lies behind the religions.

But the novelty which neither Celsus nor Porphyry could recognise lies in the acknowledgment that the one religion, even in its mythical form, is unique and divine, and in the demand that all men, so far as they cannot attain the highest knowledge, must subject themselves to this mythical religion and no other. In this claim Origen rejected the ancient contrast between the mult.i.tude and the initiated just as he repudiated polytheism; and in this, if I see rightly, his historical greatness consists. He everywhere recognised gradations tending in the same direction and rejected polytheism.]

[Footnote 700: Bigg (l.c., p. 154) has rightly remarked: "Origen in point of method differs most from Clement, who not unfrequently leaves us in doubt as to the precise Scriptural basis of his ideas."]

[Footnote 701: Note, for example, -- 8, where it is said that Origen adopted the allegorical method from the Stoic philosophers and applied it to the Jewish writings. On Origen's hermeneutic principles in their relation to those of Philo see Siegfried, l.c., pp. 351-62. Origen has developed them fully and clearly in the 4th Book of [Greek: peri archon].]

[Footnote 702: See Overbeck, Theologische Literatur-Zeitung, 1878, Col.

535.]

[Footnote 703: A full presentation of Origen's theology would require many hundreds of pages, because he introduced everything worth knowing into the sphere of theology, and a.s.sociated with the Holy Scriptures, verse by verse, philosophical maxims, ethical reflexions, and results of physical science, which would require to be drawn on the widest canvas, because the standpoint selected by Origen allowed the most extensive view and the most varied judgments. The case was similar with Clement before him, and also with Tertullian. This is a necessary result of "Scripture theology" when one takes it up in earnest. Tertullian a.s.sumes, for example, that there must be a Christian doctrine of dreams.

Why? Because we read of dreams in the Holy Scriptures.]

[Footnote 704: In c. Cels. III. 61 it is said (Lommatzsch XVIII., p.

337): [Greek: epemphthe oun Theos logos katho men iatros tois hamartolois, katho de didaskalos theion musterion tois ede katharois kai meketi hamartanousin.] See also what follows. In Comment. in John I. 20 sq. the crucified Christ, as the Christ of faith, is distinguished from the Christ who takes up his abode in us, as the Christ of the perfect.