Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 44

[Footnote 973: It is interesting that the opinion of many Continental writers on international law was immediately expressed in favour of the American and against the British contention. This was especially true of German opinion. (Lutz, _Notes_.)]

[Footnote 974: Lyons Papers. To Lyons, Dec. 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 975: I am aware that Seward's use of the "Privateering Bill,"

now to be recounted is largely a new interpretation of the play of diplomacy in regard to the question of Southern ship-building in England. Its significance became evident only when British correspondence was available; but that correspondence and a careful comparison of dates permits, and, as I think, requires a revised statement of the incident of the Laird Rams.]

[Footnote 976: Bullock dreamed also of ascending rivers and laying Northern cities under contribution. According to a statement made in 1898 by Captain Page, a.s.signed to command the rams, no instructions as to their use had been given him by the Confederate Government, but his plans were solely to break the blockade with no thought of attacking Northern cities. (Rhodes, IV. 385, _note_.)]

[Footnote 977: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1862, p. 134.]

[Footnote 978: Wallbridge, _Addresses and Resolutions_. Pamphlet. New York, n.d. He began his agitation in 1856, and now received much popular applause. His pamphlet quotes in support many newspapers from June, 1862, to September, 1863. Wallbridge apparently thought himself better qualified than Welles to be Secretary of the Navy. Welles regarded his agitation as instigated by Seward to get Welles out of the Cabinet.

Welles professes that the "Privateering Bill" slipped through Congress unknown to him and "surrept.i.tiously" (Diary, I, 245-50), a statement difficult to accept in view of the Senate debates upon it.]

[Footnote 979: Cong. Globe, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, Pt. IV, pp.

3271, 3325 and 3336.]

[Footnote 980: _Ibid._, 3rd Session, Pt. I, pp. 220, 393, and Part II, pp. 960, 1028, 1489.]

[Footnote 981: Brooks Adams, "The Seizure of the Laird Rams." (Ma.s.s.

Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, Vol. XLV, pp. 265-6.)]

[Footnote 982: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 116, Feb. 19, 1863.]

[Footnote 983: F.O., Am., Vol. 878, No. 180. Lyons to Russell.]

[Footnote 984: _Ibid._, Vol. 879, No. 227. Lyons to Russell, March 10, 1863.]

[Footnote 985: _Ibid._, No. 235. Lyons to Russell, March 13, 1863.

Privately Lyons also emphasized American anger. (Russell Papers. To Russell, March 24, 1863.)]

[Footnote 986: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 141.

Seward to Adams, March 9, 1863.]

[Footnote 987: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 147. Russell to Lyons, March 24, 1863.]

[Footnote 988: _Ibid._, Vol. 869, No. 155. Russell to Lyons, March 27, 1863.]

[Footnote 989: Welles, _Diary_, I, pp. 245-50.]

[Footnote 990: Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 634, Slidell to Benjamin, March 4, 1863.]

[Footnote 991: For example of American contemporary belief and later "historical tradition," see Balch, _The Alabama Arbitration_, pp. 24-38.

Also for a curious story that a large part of the price paid for Alaska was in reality a repayment of expenses incurred by Russia in sending her fleet to America, see _Letters of Franklin K. Lane_, p. 260. The facts as stated above are given by F.A. Golder, _The Russian Fleet and the Civil War_ (_Am. Hist. Rev_., July, 1915, pp. 801 _seq_.). The plan was to have the fleet attack enemy commerce. The idea of aid to the North was "born on American soil," and Russian officers naturally did nothing to contradict its spread. In one case, however, a Russian commander was ready to help the North. Rear-Admiral Papov with six vessels in the harbour of San Francisco was appealed to by excited citizens on rumours of the approach of the _Alabama_ and gave orders to protect the city. He acted without instructions and was later reproved for the order by his superiors at home.]

[Footnote 992: _The Liberator_, March 6, 1863.]

[Footnote 993: American opinion knew little of this change. An interesting, if somewhat irrational and irregular plan to thwart Southern ship-building operations, had been taken up by the United States Navy Department. This was to buy the Rams outright by the offer of such a price as, it was thought, would be so tempting to the Lairds as to make refusal unlikely. Two men, Forbes and Aspinwall, were sent to England with funds and much embarra.s.sed Adams to whom they discreetly refrained from stating details, but yet permitted him to guess their object. The plan of buying ran wholly counter to Adams' diplomatic protests on England's duty in international law and the agents themselves soon saw the folly of it. Fox, a.s.sistant Secretary of the Navy, wrote to Dupont, March 26, 1863: "The Confederate ironclads in England, I think, will be taken care of." (Correspondence, I, 196.) Thurlow Weed wrote to Bigelow, April 16, of the purpose of the visit of Forbes and Aspinwall. (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, 632.) Forbes reported as early as April 18 virtually against going on with the plan.

"We must keep cool here, and prepare the way; we have put new fire into Mr. Dudley by furnishing _fuel_, and he is hard at it getting evidence.... My opinion _to-day_ is that we can and shall stop by legal process and by the British Government the sailing of ironclads and other war-ships." (Forbes MS. To Fox.) That this was wholly a Navy Department plan and was disliked by State Department representatives is shown by Dudley's complaints (Forbes MS.). The whole incident has been adequately discussed by C.F. Adams, though without reference to the preceding citations, in his _Studies Military and Diplomatic_, Ch. IX. "An Historical Residuum," in effect a refutation of an article by Chittenden written in 1890, in which bad memory and misunderstanding played sad havoc with historical truth.]

[Footnote 994: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 157. To Seward, March 24, 1863.]

[Footnote 995: _Ibid._, p. 160. To Seward, March 27, 1863.]

[Footnote 996: State Department, Eng., Vol. 82, No. 356. Adams to Seward, March 27, 1863.]

[Footnote 997: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, March 27, 1863.]

[Footnote 998: Rhodes, IV, p. 369, _notes_, April 4, 1863. Bright was made very anxious as to Government intentions by this debate.]

[Footnote 999: This topic will be treated at length in Chapter XVIII. It is here cited merely in relation to its effect on the Government at the moment.]

[Footnote 1000: Trevelyan, _John Bright_, 307-8.]

[Footnote 1001: Hansard, 3rd Series, CLXX, 33-71, for entire debate.]

[Footnote 1002: _U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence_, 1863, Pt. I, p. 164.

Adams to Seward, March 28, 1863.]

[Footnote 1003: Rhodes, IV, 369-72.]

[Footnote 1004: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 1005: Bernard, p. 353. The case was heard in June, and the seizure held unwarranted. Appealed by the Government this decision was upheld by the Court of Exchequer in November. It was again appealed, and the Government defeated in the House of Lords in April, 1864.]

[Footnote 1006: _Manchester Examiner and Times_, April 7, 1863. Goldwin Smith was one of the princ.i.p.al speakers. Letters were read from Bright, Forster, R.A. Taylor, and others.]

[Footnote 1007: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 183.]

[Footnote 1008: "Historicus," in articles in the _Times_, was at this very moment, from December, 1862, on, discussing international law problems, and in one such article specifically defended the belligerent right to conduct a cruising squadron blockade. See _Historicus on International Law_, pp. 99-118. He stated the established principle to be that search and seizure could be used "not only" for "vessels actually intercepted in the attempt to enter the blockaded port, but those also which shall be elsewhere met with and shall be found to have been destined to such port, with knowledge of the fact and notice of the blockade." (_Ibid._, p. 108.)]

[Footnote 1009: F.O., Am., Vol. 869, No. 158. Russell to Lyons, March 28, 1863.]

[Footnote 1010: F.O., Am., Vol. 881, No. 309. To Russell.]

[Footnote 1011: _Ibid._, No. 310. To Russell, April 13, 1863.]

[Footnote 1012: Russell Papers. To Russell, April 13, 1863.]

[Footnote 1013: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 324. Copy enclosed in Lyons to Russell, April 17, 1863.]

[Footnote 1014: Russell Papers. To Russell.]

[Footnote 1015: F.O., Am., Vol. 882, No. 341. Lyons to Russell, April 24, 1863.]

[Footnote 1016: Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863. Lyons wrote: "The stories in the newspapers about an ultimatum having been sent to England are untrue. But it is true that it had been determined (or very nearly determined) to issue letters of marque, if the answers to the despatches sent were not satisfactory. It is very easy to see that if U.S.

privateers were allowed to capture British merchant vessels on charges of breach of blockade or carrying contraband of war, the vexations would have soon become intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel must have ensued."]

[Footnote 1017: _Parliamentary Papers_, 1863, _Commons_, LXXII.