Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 35

In general, as the weeks pa.s.sed, the satisfaction grew both with the public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new policy towards America. This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America.

Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the "Conservatives"

were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it would only do harm until there was a change of Government in Washington--an event still remote. Lyons himself believed mediation useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837].

Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart's reports, his cool judgment of conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in comparison with his subordinate's excited and eager pro-Southern arguments. Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838].

In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British feeling[839].

The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war. It expressed no grat.i.tude to England, devoting its energy rather to animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally responsible. Since there had been no European offer made there was no cause for governmental action. Seward had given Adams specific instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently. He wrote to Bigelow: "We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession intrigues in Europe. They have had their day. We propose to forget them[840]." This was a wise and statesmanlike att.i.tude and was shared by Adams in London. Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that answer as fulfilment of Russell's declaration to Adams, October 23, that Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].

So far removed was Seward's att.i.tude toward England from that ascribed to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons, that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening the retirement of the Secretary of State. This was a quarrel brought on by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and directed at Seward's conduct of foreign affairs. It was quieted by the tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his resignation, secured from Chase a similar offer of resignation, refused both and in the result read to Chase that lesson of Presidential control which Seward had learned in May, 1861. Lyons wrote of this controversy "I shall be sorry if it ends in the removal of Mr. Seward. We are much more likely to have a man less disposed to keep the peace than a man more disposed to do so. I should hardly have said this two years ago[842]." After the event of Seward's retention of office Russell wrote: "I see Seward stays in. I am very glad of it[843]." This is a remarkable reversal of former opinion. A better understanding of Seward had come, somewhat slowly, to British diplomats, but since his action in the _Trent_ affair former suspicion had steadily waned; his "high tone"

being regarded as for home consumption, until now there was both belief in Seward's basic friendliness and respect for his abilities.

Thus Russell's ambitious mediation projects having finally dwindled to a polite refusal of the French offer to join in a mere suggestion of armistice left no open sores in the British relations with America. The projects were unknown; the refusal seemed final to Seward and was indeed destined to prove so. But of this there was no clear conception in the British Cabinet. Hardly anyone yet believed that reconquest of the South was even a remote possibility and this foretold that the day must some time come when European recognition would have to be given the Confederacy. It is this unanimity of opinion on the ultimate result of the war in America that should always be kept in mind in judging the att.i.tude of British Government and people in the fall of 1862. Their sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in evidence during the Cabinet crisis. All argument was based upon the expediency and wisdom of the present proposal. Could European nations _now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result in separation was inevitable? It was the hope that such action promised good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North. It was, in the end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time which determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on. Moreover both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].

For America Russell's mediation plan const.i.tutes the most dangerous crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union. Had that plan been adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that Lewis' forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued between England and the North. But also whatever its results in other respects the independence of the South would have been established.

Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of life--and by British action. In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed that Lincoln's emanc.i.p.ation proclamation was but an incitement to servile war and it played no part in the final decision. Soon that proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against any future efforts to secure British intervention. Never again was there serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil War[845].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 734: Motley, _Correspondence_, II, 71. To his mother, March 16, 1862.]

[Footnote 735: _Ibid._, p. 81. Aug. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 736: _The Index_ first appeared on May 1, 1862. Nominally a purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the Confederacy.]

[Footnote 737: _The Index_, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.]

[Footnote 738: e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck. In his speech Roebuck a.s.serted: "A divided America will be a benefit to England." He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not come to recognize the South. "The North will never be our friends.

(Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends. They are Englishmen; they are not the sc.u.m and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester: 'Don't say that; don't say that.') (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I am saying. They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends."]

[Footnote 739: All American histories treat this incident at much length. The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F.

Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light. See his _Life of C.F. Adams_, Ch. XV; _Studies, Military and Diplomatic_, pp.

400-412; _Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity_, pp. 97-106; _A Crisis in Downing Street_, Ma.s.s. Hist. Soc. _Proceedings_, May, 1914, pp.

372-424. It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck's motion of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.]

[Footnote 740: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 388.]

[Footnote 741: _U.S. Messages and Doc.u.ments_, 1862-3. Pt. I, pp.

165-168.]

[Footnote 742: Adams, _A Crisis in Downing Street_, p. 389. First printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.]

[Footnote 743: _Ibid._, p. 390.]

[Footnote 744: See _ante_, p. 32.]

[Footnote 745: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, July 21, 1862.]

[Footnote 746: Lyons Papers. Lyons to Stuart, July 25, 1862.]

[Footnote 747: Russell Papers. Stuart to Russell, Aug. 8, 1862.

Stoeckl's own report hardly agrees with this. He wrote that the newspapers were full of rumours of European mediation but, on consultation with Seward, advised that any offer at present would only make matters worse. It would be best to wait and see what the next spring would bring forth (Russian Archives, Stoeckl to F.O., Aug. 9-21, 1862. No. 1566). Three weeks later Stoeckl was more emphatic; an offer of mediation would accomplish nothing unless backed up by force to open the Southern ports; this had always been Lyons' opinion also; before leaving for England, Lyons had told him "we ought not to venture on mediation unless we are ready to go to war." Mercier, however, was eager for action and believed that if France came forward, supported by the other Powers, especially Russia, the United States would be compelled to yield. To this Stoeckl did not agree. He believed Lyons was right (_Ibid._, Sept. 16-28, 1862. No. 1776).]

[Footnote 748: _Ibid._, Aug. 22, 1862. Sumner was Stuart's informant.]

[Footnote 749: _Ibid._, Sept. 26, 1862. When issued on September 22, Stuart found no "humanity" in it. "It is cold, vindictive and entirely political."]

[Footnote 750: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Aug. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 751: The ignorance of other Cabinet members is shown by a letter from Argyll to Gladstone, September 2, 1862, stating as if an accepted conclusion, that there should be no interference and that the war should be allowed to reach its "natural issue" (Gladstone Papers).]

[Footnote 752: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell. Sept. 18, 1862, fixes the date of Russell's letter.]

[Footnote 753: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 754: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 360.]

[Footnote 755: _Ibid._, p. 361. Sept. 17, 1862.]

[Footnote 756: Russell Papers. Cowley to Russell, Sept. 18, 1862. This is the first reference by Cowley in over three months to mediation--evidence that Russell's instructions took him by surprise.]

[Footnote 757: Gladstone Papers.]

[Footnote 758: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Sept. 22, 1862.]

[Footnote 759: Russell Papers.]

[Footnote 760: Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362. Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 761: Lyons Papers.]

[Footnote 762: Lyons Papers. Stuart to Lyons, Sept. 23, 1862.]

[Footnote 763: Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 76.]

[Footnote 764: See _ante_, p. 40.]

[Footnote 765: Adams, _A Crisis in Dooming Street_, p. 393, giving the exact text paraphrased by Morley.]

[Footnote 766: Fitzmaurice, _Granville_, I, pp. 442-44, gives the entire letter. Sept. 27, 1862.]

[Footnote 767: _Ibid._, p. 442. Oct. 1, 1862. Fitzmaurice attributes much influence to Granville in the final decision and presumes that the Queen, also, was opposed to the plan. There is no evidence to show that she otherwise expressed herself than as in the acquiescent suggestion to Russell. As for Granville, his opposition, standing alone, would have counted for little.]

[Footnote 768: Russell Papers. A brief extract from this letter is printed in Walpole, _Russell_, II, p. 362.]

[Footnote 769: Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 770: Brunow reported Russell's plan October 1, as, summarized, (1) an invitation to France and Russia to join with England in offering good services to the United States looking towards peace. (2) Much importance attached to the adhesion of Russia. (3) Excellent chance of success. (4) Nevertheless a possible refusal by the United States, in which case, (5) recognition by Great Britain of the South if it seemed likely that this could be done without giving the United States a just ground of quarrel. Brunow commented that this would be "eventually" the action of Great Britain, but that meanwhile circ.u.mstances might delay it. Especially he was impressed that the Cabinet felt the political necessity of "doing something" before Parliament rea.s.sembled (Russian Archives, Brunow to F.O., London, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.). No. 1698.) Gortchakoff promptly transmitted this to Stoeckl, together with a letter from Brunow, dated Bristol, Oct. 1, 1862 (N.S.), in which Brunow expressed the opinion that one object of the British Government was to introduce at Washington a topic which would serve to accentuate the differences that were understood to exist in Lincoln's Cabinet. (This seems very far-fetched.) Gortchakoff's comment in sending all this to Stoeckl was that Russia had no intention of changing her policy of extreme friendship to the United States (_Ibid._, F.O. to Stoeckl, Oct.

3, 1862 (O.S.).)]