Grace, Actual and Habitual Part 3

Article 1. The Capacity Of Mere Nature Without Grace

The capacity of nature in its own domain may be considered with regard either to the intellect or to the will.

*Thesis I: Man is capable by the natural power of his intellect to arrive at a knowledge of G.o.d from a consideration of the physical universe.*

This proposition embodies an article of faith defined by the Vatican Council: "If any one shall say that the one true G.o.d, our Creator and Lord, cannot be certainly known by the natural light of human reason through created things, let him be anathema."(116)

For a formal demonstration of this truth we must refer the reader to our treatise on _G.o.d: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes_, pp. 17 sqq.

The argument there given may be supplemented by the following considerations:

1. The Vatican Council vindicates the native power of the human intellect when it says: "The Catholic Church, with one consent, has ever held and does hold, that there is a twofold order of knowledge, distinct both in principle and in object: in principle, because our knowledge in the one is by natural reason, and in the other by divine faith; in object, because, besides those things to which natural reason can attain, there are proposed to our belief mysteries hidden in G.o.d, which, unless divinely revealed, cannot be known."(117) This teaching, which the Church had repeatedly emphasized on previous occasions against the scepticism of Nicholas de Ultricuria,(118) the rationalistic philosophy of Pomponazzi, the "log-stick-and-stone" theory(119) of Martin Luther, the exaggerations of the Jansenists, and the vagaries of the Traditionalists,(120) is based on Revelation as well as on sound reason. Holy Scripture clearly teaches that we can gain a certain knowledge of G.o.d from a consideration of the created universe.(121) Reason tells us that a creature endowed with intelligence must be capable of acquiring natural knowledge, and that supernatural faith is based on certain _praeambula_, which are nothing else than philosophical and historical truths.(122) "The existence of G.o.d and other like truths," says St. Thomas, "are not articles of faith, but preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection something that can be perfected."(123) Luther denounced reason as the most dangerous thing on earth, because "all its discussions and conclusions are as certainly false and erroneous as there is a G.o.d in Heaven."(124) The Church teaches, in accordance with sound philosophy and experience, that the original powers of human nature, especially free-will, though greatly weakened, have not been destroyed by original sin.(125) The Scholastics, it is true, reckoned ignorance among the four "wounds of nature" inflicted by original sin.(126) But this teaching must be regarded in the light in which the Church condemned Quesnel's proposition that "All natural knowledge of G.o.d, even that found in pagan philosophers, can come from nowhere else than G.o.d, and without grace produces nothing but presumption, vanity, and opposition against G.o.d Himself, instead of adoration, grat.i.tude, and love."(127) The Traditionalist contention that the intrinsic weakness of the human intellect can be cured only by a primitive revelation handed down through the instrumentality of speech and instruction, or by a special interior illumination, involves the false a.s.sumption that there can be a cognitive faculty incapable of knowledge,-which would ultimately lead to a denial of the essential distinction between nature and the supernatural, because it represents exterior revelation or interior grace as something positively due to fallen nature.(128) Following the lead of St. Thomas,(129) Catholic apologists, while maintaining the necessity of a supernatural revelation even with regard to the truths of natural religion and ethics, base their argument not on the alleged physical incapacity of reason to ascertain these truths, but on the moral impossibility (_i.e._ insuperable difficulty) of finding them unaided. "It is to be ascribed to this divine Revelation," says the Vatican Council, "that such truths among things divine as are not of themselves beyond human reason, can, even in the present state of mankind, be known by every one with facility and firm a.s.surance, and without admixture of error."(130) In conformity with the teaching of Revelation and Tradition, the Church has always sharply distinguished between p?st?? and ???s??,-faith and knowledge, revelation and philosophy,-a.s.signing to reason the double role of an indispensable forerunner and a docile handmaid of faith. Far from antagonizing reason, as charged by her enemies, the Church has on the contrary always valiantly championed its rights against Scepticism, Positivism, Criticism, Traditionalism, Rationalism, Pantheism, and Modernism.(131)

2. As regards those purely natural truths that const.i.tute the domain of science and art, Catholic divines are practically unanimous(132) in holding that, though man possesses the physical ability of knowing every single one of these truths, even the most highly gifted cannot master them all. Cardinal Mezzofanti had acquired a knowledge of many languages,(133) and undoubtedly was capable of learning many more; yet without a special grace he could not have learned all the languages spoken on earth, though their number is by no means infinite. The science of mathematics, which embraces but a limited field of knowledge, comprises an indefinite number of propositions and problems which even the greatest genius can not master. Add to these impediments the shortness of human life, the limitations of the intellect, the mult.i.tude and intricacy of scientific methods, the inaccessibility of many objects which are in themselves knowable, (_e.g._ the interior of the earth, the stellar universe)-and you have a host of limitations which make it physically impossible for the mind of man to encompa.s.s the realm of natural truths.(134)

*Thesis II: Fallen man, whether pagan or sinner, is able to perform some naturally good works without the aid of grace.*

This thesis may be technically qualified as _propositio certa_.

Proof. A man performing moral acts may be either in a state of unbelief, or of mortal sin, or of sanctifying grace. The question here at issue is chiefly whether all the works of pagans, that is all acts done without grace of any kind, are morally bad, or whether any purely natural works may be good despite the absence of grace. Baius and Jansenius affirmed this; nay more, they a.s.serted that no man can perform good works unless he is in the state of grace and inspired by a perfect love of G.o.d (_caritas_). If this were true, all the works of pagans and of such Christians as have lost the faith, would be so many sins. But it is _not_ true. The genuine teaching of the Church may be gathered from her official condemnation of the twenty-fifth, the twenty-sixth, and the thirty-seventh propositions of Baius. These propositions run as follows: "Without the aid of G.o.d's grace free-will hath power only to sin;"(135) "To admit that there is such a thing as a natural good, _i.e._ one which originates solely in the powers of nature, is to share the error of Pelagius;"(136) "All the actions of unbelievers are sins and the virtues of philosophers vices."(137) To these we may add the proposition condemned by Pope Alexander VIII, that "The unbeliever necessarily sins in whatever he does."(138)

1. Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, St. Augustine included, admit the possibility of performing naturally good, though unmeritorious, works (_opera steriliter bona_) in the state of unbelief; and their teaching is in perfect conformity with right reason.

a) Our Divine Lord Himself says:(139) "If you love them that love you, what reward(140) shall you have? Do not even the publicans this? And if you salute(141) your brethren only, what do you more? Do not also the heathens(142) this?" The meaning plainly is: To salute one's neighbor is an act of charity, a naturally good deed, common even among the heathens, and one which, not being done from a supernatural motive, deserves no supernatural reward. But this does not by any means imply that to salute one's neighbor is sinful.

St. Paul(143) says: "For when the gentiles,(144) who have not the law,(145) do by nature(146) those things that are of the law; these having not the law are a law to themselves: who shew the work of the law written in their hearts." By "gentiles" the Apostle evidently means genuine heathens, not converts from paganism to Christianity, and hence the meaning of the pa.s.sage is that the heathens who know the natural law embodied in the Decalogue only as a postulate of reason, are by nature(147) able to "do those things that are of the law,"(148) _i.e._ observe at least some of its precepts. That St. Paul did not think the gentiles capable of observing the whole law without the aid of grace appears from his denunciation of their folly, a little further up in the same Epistle: "Because that, when they knew G.o.d, they have not glorified him as G.o.d, or given thanks; but became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was darkened, etc.,"(149) and also from the hypothetic form of Rom. II, 14 in the original Greek text: "?ta? ??? ???? ... t? t?? ????

p???s??-_Si quando gentes, ... quae legis sunt, faciunt._"(150)

In Rom. XIV, 23: "For all that is not faith is sin,"(151) a text often quoted against our thesis, "faith" does not mean the theological habit of faith, but "conscience,"(152) as the context clearly shows.(153)

b) The teaching of the Fathers is in substantial harmony with Sacred Scripture.

a) Thus St. Jerome, speaking of the reward which Yahweh gave to Nabuchodonosor for his services against Tyre,(154) says: "The fact that Nabuchodonosor was rewarded for a good work shows that even the gentiles in the judgment of G.o.d are not pa.s.sed over without a reward when they have performed a good deed."(155) In his commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians the same holy Doctor observes: "Many who are without the faith and have not the Gospel of Christ, yet perform prudent and holy actions, _e.g._ by obeying their parents, succoring the needy, not oppressing their neighbors, not taking away the possessions of others."(156)

) The teaching of St. Augustine offers some difficulties. There can be no doubt that this Father freely admitted that pagans and infidels can perform naturally good works without faith and grace. Thus he says there is no man so wicked that some good cannot be found in him.(157) He extols the moderation of Polemo(158) and the purity of Alypius, who were both pagans.(159) He admires the civic virtues of the ancient Romans,(160) etc.

Holding such views, how could Augustine write: "Neither doth free-will avail for anything except sin, if the way of truth is hidden."(161) And what did his disciple Prosper mean when he said: "The whole life of unbelievers is a sin, and nothing is good without the highest good. For wherever there is no recognition of the supreme and immutable truth, there can be no genuine virtue, even if the moral standard be of the highest."(162)

To understand these and similar pa.s.sages rightly and to explain at the same time how it was possible for Baius and Jansenius to bolster their heretical systems with quotations from the writings of St. Augustine and his disciples, it is necessary to observe that the quondam rhetorician and Platonic idealist of Hippo delights in applying to the genus the designation which belongs to its highest species, and _vice versa_.(163) Thus, in speaking of liberty, he often means the perfect liberty enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise;(164) in using the term "children of G.o.d"

he designates those who persevere in righteousness;(165) and in employing the phrase "a good work" he means one supernaturally meritorious. Or, _vice versa_, he designates the slightest good impulse of the will as "_caritas_," as it were by antic.i.p.ation, and brands every unmeritorious work (_opus informe s. sterile_) as false virtue (_falsa virtus_), nay sin (_peccatum_). To interpret St. Augustine correctly, therefore, allowance must be made for his peculiar idealism and a careful distinction drawn between the real and the metaphorical sense of the terms which he employs.

Baius neglected this precaution and furthermore paid no attention to the controversial att.i.tude of the holy Doctor. Augustine's peculiar task was not to maintain the possibility of naturally good works without faith and grace, but to defend against Pelagius and Julian the impossibility of performing supernaturally good and meritorious works without the aid of grace. It is this essential difference in their respective points of view that explains how St. Augustine and Baius were able to employ identical or similar terms to express radically different ideas.(166)

c) It can easily be demonstrated on theological grounds that fallen man is able, of his own initiative, _i.e._ without the aid of grace, to perform morally good works, and that Baius erred in a.s.serting that this is impossible without theological faith.

a) With regard to the first-mentioned point it will be well, for the sake of clearness, to adopt Palmieri's distinction between physical and moral capacity.(167) Man sins whenever he transgresses the law or yields to temptation. This would be impossible if he were physically unable to keep the whole law and resist temptation. Hence he must be physically able to do that which he is obliged to do under pain of sin, though in this or that individual instance the difficulties may be insuperable without the aid of grace. To put it somewhat differently: Baius and Jansenius hold that fallen man can perform no morally good works because of physical or moral impotence on the part of the will. This a.s.sumption is false. Man is physically able to perform good works because they are enjoined by the moral law of nature under pain of sin; he is morally able because, in spite of numerous evil tendencies, not a few gentiles and unbelievers have led upright lives and thereby proved that man can perform good works without the aid of grace.(168) This is also the teaching of St.

Thomas.(169)

) It is an expressly defined dogma that the process of justification starts with theological faith (_fides_), preceded by the so-called grace of vocation, which prepares and effects conversion. To say, as Baius did, that all good works performed in a state of unbelief are so many sins, is tantamount to a.s.serting that the preliminary acts leading up to faith, and which the unbeliever performs by the aid of prevenient grace, are sinful; in other words, that G.o.d requires the unbeliever to prepare himself for justification by committing sin. This is as absurd as it is heretical.(170)

The whole argument of this section applies _a fortiori_ to the theory that no act can be morally good unless prompted by both theological charity and theological faith.(171)

2. We must now define the limitations of fallen nature unaided by grace.

Though the graces dispensed by Providence even for naturally good deeds are in the present economy _de facto_ nearly all supernatural, nothing prevents us from conceiving a different economy, consisting of purely natural helps, such as would have been necessary in the state of pure nature.(172)

As regards the limitations of man's moral power in the natural order, we may say, in a general way, that the will is able to keep the easier precepts of the moral law of nature without the a.s.sistance of grace (either supernatural or natural). However, as it is impossible in many instances to determine just where the easier precepts end and the more difficult ones begin, a broad field is left open for theological speculation.

a) Theologians are practically unanimous in holding that man cannot observe the natural law in its entirety for any considerable length of time without the aid of grace.

Suarez is so sure of this that he does not hesitate to denounce the contrary teaching,-which is (perhaps unjustly) ascribed to Durandus, Scotus, and Gabriel Biel-as "rash and verging on error."(173) In matter of fact the Church has formally defined that, because of concupiscence, no one, not even the justified man, much less the sinner, is able, without divine a.s.sistance (grace), to keep for any considerable length of time the whole Decalogue, which embodies the essentials of the moral law.

"Nevertheless," says the Council of Trent, "let those who think themselves to stand take heed lest they fall, and with fear and trembling work out their salvation, ... for ... they ought to fear for the combat which yet remains with the flesh, with the world, with the devil, wherein they cannot be victorious unless they be with G.o.d's grace obedient to the Apostle, who says: 'We are debtors, etc.' "(174)

St. Paul, who lived, so to speak, in an atmosphere of grace, yet found reason to exclaim: "I am delighted with the law of G.o.d, according to the inward man, but I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin, that is in my members,"(175) and: "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of G.o.d, by Jesus Christ our Lord."(176) Surely it would be vain to expect the proud ideal of the Stoics or Pelagius' presumptuous claim of impeccability ever to be realized on earth except by a special privilege of grace, such as that bestowed upon the Blessed Virgin Mary.(177)

The Fathers follow St. Paul in describing the power of concupiscence, even after justification.(178)

b) A pertinent question, closely allied to the proposition just treated, is this: Can the human will, without the aid of grace, overcome all the grievous temptations to mortal sin by which it is besieged?

It is the common teaching of theologians that, without the aid of grace, man in the fallen state succ.u.mbs with moral (not physical) necessity to grievous temptations against the moral law, _i.e._ to mortal sin. This conclusion flows from the impossibility, which we have demonstrated above, of observing the whole law of nature for life or for any considerable length of time without the help of grace. If man were able to resist all violent temptations, he would be able to keep the whole law.

The theological teaching which we are here expounding may be formulated in two different ways: (1) No man can overcome all grievous temptations against the moral law without the aid of grace; (2) there is no man living who is not now and then a.s.sailed by temptations to which he would inevitably succ.u.mb did not G.o.d lend him His a.s.sistance.

In its first and rather indefinite form the proposition is attacked by Ripalda,(179) Molina,(180) and many later Scholastics. These writers argue as follows: It is impossible to deduce from Revelation or experience a definite rule by which man could determine the conditions on which the grievousness of a temptation depends. To say that a temptation is grievous when it cannot be resisted without the aid of grace, would be begging the question. Besides, the possibility always remains that there be men who, though in theory unable to withstand all grievous temptations without the aid of grace, _de facto_ never meet with such temptations, but only with the lighter kind which can be overcome without supernatural help.

The second and more specific formulation of our proposition is supported by Sacred Scripture, which explicitly declares that all men are subject to temptations which they could not resist if G.o.d did not uphold them.(181)

If the just are obliged to watch and pray constantly, lest they fall,(182) this must be true in an even higher degree of sinners and unbelievers. St.

Augustine writes against the Pelagians: "Faithful men say in their prayer: 'Lead us not into temptation.' But if they have the capacity [of avoiding evil], why do they pray [for it]? Or, what is the evil which they pray to be delivered from, but, above all else, the body of this death?... the carnal l.u.s.ts, whence a man is liberated only by the grace of the Saviour.... He may be permitted to pray that he may be healed. Why does he presume so strongly on the capability of his nature? It is wounded, hurt, hara.s.sed, destroyed; what it stands in need of is a true confession [of its weakness], not a false defense [of its capacity]."(183)

c) Another question, on which Catholic divines disagree, is this: Can fallen man, unaided by grace, elicit an act of perfect natural charity (_amor Dei naturalis perfectus_)?

Scotus answers this question affirmatively,(184) and his opinion is shared by Cajetan,(185) Banez,(186) Dominicus Soto,(187) and Molina.(188) Other equally eminent theologians, notably Suarez(189) and Bellarmine,(190) take the negative side.

In order to obtain a clear understanding of the question at issue we shall have to attend to several distinctions.

First and above all we must not lose sight of the important distinction between the _natural_ and the _supernatural_ love of G.o.d. Supernatural charity, in all its stages, necessarily supposes supernatural aid. The question therefore can refer only to the _amor Dei naturalis_.(191) That this natural charity is no mere figment appears from the ecclesiastical condemnation of two propositions of Baius.(192)

Another, even more important distinction is that between _perfect_ and _imperfect_ charity. Imperfect charity is the love of G.o.d as our highest good (_amor Dei ut summum bonum n.o.bis_); perfect charity is the love of G.o.d for His own sake above all things (_amor Dei propter se et super omnia_). The holy Fathers and a number of councils(193) declare that it is impossible to love G.o.d perfectly without the aid of grace. The context and such stereotyped explanatory phrases as "_sicut oportet_" or "_sicut expedit ad salutem_,"(194) show that these Patristic and conciliary utterances apply to the _supernatural_ love of G.o.d. Hence the question narrows itself down to this: Can fallen man without the aid of grace love G.o.d for His own sake and above all things by a purely natural love? In answering this question Pesch,(195) Tepe,(196) and other theologians distinguish between _affective_ and _effective_ love. They hold that whereas the _amor affectivus_ in all its stages is possible without the aid of grace, not so the _amor effectivus_, since that would involve the observance of the whole natural law. This compromise theory can be demonstrated as highly probable from Scripture and Tradition. St. Paul says(197) that the gentiles knew G.o.d and should have glorified Him. This evidently supposes that it was possible for them to glorify G.o.d, and consequently to love Him affectively, as easily and with the same means by which they knew Him. Else how could the Apostle say of those gentiles who, "when they knew G.o.d, glorified him not as G.o.d," that they "changed the truth of G.o.d into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather than the Creator"?(198) This interpretation of Rom. I, 21 sqq. is explicitly confirmed by St. Ambrose when he says: "For they were able to apprehend this by the law of nature, inasmuch as the fabric of the cosmos testifies that G.o.d, its author, is alone to be loved, as Moses hath set it down in his writings; but they were made impious by not glorifying G.o.d, and unrighteousness became evident in them when, knowing, they changed the truth into a lie and refused to confess the one G.o.d."(199)

3. It follows, by way of corollary, that Vasquez's opinion,(200) that there can be no good work without supernatural aid in the shape of a _cogitatio congrua_, is untenable, as is also the a.s.sertion of Ripalda(201) that in the present economy purely natural good actions are so invariably connected with the prevenient grace of Christ that they practically never exist as such.

a) Vasquez, whose position in the matter is opposed by most other theologians, contends(202) that no man can perform a good work or resist any temptation against the natural law (Decalogue) without the help of supernatural grace derived from the merits of Christ. To avoid the heretical extreme of Baianism, however, he makes a twofold limitation. He a.s.sumes with the Scotists that there is such a thing as a morally indifferent act of the will,(203) and defines the grace which he holds to be necessary for the performance of every morally good deed, as _cogitatio congrua_. This "congruous thought," he says, is in itself, _i.e._ ontologically, natural, and can be regarded as supernatural only _quoad modum et finem_. The subtle argument by which Vasquez tries to establish this thesis is based princ.i.p.ally on St. Augustine and may be summarized as follows: Whenever the Fathers and councils insist on the necessity of grace for the performance of good works, they mean _all_ good works, natural as well as supernatural. The only alternative they know is virtue or vice, good or evil. Consequently the grace of Christ, in some form or other, is a necessary requisite of all morally good deeds.

As we have already intimated, we regard this opinion of the learned Spanish divine as erroneous.(204) Three solid reasons militate against it.

The first is that, to guard against Baianism, Vasquez is compelled to a.s.sume the existence of morally indifferent acts of the will, which is untenable, as "St. Augustine and St. Thomas, and theologians generally teach that there is no such thing in the concrete as a morally indifferent act of the free will, and consequently, if the will is able, without grace, to perform acts that are not evil, it is also able to perform good acts."(205) Second, Vasquez's theory counterfeits the notion of Christian grace. "Good thoughts" come so natural to man, and are so closely bound up with the grace of creation, that even Pelagius found no difficulty in admitting this sort of "grace."(206) Surely fallen nature is not so utterly corrupt that a good child is unable to honor and love his parents without the aid of "grace" (in the sense of _cogitatio congrua ex meritis Christi_). The third reason which constrains us to reject Vasquez's theory, is that it leaves no room for natural morality (_naturaliter honestum_) to fill the void between those acts that are naturally bad (_moraliter inhonesta_, _i.e._ _peccata_) and such as are supernaturally good (_supernaturaliter bona_, _i.e._ _salutaria_). The existence of such naturally good acts would seem to be a highly probable inference from the condemnation, by Pius VI, of a certain proposition taught by the pseudo-Council of Pistoia.(207)

b) Martinez de Ripalda (+1648) tried to improve Vasquez's theory by restoring the Christian concept of grace and adding that Providence invariably precedes all naturally good works, including those performed by heathens and sinners, with the ent.i.tatively supernatural grace of illumination and confirmation.(208) In this hypothesis the necessity of grace is not theological but purely historic.(209)

Despite the wealth of arguments by which Ripalda attempted to prove his theory,(210) it has not been generally accepted. While some, _e.g._ Platel(211) and Pesch,(212) regard it with a degree of sympathy, others, notably De Lugo(213) and Tepe,(214) are strongly opposed to it. Palmieri thinks it may be accepted in a restricted sense, _i.e._ when limited to the faithful.(215)

Ripalda's hypothesis of the universality of grace is truly sublime and would have to be accepted if G.o.d's salvific will could be demonstrated by revelation or some historic law to suffer no exceptions. But Ripalda has not been able to prove this from Revelation.(216) Then, too, his theory entails two extremely objectionable conclusions: (1) a denial, not indeed of the possibility (Quesnel), but of the existence of purely natural good works, and (2) the possibility of justification without theological faith.