Germany, The Next Republic? Part 11

So it is with the German nation. The country is on the verge of a nervous breakdown. Men and women, business men and generals, long ago lost their patience. They are under-nourished. They are depressed, distressed, suffering and anxious for peace. It is as true of the Hamburg-American Line directors as it is true of the officers at the front.

There have been more cases of nervous breakdowns among the people during the last year than at any time in Germany's history. There have been so many suicides that the newspapers are forbidden to publish them. There have been so many losses on the battlefields that every family has been affected not once, but two, three and four times.

Dance halls have been closed. Cafes and hotels must stop serving meals by 11 o'clock. Theatres are presenting the most sullen plays. Rumours spread like prairie fires. One day Hindenburg is dead. Two days later he is alive again.

But the Kaiser has studied this war psychology. He and his ministers know that one thing keeps the German people fighting--their hope of ultimate victory; their belief that they have won already. The Kaiser knows, too, that if the public mind is stimulated from day to day by new victories, by reports of many prisoners, of new territory gained, of enemy ships torpedoed, or by promises of reforms after the war, the public will continue fighting.

So the Kaiser gambles from day to day with his people's nerves. For two years he has done this, and for two years he has been supported by a 12,000,000-man-power army and a larger army of workers and women at home. The Kaiser believes he can gamble for a long time yet with his people.

Just as it is impossible for a physician to say how long his patient can be stimulated without breaking down, so is it impossible for an observer in Germany to say how long it will be before the break-up comes in Germany.

Many times during the war Germany has been on the verge of a collapse.

President Wilson's ultimatum after the sinking of the Suss.e.x in the English Channel brought about one crisis. Von Falkenhayn's defeat at Verdun caused another. The Somme battle brought on a third. General Brusiloff's offensive against the Austrians upset conditions throughout the Central Powers. Rumania's declaration of war made another crisis.

But Germany pa.s.sed all of these successfully.

The ability of the German Government to convince the people that Wilson was unneutral and wanted war caused them to accept Germany's note in the _Suss.e.x_ case. The defeat at Verdun was explained as a tactical success. The Somme battles, with their terrible losses, failed to bring a break-up because the Allies stopped attacking at the critical moment.

Von Hindenburg as chief of the General Staff of Central Europe remedied the mistakes of the Austrians during Brusiloff's attacks by reorganising the Dual Monarchy's army. The crisis which Rumania's entrance on the Allies' side brought in Germany and Hungary was forgotten after von Mackensen took Bucharest.

In each of these instances it will be noticed that the crisis was successfully pa.s.sed by "stimulation." The German mind was made to believe what the Kaiser willed.

But what about the future? Is there a bottomless well of stimulation in Germany?

Before these questions can be answered others must be asked: Why don't the German people think for themselves? Will they ever think for themselves?

An incident which occurred in Berlin last December ill.u.s.trates the fact that the people are beginning to think. After the Allies replied to President Wilson's peace note the Kaiser issued an appeal to the German people. One morning it was printed on the first pages of all newspapers in boldface type. When I arrived at my office the janitor handed me the morning papers and, pointing to the Kaiser's letter, said:

"I see the Kaiser has written US another letter. You know he never wrote to US in peace time."

There are evidences, too, that others are beginning to think. The Russian revolution is going to cause many Socialists to discuss the future of Germany. They have discussed it before, but always behind closed doors and with lowered voices. I attended one night a secret meeting of three Socialist leaders of the Reichstag, an editor of a Berlin paper and several business men. What they said of the Kaiser that night would, if it were published, send every man to the military firing squad. But these men didn't dare speak that way in public at that time. Perhaps the Russian revolt will give them more courage.

But the Government is not asleep to these changes. The Kaiser believes he can continue juggling public opinion, but he knows that from now on it will be more difficult. But he will not stop. He will always hold forth the vision of victory as the reward for German faithfulness.

Today, for instance, in the United States we hear very little about the German submarine warfare. It is the policy of the Allies not to publish all losses immediately; first because the enemy must not be given any important information if possible, and, secondly, because, losses have a bad effect upon any people.

But the German people do not read what we do. Their newspapers are printing daily the ship losses of the Entente. Submarines are returning and making reports. These reports are published and in a way to give the people the impression that the submarine war is a success.

We get the opposite impression here, but we are not in a position better to judge than the Germans, because we don't hear everything.

The important question, however, is: What are the German people being told about submarine warfare?

Judging from past events, the Kaiser and his Navy are undoubtedly magnifying every sinking for the purpose of stimulating the people into believing that the victory they seek is getting nearer. The Government knows that the public favours ruthless torpedoing of all ships bound for the enemy, so the Government is safe in concluding that the public can be stimulated for some months more by reports of submarine victory.

Military operations in the West are probably not arousing the discussion in Berlin that the plans against Russia are. The Government will see to it that the press points regularly to the possibilities of a separate peace with Russia, or to the possibility of a Hindenburg advance against England and France.

The people have childlike faith in von Hindenburg. If Paul von Hindenburg says a retreat is a victory the people will take his judgment. But all German leaders know that the time is coming when they will have to show the German people a victory or take the consequences themselves.

Hence it would not be surprising if, after present military operations are concluded, either by an offensive against Russia or by an attack on the Western line, the Chancellor again made peace proposals. The Socialists will force the Chancellor to do it sooner or later. They are the real power behind the throne, although they have not enough s.p.u.n.k to try to oust the Kaiser and tell the people to do their own thinking.

A big Allied military victory would, of course, change everything.

Defeat of the German army would mean defeat of von Hindenburg, the German G.o.d. It would put an end to the Kaiser's juggling with his people's nerves. But few people in Germany expect an Entente victory this year, and they believe that if the Allies don't win this year they never will win.

Germany is stronger militarily now than she has been and Germany will be able for many months to keep many Entente armies occupied. Before the year is pa.s.sed the Entente may need American troops as badly as France needed English a.s.sistance last year. General von Falkenhayn, former chief of the German General Staff, told me about the same thing last December, in Rumania.

"In war," he remarked, "nothing is certain except that everything is uncertain, but one thing I know is certain: We will win the war."

_America's entrance, however, will have the decisive effect_. The Allies, especially the French, appreciate this. As a high French official remarked one day when Amba.s.sador Gerard's party was in Paris:

"There have been two great moments in the war for France. The first was when England declared war to support us. The second was the breaking of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany."

The Germans don't believe this. As General von Stein, Prussian Minister of War, said, Germany doesn't fear the United States. He said that, of course, for its effect upon the German people. The people must be made to believe this or they will not be able to hate America in true German fashion.

America's partic.i.p.ation, however, will upset Hindenburg's war plans.

American intervention can put a stop to the Kaiser's juggling with his people's minds by helping the Allies defeat Germany. Only a big military defeat will shake the confidence of the Germans in the Kaiser, Hindenburg and their organised might. The people are beginning to think now, but they will do a great deal more thinking if they are beaten.

So the answer to the question: "How long can Germany hold out?" is really answered by saying that Germany can keep on until she is decisively defeated militarily.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PEACE DRIVE OF DECEMBER 12TH

I

Disturbed by internal political dissension and tormented by lack of food the German ship of state was sailing troubled waters by November, 1916. Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg's speech to the Reichstag on September 28th satisfied no one. After he had spoken the only thing people could recall were his words:

"The mighty tasks which await us in all the domains of public, social, economic, and political life need all the strength of the people for their fulfilment. It is a necessity of state which will triumph over all obstacles to utilise to the utmost those forces which have been forged in the fire and which clamour for work and creation. _A free path for all who are capable--that must be our watch-word_. If we carry it out freely, without prejudice, then our empire goes to a healthy future."

The press interpreted this as meaning that the Chancellor might some day change his mind about the advisability of a ruthless submarine warfare. Early in November when it appeared that the Allies would not succeed in breaking through at the Somme peace forces were again mobilised. But when various neutral countries sounded Germany as to possible terms they discovered that Germany was the self-appointed "victor" and would consider only a peace which recognised Germany as the dominant power in Europe. The confidence of the army in the victory was so great that the following article was printed in all the German newspapers:

"FAITH IN VICTORY"

"Great Headquarters sends us the following:

"Since the beginning of the war, when enemies arose on all sides and millions of troops proceeded from all directions--since then more than two long years have brought no more eventful days than those of the present. The unity of the front--our enemies have prepared it for a long time past with great care and proclaimed it in loud tones. Again and again our unexpected attacks have disturbed this boldly thought out plan in its development, destroying its force, but now at last something has been accomplished that realises at least part of the intentions of our enemies and all their strength is being concentrated for a simultaneous attack. The victory which was withheld from them on all the theatres of war is to be accomplished by an elaborate attack against the defensive walls of our best blood. The ma.s.ses of iron supplied them by half the world are poured on our gallant troops day and night with the object of weakening their will and then the ma.s.s attacks of white, yellow, brown and black come on.

"The world never experienced anything so monstrous and never have armies kept up a resistance such as ours.

"Our enemies combine the hunger and lie campaign with that of arms, both aimed at the head and heart of our home. The hunger campaign they will lose as the troublesome work of just an equal administration and distribution of the necessities of life is almost complete. And a promising harvest has ripened on our broad fields. From the first day of the war, we alone of all the belligerent nations published the army reports of all of our enemies in full, as our confidence in the constancy of those at home is unlimited. But our enemies have taken advantage of this confidence and several times a day they send out war reports to the world; the English since the beginning of their offensive send a despatch every two hours. Each of these publications is two or three times as long as our daily report and all written in a style which has nothing in common with military brevity and simplicity.

This is no longer the language of the soldier. They are mere fantastic hymns of victory and their parade of names and of conquered villages and woods and stormed positions, and the number of captured guns, and tens of thousands of prisoners is a mockery of the truth.

"Why is all this done? Is it only intended to restore the wearying confidence of their own armies and people and the tottering faith of their allies? Is it only intended to blind the eagerly observing eye of the neutrals? No, this flood of telegrams is intended to pa.s.s through the channels which we ourselves have opened to our enemy, and to dash against the heart of the German people, undermining and washing away our steadfastness.

"But this despicable game will not succeed. In the same manner as our gallant troops in the field defy superior numbers, so the German people at home will defy the enemies' legions of lies, and remember that the German army reports cannot tell them and the world at large everything at present, but they never publish a word the truth of which could not be minutely sifted. With proud confidence in the concise, but absolutely reliable publications of our own army administration, Germany will accept these legions of enemy reports at their own value, as wicked concoctions, attempting to rob them of calm and confidence which the soldier must feel supporting him, if he joyfully risks his all for the protection of those at home. Thus our enemies' legions of lies will break against the wall of our iron faith. Our warriors defy the iron and fire--those at home will also defy the floods of printed paper and remain unruffled. The nation and army alike are one in their will and faith in victory."

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE POPE TO PRESIDENT WILSON----"HOW CAN MY PEACE ANGEL FLY, MR. PRESIDENT, WHEN YOU ALWAYS PUT Sh.e.l.lS IN HER POCKETS?"]

This is a typical example of the kind of inspired stories which are printed in the German newspapers from time to time to keep up the confidence of the people. This was particularly needed last fall because the people were depressed and melancholy over the losses at the Somme, and because there was so much criticism and dissatisfaction over the Chancellor's att.i.tude towards the submarine warfare and peace.

People, too, were suffering agonies in their homes because of the inferior quality of the food,--the lack of necessary fats and sugar which normal people need for regular nourishment. The Socialists, who are in closer touch with the people than any others, increased their demands for peace while the National Liberals and the Conservatives, who wanted a war of exhaustion against Great Britain, increased their agitation for the submarine warfare. The Chancellor was between two tormentors. Either he had to attempt to make peace to satisfy the Socialists and the people, or he had to give in to the demands for submarine warfare as outlined by the National Liberals. One day Scheidemann went to the Chancellor's palace, after he had visited all the big centres of Germany, and said to von Bethmann-Hollweg: