Generals of the British Army Part 1

Generals of the British Army.

by Francis Dodd.

INTRODUCTION.

This small portrait gallery of British generals represents, in fair epitome, the drama of British history. Each of the officers who figure here has behind him a varied story of fighting in strange places, under all sorts of conditions, as well as in the tense atmosphere of modern scientific war; each of them has first had to struggle against heavy odds before arriving at the conditions which at present obtain on the Western front. Infantrymen, cavalrymen, artillerists, they have come through a fiery trial to command large bodies of troops in the most terrible struggle of our history.

The part of their story that is concerned in this war is memorable, and may we not say it, memorably fine? For these are not the leaders of that vast host whose shadow has hung over Europe for so many years, whose numbers and efficiency have been the evil dream of the international situation; but of that small contingent that, for an ideal, took the field light-heartedly, against the vast German horde. Even the Belgian army was more numerous than the Expeditionary Force that struck its first blow before Mons; and these leaders have memories of the days when it was the equal in nothing, save undaunted courage and tactical ability, of the army in whose path it stood.

They have seen every type of fighting. The war of movements with its swift changes and long hazards was their first experience, an experience that none of those who took part in it will ever forget. For some terrible days the British army stood between the Allies and disaster; but the experience it bought was handed on to the enemy in a series of engagements, the lesson of which he softens by proclaiming the first seven divisions to have been unique. The admission is sufficiently revealing, for the handful of troops ought to have been crushed at Mons; or, escaping thence, should have been penned into Maubeuge; or, evading that trap, should have met annihilation at Le Cateau. But they fought coolly, were manoeuvred skilfully, saving themselves by sheer fighting ability from the tide which threatened to overwhelm them.

Only consummate leaders could have taken an army to the Marne. The army ought to have been wiped out long before. The Germans had fully resolved upon it, they had the men and guns to encompa.s.s it, their long-perfected plans depended upon it. The British, wearied by the pressure of a hurried retreat, fought almost without cover against a great concentration of guns. But not only did they fight with superb spirit; they fought also with that instinctive appreciation of tactics which comes from perfectly a.s.similated experience. When the German blow had over reached itself, the British Generals were able to advance, threaten the left wing of Von Kluck's army when his right was dealing with General Manoury's outflanking movement on the Ourcq, outmanoeuvre and outfight the enemy on the Aisne and secure tactical advantages of the first importance. In the victory of the Marne not the least wonderful of many arresting features was this effective recoil of the army which the Germans had announced to be "dispersed" ten days before.

After the battle of the Aisne, the army, moved _en bloc_ from the heart of France, where the war of positions was beginning to develop, appeared on the extreme left flank of the Allied forces, manoeuvring towards the East in the effort to outflank the Germans. Here, out of a struggle of cross-purposes, there emerged, little by little, the outlines of a t.i.tanic battle for the possession of the Channel coast. The Belgian army had fallen back from Antwerp upon the sea, covered by an army corps pushed from the coast in a precarious venture towards Bruges and Ghent; and the handful of British divisions stood between the picked troops of the Germans and the goal they had failed to value before it was lost.

Many of these generals tasted the bitter savour of those days when it seemed impossible that flesh and blood could withstand the unceasing onslaught of ever fresh troops--of the Bavarians, the Guard, and picked Prussian regiments--and of the pounding of an overwhelming weight of metal. German critics have said that this army was one of non-commissioned officers, and certainly not even the racial stubbornness could have saved the situation if it had not been wedded to high ability, if undaunted courage had not been equalled by the resolute skill of the command. The first battle of Ypres was the first in which the Germans and the British fought _a outrance_, and no one to-day is ignorant of the result. The Germans broke off the engagement and thereby acknowledged their defeat. The British had not turned the line. That was impossible with their resources. But they had held the Germans off from their goal and inflicted upon them one of the bloodiest defeats in history.

Henceforward the war presented a different problem to the command. The last battle of the war of movements on the Western front had been fought for the time being and the war of positions held sway. In the months that followed, Britain had to build up an army commensurate with the task she had a.s.sumed. For every soldier of the pre-war army she had to find about ten, and her generals had to teach the new armies their business. The action of Neuve Chapelle showed the British army making its _debut_ in one of those carefully-planned limited attacks against entrenched positions which have been developed, with growing experience, out of all recognition. Loos was a more ambitious venture. In it there appeared volunteer troops to astound seasoned veterans by their dash and discipline. But the lessons of Neuve Chapelle had not been perfectly digested and too much was attempted. The result, in its larger aspect, was less achievement than the promise of overwhelming success in the future. In these two battles the British commanders firmly grasped the elements of the problem that confronted them, and proved the worth of the new Armies. They were to apply this knowledge in the most mighty battle the world has seen.

It was the battle of the Somme that first revealed the true formidableness of the new British armies. The opening of this terrific campaign was pitched for the fifth month of the Verdun struggle. The offensive against modern entrenchments seemed to be in eclipse. Four months' pounding by the seried ma.s.ses of the German guns and carefully arranged a.s.saults by picked troops had failed to reach the enemy objective. The deduction that seemed inevitable was that the offensive was bound to be extremely costly and productive of little. It was in this atmosphere the Somme battle opened against positions that had been elaborated by two years of care and cunning. The course of that bitterly contested campaign re-established the offensive as a paying proposition.

All manner of engagements were fought out in that area. Some positions were carried at the point of the bayonet. Others were encircled so that the garrisons had to evacuate them or choose between annihilation and capture. But, by whatever means, one fell after another. The experience gained was a.s.similated and the armies marched from strength to strength.

On at least one occasion the British were only cheated of a decisive and overwhelming victory by an unkindly fate that brought bad weather when the armies were straining to go forward. A flank was opened in the German lines and through it the German army steadily bled away until an unwonted prudence conquered Prussian pride and the great strategic retreat was carried out. By that retreat, carried out under the compulsion of the British army, the Germans admitted to the world the strategic nature of the Somme campaign success.

By the retreat the Germans hoped to gain a respite. The victory of Vimy Ridge was the unwelcome reality to which that dream materialized. This position was one that was formidable from its natural conformation to begin with, and it had been turned into an obstacle which almost justified the German confidence in its impregnability. The a.s.saulting troops had the advantage of only a limited surprise. The Ridge overlooked the British positions, and little could be done between Arras and La Ba.s.see that was not detected by the German observers. Yet in two days the position was carried with 11,000 prisoners and 100 guns. And it was but three weeks since the enemy had carried out the retreat that was to cut the ground from under the British plans. The British losses were comparatively light; everyone could see that if the battle were to become a precedent, the decisive defeat of Germany was a.s.sured.

Just two months later, the capture of Messines Ridge proved conclusively that the success could be repeated against another of the strongest sectors of the line. But the victory on this occasion was even more remarkable. The position was so advantageous to the Germans that the enemy troops had been urged to fight to the last. The ridge overlooked the whole of the Ypres salient which had been held so staunchly against every handicap. The a.s.sault differed greatly from that on the Vimy Ridge. The tactics were different in detail though the outlines were the same; but the attack was equally kept under the control of the command and swept forward to a similar success. These two battles of the 1917 Campaign made it clear that the British had solved the general problem of the German defensive, and at the same time they revealed the intimate dependence of victory upon the control of the commanders. In a war that seemed to be given over to mechanics, engineering and physics, that was frequently regarded as a mathematical problem, they showed that leadership is still the paramount factor in the art of warfare.

Such then is the versatility of these leaders. The war has cast upon them the burden of meeting every sort of warfare. They have come triumphantly through the ordeal, winning a grudging praise from the enemy, and the more unmistakeable approval of attempts at imitation.

They have shown themselves as resourceful in devising new machines and methods of attack as they are experienced in the orthodox fighting of other days. The war may have new experiences for them, but it cannot daunt or check them. They have seen the worst. They have come through dark places to the approaching light of day. Their record is our best a.s.surance for the future.

I

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG, K.T., G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.I.E., =A.D.C.=

SIR DOUGLAS HAIG was born in Fife on June 19th, 1861, of a family which has played a great part in the annals of the Scottish Borders. He was educated at Clifton and Brasenose College, Oxford, of which he is an Honorary Fellow. He is almost the only great soldier of modern times who has pa.s.sed through the curriculum of an English University.

He joined the 7th Hussars in 1885, and, after pa.s.sing through the Staff College, served in the Soudan Campaign of 1898, being present at the Battles of Atbara and Omdurman.

His great military talents were first proved in the South African War.

After acting as D.A.A.G. for the Cavalry in Natal, he became the Chief Staff officer of General French during the Colesberg operations. In 1901-2 he commanded a group of columns which did brilliant work, chiefly in northern Cape Colony, in pursuit of Kritzinger and Scheepers. His South African record marked him out as an ideal Staff officer, and thereafter his rise was rapid. From 1903-6 he was Inspector-General of Cavalry in India with the rank of Major-General. He was Director of Military Training at home from 1906-7, and Director of Staff Duties from 1907-9. From 1909-12 he was Chief-of-Staff in India. From 1912-14 he was G.O.C. at Aldershot, and in 1914, on the outbreak of the European War, he was given command of the I Corps.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIELD-MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG]

His record during the European War has been one of incessant and arduous toil and heavy responsibility. He commanded the I Corps in the Retreat from Mons, at the Battles of the Marne and of the Aisne, and on him fell the chief brunt of the German attack in the first Battle of Ypres. With the First Army, when it was formed, he fought at Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, Givenchy and Loos. In December, 1915, he succeeded Field-Marshal Lord French as Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in the West. Thereafter the record of his doings is the history of his country. The Somme, the German retreat, the Battle of Arras, and the victory of the Messines Ridge are part of his achievements in Supreme Command.

The foremost living British General, and one fit to rank with any soldier in Europe, is, as Generals go to-day, a young man, only fifty-six. He is at once a scientific soldier after the most modern plan, and a true leader of men. Having been a brilliant Staff officer, he has a proper understanding of the functions of a Staff. Chary of speech, bold in design, resolute in execution, he raised first his Corps and then his Army to a foremost place among British forces, and now he has raised the British Army to a foremost place among the armies of the world. He has the complete confidence of his men, and has earned the admiration and affection of all who work with him.

Scotland has given an innumerable host of soldiers to British and foreign armies, but, with the possible exception of Montrose and Sir John Moore (if Moore can be counted a Scotsman), there has been none who stands in the very front rank of the profession of arms. To-day there is such an one. It has been truly said that the biggest soldiers of all have not the specific military mind, but have a brain indistinguishable from the brain which makes a great statesman or any other great man of action. Sir Douglas Haig, while possessing every technical quality of a soldier, has the mind as well of a statesman, and of a great captain of industry. The organisation of modern war, indeed, requires qualities of which the soldier of other years had no conception. The gigantic industrial activities behind the British front, on which our fighting line depend, the gigantic educational schemes necessary to train our new Armies, demand from the Commander-in-Chief an administrative talent not less high than that required from a Prime Minister or a Pro-Consul. In such tasks Sir Douglas Haig has shown himself pre-eminent, and to this capacity he adds the swiftness in design and precision in performance of the foremost captains of history. Britain has entrusted her manhood to one who has n.o.bly justified her confidence.

II

GENERAL SIR HERBERT CHARLES ONSLOW PLUMER, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., =A.D.C.=

SIR HERBERT PLUMER was born in Devon on March 13th, 1857. In 1876 he entered the York and Lancaster Regiment and served with it in the Soudan War of 1884. In South Africa, in 1896, he raised and commanded a corps of mounted rifles for service in the Matabele rebellion, being mentioned in despatches and receiving the brevet of Lieut.-Colonel. In the South African War of 1899-1902 he won his first great reputation in the field.

He commanded the Rhodesian Field Force and was the first British soldier to cross the enemy frontier.

For months he attempted to reach Mafeking from the north, and, after the happy relief of that historic town, he was one of the most active and resolute of column commanders in the Transvaal. This "small, quiet, resolute man," as a historian describes him, had the power of enforcing discipline and inspiring confidence in the diverse elements under him.

In 1902 he became Major-General, and 1908 Lieut.-General. In 1904-5 he was Q.M.G. to the Forces and Third Military Member of the Army Council.

In 1911-14 he was G.O.C. Northern Command.

[Ill.u.s.tration: GENERAL SIR HERBERT PLUMER]

Sir Herbert Plumer did not appear in the field in the European War till January, 1915, when he was given command of the new V Corps, holding the southern side of the Ypres Salient. When General Smith-Dorrien retired in April of that year from the command of the Second Army, Sir Herbert succeeded him. It was that Army which fought the Second Battle of Ypres, and has since remained on the left flank of the British front in the West. It has seen severe fighting, such as the Hooge battle of August, 1915, the advance at Hooge during the Battle of Loos in September, 1915, the struggle at the Bluff in the spring of 1916, and the action of the Canadians at Ypres in June of the same year. The Ypres Salient has become historic as the most critical part of the British line.

The Second Army was not engaged during the Battle of the Somme or the first stages of the Battle of Arras, but on Thursday, June 7th, 1917, attacking on the whole front from the Ypres salient to Ploegsteert Wood, it carried all its objectives, with the vital Wytschaete-Messines Ridge, put an end to the embarra.s.sment of the Ypres salient, took over 7,000 prisoners, and accounted for at least 30,000 of the enemy,--the whole at a small expense of British lives. The action was probably the most perfectly planned and executed in the history of the campaign.

Sir Herbert Plumer is the best type of British regular officer, an enthusiast for the historic traditions of the army, a soldier with wide experience in many lands and many different forms of campaign. His patience and stamina and perfect judgment have made him for many months a brilliant Warden of the Flanders Marches.

III

GENERAL SIR HENRY SEYMOUR RAWLINSON, BART., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.

SIR HENRY RAWLINSON was born on February 20th, 1864; the eldest son of Major-General Sir H. C. Rawlinson, Bart. He was educated at Eton and Sandhurst, and in February, 1884, entered the 60th Rifles. After acting as A.D.C. for four years to Lord Roberts, then Commander-in-Chief in India, he served with the Mounted Infantry in the Burma campaign, 1888.

He exchanged into the Coldstream Guards in 1891, was a Brigade Major at Aldershot from 1894 to 1896, and served in the Soudan Campaign of 1897-8 as D.A.A.G. to Lord Kitchener, being present at the Battles of Atbara and Omdurman. In the South African War he was through the siege of Ladysmith as A.A.G. to Sir George White, acted as A.A.G. to Lord Roberts' Army at Headquarters, and commanded with great distinction a Mobile Column during the last eighteen months of the war. As Column Commander he was more than once in action against the brilliant soldier who is now Lieut.-General s.m.u.ts. He was Commandant of the Staff College from 1903-6, commanded the 2nd Brigade at Aldershot 1907-10, and the 3rd Division at Salisbury Plain 1910-14.

On the outbreak of the European War he was given command of the 4th Division on the Aisne, and was then put in command of the new IV Corps which included the 7th Division and which landed in Flanders in the beginning of October, 1914. The exploits of the 7th Division form one of the most glorious pages in modern British military history. As all the world knows, it was compelled to fall back with the 3rd Cavalry Division towards Ypres, and on October 16th held the line east of Ypres running through Gheluvelt. On the 20th of the month Sir Douglas Haig's I Corps came into line on its left, and the First Battle of Ypres began. The story of its desperate fighting for Gheluvelt and then for the Klein Zillebeke ridge is familiar to all. The best account of the exploits of the 7th Division is to be found in an order issued by Major-General Capper who then commanded the Division and was later killed in action.

[Ill.u.s.tration: GENERAL SIR HENRY RAWLINSON]

"After the deprivations and tensions of being pursued day and night by an infinitely stronger force, the Division had to pa.s.s through the worst ordeal of all. It was left to a little force of 30,000 to keep the German army at bay, while the other British Corps were being brought up from the Aisne. Here they clung like grim death with almost every man in the trench, holding a line which of necessity was a great deal too long--a thin exhausted line--against which the pride of the German first line troops were hurling themselves with fury. The odds against them were about eight to one, and, when once the enemy found the range of a trench, the sh.e.l.ls dropped into it from one end to the other with terrible effect. Yet the men stood firm, and defended Ypres in such a manner that a German officer afterwards described their action as a brilliant feat of arms, and said that they were under the impression that there had been four British Army Corps against them at this point.

When the Division was afterwards withdrawn from the fighting line to refit, it was found that out of 400 officers who set out from England only 44 were left, and out of 12,000 men only 2,336."

At the Battle of Neuve Chapelle the IV Corps, including the 7th and 8th Divisions, attacked on the afternoon of the first day on the left of the British front and incurred severe losses in that memorable action. The IV Corps was reconst.i.tuted after Neuve Chapelle under Sir Henry Rawlinson, and its three Divisions, the 1st, 15th, and 47th, played a conspicuous part in the Battle of Loos in September, 1915. It was the 15th Division which, it will be remembered, took the village of Loos and Hill 70, and advanced to the suburbs of Lens--one of the most heroic episodes in the whole campaign.