Fugitive Slaves Part 12

[Footnote 228: W. I. Bowditch, Slavery and the Const.i.tution; Macon (Ga.) Telegram, Nov. 27, 1838.]

[Footnote 229: Liberator, April 12, 1839.]

[Footnote 230: Wm. Parker, Freedman's Story, in Atlantic Monthly, February and March, 1866; Letter from Gerrit Smith, in Liberator, Dec.

28, 1838.]

[Footnote 231: J. F. Clarke, Antislavery Days, 93.]

[Footnote 232: Life and Times of Frederick Dougla.s.s, 196.]

[Footnote 233: Appendix D, No. 41; Antislavery Almanac, 74.]

[Footnote 234: J. F. Clarke, Antislavery Days, 83.]

[Footnote 235: Appendix D, No. 41.]

[Footnote 236: Smedley, The Underground Railroad, 26.]

[Footnote 237: Lalor's Cyclopaedia, I. 5; Williams, History of the Negro Race in America, II. 58, 59.]

[Footnote 238: Clarke, Antislavery Days, 81.]

[Footnote 239: Smedley, The Underground Railroad, 35.]

[Footnote 240: Ibid., 64, 138.]

[Footnote 241: Ibid., 568-570.]

[Footnote 242: Ibid., 172.]

[Footnote 243: Ibid., 34.]

[Footnote 244: Ibid., 146.]

[Footnote 245: Smedley, Underground Railroad, 58.]

[Footnote 246: Harriet, the Moses of her People.]

[Footnote 247: Clarke, Antislavery Days, 81.]

[Footnote 248: Liberator, March 2, 1860.]

[Footnote 249: Pamphlet proposing a Defensive League of Freedom, 6.]

[Footnote 250: Smedley, Underground Railroad, 241.]

[Footnote 251: Ibid., 355.]

[Footnote 252: Dougla.s.s, My Bondage and Freedom, 323.]

[Footnote 253: J. F. Clarke, Antislavery Days, 83.]

[Footnote 254: Lalor's Cyclopaedia, I. 5; Congressional Globe, 36 Cong. 1 Sess., Appendix, 250.]

[Footnote 255: Williams, History of the Negro Race in America, II. 58, 59.]

CHAPTER V.

_PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS._

-- 77. Character of the personal liberty laws.

-- 78. Acts pa.s.sed before the Prigg decision (1793-1842).

-- 79. Acts pa.s.sed between the Prigg decision and the second Fugitive Slave Law (1842-1850).

-- 80. Acts occasioned by the law of 1850 (1850-1860).

-- 81. Ma.s.sachusetts acts.

-- 82. Review of the acts by States.

-- 83. Effect of the personal liberty laws.

=-- 77. Character of the personal liberty laws.=--The personal liberty laws were statutes pa.s.sed in the Northern States whose object was to defeat in some measure the national Fugitive Slave Law. Often their ostensible purpose was to protect the free negroes from kidnappers, and to this end they secured for the alleged fugitive the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the trial by jury. Sometimes, however, they frankly avowed their aim as a deliberate attempt to interfere with the execution of the United States statutes. In the following examination of these laws, they will be considered first chronologically, and afterward more minutely according to their subject matter. In previous chapters we have noticed many instances wherein fugitives have been befriended by individuals, or by organizations like the Antislavery Societies or the Underground Railroad. But the action of the State governments in the personal liberty bills, from the time the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 began to be executed to the outbreak of the Civil War, showed that the dissatisfaction of the North was fundamental, and was not confined merely to the few in the van of the Antislavery movement.

[Sidenote: a.n.a.lysis.]

=-- 78. Acts pa.s.sed before the Prigg decision (1793-1842).=--Although the so-called personal liberty laws were not pa.s.sed until about 1840, Indiana[256] and Connecticut[257] had before that time provided that on appeal fugitives might have a trial by jury. The Connecticut law, in contrast to the hostile spirit of later legislation, was ent.i.tled, "An Act for the fulfilment of the obligation of this State imposed by the Const.i.tution of the United States in regard to persons held to service or labor in one State escaping into another, and to secure the right of trial by jury in the cases herein mentioned." Notwithstanding this preamble, the law provided for fining State officials who might take part in fugitive slave cases.

The first definite personal liberty laws were pa.s.sed by Vermont[258] and New York,[259] in 1840, and were ent.i.tled Acts "to extend the right of trial by jury." They not only insured jury trial, but also provided attorneys to defend fugitives. This was the only law of the kind New York ever pa.s.sed, and proved of little value, since it soon fell into disuse, and was almost forgotten.

=-- 79. Acts pa.s.sed between the Prigg decision and the second Fugitive Slave Law (1842-1850).=--After the Prigg decision in 1842, wherein it was declared that the law must be executed through national powers only, and that State authorities could not be forced into action,[260] a new cla.s.s of statutes sprang up. The State legislatures seized the opportunity afforded them by Judge Story's opinion, to forbid State officers from performing the duties required of them by the law of 1793, and prohibited the use of State jails in fugitive slave cases. Such laws were pa.s.sed in Ma.s.sachusetts,[261] Vermont,[262] Pennsylvania,[263] and Rhode Island.[264] In 1844, Connecticut repealed her act of 1838, as being then unconst.i.tutional, but retained the portion forbidding State officers to partic.i.p.ate in the execution of the law.

=-- 80. Acts occasioned by the law of 1850 (1850-1860).=--The provisions of the law of 1850 roused yet more opposition in the North, and before 1856 many of the States had pa.s.sed personal liberty bills. The new national law avoided the employment of State officers. This change in the statute brought about a corresponding alteration in the State legislation, and we therefore find the acts of this period differing somewhat from those of earlier years. They almost invariably prohibited the use of State jails, they often forbade State judges and officers to issue writs or to give a.s.sistance to the claimant, and punished severely the seizure of a free person with the intent to reduce him to slavery.

Should an alleged fugitive be arrested, the personal liberty acts were intended to secure him a trial surrounded by the usual legal safeguards.

The ident.i.ty of the person claimed was to be proved by two witnesses; or they gave him the right to a writ of habeas corpus; or they enjoined upon the court to which the writ was returnable a trial by jury. At the trial the prisoner must be defended by an attorney, frequently the State or county attorney, and a penalty was provided for false testimony. Any violation of these clauses by State officers was punished by penalties varying from five hundred dollars and six months in jail, as in Pennsylvania, to the maximum punishment in Vermont, of two thousand dollars' fine and ten years in prison.

Such acts were pa.s.sed in Vermont,[265] Connecticut,[266] and Rhode Island,[267] in Ma.s.sachusetts,[268] Michigan,[269] and Maine.[270] Later, laws were also enacted in Wisconsin,[271] Kansas,[272] Ohio,[273] and Pennsylvania.[274] Of the other Northern States, two only, New Jersey and California, gave any official sanction to the rendition of fugitives. In New Hampshire, New York, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Minnesota, however, no full personal liberty laws were pa.s.sed.[275]

=-- 81. Ma.s.sachusetts acts.=--Let us now examine the purport of these acts in the various States. The general tenor and effect are best seen in Ma.s.sachusetts, which may be selected as a typical State. In 1837, Ma.s.sachusetts pa.s.sed a law "to restore the trial by jury, on questions of personal freedom." This secured to the prisoner a writ of personal replevin, which was to be issued from and returnable to the Court of Common Pleas for the county in which the plaintiff was confined, and was to be issued fourteen days at least before the return day. If the prisoner were secreted, the court might send out a capias to take the body of the defendant. This act allowed an appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court.

In 1842, the Latimer case[276] occurred. This so aroused public sentiment that a great pet.i.tion, signed by sixty-five thousand people, was sent to the legislature, asking for a new personal liberty law. On the basis of the Prigg decision, a law was enacted which forbade State magistrates to issue certificates or take cognizance of the law of 1793, and withheld the use of State jails for the imprisonment of fugitives.[277]

In 1851, in the Shadrach case,[278] there was opportunity for testing the value of this law. The fugitive was not indeed confined in any jail, but there was little difficulty in providing a place of detention, and the court-house was secured. In this year, acting upon a clause in the Governor's message, which treated of the new Fugitive Slave Law of 1850, a committee in the legislature made a report, accompanied by resolutions and a bill further to protect personal liberty; but no law was pa.s.sed, and there the matter rested until 1855.[279]