Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Part 35

'The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and light airs.

'At the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking ship could fire a gun in her defence.

'It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of them, they are placed, for the most part, _hors de combat_ for the rest of the action.

'Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear could possibly come to their a.s.sistance.

'In proceeding to the attack of October 21, the weather was exactly such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the British were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of attacking in detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the British were, on that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was totally lost.

'The Victory, Temeraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus and Bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their guns could have extricated them. If the enemy's vessels had closed up as they ought to have done, _from van to rear_, and had possessed a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which the British were desirous of being placed; namely, to have part of an opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body.

'The French admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest pa.s.sive gallantry; and certainly the French Intrepide, with some others, evinced active courage equal to the British; but there was no nautical management, no skilful manoeuvring.

'It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of the Trafalgar attack; but it is only just, to point out the advantages and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment of great results, that the probabilities and existing circ.u.mstances may be well weighed before such means are applied. A plan, to be entirely correct, must be suited to all cases. If its infallibility is not thus established, there can be no impropriety in pointing out the errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of others.

'Our heroic and lamented chief knew his means, and the power he had to deal with; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the occasion; and that sufficed.

'The Trafalgar attack might be followed under different circ.u.mstances, and have a different result: it is right, therefore, to discuss its merits and demerits. It cannot take one atom from the fame of the departed hero, whose life was one continued scene of original ability, and of superior action.'

FOOTNOTE:

[1] The concluding part of the MS. is devoted to a detailed account of the part played in the action by the Conqueror and her two seconds, Neptune and Leviathan, with the special purpose of showing that Villeneuve really struck to the Conqueror. In a note the author says, 'I have been thus particular, as the capture of the French admiral has been unblushingly attributed to others without any mention being made of the ship that actually was the princ.i.p.al in engaging her, wishing to do justice to a gallant officer who on that day considered his task not complete until every ship was either captured or beyond distance of pursuit.' The inference is that the author was an officer of the Conqueror, defending his captain, Israel Pellew, younger brother of the more famous Edward, Lord Exmouth. It is possible therefore, and even probable, that this criticism of Trafalgar represents the ideas of the Pellews.