Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Part 34

[6] Mathieu-Dumas, _Precis des Evenements Militaires: Pieces Justificatives_, vol. xiv. p. 408.

[7] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Espanola_, viii. 353.

[8] The anonymous veteran of the old French navy, cited by Mathieu-Dumas, explains exactly how Villeneuve might have turned the tables on Nelson by forming two lines himself. 'There is,' he concludes, 'no known precedent of a defensive formation in two lines; but I will venture to a.s.sert that if Admiral Villeneuve had doubled his line at the moment he saw Nelson meant to attack him in two lines, that admiral would never have had the imprudence of making such an attack.'--_Evenements Militaires_, xiv. 411.

_THE INSTRUCTIONS OF_ 1816.

[+Signal Book, United Service Inst.i.tution+.]

_Instructions relating to the Line of Battle and the Conduct of the Fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an enemy_.

I. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle are, that the ships may be able, to a.s.sist and support each other in action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships greater in number than themselves, and that every ship may be able to fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own fleet.

II. On whichever tack the fleet may be sailing, when the line of battle is formed, the van squadron is to form the van, the centre squadron the centre, and the rear squadron the rear of the line, unless some other arrangement be pointed out by signal. But if a change of wind, or tacking, or wearing, or any other circ.u.mstance, should alter the order in which the line of battle was formed, the squadrons are to remain in the stations in which they may so happen to be placed, till the admiral shall direct them to take others.

III. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle, each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as expeditiously as possible; and to keep in close order, if not otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the line, when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.

IV. In forming the line of battle, each ship should haul up a little to windward rather than to leeward of her second ahead, as a ship a little to leeward will find great difficulty in getting into her station, if it should be necessary to keep the line quite close to the wind; and it may also be better to form at a distance a little greater, rather than smaller, than the prescribed distance, as it is easier to close the line than to extend it.

V. If the admiral should haul out of the line, the ships astern of him are to close up to fill the vacancy he has made, and the line is to continue on its course, and to act in the same manner as if the admiral had not left it All signals made to the centre will be addressed to the senior officer remaining in it, who, during the absence of the admiral, is to be considered as the commander of the centre squadron.

VI. The repeating frigates are to be abreast of the commanders of the squadrons to which they belong, and the fireships and frigates to windward of their squadrons, if no particular station be a.s.signed to them.

VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to place themselves in such a manner that, if they were to haul to the wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed, they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this, every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compa.s.s on which the line of battle would sail, viz. on that point of the compa.s.s which is six points from the direction of the wind.

As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or squadron flags, shown with the signals for such a line, will refer to the forming the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag is _uppermost_ (without considering whether it do or do not form the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind, and form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is _undermost_ is to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed.

VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed the ships are to preserve their relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to alter their course together; but if they are directed to alter their course in succession, as the line of bearing would by that circ.u.mstance be destroyed, it is to be no longer attended to.

IX. If after having made the signal to prepare to form the line of battle, or either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession to point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again. They are to be executed in the order in which they are made, excepting such as the admiral may annul previously to his again hoisting the signal for the line.

X. If the wind should come _forward_ when the fleet is formed in line of battle, or is sailing by the wind on a line of bearing, the leading ship is to steer seven points from the wind, and every ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible till she has got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come _aft_, the ships are to bear up until they get into the wake, or on the proper point of bearing from the leading ship.

XI. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet on any separate service are not to obey the signal for forming the line of battle unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by signal.

XII. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as directed in Article XIX. in the General Instructions, though in the presence of an enemy. The captains of such ships will not thereby be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have the opportunities of rendering essential service by placing their ships advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with the other part of the fleet.

XIII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper, but he is to hoist it in one of his own squadron or division, if there be one near and fit for the purpose.

XIV. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the ships, which at either extremity of the line are thereby left without opponents, may, after the action is begun, quit the line, without waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or a.s.sist the ships of the fleet in the best manner that circ.u.mstances will allow.

XV. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy either over or very near to any ships of the fleet, nor, though the signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy.

XVI. No ship is to separate from the body of the fleet in time of action to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to a.s.sist any ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled, unless by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act otherwise.

XVII. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of being destroyed or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate that may be near is to use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off, or by joining in the attack on the enemy, or by covering the fireship, or, if necessity requires it, by taking out the crew of the disabled ship, or by any other means which circ.u.mstances at the time will admit.

XVIII. Though a ship be disabled and hard pressed by the enemy in battle, she is not to quit her station in the line if it can possibly be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do from the commander of the division or squadron to which he belongs, or from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of the line, or should be obliged to quit it before a.s.sistance can be sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the s.p.a.ce become vacant to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.

XIX. If there should be a captain so lost to all sense of honour and the great duty he owes his country as not to exert himself to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them when engaged, the commander of the squadron or division to which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from the command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship till the admiral's pleasure shall be known.

APPENDIX

_FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT_

[+Sir Charles Ekin's Naval Battles, pp. 271 et seq. Extract+.]

The intelligent officer to whom the writer is indebted for this important ma.n.u.script was an eye-witness of what he has so ably related, and upon which he has reasoned with so much judgment.[1]

'The combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard tack, gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent; in which they remained to the moment of attack. Many have considered that the French admiral intended this formation of the line of battle; but from the information I obtained after the action, connected with some doc.u.ments found on board the Bucentaur, I believe it was the intention to have formed a line ahead, consisting of twenty-one sail--the supposed force of the British fleet--and a squadron of observation composed of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended to act according to circ.u.mstances after the British fleet were engaged. By wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. The wind being light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main topsails to the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve their exact station in the line; consequently scarce any ship was immediately ahead or astern of her second. The fleet had then the appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus: so that the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the s.p.a.ce left between two in the weather-line.

[Ill.u.s.tration]

'In the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this particularly happened where the Colossus was, who, after pa.s.sing the stern of the French Swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the Bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly ran alongside of the French Achille under cover of the smoke. The Colossus was then placed between the Achille and the Bahama, being on board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the Swiftsure's after-guns. All these positions I believe to have been merely accidental; and to accident alone I attribute the concave circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to the westward as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter line. The ships were therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders; and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity, undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the skilful manoeuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice in gunnery.

'Of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by the British fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the event was so completely successful; but as the necessity of any particular experiment frequently depends upon contingent circ.u.mstances, not originally calculated upon, there can be no impropriety in questioning whether the same plan be likely to succeed under all circ.u.mstances, and on all occasions.

'The original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of our great commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's fleet consisted of forty-six sail of the line and the British forty; and the attack, as designed from to-windward, was to be made under the following circ.u.mstances:

'Under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line ahead of forty-six sail, the British fleet was to be brought within gun-shot of the enemy's centre, in two divisions of sixteen sail each, and a division of observation consisting of the remaining eight.

'The lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all possible sail on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. The ships were to break through the enemy's line; and such ships as were thrown out of their stations were to a.s.sist their friends that were hard pressed. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, of thirty-four sail, were to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief.'

This able officer then proceeds to describe, by a figure, the plan of attack as originally intended; bearing a very close resemblance to that already given in Plate XXVIII. fig. 1; but making the enemy's fleet, as arranged in a regular line ahead, to extend the distance of five miles; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, left unoccupied; the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. He then observes:

'If the regulated plan of attack had been adhered to, the English fleet should have borne up together, and have sailed in a line abreast in their respective divisions until they arrived up with the enemy. Thus the plan which consideration had matured would have been executed, than which perhaps nothing could be better; the victory would have been more speedily decided, and the brunt of the action would have been more equally felt, &c.

'With the exception of the Britannia, Dreadnought, and Prince, the body of the fleet sailed very equally; and I have no doubt could have been brought into action simultaneously with their leaders. This being granted, there was no time gained by attacking in a line ahead, the only reason, I could suppose, that occasioned the change.

'The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution under all circ.u.mstances.

'The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards [so] as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably lead to a victory; and if followed up according to circ.u.mstances, may ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part of the mutilated fleet.

'Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support.

'The swifter ships, pa.s.sing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to complete what their leaders had begun. The weather division, from being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend the success they may appear to have gained, &c.

'If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in pursuit.

'The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired throughout the British fleet from their being commanded by their beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet.

'It was successful also from the consternation spread through the combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss of the admiral's ship early in the action.