Essays on the Constitution of the United States Part 23

What facilitated the corrupt designs of Philip of Macedon and caused the ruin of Athens, but the unbounded confidence in their statesmen and rulers? Such improper confidence Demosthenes was so well convinced had ruined his country, that in his second Philippic oration he remarks "that there is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free states, against the a.s.saults of tyrants. What is this? Distrust. Of this be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can affect you." Montesquieu observes that "the course of government is attended with an insensible descent to evil, and there is no reascending to good without very great efforts." The plain influence from this doctrine is, that rulers in all governments will erect an interest separate from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them. There is, therefore, no other way of interrupting this insensible descent and warding off the evil as long as possible, than by establishing principles of distrust on your const.i.tuents, and cultivating the sentiment among yourselves. But let me inquire of you, my countrymen, whether the freedom and independence of elections is a point of magnitude? If it is, what kind of a spirit of amity, deference and concession is that which has put in the power of congress, at one stroke, to prevent your interference in government, and do away your liberties forever? Does either the situation or circ.u.mstances of things warrant it?

CATO.

THE LETTERS OF CaeSAR, WRITTEN BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

Printed In The Daily Advertiser, October, 1787.

Note.

These letters, from what has already been quoted on page 245, were evidently written by Alexander Hamilton. He had just finished a newspaper controversy of a very acrimonious character with George Clinton, which probably caused these letters to be an attack on the writer of _Cato_, rather than a defense of the new government. They are further evidence of the great want of political tact and sympathy with the ma.s.ses, of which Hamilton gave so many specimens in his short life, and which alone prevented his political success. That he himself realized this mistake is shown by his prompt abandonment of _Caesar_ and his beginning again anew in _The Federalist_; the latter being a singular and interesting contrast in both tone and argument to these earlier writings, which, it should be also considered, were undoubtedly written in great haste.

Caesar, I.

The Daily Advertiser, (Number 812)

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1787.

The citizens of the State of New York have received yesterday, from _Cato_ (an ally of _Pompey_, no doubt), an introductory discourse on the appearance of the new system for the government of the United States: this, we are told, will be followed by such observations, on the const.i.tution proposed to the union, "as will promote our welfare and be justified by reason and truth." There is, in this preparatory lecture, little that is necessary to be dwelt on just now; and if Cato had not possessed his future investigations in such terms as wore a _questionable shape_, they should have pa.s.sed unheeded.

Cato tells us that he will not _directly engage as an advocate_ for this new form of government, or as an _opponent_. Here Cato, without any dispute, acts prudently. It will be wise in him to rest awhile; since he has given a _preface_, which, with small address, can easily be made to work on either side. When the sentiments of the confederate states come to be generally known it will be time enough to proceed. Cato will then _start fair_. A little caution, however, he thinks necessary to be given the meantime. "Do not," says this prudent censor, in addressing the citizens, "because you will admit that _something_ must be done, adopt _anything_." What, in the name of common sense, does this injunction import? I appeal to men of understanding, whether it is not obviously the language of distrust, calculated, as far as such a thing can influence, to prejudice the public opinion against the new const.i.tution; and, in effect, by a periphrastic mode of speech, recommending the rejection of it?

"_Teach_ the members of the Convention (Cato _very modestly_ goes on) that you are capable of supervision of their conduct; the same medium that gave you this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make amendments _or give you another_." O excellent thought, and happily advised! Be clamorous, my friends-be discontented-a.s.sert your prerogative-forever a.s.sert the power and _majesty of the people_. I am not willing to suspect any man's intentions, when they aim at giving information; but when they come abroad, couched in such _magisterial_ terms, I own I feel some indignation. If this demagogue had talents to throw light on the subject of legislation, why did he not offer them when the Convention was in session? If they had been judged useful, no doubt they would have been attended to. But is this _now a time_ for such insinuations? Has not the wisdom of America been drawn, as it were, into a focus, and the proffered const.i.tution sent forth with a unanimity that is unequalled in ancient or modern story? And shall we now wrangle and find fault with the _excellent whole_, because, perhaps some of its parts _might have been_ more perfect? There is neither virtue or patriotism in such conduct. Besides, how can Cato say, "that the door is now open to receive any amendments, or give us _another const.i.tution_, if required?" I believe he has advanced this without proper authority. I am inclined to believe that the _door of recommendation is shut and cannot be opened by the same men_; that the Convention, in one word, is dissolved; if so we must reject IN TOTO, or _vice versa_; just take it as it is and be thankful. I deny the similarity betwixt the present const.i.tution and that of the United Netherlands. Cato would have drawn a very melancholy picture, but it won't apply. In my most humble opinion, it has a much greater affinity with the government, which, in all human probability, will remain when the history of the Seven Provinces shall be forgotten.

Cato tells us (what all America knows by this time) that the new const.i.tution comes sanctioned with the approbation of General Washington; and, though he appears to have some reverence for that great patriot chief, yet he very sagaciously observes, that the _best and wisest man may err_; and thence a.s.serts, that every man in _politics_, as well as in religion, ought to judge for himself. This paragraph needs no comment, and, for that reason, I shall not touch it; but with all deference to Cato's penetration, I would recommend to him, instead of entering into fruitless discussion of what has come from so many _clear heads_ and _good hearts_, to join his fellow-citizens, and endeavor to reconcile this _excellent const.i.tution_ to the _weak_, the _suspicious_, and the _interested_, who will be chiefly opposed to it, as soon as possible. I would also advise him to give his vote (as he will probably be one of the Electors) to the American Fabius; it will be more healthy for this country, and _this state_, that he should be induced to accept of the presidency of the new government, than that he should be solicited again to accept of the command of _an army_.

Cato, it appears, intends to adventure on perilous grounds; it will therefore become him to be cautious on what terms he takes the field. "He advises us to attach ourselves to measures, and not to men." In this instance he advises well; and I heartily recommend it to _himself_, and not to forget the force of that important admonition; for Cato, in his future marches, will very probably be _followed_ by

CaeSAR.

Friday.

Caesar, II.

The Daily Advertiser, (Number 826)

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1787.

For the Daily Advertiser.

"The great source of all the evils which afflict Republics, is, that the people are too apt to make choice of rulers, who are either Politicians without being Patriots, or Patriots without being Politicians."

MR. CHILDS:

When I took notice of Cato's prefatory address to the Citizens of the State of New York, in your paper of the first instant, I had no serious intention of becoming a controversial defendant of the new const.i.tution.

Indeed, if the system required defence, I was neither so weak nor so vain as to suppose myself competent to the task. To obviate difficulties which may arise, when such weighty affairs as the principles of legislation are under discussion, I am sensible requires talents far beyond my limited abilities. When I offered a few remarks on Cato's introduction, I was strongly impressed with the idea that even the most substantial criticisms, promulgated by the most influential _avowed Citizens_, could have no good tendency at _this time_. I viewed the public mind as wound up to a great pitch of dissatisfaction, by the inadequacy of the powers of the present Congress to the general good and conversation of the union. I believed then, as I do now, that the people were determined and prepared for a _change_. I conceived, therefore, that the wish of every good man would be, that _this change might be peaceably effected_. With this view I opposed myself to Cato. I a.s.serted, in my last, _that the __ door of recommendation was shut, and cannot be opened by the same men-that the Convention was dissolved._ If I am wrong, it will be of great importance to Cato's future remarks that he make it appear. If he will declare from sufficient authority, that the members of the late Convention have only adjourned to give time to hear the sentiments of every political disputant, that after the numerous presses of America have groaned with the heavy productions of speculative politicians, they will _again meet_, weigh their respective merits, and accommodate accordingly-I say, if Cato can do this, I make no hesitation in acknowledging the utility of his plan. In the mean time, I positively deny having any, the most distant desire of shutting the door of free discussion, on any subject which may benefit the people; but I maintain (until Cato's better information refutes me) that the door, as far as relates to _this subject_, is already shut, not by me, but by the highest possible authority which the case admits, even by those great Patriots who were delegated by the people of the United States to _open such a door_, as might enable them to escape from impending calamities and political shipwreck. This distinction is clear, I conceive, and ought to have some weight even with Cato, as well as those for whom he writes. I am not one of those who gain an influence by cajoling the unthinking ma.s.s (tho' I pity their delusions), and ringing in their ears the gracious sound of their _absolute Sovereignty_. I despise the trick of such dirty policy. I know there are Citizens, who, to gain their own private ends, enflame the minds of the well-meaning, tho'

less intelligent parts of the community, by sating their vanity with that cordial and unfailing specific, that _all power is seated in the people_.

For my part, I am not much attached to the _majesty of the mult.i.tude_, and therefore waive all pretensions (founded on such conduct), to their countenance. I consider them in general as very ill qualified to judge for themselves what government will best suit their peculiar situations; nor is this to be wondered at. The science of government is not easily understood. Cato will admit, I presume, that men of good education and deep reflection, only, are judges of the _form_ of a government; whether it is const.i.tuted on such principles as will restrain arbitrary power, on the one hand, and equal to the exclusion of corruption and the destruction of licentiousness on the other; whether the New Const.i.tution, if adopted, will prove adequate to such desirable ends, time, the mother of events, will show. For my own part, I sincerely esteem it a system, which, without the finger of _G.o.d_, never could have been suggested and agreed upon by such a diversity of interests. I will not presume to say that a more perfect system might not have been fabricated; but who expects perfection at once? And it may be asked, _who are judges of it_? Few, I believe, who have leisure to study the nature of Government scientifically, but will frequently disagree about the quantum of power to be delegated to Rulers, and the different modifications of it. Ingenious men will give every plausible, and, it may be, pretty substantial reasons, for the adoption of two plans of Government, which shall be fundamentally different in their construction, and not less so in their operation; yet both, if honestly administered, might operate with safety and advantage. When a new form of government is fabricated, it lies with the people at large to receive or reject it-that is, their _inherent rights_. Now, I would ask (without intending to triumph over the weaknesses or follies of any men), how are the people to profit by this inherent right? By what conduct do they discover that they are sensible of their own interests in this situation?

Is it by the exercise of a well-disciplined reason, and a correspondent education? I believe not. How then? As I humbly conceive, by a tractable and docile disposition, and by honest men endeavoring to keep their minds easy, while others, of the same disposition, with the advantages of genius and learning, are constructing the bark that may, by the blessing of Heaven, carry them to the port of rest and happiness, if they will embark without diffidence and proceed without mutiny. I know this is blunt and ungracious reasoning; it is the best, however, which I am prepared to offer on this momentous business; and, since my own heart does not reproach me, I shall not be very solicitous about its reception. If truth, then, is permitted to speak, the ma.s.s of the people of America (any more than the ma.s.s of other countries) cannot judge with any degree of precision concerning the fitness of this New Const.i.tution to the peculiar situation of America; they have, however, done wisely in delegating the power of framing a government to those every way worthy and well-qualified; and, if this Government is s.n.a.t.c.hed, untasted, from them, it may not be amiss to inquire into the causes which will probably occasion their disappointment. Out of several, which present to my mind, I shall venture to select _one_, baneful enough, in my opinion, to work this dreadful evil. There are always men in society of some talents, but more ambition, in quest of _that_ which it would be impossible for them to obtain in any other way than by working on the pa.s.sions and prejudices of the less discerning cla.s.ses of citizens and yeomanry. It is the plan of men of this stamp to frighten the people with ideal bugbears, in order to mould them to their own purposes. The unceasing cry of these designing croakers is, My friends, your liberty is invaded! Have you thrown off the yoke of one tyrant to invest yourselves with that of another? Have you fought, bled and conquered for _such a change_? If you have-go-retire into silent obscurity, and kiss the rod that scourges you.

To be serious: These state empirics leave no species of deceit untried to convince the unthinking people that they have power to do-what? Why truly to do much mischief, and to occasion anarchy and wild uproar. And for what reason do these political jugglers incite the peaceably disposed to such extravagant commotions? Because until the people really discover that they have _power_, by some outrageous act, they never can become of any importance. The misguided people never reflect during this frenzy, that the moment they become riotous, they renounce, from that moment, their independence, and commence va.s.sals to their ambitious leaders, who instantly, and with a high hand, rob them of their consequence, and apply it to their own present or future aggrandis.e.m.e.nt; nor will these tyrants over the people stick at sacrificing _their_ good, if an advantageous compromise can be effected for _themselves_.

Before I conclude, I cannot refrain from observing that Cato states very disingenuously the manner in which the Federal System came abroad. He tells us, Congress were sensible that the late Convention exercised a power which no authority could delegate to them. The Convention, says Cato, have taken upon them to make a perfectly new system, which by its operations will absorb the sovereignties of the individual States; this new government founded on _usurpation_, (Cato, this expression is very indecent-but I will rouse no pa.s.sions against you) this consolidated system Congress did not approve and _therefore_ have been _silent_ on its character. That Congress was silent on its character is true, but could Cato find no other reason for their silence than that of disapprobation? I believe Congress were by no means dissatisfied with the freedom the Convention took with the Articles of Confederation; I believe further that with very few exceptions, that honorable body approves of the New Const.i.tution; and that they did not accompany it to the States with a recommendatory capitation or circular letter, proceeded from a delicate attention to the members of the late Convention, to a few of their own body, and to the people of America at large. That the Convention went so earnestly into the business committed to their care ought, instead of being matter of chagrin, to occasion the liveliest expressions of approbation and grat.i.tude-as matters stand just now. I think it may be fairly said, that no _generous plan of government_ for the _United States_ has ever been constructed, (the plan only excepted which is under consideration) so that it seems quite unnecessary in Cato to disturb the peace of society by a bombast appeal to their feelings, on the _generous plan of power delivered down by their renowned forefathers_. I venerate the memory of the slaughtered patriots of America, and rejoice as much as Cato that they did not bleed in vain, but I would have America profit by their death in a different manner from him. I believe they sought to obtain liberty for no particular State, but for the whole Union, indissolubly connected under one controlling and supreme head.

Cato complains of my antic.i.p.ating parts of his subject which he intended for future periods. I shall break in no more upon his _arrangements_. All he can say against the New Const.i.tution has been already disseminated in a neighboring State by the glorious defenders of _Shayism_. I shall therefore leave Cato to the wicked influences of his own heart, in the fullest persuasion that all good citizens will combine their influence to establish the fair fabric of American liberty beyond the reach of suspicion, violence, anarchy, and tyranny. When this glorious work is accomplished, what may America not hope to arrive at? I will venture to prophesy that the day on which the Union under the new government shall be ratified by the American States, that _that day_ will begin an era which will be recorded and observed by future ages as a day which the Americans had marked by their wisdom in circ.u.mscribing the _power_ and ascertaining the _decline_ of the ancient nations in Christendom.

CaeSAR.

October 15.

THE LETTERS OF SYDNEY. WRITTEN BY ROBERT YATES.

Printed In The New York Journal, June, 1788.

Note.

_Sydney_ was a favorite pseudonym of Robert Yates, and was so well known as his pen name by his contemporaries that it was hardly intended as a mask. He had already contributed to the New York Journal a very able series of papers on the Const.i.tution over the signature of _Brutus_, written to influence the people, but the elections had taken place before the appearance of _Sydney_, which were therefore intended for the delegates to the State Convention, soon to a.s.semble. A year later, when Yates was nominated for governor by the Federalists, quotation from these articles was one of the favorite modes of attacking him used by the anti-federalists.

Sydney, I.