Decision Points Part 10

As the anthrax news broke, panic spread across the country. Millions of Americans were afraid to open their mailboxes. Office mailrooms shut down. Mothers rushed to the hospital to order anthrax tests for children suffering from a common cold. Deranged hoaxsters mailed packages laced with talc.u.m powder or flour, which exacerbated people's fears.

The Postal Service tested samples of mail for anthrax at more than two hundred sites across the country. Mail at the White House was re-routed and irradiated for the rest of my presidency. Thousands of government personnel, including Laura and me, were advised to take Cipro, a powerful antibiotic.

The biggest question during the anthrax attack anthrax attack was where it was coming from. One of the best intelligence services in Europe told us it suspected Iraq. was where it was coming from. One of the best intelligence services in Europe told us it suspected Iraq. Saddam Hussein Saddam Hussein's regime was one of few in the world with a record of using weapons of ma.s.s destruction, and it had acknowledged possession of anthrax in 1995. Others suspected that al Qaeda al Qaeda was involved. Frustratingly, we had no concrete evidence and few good leads. was involved. Frustratingly, we had no concrete evidence and few good leads.*

One month after 9/11, I held a primetime televised press conference from the White House. Earlier that day, we had raised the terror alert level in response to reports about a senior Taliban official warning of another major attack on America.

"You talk about the general threat toward Americans," Ann Compton Ann Compton of ABC News said. "...What are Americans supposed to look for?" of ABC News said. "...What are Americans supposed to look for?"

A CIA briefing on the threat of terrorists spraying anthrax over a city from a small plane was fresh in my mind. "Ann," I said, "if you find a person that you've never seen before getting in a crop duster that doesn't belong to [him], report it."

My line got a laugh, but behind the humor was a maddening reality: We believed more attacks were coming, but we didn't know when, where, or from whom. Striking the right balance between alerting and alarming the public balance between alerting and alarming the public remained a challenge for the rest of the administration. As time pa.s.sed, some critics charged that we inflated the threat or manipulated alert levels for political benefit. They were flat wrong. We took the intelligence seriously and did the best we could to keep the American people informed and safe. remained a challenge for the rest of the administration. As time pa.s.sed, some critics charged that we inflated the threat or manipulated alert levels for political benefit. They were flat wrong. We took the intelligence seriously and did the best we could to keep the American people informed and safe.

"This is the worst we've seen since 9/11," George Tenet George Tenet said in a grave voice as he pulled out his half-chewed cigar at a late October intelligence briefing. He cited a highly reliable source warning that there would be an attack on either October 30 or 31 that was bigger than the World Trade Center attack. said in a grave voice as he pulled out his half-chewed cigar at a late October intelligence briefing. He cited a highly reliable source warning that there would be an attack on either October 30 or 31 that was bigger than the World Trade Center attack.

After several false alarms, we believed this could be the real deal. d.i.c.k Cheney d.i.c.k Cheney and I agreed that he should move to a safe place outside Washington-the famous undisclosed location-to ensure continuity of government. The Secret Service recommended that I leave, too. I told them I was staying put. Maybe this was a little bravado on my part. Mostly it was fatalism. I had made my peace. If it was G.o.d's will that I die in the White House, I would accept it. Laura felt the same way. We were confident the government would survive an attack, even if we didn't. and I agreed that he should move to a safe place outside Washington-the famous undisclosed location-to ensure continuity of government. The Secret Service recommended that I leave, too. I told them I was staying put. Maybe this was a little bravado on my part. Mostly it was fatalism. I had made my peace. If it was G.o.d's will that I die in the White House, I would accept it. Laura felt the same way. We were confident the government would survive an attack, even if we didn't.

I did have one good reason to leave Washington for a few hours. The New York Yankees had invited me to throw out the first pitch at Game Three of the World Series. Seven weeks after 9/11, it would send a powerful signal for the president to show up in Yankee Stadium. I hoped my visit would help lift the spirits of New Yorkers.

We flew to New York on Air Force One and choppered into a field next to the ballpark. I went to a batting cage to loosen up my arm. A Secret Service agent strapped a bulletproof vest to my chest. After a few warm-up pitches, the great Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter Derek Jeter dropped in to take some swings. We talked a little. Then he asked, "Hey President, are you going to throw from the mound or from in front of it?" dropped in to take some swings. We talked a little. Then he asked, "Hey President, are you going to throw from the mound or from in front of it?"

I asked what he thought. "Throw from the mound," Derek said. "Or else they'll boo you." I agreed to do it. On his way out, he looked over his shoulder and said, "But don't bounce it. They'll boo you."

Nine months into the presidency, I was used to being introduced to a crowd. But I'd never had a feeling like I did when Bob Sheppard Bob Sheppard, the Yankees legendary public address announcer, belted out, "Please welcome the president of the United States." I climbed the mound, gave a wave and a thumbs-up, and peered in at the catcher, Todd Greene Todd Greene. He looked a lot farther away than sixty feet, six inches. My adrenaline was surging. The ball felt like a shot put. I wound up and let it fly.

Opening Game Three of the 2001 World Series at Yankee Stadium. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper The noise in the stadium was like a sonic boom. "USA, USA, USA!" I thought back to the workers at Ground Zero. I shook hands with Todd Greene, posed for a photo with the managers, Joe Torre Joe Torre of the Yankees and of the Yankees and Bob Brenly Bob Brenly of the Arizona Diamondbacks, and made my way to George Steinbrenner's box. I was the definition of a relieved pitcher. I was thrilled to see Laura and our daughter Barbara. She gave me a big hug and said, "Dad, you threw a strike!" of the Arizona Diamondbacks, and made my way to George Steinbrenner's box. I was the definition of a relieved pitcher. I was thrilled to see Laura and our daughter Barbara. She gave me a big hug and said, "Dad, you threw a strike!"

We flew back to Washington late that night and waited out the next day. October 31 pa.s.sed without an attack.

Putting the country on a war footing required more than just tightening our physical defenses. We needed better legal, financial, and intelligence tools to find the terrorists and stop them before it was too late.

One major gap in our counterterrorism capabilities was what many called "the wall." Over time, the government had adopted a set of procedures that prevented law enforcement and intelligence personnel from sharing key information.

"How can we possibly a.s.sure our citizens we are protecting them if our own people can't even talk to each other?" I said in one meeting shortly after the attacks. "We've got to fix the problem."

Attorney General John Ashcroft John Ashcroft took the lead in writing a legislative proposal. The result was the USA took the lead in writing a legislative proposal. The result was the USA PATRIOT Act PATRIOT Act.** The bill eliminated the wall and allowed law enforcement and intelligence personnel to share information. It modernized our counterterrorism capabilities by giving investigators access to tools like roving wiretaps, which allowed them to track suspects who changed cell phone numbers-an authority that had long been used to catch drug traffickers and mob bosses. It authorized aggressive financial measures to freeze terrorist a.s.sets. And it included judicial and congressional oversight to protect civil liberties. The bill eliminated the wall and allowed law enforcement and intelligence personnel to share information. It modernized our counterterrorism capabilities by giving investigators access to tools like roving wiretaps, which allowed them to track suspects who changed cell phone numbers-an authority that had long been used to catch drug traffickers and mob bosses. It authorized aggressive financial measures to freeze terrorist a.s.sets. And it included judicial and congressional oversight to protect civil liberties.

One provision created a little discomfort at home. The PATRIOT Act PATRIOT Act allowed the government to seek warrants to examine the business records of suspected terrorists, such as credit card receipts, apartment leases, and library records. As a former librarian, Laura didn't like the idea of federal agents snooping around libraries. I didn't, either. But the intelligence community had serious concerns about terrorists using library computers to communicate. Library records had played a role in several high-profile cases, such as the Zodiac gunman murders in California. The last thing I wanted was to allow the freedom and access to information provided by American libraries to be utilized against us by allowed the government to seek warrants to examine the business records of suspected terrorists, such as credit card receipts, apartment leases, and library records. As a former librarian, Laura didn't like the idea of federal agents snooping around libraries. I didn't, either. But the intelligence community had serious concerns about terrorists using library computers to communicate. Library records had played a role in several high-profile cases, such as the Zodiac gunman murders in California. The last thing I wanted was to allow the freedom and access to information provided by American libraries to be utilized against us by al Qaeda al Qaeda.

Lawmakers recognized the urgency of the threat and pa.s.sed the PATRIOT Act 98 to 1 in the Senate and 357 to 66 in the House. I signed the bill into law on October 26, 2001. "We took time to look at it, we took time to read it, and we took time to remove those parts that were unconst.i.tutional and those parts that would have actually hurt liberties of all Americans," Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy Patrick Leahy of Vermont said. His Democratic colleague, Senator of Vermont said. His Democratic colleague, Senator Chuck Schumer Chuck Schumer of New York, added, "If there is one key word that underscores this bill, it is 'balance.' In the new postSeptember 11 society that we face, balance is going to be a key word....Balance and reason have prevailed." of New York, added, "If there is one key word that underscores this bill, it is 'balance.' In the new postSeptember 11 society that we face, balance is going to be a key word....Balance and reason have prevailed."

Over the next five years, the PATRIOT Act helped us break up potential terror cells in New York, Oregon, Virginia, and Florida. In one example, law enforcement and intelligence authorities shared information that led to the arrest of six Yemeni Americans in Lackawanna, New York, who had traveled to a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan and met with Osama bin Laden Osama bin Laden. Five pled guilty to providing material support to al Qaeda. The other admitted to unlawful transactions with al Qaeda.

Some claimed the Lackawanna Six Lackawanna Six and others we arrested were little more than "small-town dupes" with fanciful plots "who had no intention of carrying out terrorist acts." I always wondered how the second-guessers could be so sure. After all, in August 2001, the idea that terrorists commanded from caves in Afghanistan would attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on U.S. commercial airplanes would have seemed pretty far-fetched. For me, the lesson of 9/11 was simple: Don't take chances. When our law enforcement and intelligence professionals found people with ties to terrorist networks inside the United States, I would rather be criticized for taking them into custody too early than waiting until it was too late. and others we arrested were little more than "small-town dupes" with fanciful plots "who had no intention of carrying out terrorist acts." I always wondered how the second-guessers could be so sure. After all, in August 2001, the idea that terrorists commanded from caves in Afghanistan would attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on U.S. commercial airplanes would have seemed pretty far-fetched. For me, the lesson of 9/11 was simple: Don't take chances. When our law enforcement and intelligence professionals found people with ties to terrorist networks inside the United States, I would rather be criticized for taking them into custody too early than waiting until it was too late.

As the freshness of 9/11 faded, so did the overwhelming congressional support for the PATRIOT Act PATRIOT Act. Civil liberties advocates and commentators on the wings of both parties mischaracterized the law as a stand-in for everything they disliked about the war on terror. Key provisions of the PATRIOT Act, such as the authority to conduct roving wiretaps, were set to expire in 2005. I pushed hard for their re-authorization. As I told Congress, the threat had not expired, so the law shouldn't, either.

Lawmakers delayed and complained. But when they finally held a vote, they renewed the PATRIOT Act by a margin of 89 to 10 in the Senate and 251 to 174 in the House. In early 2010, key provisions of the PATRIOT Act were authorized again by the heavily Democratic Congress.

My one regret about the PATRIOT Act is its name. When my administration sent the bill to Capitol Hill, it was initially called the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001. Congress got clever and renamed it. As a result, there was an implication that people who opposed the law were unpatriotic. That was not what I intended. I should have pushed Congress to change the name of the bill before I signed it.

As part of the 9/11 investigation, we discovered that two hijackers who had infiltrated the United States, Khalid al Mihdhar Khalid al Mihdhar and and Nawaf al Hazmi Nawaf al Hazmi, had communicated with al Qaeda al Qaeda leaders overseas more than a dozen times before the attack. My immediate question was: Why hadn't we intercepted the calls? If we had heard what Mihdhar and Hazmi were saying, we might have been able to stop the attacks of 9/11. leaders overseas more than a dozen times before the attack. My immediate question was: Why hadn't we intercepted the calls? If we had heard what Mihdhar and Hazmi were saying, we might have been able to stop the attacks of 9/11.

The man with the answers was Mike Hayden Mike Hayden, the three-star Air Force general who led the National Security Agency. If the intelligence community is the brains of national security, the NSA is part of the gray matter. The agency is filled with smart, techno-savvy experts and code breakers, along with a.n.a.lysts and linguists. Mike told me the NSA had the capability to monitor those al Qaeda phone calls into the United States before 9/11. But he didn't have the legal authority to do it without receiving a court order, a process that could be difficult and slow.

With General Mike Hayden. White House/Eric Draper White House/Eric Draper The reason was a law called the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Written in 1978, before widespread use of cell phones and the Internet, FISA prohibited the NSA from monitoring communications involving people inside the United States without a warrant from the FISA court. For example, if a terrorist in Afghanistan contacted a terrorist in Pakistan, NSA could intercept their conversation. But if the same terrorist called someone in the United States, or sent an email that touched an American computer server, NSA had to apply for a court order.

That made no sense. Why should it be tougher to monitor al Qaeda communications with terrorists inside the United States than with their a.s.sociates overseas? As Mike Hayden put it, we were "flying blind with no early warning system."

After 9/11, we couldn't afford to fly blind. If al Qaeda operatives were calling into or out of the United States, we d.a.m.n sure needed to know who they were calling and what they were saying. And given the urgency of the threats, we could not allow ourselves to get bogged down in the court approval process. I asked the White House counsel's office and the Justice Department to study whether I could authorize the NSA to monitor al Qaeda communications into and out of the country without FISA warrants.

Both told me I could. They concluded that conducting surveillance against our enemies in war fell within the authorities granted by the congressional war resolution and the const.i.tutional authority of the commander in chief. Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln had wiretapped telegraph machines during the Civil War. had wiretapped telegraph machines during the Civil War. Woodrow Wilson Woodrow Wilson had ordered the interception of virtually every telephone and telegraph message going into or out of the United States during World War I. had ordered the interception of virtually every telephone and telegraph message going into or out of the United States during World War I. Franklin Roosevelt Franklin Roosevelt had allowed the military to read and censor communications during World War II. had allowed the military to read and censor communications during World War II.

Before I approved the Terrorist Surveillance Program Terrorist Surveillance Program, I wanted to ensure there were safeguards to prevent abuses. I had no desire to turn the NSA into an Orwellian Big Brother. I knew that the Kennedy brothers had teamed up with J. Edgar Hoover J. Edgar Hoover to listen illegally to the conversations of innocent people, including to listen illegally to the conversations of innocent people, including Martin Luther King, Jr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Lyndon Johnson had continued the practice. I thought that was a sad chapter in our history, and I wasn't going to repeat it. Lyndon Johnson had continued the practice. I thought that was a sad chapter in our history, and I wasn't going to repeat it.

On the morning of October 4, 2001, Mike Hayden Mike Hayden and the legal team came to the Oval Office. They a.s.sured me the Terrorist Surveillance Program had been carefully designed to protect the civil liberties of innocent people. The purpose of the program was to monitor so-called dirty numbers, which intelligence professionals had reason to believe belonged to al Qaeda operatives. Many had been found in the cell phones or computers of terrorists captured on the battlefield. If we inadvertently intercepted any portion of purely domestic communications, the violation would be reported to the Justice Department for investigation. To be sure the program was used only as long as necessary, it had to be regularly rea.s.sessed and reapproved. and the legal team came to the Oval Office. They a.s.sured me the Terrorist Surveillance Program had been carefully designed to protect the civil liberties of innocent people. The purpose of the program was to monitor so-called dirty numbers, which intelligence professionals had reason to believe belonged to al Qaeda operatives. Many had been found in the cell phones or computers of terrorists captured on the battlefield. If we inadvertently intercepted any portion of purely domestic communications, the violation would be reported to the Justice Department for investigation. To be sure the program was used only as long as necessary, it had to be regularly rea.s.sessed and reapproved.

I gave the order to proceed with the program. We considered going to Congress to get legislation, but key members from both parties who received highly cla.s.sified briefings on the program agreed that the surveillance was necessary and that a legislative debate was not possible without exposing our methods to the enemy.

I knew the Terrorist Surveillance Program would prove controversial one day. Yet I believed it was necessary. The rubble at the World Trade Center was still smoldering. Every morning I received intelligence reports about another possible attack. Monitoring terrorist communications into the United States was essential to keeping the American people safe.

On December 22, a British pa.s.senger named Richard Reid Richard Reid tried to blow up an American Airlines flight carrying 197 people from Paris to Miami by detonating explosives in his shoes. Fortunately, an alert flight attendant noticed his suspicious behavior, and pa.s.sengers overwhelmed him before he could light the fuse. The plane was diverted to Boston, where Reid was marched off in handcuffs. He later told questioners that his goal was to cripple the U.S. economy with an attack during the holiday season. He pled guilty to eight counts of terrorist activity, leading to a life sentence at the federal supermax prison in Florence, Colorado. tried to blow up an American Airlines flight carrying 197 people from Paris to Miami by detonating explosives in his shoes. Fortunately, an alert flight attendant noticed his suspicious behavior, and pa.s.sengers overwhelmed him before he could light the fuse. The plane was diverted to Boston, where Reid was marched off in handcuffs. He later told questioners that his goal was to cripple the U.S. economy with an attack during the holiday season. He pled guilty to eight counts of terrorist activity, leading to a life sentence at the federal supermax prison in Florence, Colorado.

The foiled attack had a big impact on me. Three months after 9/11, it was a vivid reminder that the threats were frighteningly real. Airport screeners began requiring pa.s.sengers to remove their shoes at checkpoints. I recognized that we were creating an inconvenience, but I felt it was worth it to prevent a copycat attack. I knew my policy was being implemented fully when Laura's eighty-two-year-old mom had to take off her shoes before her Christmas flight from Midland to Washington. I sure hoped I wouldn't be nearby if they asked Mother to do the same.

The near-miss over the Atlantic highlighted a broader gap in our approach to the war on terror. When Richard Reid was arrested, he was swiftly placed into the U.S. criminal justice system, which ent.i.tled him to the same const.i.tutional protections as a common criminal. But the shoe bomber was not a burglar or bank robber; he was a foot soldier in al Qaeda's war against America. He had emailed his mother two days before his attempted attack: "What I am doing is part of the ongoing war between Islam and disbelief." By giving this terrorist the right to remain silent, we deprived ourselves of the opportunity to collect vital intelligence on his plan and his handlers.

Reid's case made clear we needed a new policy for dealing with captured terrorists. In this new kind of war, there is no more valuable source of intelligence on potential attacks than the terrorists themselves. Amid the steady stream of threats after 9/11, I grappled with three of the most critical decisions I would make in the war on terror: where to hold captured enemy fighters, how to determine their legal status and ensure they eventually faced justice, and how to learn what they knew about future attacks so we could protect the American people.

Initially, most captured al Qaeda fighters were held for questioning in battlefield prisons in Afghanistan. In November, CIA officers went to interrogate Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners detained at a primitive nineteenth-century Afghan fortress, Qala-i-Jangi. A riot ensued. Using weapons smuggled onto the complex, enemy fighters killed one of our officers, Johnny "Mike" Spann, making him the first American combat death in the war.

The tragedy highlighted the need for a secure facility to hold captured terrorists. There were few options, none particularly attractive. For a while, we held al Qaeda al Qaeda detainees on Navy ships in the Arabian Sea. But that was not a viable long-term solution. Another possibility was to send the terrorists to a secure base on a distant island or U.S. territory, such as Guam. But holding captured terrorists on American soil could activate const.i.tutional protections they would not otherwise receive, such as the right to remain silent. That would make it much more difficult to get urgently needed intelligence. detainees on Navy ships in the Arabian Sea. But that was not a viable long-term solution. Another possibility was to send the terrorists to a secure base on a distant island or U.S. territory, such as Guam. But holding captured terrorists on American soil could activate const.i.tutional protections they would not otherwise receive, such as the right to remain silent. That would make it much more difficult to get urgently needed intelligence.

We decided to hold detainees at a remote naval station on the southern tip of Cuba, Guantanamo Bay. The base was on Cuban soil, but the United States controlled it under a lease acquired after the Spanish-American War. The Justice Department advised me that prisoners brought there had no right of access to the U.S. criminal justice system. The area surrounding Guantanamo was inaccessible and spa.r.s.ely populated. Holding terrorists in Fidel Castro's Cuba was hardly an appealing prospect. But as Don Rumsfeld put it, Guantanamo was the "least worst choice" available.

At Guantanamo, detainees were given clean and safe shelter, three meals a day, a personal copy of the Koran, the opportunity to pray five times daily, and the same medical care their guards received. They had access to exercise s.p.a.ce and a library stocked with books and DVDs. One of the most popular was an Arabic translation of Harry Potter Harry Potter.

Over the years, we invited members of Congress, journalists, and international observers to visit Guantanamo and see the conditions for themselves. Many came away surprised by what they found. A Belgian official inspected Guantanamo five times and called it a "model prison" that offered detainees better treatment than Belgian prisons. "I have never witnessed acts of violence or things which shocked me in Guantanamo," he said. "One should not confuse this center with Abu Ghraib."

While our humane treatment of Guantanamo detainees was consistent with the Geneva Conventions Geneva Conventions, al Qaeda did not meet the qualifications for Geneva protection as a legal matter. The purpose of Geneva was to provide incentives for nation-states to fight wars by an agreed set of rules that protect human dignity and innocent life-and to punish warriors who do not. But the terrorists did not represent a nation-state. They had not signed the Geneva Conventions. Their entire mode of operation-intentionally killing the innocent-defied the principles of Geneva. And if al Qaeda captured an American, there was little chance they would treat him humanely.

This was confirmed with gruesome clarity in late January 2002, when terrorists in Pakistan abducted Wall Street Journal Wall Street Journal reporter reporter Daniel Pearl Daniel Pearl. They alleged he was a CIA spy and tried to blackmail the United States into bargaining for his release. America has a longstanding policy of not negotiating with terrorists, and I continued it. I knew that if I accepted one terrorist's demands, it would only encourage more kidnappings. Our military and intelligence a.s.sets were searching urgently for Pearl, but they couldn't make it in time. In his final moments, Danny Pearl said, "My father is Jewish, my mother is Jewish, I am Jewish." Then his al Qaeda captors slit his throat.

As I made my decision on Geneva protection, I also decided to create a legal system to determine the innocence or guilt of detainees. George Washington George Washington, Abraham Lincoln Abraham Lincoln, William McKinley William McKinley, and Franklin Roosevelt Franklin Roosevelt had faced similar dilemmas of how to bring captured enemy combatants to justice during wartime. All had reached the same conclusion: a court operated by the military. had faced similar dilemmas of how to bring captured enemy combatants to justice during wartime. All had reached the same conclusion: a court operated by the military.

On November 13, 2001, I signed an executive order establishing military tribunals to try captured terrorists. The system was based closely on the one created by FDR in 1942, which tried and convicted eight n.a.z.i spies who had infiltrated the United States. The Supreme Court Supreme Court had unanimously upheld the legality of those tribunals. had unanimously upheld the legality of those tribunals.

I was confident the military tribunals would provide a fair trial. Detainees were ent.i.tled to the presumption of innocence, representation by a qualified attorney, and the right to present evidence that would "have probative value to a reasonable person." For practical national security reasons, they were not allowed to view cla.s.sified information that would expose intelligence sources and methods. Convicting a defendant required agreement of two thirds of the tribunal. The detainee could appeal the tribunal's decision or sentence to the secretary of defense and to the president.

Inherent in my tribunals decision-and many others in the new war-was the tension between protecting the American people and upholding civil liberties. Maintaining our values was critical to our position in the world. We could neither lead the free world nor recruit new allies to our cause if we did not practice what we preached. I believed military tribunals struck the right balance, upholding the rule of law while protecting the country.

On March 28, 2002, I could hear excitement in George Tenet's voice. He reported that Pakistani police-with a hand from the FBI and CIA-had launched a takedown operation against several al Qaeda safe houses in the Pakistani city of Faisalabad. They netted more than two dozen operatives, including Abu Zubaydah Abu Zubaydah.

I had been hearing reports about Zubaydah for months. The intelligence community believed he was a trusted a.s.sociate of Osama bin Laden and a senior recruiter and operator who had run a camp in Afghanistan where some of the 9/11 hijackers had trained. He was suspected of involvement in previous plots to destroy targets in Jordan and blow up Los Angeles International Airport. The CIA believed he was planning to attack America again.

Zubaydah had been severely wounded in a gun battle prior to his arrest. The CIA flew in a top doctor, who saved his life. The Pakistanis then turned him over to our custody. The FBI began questioning Zubaydah, who had clearly been trained on how to resist interrogation. He revealed bits and pieces of information that he thought we already knew. Frighteningly, we didn't know much. For example, we received definitive information about a new alias for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who Zubaydah also confirmed had masterminded the 9/11 attacks.

Then Zubaydah stopped answering questions. George Tenet told me interrogators believed Zubaydah had more information to reveal. If he was hiding something more, what could it be? Zubaydah was our best lead to avoid another catastrophic attack. "We need to find out what he knows," I directed the team. "What are our options?"

One option was for the CIA to take over Zubaydah's questioning and move him to a secure location in another country where the Agency could have total control over his environment. CIA experts drew up a list of interrogation techniques that differed from those Zubaydah had successfully resisted. George a.s.sured me all interrogations would be performed by experienced intelligence professionals who had undergone extensive training. Medical personnel would be on-site to guarantee that the detainee was not physically or mentally harmed.

At my direction, Department of Justice and CIA lawyers conducted a careful legal review. They concluded that the enhanced interrogation program interrogation program complied with the Const.i.tution and all applicable laws, including those that ban torture. complied with the Const.i.tution and all applicable laws, including those that ban torture.

I took a look at the list of techniques. There were two that I felt went too far, even if they were legal. I directed the CIA not to use them. Another technique was waterboarding waterboarding, a process of simulated drowning. No doubt the procedure was tough, but medical experts a.s.sured the CIA that it did no lasting harm.

I knew that an interrogation program this sensitive and controversial would one day become public. When it did, we would open ourselves up to criticism that America had compromised our moral values. I would have preferred that we get the information another way. But the choice between security and values was real. Had I not authorized waterboarding on senior al Qaeda leaders, I would have had to accept a greater risk that the country would be attacked. In the wake of 9/11, that was a risk I was unwilling to take. My most solemn responsibility as president was to protect the country. I approved the use of the interrogation techniques.

The new techniques proved highly effective. Zubaydah revealed large amounts of information on al Qaeda's structure and operations. He also provided leads that helped reveal the location of Ramzi bin al Shibh Ramzi bin al Shibh, the logistical planner of the 9/11 attacks. The Pakistani police picked him up on the first anniversary of 9/11.

Zubaydah later explained to interrogators why he started answering questions again. His understanding of Islam was that he had to resist interrogation only up to a certain point. Waterboarding was the technique that allowed him to reach that threshold, fulfill his religious duty, and then cooperate. "You must do this for all the brothers," he said.

On March 1, 2003, George Tenet told a spy story suitable for a John le Carre novel. Information gleaned through the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah Abu Zubaydah and and Ramzi bin al Shibh Ramzi bin al Shibh, combined with other intelligence, had helped us draw a bead on a high-ranking al Qaeda al Qaeda leader. Then a brave foreign agent recruited by the CIA led us to the door of an apartment complex in Pakistan. "I want my children free of these madmen who distort our religion and kill innocent people," the agent later said. leader. Then a brave foreign agent recruited by the CIA led us to the door of an apartment complex in Pakistan. "I want my children free of these madmen who distort our religion and kill innocent people," the agent later said.

Pakistani forces raided the complex and hauled out their target. It was the chief operating officer of al Qaeda, the murderer of Danny Pearl, and the mastermind of 9/11: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

I was relieved to have one of al Qaeda's senior leaders off the battlefield. But my relief did not last long. Agents searching Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's compound discovered what one official later called a "mother lode" of valuable intelligence. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was obviously planning more attacks. It didn't sound like he was willing to give us any information about them. "I'll talk to you," he said, "after I get to New York and see my lawyer."

George Tenet asked if he had permission to use enhanced interrogation techniques, including waterboarding waterboarding, on Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. I thought about my meeting with Danny Pearl's widow, who was pregnant with his son when he was murdered. I thought about the 2,973 people stolen from their families by al Qaeda on 9/11. And I thought about my duty to protect the country from another act of terror.

"d.a.m.n right," I said.

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed proved difficult to break. But when he did, he gave us a lot. He disclosed plans to attack American targets with anthrax and directed us to three people involved in the al Qaeda biological weapons program. He provided information that led to the capture of Hambali Hambali, the chief of al Qaeda's most dangerous affiliate in Southeast Asia and the architect of the Bali terrorist attack that killed 202 people. He provided further details that led agents to Hambali's brother, who had been grooming operatives to carry out another attack inside the United States, possibly a West Coast version of 9/11 in which terrorists flew a hijacked plane into the Library Tower in Los Angeles.

Years later, the Washington Post Washington Post ran a front-page story about Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's transformation. Headlined "How a Detainee Became an a.s.set," it described how Mohammed "seemed to relish the opportunity, sometimes for hours on end, to discuss the inner workings of al-Qaeda and the group's plans, ideology and operatives....He'd even use a chalkboard at times." The intelligence he provided, which proved vital to saving American lives, almost certainly would not have come to light without the CIA's enhanced interrogation program. ran a front-page story about Khalid Sheikh Mohammed's transformation. Headlined "How a Detainee Became an a.s.set," it described how Mohammed "seemed to relish the opportunity, sometimes for hours on end, to discuss the inner workings of al-Qaeda and the group's plans, ideology and operatives....He'd even use a chalkboard at times." The intelligence he provided, which proved vital to saving American lives, almost certainly would not have come to light without the CIA's enhanced interrogation program.

Of the thousands of terrorists we captured in the years after 9/11, about a hundred were placed into the CIA program. About a third of those were questioned using enhanced techniques. Three were waterboarded. The information the detainees in the CIA program revealed const.i.tuted more than half of what the CIA knew about al Qaeda. Their interrogations helped break up plots to attack American military and diplomatic facilities abroad, Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London, and multiple targets in the United States. Experts in the intelligence community told me that without the CIA program, there would have been another attack on the United States.

After we implemented the CIA program, we briefed a small number of lawmakers from both parties on its existence. At the time, some were concerned we weren't pushing hard enough. But years later, once the threat seemed less urgent and the political winds had shifted, many lawmakers became fierce critics. They charged that Americans had committed unlawful torture. That was not true. I had asked the most senior legal officers in the U.S. government to review the interrogation methods, and they had a.s.sured me they did not const.i.tute torture. To suggest that our intelligence personnel violated the law by following the legal guidance they received is insulting and wrong.

The CIA interrogation program saved lives. Had we captured more al Qaeda operatives with significant intelligence value, I would have used the program for them as well.

On the morning of March 10, 2004, d.i.c.k Cheney d.i.c.k Cheney and and Andy Card Andy Card greeted me with a startling announcement: The Terrorist Surveillance Program would expire at the end of the day. greeted me with a startling announcement: The Terrorist Surveillance Program would expire at the end of the day.

"How can it possibly end?" I asked. "It's vital to protecting the country." Two and a half years had pa.s.sed since I authorized the TSP in October 2001. In that time, the NSA had used the program to uncover key details about terrorist plots and locations. NSA Director Mike Hayden Mike Hayden later said publicly that the program had been "successful in detecting and preventing attacks inside the United States" and that it was his "professional judgment that we would have detected some of the 9/11 al Qaeda operatives in the United States" if it had been operational before the attacks. later said publicly that the program had been "successful in detecting and preventing attacks inside the United States" and that it was his "professional judgment that we would have detected some of the 9/11 al Qaeda operatives in the United States" if it had been operational before the attacks.

Andy explained the situation. While John Ashcroft John Ashcroft had regularly recommended the renewal of the TSP since 2001, the had regularly recommended the renewal of the TSP since 2001, the Justice Department Justice Department had raised a legal objection to one component of the program. had raised a legal objection to one component of the program.

"Why didn't I know about this?" I asked. Andy shared my disbelief. He told me he had just learned about the objection the previous night. The legal team must have thought the disagreement could be settled without presidential involvement. I told Andy to work with Ashcroft and White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales Alberto Gonzales to solve the problem. In the meantime, I had to fly to Cleveland to deliver a speech on trade policy. to solve the problem. In the meantime, I had to fly to Cleveland to deliver a speech on trade policy.

When I got back, I checked in with Andy. Little progress had been made. The Justice Department was sticking to its objection. My lawyers weren't budging, either. They were convinced the program was legal.

"Where the h.e.l.l is Ashcroft?" I asked.

"He's in the hospital," Andy replied.

That was news to me. I called John, who I discovered was recovering from emergency gallbladder surgery. I told him I was sending Andy and Al to talk to him about an urgent matter. They drove to the hospital with the TSP reauthorization order. When they got back, they told me Ashcroft hadn't signed. The only way to allow the program to continue was to override the Justice Department's objection. I didn't like the idea, but I saw no other alternative. I signed an order keeping the TSP alive based on my authority as head of the executive branch.

I went to bed irritated and had a feeling I didn't know the full story. I intended to get it.

"Mr. President, we've got a major problem," Andy told me when I got to the Oval Office on the morning of March 12. "Jim Comey is the acting attorney general, and he's going to resign because you extended the TSP. So are a bunch of other Justice Department officials."

I was stunned. n.o.body had told me that Comey, John Ashcroft's deputy, had taken over Ashcroft's responsibilities when he went in for surgery. If I had known that, I never would have sent Andy and Al to John's hospital room.

I asked to speak to Comey privately after the morning FBI briefing, which he attended in John Ashcroft's place. I hadn't spent a lot of time with Jim, but I knew he had a distinguished record as a prosecutor in New York. I started by explaining that I had an obligation to do what was necessary to protect the country. I felt the TSP was essential to that effort. He explained his concerns about the problematic aspect of the program. "I just don't understand why you are raising this at the last minute," I said.

He looked shocked. "Mr. President," he said, "your staff has known about this for weeks." Then he dropped another bomb. He wasn't the only one planning to resign. So was FBI Director Bob Mueller Bob Mueller. I was about to witness the largest ma.s.s resignation in modern presidential history, and we were in the middle of a war.

I called Bob into the Oval Office. I had come to know him well over the past two and a half years. He was a good and decent man, a former Princeton hockey star who had served in the Marines and led the U.S. Attorney's Office in San Francisco. Without hesitation, he agreed with Comey. If I continued the program over the Justice Department's objection, he said, he couldn't serve in my administration.

I had to make a big decision, and fast. Some in the White House believed I should stand on my powers under Article II of the Const.i.tution and suffer the walkout. Others counseled that I accept Justice's objections, modify the program, and keep the administration intact.

I was willing to defend the powers of the presidency under Article II. But not at any cost. I thought about the Sat.u.r.day Night Ma.s.sacre in October 1973, when President Richard Nixon Richard Nixon's firing of Watergate prosecutor Archibald c.o.x led his attorney general and deputy attorney general to resign. That was not a historical crisis I was eager to replicate. It wouldn't give me much satisfaction to know I was right on the legal principles while my administration imploded and our key programs in the war on terror were exposed in the media firestorm that would inevitably follow.

I decided to accommodate the Justice Department's concern by modifying the part of the program they found problematic, while leaving the TSP in place. Comey and Mueller dropped their resignation threats. The surveillance program continued to produce results, and that was the most important thing.

I was relieved to have the crisis over, but I was disturbed it had happened at all. I made clear to my advisers that I never wanted to be blindsided like that again. I did not suspect bad intentions on anyone's part. One of the toughest questions every White House faces is how to manage the president's time and when to bring policy disputes to his desk. The standoff over the surveillance program was a case of bad judgment. There was no shortage of disagreements in the years ahead, but nothing like this ever happened again.