Dante. An essay Part 19

Therefore we must recognise that it is one thing to be another's vicar, and that it is another to be his messenger or minister, just as it is one thing to be a doctor, and another to be an interpreter. For a vicar is one to whom is committed jurisdiction with law or with arbitrary power, and therefore within the bounds of the jurisdiction which is committed to him, he may act by law or by his arbitrary power without the knowledge of his lord. It is not so with a mere messenger, in so far as he is a messenger; but as the mallet acts only by the strength of the smith, so the messenger acts only by the authority of him that sent him. Although, then, G.o.d did this by His messenger Samuel, it does not follow that the Vicar of G.o.d may do the same. For there are many things which G.o.d has done and still does, and yet will do through angels, which the Vicar of G.o.d, the successor of Peter, might not do.

Therefore we may see that they argue from the whole to a part, thus: Men can hear and see, therefore the eye can hear and see: which does not hold. Were the argument negative, it would be good: for instance, man cannot fly, therefore man's arm cannot fly. And, in the same way, G.o.d cannot, by his messenger, cause what is not to have been,[290] as Agathon says; therefore neither can his Vicar.

[Footnote 290: As quoted by Aristotle, _Ethics_, vi. 3.--(W.)]

VII.--Further, they use the offering of the wise men from the text of Matthew, saying that Christ accepted from them both frankincense and gold, to signify that He was lord and ruler both of things temporal and of things spiritual; and from this they infer that the Vicar of Christ is also lord and ruler both of things temporal and of things spiritual; and that consequently he has authority over both.

To this I answer, that I acknowledge that Matthew's words and meaning are both as they say, but that the inference which they attempt to draw therefrom fails, because it fails in the terms of the argument.

Their syllogism runs thus: G.o.d is the lord both of things temporal and of things spiritual, the holy Pontiff is the Vicar of G.o.d; therefore he is lord both of things temporal and of things spiritual. Both of these propositions are true, but the middle term in them is different, and _four_ terms are introduced, by which the form of the syllogism is not kept, as is plain from what is said of "the syllogism simply."[291] For "G.o.d" is the subject of the major premiss, and "the Vicar of G.o.d" is the predicate of the minor; and these are not the same.

[Footnote 291: Arist. _a.n.a.l. Prior._, or rather, the _Summulae Logicae_, l. iv., of Petrus Hispa.n.u.s.--(W.)]

And if anyone raises the objection that the Vicar of G.o.d is equal in power to G.o.d, his objection is idle; for no vicar, whether human or divine, can be equal in power to the master whose vicar he is, which is at once obvious. We know that the successor of Peter had not equal authority with G.o.d, at least in the works of nature; he could not make a clod of earth fall upwards, nor fire to burn in a downward direction, by virtue of the office committed to him. Nor could all things be committed to him by G.o.d; for G.o.d could not commit to any the power of creation, and of baptism, as is clearly proved, notwithstanding what[292] the Master says in his fourth book.

[Footnote 292: Peter Lombard, "magister sententiarum," iv. dist. 5, f.

2.--(W.)]

We know also that the vicar of a mortal man is not equal in authority to the man whose vicar he is, so far as he is his vicar; for none can give away what is not his. The authority of a prince does not belong to a prince, except for him to use it; for no prince can give to himself authority. He can indeed receive authority, and give it up, but he cannot create it in another man, for it does not belong to a prince to create another prince. And if this is so, it is manifest that no prince can subst.i.tute for himself a vicar equal to himself in authority respecting all things, and therefore the objection to our argument has no weight.

VIII.--They also bring forward that saying in Matthew of Christ to Peter: "Whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven;"

which also, from the text of Matthew and John, they allow to have been in like manner said to all the Apostles. From this they argue that it has been granted by G.o.d to the successor of Peter to be able to bind and to loose all things; hence they infer that he can loose the laws and decrees of the Empire, and also bind laws and decrees for the temporal power; and, if this were so, this conclusion would rightly follow.

But we must draw a distinction touching their major premiss. Their syllogism is in this form. Peter could loose and bind all things; the successor of Peter can do whatever Peter could do; therefore the successor of Peter can bind and can loose all things: whence they conclude that he can bind and can loose the decrees and the authority of the Empire.

Now I admit the minor premiss; but touching the major premiss I draw a distinction. The universal "everything" which is included in "whatever" is not distributed beyond the extent of the distributed term. If I say "all animals run," "all" is distributed so as to include everything which comes under the cla.s.s "animal." But if I say "all men run," then "all" is only distributed so as to include every individual in the cla.s.s "man;" and when I say "every grammarian runs,"

then is the distribution even more limited.

Therefore we must always look to see what it is that is to be included in the word "all," and when we know the nature and extent of the distributed term, it will easily be seen how far the distribution extends. Therefore, when it is said "whatsoever thou shalt bind," if "whatsoever" bore an unlimited sense, they would speak truly, and the power of the Pope would extend even beyond what they say; for he might then divorce a wife from her husband, and marry her to another while her first husband was yet alive, which he can in no wise do. He might even absolve me when impenitent, which G.o.d Himself cannot do.

Therefore it is manifest that the distribution of the term in question is not absolute, but in reference to something. What this is will be sufficiently clear if we consider what power was granted to Peter.

Christ said to Peter: "To thee will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven"--that is, "I will make thee the doorkeeper of the kingdom of heaven." And then He adds: "Whatsoever," which is to say "all that"--to wit, all that has reference to this duty--"thou shalt have power to bind and to loose." And thus the universal which is implied in "whatsoever" has only a limited distribution, referring to the office of the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And in this sense the proposition of our opponents is true, but, taken absolutely, it is manifestly false. I say, then, that although the successor of Peter has power to bind and to loose, as belongs to him to whom the office of Peter was committed, yet it does not therefore follow that he has power to bind and to loose the decrees of the Empire, as our opponents say, unless they further prove that to do so belongs to the office of the keys, which we shall shortly show is not the case.

IX.--They further take the words in Luke which Peter spake to Christ, saying: "Behold, here are two swords;" and they understood that by these two swords the two kinds of rule were foretold. And since Peter said "here," where he was, which is to say, "with him," they argue that the authority of the two kinds of rule rests with the successor of Peter.

We must answer by showing that the interpretation, on which the argument rests, is wrong. They say that the two swords of which Peter spake mean the two kinds of rule which we have spoken of; but this we wholly deny, for then Peter's answer would not be according to the meaning of the words of Christ; and also we say that Peter made, as was his wont, a hasty answer, touching only the outside of things.

It will be manifest that such an answer as our opponents allege would not be according to the meaning of the words of Christ, if the preceding words, and the reason of them, be considered. Observe, then, that these words were spoken on the day of the feast, for a little before Luke writes thus: "Then came the day of unleavened bread, when the Pa.s.sover must be killed;" and at this feast Christ had spoken of His Pa.s.sion, which was at hand, in which it was necessary for Him to be separated from His disciples. Observe, too, that when these words were spoken the twelve were a.s.sembled together, and therefore, shortly after the words which we have just quoted, Luke says: "And when the hour was come He sat down, and the twelve Apostles with Him." And continuing His discourse with them, He came to this: "When I sent you, without purse, and scrip, and shoes, lacked ye anything? And they said, Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip; and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment, and buy one." From these words the purpose of Christ is sufficiently manifest; for He did not say: "Buy, or get for yourselves, two swords," but rather "twelve swords," seeing that He spake unto twelve disciples: "He that hath not, let him buy," so that each should have one. And He said this to admonish them of the persecution and scorn that they should suffer, as though He would say: "As long as I was with you men received you gladly, but now you will be driven away; therefore of necessity ye must prepare for yourselves those things which formerly I forbade you to have." And therefore if the answer of Peter bore the meaning which our opponents a.s.sign to it, it would have been no answer to the words of Christ; and Christ would have rebuked him for answering foolishly, as He often did rebuke him.

But Christ did not rebuke him, but was satisfied, saying unto him: "It is enough," as though He would say: "I speak because of the necessity; but if each one of you cannot possess a sword, two are enough."

And that it was Peter's wont to speak in a shallow manner is proved by his hasty and thoughtless forwardness, to which he was led not only by the sincerity of his faith, but also, I believe, by the natural purity and simplicity of his character. All the Evangelists bear testimony to this forwardness.

Matthew writes that when Jesus had asked His disciples: "Whom say ye that I am?" Peter answered before them all and said: "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living G.o.d." He writes also that when Christ was saying to His disciples that he must go up to Jerusalem and suffer many things, Peter took Him and began to rebuke Him, saying: "Be it far from Thee, Lord; this shall not be unto Thee." But Christ turned and rebuked him, and said: "Get thee behind me, Satan." Matthew also writes that in the Mount of Transfiguration, on the sight of Christ, and of Moses and Elias, and of the two sons of Zebedee, Peter said: "Lord, it is good for us to be here; if Thou wilt, let us make here three tabernacles, one for Thee, one for Moses, and one for Elias." He also writes that when the disciples were in a ship, in the night, and Christ went unto them walking on the sea, then Peter said unto Him: "Lord, if it be Thou, bid me come unto Thee on the water." And when Christ foretold that all His disciples should be offended because of Him, Peter answered and said: "Though all men shall be offended because of Thee, yet will I never be offended;" and then: "Though I should die with Thee, yet will I not deny Thee." And to this saying Mark bears witness also. And Luke writes that Peter had said to Christ, a little before the words touching the swords which we have quoted: "Lord, I am ready to go with Thee, both into prison and to death." And John says of him, that, when Christ wished to wash his feet, Peter answered and said: "Lord, dost Thou wash my feet?" and then: "Thou shalt never wash my feet." The same Evangelist tells us that it was Peter who smote the High Priest's servant with a sword, and the other Evangelists also bear witness to this thing. He tells us also how Peter entered the sepulchre at once, when he saw the other disciple waiting outside, and how, when Christ was on the sh.o.r.e after the resurrection, when Peter had heard that it was the Lord, he girt his fisher's coat unto him (for he was naked) and did cast himself into the sea. Lastly, John tells that when Peter saw John, he said unto Jesus: "Lord, and what shall this man do?"

It is a pleasure to have pursued this point about our Chief Shepherd,[293] in praise of his purity of spirit; but from what I have said it is plain that when he spake of the two swords, he answered the words of Christ with no second meaning.

[Footnote 293: "Archimandrita nostro." Cf. _Parad._ xi. 99, of St.

Francis.--(W.)]

But if we are to receive these words of Christ and of Peter typically, they must not be explained as our adversaries explain them; but they must be referred to that sword of which Matthew writes: "Think not that I am come to send peace on the earth; I come not to send peace, but a sword. For I am come to set a man at variance against his father," &c. And this comes to pa.s.s not only in words, but also in fact. And therefore Luke speaks to Theophilus of all "that Jesus began both to do and to teach." It was a sword of that kind that Christ commanded them to buy; and Peter said that it was already doubly there. For they were ready both for words and for deeds, by which they should accomplish what Christ said that He had come to do by the sword.

X.--Certain persons say further that the Emperor Constantine, having been cleansed from leprosy by the intercession of Sylvester, then the Supreme Pontiff, gave unto the Church the seat of Empire which was Rome, together with many other dignities belonging to the Empire.[294]

Hence they argue that no man can take unto himself these dignities unless he receive them from the Church, whose they are said to be.

From this it would rightly follow, that one authority depends on the other, as they maintain.

[Footnote 294: On the Donation of Constantine, Witte refers to _Inf._ x.x.xviii. 94; xix. 115; _Purg._ x.x.xii. 124; _Parad._ xx. 35; _supra_ ii. 12.]

The arguments which seemed to have their roots in the Divine words, have been stated and disproved. It remains to state and disprove those which are grounded on Roman history and in the reason of mankind. The first of these is the one which we have mentioned, in which the syllogism runs as follows: No one has a right to those things which belong to the Church, unless he has them from the Church; and this we grant. The government of Rome belongs to the Church; therefore no one has a right to it unless it be given him by the Church. The minor premiss is proved by the facts concerning Constantine, which we have touched on.

This minor premiss then will I destroy; and as for their proof, I say that it proves nothing. For the dignity of the Empire was what Constantine could not alienate, nor the Church receive. And when they insist, I prove my words as follows: No man on the strength of the office which is committed to him, may do aught that is contrary to that office; for so one and the same man, viewed as one man, would be contrary to himself, which is impossible. But to divide the Empire is contrary to the office committed to the Emperor; for his office is to hold mankind in all things subject to one will: as may be easily seen from the first book of this treatise. Therefore it is not permitted to the Emperor to divide the Empire. If, therefore, as they say, any dignities had been alienated by Constantine, and had pa.s.sed to the Church, the "coat without seam"--which even they, who pierced Christ, the true G.o.d, with a spear, dared not rend--would have been rent.[295]

[Footnote 295: Each side in the controversy used the type of the "seamless robe," one of the Empire (_supra_ i. 16), the other of the Church; _e.g._, in the Bull of Boniface VIII., "_Unam Sanctam_."]

Further, just as the Church has its foundation, so has the Empire its foundation. The foundation of the Church is Christ, as Paul says in his first Epistle to the Corinthians: "For other foundation can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ."[296] He is the rock on which the Church is built; but the foundation of the Empire is human right. Now I say that, as the Church may not go contrary to its foundation--but must always rest on its foundation, as the words of the Canticles say: "Who is she that cometh up from the desert, abounding in delights, leaning on her beloved?"[297]--in the same way I say that the Empire may not do aught that transgresses human right.

But were the Empire to destroy itself, it would so transgress human right. Therefore the Empire may not destroy itself. Since then to divide the Empire would be to destroy it, because the Empire consists in one single universal Monarchy, it is manifest that he who exercises the authority of the Empire may not destroy it, and from what we have said before, it is manifest that to destroy the Empire is contrary to human right.

[Footnote 296: 1 Cor. iii. 11.--(W.)]

[Footnote 297: Cant. viii. 5.--(W.)]

Moreover, all jurisdiction is prior in time to the judge who has it; for it is the judge who is ordained for the jurisdiction, not the jurisdiction for the judge. But the Empire is a jurisdiction, comprehending within itself all temporal jurisdiction: therefore it is prior to the judge who has it, who is the Emperor. For it is the Emperor who is ordained for the Empire, and not contrariwise.

Therefore it is clear that the Emperor, in so far as he is Emperor, cannot alter the Empire; for it is to the Empire that he owes his being. I say then that he who is said to have conferred on the Church the authority in question either was Emperor, or he was not. If he was not, it is plain that he had no power to give away any part of the Empire. Nor could he, if he was Emperor, in so far as he was Emperor, for such a gift would be a diminishing of his jurisdiction.

Further, if one Emperor were able to cut off a certain portion of the jurisdiction of the Empire, so could another; and since temporal jurisdiction is finite, and since all that is finite is taken away by finite diminutions, it would follow that it is possible for the first of all jurisdictions to be annihilated, which is absurd.

Further, since he that gives is in the position of an agent, and he to whom a thing is given in that of a patient, as the Philosopher holds in the fourth book to Nicomachus,[298] therefore, that a gift may be given, we require not only the fit qualification of the giver, but also of the receiver; for the acts of the agent are completed in a patient who is qualified.[299] But the Church was altogether unqualified to receive temporal things; for there is an express command, forbidding her so to do, which Matthew gives thus: "Provide neither gold, nor silver, nor bra.s.s in your purses." For though we find in Luke a relaxation of the command in regard to certain matters, yet I have not anywhere been able to find that the Church after that prohibition had licence given her to possess gold and silver. If therefore the Church was unable to receive temporal power, even granting that Constantine was able to give it, yet the gift was impossible; for the receiver was disqualified. It is therefore plain that neither could the Church receive in the way of possession, nor could Constantine give in the way of alienation; though it is true that the Emperor, as protector of the Church, could allot to the Church a patrimony and other things, if he did not impair his supreme lordship, the unity of which does not allow division. And the Vicar of G.o.d could receive such things, not to possess them, but as a steward to dispense the fruits of them to the poor of Christ, on behalf of the Church, as we know the Apostles did.

[Footnote 298: _Eth._ iv. 1.--(W.)]

[Footnote 299: "_Dispositio; dispositus; indisposita._"]

XI.--Our adversaries further say that the Pope Hadrian[300] summoned Charles the Great to his own a.s.sistance[301] and to that of the Church, on account of the wrongs suffered from the Lombards in the time of their king Desiderius, and that Charles received from that Pope the imperial dignity, notwithstanding that Michael was emperor at Constantinople. And therefore they say that all the Roman emperors who succeeded Charles were themselves the "advocates" of the Church, and ought by the Church to be called to their office. From which would follow that dependence of the Empire on the Church which they wish to prove.

[Footnote 300: A.D. 773.--(W.)]

[Footnote 301: "_Advocavit._"]

But to overset their argument, I reply that what they say is nought; for a usurpation of right does not make right; and if it were so, it might be proved in the same way that the Church is dependent on the Empire; for the Emperor Otto restored the Pope Leo, and deposed Benedict, leading him into exile to Saxony.[302]

[Footnote 302: Otto I. (964) deposed Benedict V. and restored Leo VIII.]

XII.--But from _reason_ they thus argue: they take the principle laid down in the tenth book of "_Philosophia Prima_,"[303] saying that all things which belong to one genus are to be brought under one head, which is the standard and measure of all that come under that genus.

But all men belong to one genus: therefore they are to be brought under one head, as the standard and measure of them all. But the Supreme Pontiff and the Emperor are men; therefore if the preceding reasoning be true, they must be brought under one head. And since the Pope cannot come under any other man, the result is that the Emperor, together with all other men, must be brought under the Pope, as the measure and rule of all; and then, what those who argue thus desire follows.