Dante. An essay Part 13

X.--Wherever there is controversy, there ought to be judgment, otherwise there would be imperfection without its proper remedy,[164]

which is impossible; for G.o.d and Nature, in things necessary, do not fail in their provisions. But it is manifest that there may be controversy between any two princes, where the one is not subject to the other, either from the fault of themselves, or even of their subjects. Therefore between them there should be means of judgment.

And since, when one is not subject to the other, he cannot be judged by the other (for there is no rule of equals over equals), there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction, within the circle of whose laws both may come. Either he will or he will not be a Monarch. If he is, we have what we sought; if not, then this one again will have an equal, who is not subject to his jurisdiction, and then again we have need of a third. And so we must either go on to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to that judge who is first and highest; by whose judgment all controversies shall be either directly or indirectly decided; and he will be Monarch or Emperor. Monarchy is therefore necessary to the world, and this the Philosopher saw when he said: "The world is not intended to be disposed in evil order; 'in a mult.i.tude of rulers there is evil, therefore let there be one prince.'"[165]

[Footnote 164: "_Sine proprio perfectivo._"]

[Footnote 165: Arist. _Metaphys._ xii. 10, who quotes from Hom. _Il._ ii. 204.--(W.)]

XI.--Further, the world is ordered best when justice is most paramount therein: whence Virgil, wishing to celebrate that age, which in his own time seemed to be arising, sang in his _Bucolics_:[166] "Now doth the Virgin return, and the kingdom of Saturn." For Justice was named "the Virgin," and also Astraea. The kingdom of Saturn was the good time, which they also called the Golden Age. But Justice is paramount only in a Monarchy, and therefore a Monarchy, that is, the Empire, is needed if the world is to be ordered for the best. For better proof of this a.s.sumption it must be recognised that Justice, considered in itself, and in its proper nature, is a certain rightness or rule of conduct, which rejects on either side all that deviates from it. It is like whiteness considered as an abstraction, not admitting of degrees.

For there are certain forms of this sort which belong to things compounded, and exist themselves in a simple and unchanging essence, as[167] the Master of the Six Principles rightly says. Yet qualities of this sort admit of degrees on the part of their subjects with which they are connected, according as in their subjects more or less of their contraries is mingled. Justice, therefore, is strongest in man, both as a state of mind and in practice, where there is least admixture of its opposite; and then we may say of it, in the words of the Philosopher, that "neither the star of morning nor of evening is so admirable."[168] For then is it like Phoebe, when she looks across the heavens at her brother from the purple of the morning calm.

[Footnote 166: _Ecl._ iv. 6.]

[Footnote 167: Gilbert de la Porree, [dagger symbol]1154. The "Six Principles" were the last six of the Ten Categories of Aristotle, and the book became one of the chief elementary logic-books of the Middle Ages. _Vide_ Haureau, _Philosophie Scolastique_, 1e Partie, p.

452.]

[Footnote 168: From Arist. _Ethics_, v. 1.--(W.)]

Now Justice, as a state of mind,[169] has a force which opposes it in the will; for where the will of a man is not pure from all desire, then, though there be Justice, yet there is not Justice in all its ideal brightness; for there is in that man, however little, yet in some degree, an opposing force; and therefore they, who would work on the feelings[170] of a judge, are rightly repelled. But, in practice,[171] Justice finds an opposing force in what men are able to do. For, seeing that it is a virtue regulating our conduct towards other men, how shall any act according to Justice if he has not the power of rendering to all their due? Therefore it is plain that the operation of Justice will be wide in proportion to the power of the just man.

[Footnote 169: "_Quantum ad habitum._"]

[Footnote 170: "_Pa.s.sionare._"]

[Footnote 171: "_Quantum ad operationem._"]

From this let us argue: Justice is strongest in the world when it is in one who is most willing and most powerful; only the Monarch is this; therefore, only when Justice is in the Monarch is it strongest in the world. This pro-syllogism goes on through the second figure, with an involved negative, and is like this: All B is A; only C is A; therefore only C is B: or all B is A; nothing but C is A; therefore nothing but C is B.

Our previous explanation makes the first proposition apparent: the second is proved thus, first in regard to will, and secondly in regard to power. First it must be observed that the strongest opponent of Justice is Appet.i.te, as Aristotle intimates in the fifth book to Nicomachus.[172] Remove Appet.i.te altogether, and there remains nothing adverse to Justice; and therefore it is the opinion of the Philosopher that nothing should be left to the judge, if it can be decided by law;[173] and this ought to be done for fear of Appet.i.te, which easily perverts men's minds. Where, then, there is nothing to be wished for, there can be no Appet.i.te, for the pa.s.sions cannot exist if their objects are destroyed. But the Monarch has nothing to desire, for his jurisdiction is bounded only by the ocean; and this is not the case with other princes, whose kingdoms are bounded by those of their neighbours; as, for instance, the kingdom of Castile is bounded by the kingdom of Aragon. From which it follows that the Monarch is able to be the purest embodiment of Justice among men.

[Footnote 172: _Eth._ v. 2.--(W.)]

[Footnote 173: _Rhetoric_, i. 1.--(W.)]

Further, as Appet.i.te in some degree, however small, clouds the habit of Justice, so does Charity, or rightly-directed affection, sharpen and enlighten it. In whomsoever, therefore, rightly-directed affection may chiefly dwell, in him may Justice best have place: and of this sort is the Monarch. Therefore where a Monarch reigns Justice is, or at least may be, strongest. That rightly-directed affections work as we have said, we may see thus: Appet.i.te, scorning[174] what in itself belongs to man, seeks for other things outside him; but Charity sets aside all else, and seeks G.o.d and man, and consequently the good of man. And since of all the good things that men can have the greatest is to live in peace (as we have already said), and as it is Justice which most chiefly brings peace, therefore Charity will chiefly make Justice strong, and the more so in proportion to its own strength.

[Footnote 174: "_Perseitas hominum_" = "_facultas per se subsistendi_."--DUCANGE.]

And it is clear that right affections ought to exist in a Monarch more than in any other man for this reason: the object of love is the more loved the nearer it is to him that loves; but men are nearer to a Monarch than they are to other princes; therefore it is by a Monarch that they are, or ought to be, most loved. The first proposition is manifest if the nature of activity and pa.s.sivity are considered. The second is manifest because men are brought near to a Monarch in their totality,[175] but to other princes only partially; and it is only by means of the Monarch that men are brought near other princes at all.

Thus the Monarch cares for all primarily and directly, whereas other princes only care for their subjects through the Monarch, and because their care for their subjects descends from the supreme care of the Monarch.

[Footnote 175: "_Secundum totum._"]

Again, a cause has the nature of a cause in proportion as it is more universal; for the lower cause is such only on account of the higher one, as appears from the Treatise on Causes.[176] And, in proportion as a cause is really a cause, it loves what it effects; for such love follows the cause by itself. Now Monarchy is the most universal cause of men living well, for other princes work only through the Monarch, as we have said; and it therefore follows that it is the Monarch who will most chiefly love the good of men. But that in practice the Monarch is most disposed to work Justice, who can doubt, except indeed a man who understands not the meaning of the word? for if he be really a Monarch he cannot have enemies.

[Footnote 176: A compilation from the Arabians, or perhaps Aristotle or Proclus, which, under various names, pa.s.sed for a work of Aristotle, and is ascribed by Albert the Great to a certain David the Jew. It is quoted in the twelfth century, and was commented on by Albert and Thomas Aquinas. _Vide_ Jourdain, _Recherches sur les traductions d'Aristote_ (1842), pp. 114, 184, 193, 195, 445; _Philosophie de S. Thomas_ (1858), i. 94.]

The principle a.s.sumed being therefore sufficiently explained, the conclusion is certain, to wit, that a Monarch is necessary that the world may be ordered for the best.

XII.--Again, the human race is ordered best when it is most free. This will be manifest if we see what is the principle of freedom. It must be understood that the first principle of our freedom is freedom of will, which many have in their mouth, but few indeed understand. For they come so far as to say that the freedom of the will means a free judgment concerning will. And this is true. But what is meant by the words is far from them: and they do just as our logicians do all day long with certain propositions which are set as examples in the books of logic, as that, "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles."[177]

[Footnote 177: Cf. Arist. _Magna Moral._ i. 1: "It would be absurd if a man, wishing to prove that the angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, a.s.sumed as his principle that the soul is immortal."--WITTE.]

Therefore I say that Judgment is between Apprehension and Appet.i.te.

First, a man apprehends a thing; then he judges it to be good or bad; then he pursues or avoids it accordingly. If therefore the Judgment guides the Appet.i.te wholly, and in no way is forestalled by the Appet.i.te, then is the Judgment free. But if the Appet.i.te in any way at all forestalls the Judgment and guides it, then the Judgment cannot be free: it is not its own: it is captive to another power. Therefore the brute beasts cannot have freedom of Judgment; for in them the Appet.i.te always forestalls the Judgment. Therefore, too, it is that intellectual beings whose wills are unchangeable, and souls which are separate from the body, which have gone hence in peace, do not lose the freedom of their wills, because their wishes cannot change; nay, it is in full strength and completeness that their wills are free.[178]

[Footnote 178: Cf. _Purgatorio_, xviii. 22.--WITTE.]

It is therefore again manifest that this liberty, or this principle of all our liberty, is the greatest gift bestowed by G.o.d on mankind: by it alone we gain happiness[179] as men: by it alone we gain happiness elsewhere as G.o.ds.[180] But if this is so, who will say that human kind is not in its best state, when it can most use this principle?

But he who lives under a Monarchy is most free. Therefore let it be understood that he is free who exists not for another's sake but for his own, as the Philosopher, in his Treatise of simple Being, thought.[181] For everything which exists for the sake of some other thing, is necessitated by that other thing, as a road has to run to its ordained end. Men exist for themselves, and not at the pleasure of others, only if a Monarch rules; for then only are the perverted forms of government set right, while democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies, drive mankind into slavery, as is obvious to any who goes about among them all; and public power[182] is in the hands of kings and aristocracies, which they call the rule of the best, and champions of popular liberty. And because the Monarch loves his subjects much, as we have seen, he wishes all men to be good, which cannot be the case in perverted forms of government:[183] therefore the Philosopher says, in his _Politics_:[184] "In the bad state the good man is a bad citizen, but in a good state the two coincide." Good states in this way aim at liberty, that in them men may live for themselves. The citizens exist not for the good of consuls, nor the nation for the good of its king; but the consuls for the good of the citizens, and the king for the good of his nation. For as the laws are made to suit the state, and not the state to suit the laws, so those who live under the laws are not ordered for the legislator, but he for them;[185] as also the Philosopher holds, in what he has left us on the present subject. Hence, too, it is clear that although the king or the consul rule over the other citizens in respect of the means[186] of government, yet in respect of the end of government they are the servants of the citizens, and especially the Monarch, who, without doubt, must be held the servant of all. Thus it becomes clear that the Monarch is bound by the end appointed to himself in making his laws.

Therefore mankind is best off under a Monarchy, and hence it follows that Monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

[Footnote 179: "_Felicitamur._"]

[Footnote 180: "_Ut Dii_;" cf. _Paradiso_, v. 19.--WITTE.]

[Footnote 181: _I.e._ _Metaphys._ 1, 2.--(W.)]

[Footnote 182: "_Politizant reges._"]

[Footnote 183: "_Oblique politizantes._"]

[Footnote 184: _Polit._ iii. 4.]

[Footnote 185: _Ibid._ iii. 16, 17.--(W.)]

[Footnote 186: "_Respectu viae ... respectu termini._"]

XIII.--Further, he who can be best fitted to rule can best fit others.

For in every action the main end of the agent, whether acting by necessity of nature or voluntarily, is to unfold his own likeness; and therefore every agent, so far as he is of this sort, delights in action. For since all that is desires its own existence, and since the agent in acting enlarges his own existence in some way, delight follows action of necessity; for delight is inseparable from gaining what is desired. Nothing therefore acts unless it is of such sort as that which is acted on ought to be; therefore the Philosopher said in his _Metaphysics_,[187] "Everything which becomes actual from being potential, becomes so by means of something actual of the same kind,"

and were anything to try to act in any other way it would fail. Hence we may overthrow the error of those who think to form the moral character of others by speaking well and doing ill; forgetting that the hands of Jacob were more persuasive with his father than his words, though his hands deceived and his voice spake truth. Hence the Philosopher, to Nicomachus: "In matters of feeling and action, words are less to be trusted than deeds."[188] And therefore G.o.d said to David in his sin, "What hast thou to do to declare my statutes?" as though He would say, "Thou speakest in vain, for thou art different from what thou speakest." Hence it may be gathered that he needs to be fitted for his work in the best way who wishes to fit others.

[Footnote 187: _Metaphys._ ix. 8.--(W.)]

[Footnote 188: Arist. _Eth._ x. 1.--(W.)]

But the Monarch is the only one who can be fitted in the best possible way to govern. Which is thus proved: Each thing is the more easily and perfectly qualified for any habit, or actual work, the less there is in it of what is contrary to such a disposition. Therefore, they who have never even heard of philosophy, arrive at a habit of truth in philosophy more easily and completely than those who have listened to it at odd times, and are filled with false opinions. For which reason Galen well says: "Such as these require double time to acquire knowledge."[189] A Monarch then has nothing to tempt appet.i.te, or, at least, less than any other man, as we have shown before; whereas other princes have much; and appet.i.te is the only corrupter of righteousness, and the only impediment to justice. A Monarch therefore is wholly, or at least more than any other prince, disposed to govern well: for in him there may be judgment and justice more strongly than in any other. But these two things are the pre-eminent attributes of a maker of law, and of an executor of law, as that most holy king David testified when he asked of G.o.d the things which were befitting the king, and the king's son, saying: "Give the king thy judgment, O G.o.d, and thy righteousness unto the king's son."[190]

[Footnote 189: _De cognosc. animi morbis_, c. 10.--WITTE.]

[Footnote 190: Cf. _Parad._ xiii. 95.--(W.)]

We were right then when we a.s.sumed that only the Monarch can be best fitted to rule. Therefore only the Monarch can in the best way fit other men. Therefore it follows that Monarchy is necessary for the best ordering of the world.

XIV.--And where a thing can be done by one agent, it is better to do it by one than by several, for this reason: Let it be possible to do a certain thing by means of A, and also by means of A and B. If therefore what is done by A and B can be done by A alone, it is useless to add B; for nothing follows from the addition; for the same end which A and B produced is produced also by A. All additions of this kind are useless and superfluous: all that is superfluous is displeasing to G.o.d and Nature: and all that is displeasing to G.o.d and Nature is bad, as is manifest. It therefore follows not only that it is better that a thing should be done by one than by many agents, if it is possible to produce the effect by one; but also that to produce the effect by one is good, and to produce it by many is simply bad.

Again, a thing is said to be better by being nearer to the best, and the end has the nature of the best. But for a thing to be done by one agent is better, for so it comes nearer to the end. And that so it comes nearer is manifest; for let C be the end which may be reached by A, or by A and B together: plainly it is longer to reach C by A and B together than by B alone. But mankind may be governed by one supreme prince, who is, the Monarch.