Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama Part 48

There may be no G.o.d to avenge the South, but there is a devil to punish independents." The independents are only the tools of the Radicals, they are like bloodhounds,--to be used and then killed, for no sooner than their work is done the Radicals will knife them. "Satan hath been in the Democratic camp and, taking these independents from guard duty, led them up into the mountains and shown them the kingdoms of Radicalism, his silver and gold, storehouses and bacon, and all these promised to give if they would fall down and worship him; and they worshipped him, throwing down the altars of their fathers and trampling them under their feet."[2139]

The Campaign of 1874

The Democrats nominated for governor George S. Houston of north Alabama, a "Union" man whose "unionism" had not been very strong, and the Republicans renominated Governor D. P. Lewis, also of north Alabama. The Democratic convention met in July, 1874, and put forth a declaration and a platform declaring that the Radicals had for years inflamed the pa.s.sions and prejudices of the races until it was now necessary for the whites to unite in self-defence. The convention denied the power of Congress to legislate for the social equality of the races and denounced the Civil Rights Bill then pending in Congress as an attempt to force social union. Legislation on social matters was condemned as unnecessary and criminal. The Radical state administration was blamed for extravagance and corruption, and a declaration was made that fraudulent state debts would not be paid if the Democrats were successful.[2140]

The fact that the race issue was the princ.i.p.al one is borne out by the county platforms. In Barbour County the "white man's party" declared that the issue was "white _vs._ black"; that if the whites were defeated, the county would no longer be endurable and would be abandoned to the blacks; that a conflict of races would be deplorable, but that the whites must protect themselves, and that though in the past some had stayed away from the polls through disgust, those who did not vote would be reckoned as of the negro party; that the whites would be ready to protect themselves and their ballots by force if necessary. In Lee County the convention declared that the Democrats had long avoided the race issue, but that now it had been forced upon them by the Radicals; that "this county is the white man's and the white man must rule over it," and that whites or blacks who aid the negro party "are the political and social enemies of the white race." In the same county a local club declared that peace was wanted, but not peace purchased by "unconditional surrender of every freeman's privilege to fraud, Federal bayonets, and intimidation."[2141]

The Republican state convention in August p.r.o.nounced itself in favor of the Civil Rights Bill and the civil and political equality of all men without regard to race, declared that the race issue was an invention of the Democrats which would result in war with the United States, and accused the Democrats of being responsible for the bad condition of the state finances. The Equal Rights convention and the Union Labor convention declared for the Civil Rights Bill and indorsed Charles Sumner and J. T.

Rapier, the negro congressman.[2142]

In preparation for the fall elections the Radical members of Congress had secured the pa.s.sage of a resolution by Congress appropriating money for the relief of the sufferers from floods on the Alabama, Warrior, and Tombigbee rivers. The floods occurred in the early spring; the appropriation became available in May, but as late as July the governor had not appointed agents to distribute the bacon which had been purchased with the appropriation. The members of Congress from the state met and agreed upon a division of the bacon without reference to flooded districts, but with reference to the political conditions in the various counties.[2143] Their agents were to distribute the bacon, but the governor was unable to get their names until August. The purpose was to hold the bacon until near the election. The governor and other Republican leaders were opposed to the use of bacon in the campaign, and the state refused to pay transportation; so the agents had to sell part of the bacon to pay expenses. In Lewis's last message to the legislature, he said pointedly, "Our beloved state has been free from pestilence, floods, and extensive disasters to labor."[2144] As a matter of fact, there had been the regular spring freshets, but there were no sufferers. The loss fell upon the planters, who were under contract to furnish food, stock, and implements to their tenants. In August, Captain Gentry of the Nineteenth Infantry was sent by the War Department, which was supplying the bacon, to investigate the matter of the "political" bacon. He found no suffering, and no one was able to tell him where the suffering was, though the members of Congress were positive that there was suffering. The crops were doing well. In Montgomery Captain Gentry found that the agents in charge of Congressman Rapier's share of the bacon were J. C. Hendrix and Holland Thompson (colored), both active politicians. Distribution had been delayed because Rapier thought that he had not received his share. Congressman Hays had bacon sent to Calera, Brierfield, and Marion, none of the places being near flowing water. He sent quant.i.ties to Perry, Shelby, and Bibb counties, but none to Fayette and Baker (Chilton). As he wrote to his agent, "Of course the overflowed districts will need more than those not overflowed." When the War Department discovered the use that had been made of the bacon, Captain Gentry was directed to seize the bacon in dry districts that was being held until the election. At Eufaula, 80 miles from the nearest flooded district, he seized 5348 pounds that Rapier had stored there; at Seale, 7638 pounds were seized; and at Opelika, 9792 pounds; but not all was discovered at either place.[2145]

An Opelika negro thus described the method of using the bacon: It was understood that only the faithful could get any of it. This negro was considered doubtful, but was told, "If you will come along and do right, you will get two or three shoulders." Bacon suppers were held at negro churches, to which only those were admitted who promised to vote the Republican ticket.[2146]

The use of bacon in the campaign injured the Republican cause more than it aided it; the supply of bacon was too small to go around, and the whites were infuriated because the negroes stopped work so long while trying to get some of it.

In previous campaigns the Republicans had used with success the "southern outrage" issue; stories of murder, cruelty, and fraud by the whites were carried to Washington and found ready believers, and Federal troops and deputy marshals were sent to a.s.sist the southern Republicans in the elections by making arrests, thus intimidating the whites and encouraging the blacks. In the campaign of 1874 such a.s.sistance was more than ever necessary to the black man's party in Alabama. The race line was now distinctly drawn and most of the whites had forsaken the black man's party. The blacks, many of them, were indifferent; the whites were determined to overthrow the Reconstruction rule.

The leaders of the whites were confident of success and strongly advised against every appearance of violence, since it would work to the advantage of the hostile party. There were some, however, who did not object to the tales of outrage, since they would cause investigation and the sending of Federal troops. These would, in the black districts, really protect the whites, and any kind of an investigation would result in damage to the Radical party.

Pursuing its plan of a peaceable campaign, the Democratic executive committee, on August 29, 1874, issued an address as follows: "We especially urge upon you carefully to avoid all injuries to others while you are attempting to preserve your own rights. Let our people avoid all just causes of complaint. Turmoil and strife with those who oppose us in this contest will only weaken the moral force of our efforts. Let us avoid personal conflicts; and if these should be forced upon us, let us only act in that line of just self-defence which is recognized and provided for by the laws of the land. We could not please our enemies better than by becoming parties to conflicts of violence, and thus furnish them plausible pretext for asking the interference of Federal power in our domestic affairs. Let us so act that all shall see and that all whose opinions are ent.i.tled to any respect shall admit that ours is a party of peace, and that we only seek to preserve our rights and liberties by the peaceful but efficient power of the ballot-box."[2147] There is no doubt but that the whites engaged in less violence in this campaign than in former election years and less than was to be expected considering their temper in 1874.

But there is also no doubt that very little incentive would have been necessary to have precipitated serious conflict. The whites were determined to win, peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary. This very determination made them inclined to peace as long as possible and made the opposite party cautious about giving causes for conflict.

The Republican leaders industriously circulated in the North stories of "outrages" in Alabama. The most comprehensive "outrage" story was that of Charles Hays, member of Congress, published in the famous "Hays-Hawley letter" of September 7, 1874. Hays had borne a bad character in Alabama while a slaveholder and had been ostracized for being cruel to his slaves, and as a Confederate soldier he had a doubtful record. Naturally, in Reconstruction he had sided against the whites, and the negroes, with few exceptions, forgot his past history. In order to get campaign material, Senator Joseph Hawley of Connecticut wrote to Hays to get facts for publication,--"I want to publish it at home and give it to my neighbors and const.i.tuents as the account of a gentleman of unimpeachable honor."

Hays responded in a long letter, filled with minute details of horrible outrages that occurred within his personal observation. The spirit of rebellion still exists, he said; riots, murders, a.s.sa.s.sinations, torturings, are more common than ever; the half cannot be told; unless the Federal government interposes there is no hope for loyal men. The letter created a sensation. Senator Hawley sent it out with his indors.e.m.e.nt of Hays as a gentleman. The _New York Tribune_, then "Liberal" in politics, sent "a thoroughly competent and trustworthy correspondent who is a lifelong Republican" to investigate the charges made by Hays. The charges of Hays were as follows: (1) for political reasons, one Allen was beaten nearly to death with pistols; (2) five negroes were brutally murdered in Sumter County, for no reason; (3) "No white man in Pickens County ever cast a Republican vote and lived after;" (4) in Hale County a negro benevolent society was ordered to meet no more; (5) masked men drove James Bliss, a negro, from Hale County; (6) J. G. Stokes, a Republican speaker, was warned by armed ruffians not to make another Radical speech in Hale County; (7) in Choctaw County 10 negroes had been killed and 13 wounded by whites in ambuscade; (8) in Marengo County W. A. Lips...o...b..was killed for being a Republican; (9) "Simon Edward and Monroe Keeton were killed in Sumter County for political effect;" (10) in Pickens County negroes were killed, tied to logs, and sent floating down the river with the following inscription, "To Mobile with the compliments of Pickens;" (11) W. P.

Billings, a northern Republican, was killed in Sumter County on account of his politics, and Ivey, a negro mail agent, was also killed for his politics in Sumter; (12) there were numerous outrages in Coffee, Macon, and Russell counties; (13) near Carrollton, two negro speakers were hanged. Hays also declared that "only an occasional murder leaks out;"

Republican speakers were always "rotten-egged" or shot at, while not a single Democrat was injured; the a.s.sociated Press agents were all "rebels and Democrats," and systematically misrepresented the Radical party to the North.

The _Tribune_ after investigation p.r.o.nounced the Hays-Hawley letter "a tissue of lies from beginning to end." The correspondent sent to Alabama investigated each reported outrage and found that the facts were as follows: (1) Allen said that he was beaten for private reasons by one person with the weapons of nature; (2) three negroes were killed by negroes and two were shot while stealing corn; (3) since 1867 there had been white Republican voters and officials in Sumter County; (4) the negro societies in Hale County denied that any of them had been ordered to disband; (5) James Bliss himself denied that he had been driven from Hale County; (6) affidavits of the Republican officials of Hale County denied the Stokes story; (7) in regard to the "10 killed and 13 wounded" outrage, affidavits were obtained from the "killed and wounded" denying that the reported outrage had occurred (the truth was, a negro was beaten by other negroes, and when the sheriff had attempted to arrest them, they resisted and one shot was fired; the negroes swore that they had told Hays that none was injured); (8) Lips...o...b..in person denied that he had been murdered or injured; (9) Edward and Keeton lived in Mississippi and there was no evidence that either had been murdered; (10) the story of the dead negroes tied to floating logs was not heard in Pickens County before Hays published it, and no foundation for it could be discovered; (11) Billings was killed by unknown persons for purposes of robbery, and Republican officials testified that the killing of Ivey was not political; (12) nothing could be found to support the statement about outrages in Coffee, Macon, and Russell counties; (13) the hanging of the two negroes near Carrollton was denied by the Republicans of that district. The _Tribune_ correspondent a.s.serted that Hays "knew that his statements were lies when he made them"; that the whites were exercising remarkable restraint; that they were trying hard to keep the peace; that counties in Hays's district were showing signs of going Democratic, and since his was the strongest Republican district, desperate measures were necessary to hold the Republicans in line; and that the administration press "had grossly slandered the people of the state." Governor Lewis and a few of the Republicans had opposed the "outrage" issue, and though troops were sent to the state it was against the wishes of Lewis.[2148]

The Washington administration readily listened to the "outrage" stories and prepared to interfere in Alabama affairs, though Governor Lewis could not be persuaded to ask for troops. President Grant wrote, on September 3, 1874, to Belknap, Secretary of War, directing him to hold troops in readiness to suppress the "atrocities" in Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. Early in September Attorney-General Williams began to encourage United States Marshal Healy to make arrests under the Enforcement Acts, and on September 29, 1874, he instructed Healy to appoint special deputies at all points where troops were to be stationed. He promised that the deputies would be supported by the infantry and cavalry. During October the state was filled with deputy marshals, agents of the Department of Justice and of the Post-office Department, and Secret Service men, most of them in disguise, searching for opportunities to arrest whites. Most of these men were of the lowest cla.s.s, since only men of that kind would do the work required of them. The deputies were appointed, ten to twenty-five in each county, by Marshal Healy on the recommendation of the officials of the Republican party. Charles E. Mayer of Mobile, chairman of the Republican executive committee, nominated and secured the appointment of 217 deputy marshals, vouching for them as good Republicans, all except four Democrats who were warranted to be "mild, _i.e._ honest." Robert Barbour of Montgomery and Isaac Heyman of Opelika also nominated deputies.[2149]

The marshals did some effective work during October. In Dallas County, where the Democrats had encouraged a bolting negro candidate with the intention of purchasing his office from him, the negro bolter and General John T. Morgan were arrested for violation of the Enforcement Acts.[2150]

In Sumter County, John Little, a negro who had started a negro Democratic club called the "Independent Thinkers," was arrested and the club was broken up.[2151] From Eufaula several prominent whites were taken, among them General Alpheus Baker, J. M. Buford, G. L. Comer, W. H. Courtney, and E. J. Black.[2152]

In Livingston, where a Democratic convention was being held in the court-house, the deputy marshals came in, pretended to search through the whole room, and finally arrested Renfroe and Bullock, whom, with Chiles, they handcuffed and paraded about the county, exposing them to insult from gangs of negroes. The jailer in Sumter County refused to give up the jail to the use of the deputy marshals and was imprisoned in his own jail.[2153] About the same time Colonel Wedmore, chairman of the Democratic county executive committee, was arrested with forty-two other prominent Democrats, thus almost destroying the party organization in Sumter County. Though there were three United States commissioners in Sumter County, Wedmore and others were carried to Mobile for trial before a United States commissioner there, and, instead of being carried by the shortest route, they were for political effect taken on a long detour _via_ Demopolis, Selma, and Montgomery. Those arrested were never tried, but were released just before or soon after the election.[2154] The whites were thoroughly intimidated in the black districts, but were not seriously molested in the white counties. The houses of nearly all the Democrats in the Black Belt were searched by the deputies and soldiers, and the women frightened and insulted. The officers of the army were disgusted with the nature of the work.[2155]

Such was the intimidation practised by the officials of the Federal government. The Republican state administration took little part in the persecutions, because it was weak, because it was not desirous of being held responsible, and because some of the prominent officials were certain that the intimidation policy would injure their party. In the white counties there was considerably less effort to influence the elections.

But by no means was all of the intimidation on the Republican side. In the counties where the whites were numerous the determination was freely expressed that the elections were to be carried by the whites. There were few open threats, very little violence, and none of the kind of persecution employed by the other side. But the whites had made up their minds, and the other side knew it, or rather felt it in the air, and were thereby intimidated. Besides the silent forces of ostracism, etc., already described, the whites found many other means of influencing the voters on both sides. Where Radical posters were put up announcing speakers and principles, the Democrats would tear them down and post instead caricatures of Spencer, Lewis, Hays, or Rapier, or declarations against "social equality enforced by law." In white districts some obnoxious speakers were "rotten-egged," others forbidden to speak and asked to leave. One Radical speaker complained that whites in numbers came to hear him, sat on the front seats with guns across their knees, blew tin horns, and asked him embarra.s.sing questions about "political bacon" and race equality under the Civil Rights Bill. "Blacklists" of active negro politicians were kept and the whites warned against employing them; "pledge meetings" were held in some counties and negroes strenuously advised to sign the "pledge" to vote for the white man's party. "The Barbour County Fever" spread over the state. This was a term used for any process for making life miserable for white Radicals. There was something like a revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the White Leagues or clubs whose members were sworn to uphold "white" principles. In many towns these clubs were organized as military companies. Some of them applied to Governor Lewis for arms and for enrolment as militia. But he was afraid to organize any white militia because it might overthrow his administration, and, on the other hand, he also refused to give arms to negro militia because he feared race conflicts. By private subscription, often with money from the North, the white companies were armed and equipped. They drilled regularly and made long practice marches through the country. They kept the peace, they made no threats, but their influence was none the less forcible. The Democratic politicians were opposed to these organizations, but the latter persisted and several companies went in uniform to Houston's inauguration.

The Republicans found cause for anxiety in the increasing frequency of Confederate veterans' reunions, and it is said that cavalry companies and squadrons of ex-Confederates began to drill again, much to the alarm of the blacks.[2156] In truth, some of the whites were exasperated to the point where they were about ready to fight again. As one man expressed it: "The attempt to force upon the country this social equality, miscalled Civil Rights Bill, may result in another war. The southern people do not desire to take up arms again, but may be driven to desperation."[2157]

The feelings of the poorer whites and those who had suffered most from Radical rule are reflected in the following speeches. A negro who was canva.s.sing for Rapier, the negro congressman, was told by a white: "You might as well quit. We have made up our minds to carry the state or kill half of you negroes on election day. We begged you long enough and have persuaded you, but you will vote for the Radical party." Another white man said to negro Republicans, "G.o.d d.a.m.n you, you have voted my land down to half a dollar an acre, and I wish the last one of you was down in the bottom of h.e.l.l."[2158]

The Democratic campaign was managed by W. L. Bragg, an able organizer, a.s.sisted by a competent staff. The state had not been so thoroughly canva.s.sed since 1861. The campaign fund was the largest in the history of the state; every man who was able, and many who were not, contributed; a.s.sistance also came from northern Democrats, and northern capitalists who had investments in the South or who owned part of the legal bonds of the state. The election officials were all Radicals and with Federal aid had absolute control over the election. If inclined to fraud, as in 1868-1872, they could easily count themselves in, but they clearly understood that no fraud would be tolerated. To prevent the importation of negroes from Georgia and Mississippi guards were stationed all around the state. To prevent "repeating," which had formerly been done by ma.s.sing the negroes at the county seat for their first vote and then sending them home to vote again, the whites made lists of all voters, white and black, kept an accurate account of all Democratic votes cast, and demanded that the votes be thus counted. So well did the Democrats know their resources that a week before the election an estimate of the vote was made that turned out to be almost exactly correct. In Randolph County, several days before the election, the Democratic manager reported a certain number of votes for the Democrats; on election day two votes more than he estimated were cast.

Tons of campaign literature were distributed mainly by freight, express, and messengers, the mails having proved unsafe, being in the hands of the Radicals. For the same reason political messages were sent by telegraph.

Every man who could speak had to "go on the stump." Toward the close of the campaign a hundred speeches a day were made by speakers sent out from headquarters. The lawyers did little or no business during October; it is said that of seventy-five lawyers in Montgomery all but ten were usually out of the city making speeches.[2159]

The Election of 1874

The election of 1874 pa.s.sed off with less violence than was expected; in fact, it was quieter than any previous campaign. The Democrats were a.s.sured of success and had no desire to lose the fruits of victory on account of riots and disorder. So the responsible people strained every nerve to preserve the peace. A regiment of soldiers was scattered throughout the Black Belt and showed a disposition to neglect the affairs of the blacks. But here, in the counties where the numerous arrests had been made, the blacks voted in full strength. In fact, with few exceptions, both parties voted in full strength, and, as regards the counting of the votes, it was the fairest election since the negroes began to vote. There were instances in white counties of negroes being forced to vote for the Democrats, while in the Black Belt negro Democrats were mobbed and driven from the polls. But the negro Democrats resorted to expedients to get in their tickets. In one county where the Democratic tickets were smooth at the top and the negro tickets perforated, the Democrats prepared perforated tickets for negro Democrats which went unquestioned. In other places special tickets were printed for the use of negro Democrats with the picture of General Grant or of Spencer on them and these pa.s.sed the hurried Radical inspection and were cast for the Democrats. In Marengo County the Democrats purchased a Republican candidate, who agreed for $300 that he would not be elected. By his "sign of the b.u.t.ton," sent out among the negroes, the latter were instructed to vote a certain colored ticket which did not conform to law and hence was not counted. Other candidates agreed not to qualify after election, thus leaving the appointment to the governor.

In the Black Belt, now as before, the negroes were marshalled in regiments of 300 to 1500 under men who wrote orders purporting to be signed by General Grant, directing the negroes to vote for him. In Greene County 1400 uniformed negroes took possession of the polls, and excluded the few whites.[2160] A riot in Mobile was brought on by the close supervision over election affairs, which was objected to by a drunken negro who wanted to vote twice, and who declared that he wanted "to wade in blood up to his boot tops." The negro was killed. A conflict at Belmont, where a negro was killed, and another at Gainesville were probably caused by the endeavor of the whites to exclude negroes who had been imported from Mississippi. By rioting the Republicans had everything to gain and the Democrats everything to lose, and while it is impossible in most cases to ascertain which party fired the first shot or struck the first blow, the evidence is clear that the desperate Radical whites encouraged the blacks to violent conduct in order to cause collisions between the races and thus secure Federal interference. In Eufaula occurred the most serious riot of the Reconstruction period that occurred in Alabama. The negroes came armed and threatening to the polls, which were held by a Republican sheriff and forty Republican deputies. Judge Keils, a carpet-bagger, had advised the blacks to come to Eufaula to vote: "You go to town; there are several troops of Yankees there; these d.a.m.ned Democrats won't shoot a frog. You come armed and do as you please." The Democrats were glad to have the troops, who were disgusted with the intimidation work of the previous month. Order was kept until a negro tried to vote the Democratic ticket and was discovered and mobbed by other blacks. The whites tried to protect him and some negro fired a shot. Then the riot began. The few whites were heavily armed and the negroes also. The deputies, it was said, lost their heads and fired indiscriminately. When the fight was over it was found that ten whites were wounded, and four negroes killed and sixty wounded.

The Federal troops came leisurely in after it was over, and surrounded the polls. The course of the Federal troops in Eufaula was much as it was elsewhere. They camped some distance from the polls, and when their aid was demanded by the Republicans the captain either directly refused to interfere, or consulted his orders or his telegrams or his law dictionary.

At last he offered to _notify_ the white men wanted by the marshal to meet the latter and be arrested. Another commander, who took possession of the polls in Opelika in order to prevent a riot, was censured by General McDowell, the department commander. The troops were weary of such work, and their orders from General McDowell were very vague.[2161] After the election, as was to be expected, an outcry arose from the Radicals that the troops had in every case failed to do their duty.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ELECTION OF 1874 FOR GOVERNOR.]

When the votes were counted, it appeared that the Democrats had triumphed.

Houston had 107,118 votes to 93,928 for Lewis. Two years before Herndon (Democrat) had received 81,371 votes to 89,868 for Lewis. The presidential campaign in 1872 had a.s.sisted Lewis. Grant ran far ahead of the Radical state ticket. The legislature of 1874-1875 was to be composed as follows: Senate, 13 Republicans (of whom 6 were negroes) and 20 Democrats; House, 40 Republicans (of whom 29 were negroes) and 60 Democrats.[2162]

The whites were exceedingly pleased with their victory, while the Republicans took defeat as something expected. There were, of course, the usual charges of outrage, Ku Kluxism, and the intimidation of the negro vote, but these were fewer than ever before. There was considerable complaint that the Federal troops had sided always with the whites in the election troubles. The Republican leaders knew, of course, that for their own time at least Alabama was to remain in the hands of the whites. The blacks were surprisingly indifferent after they discovered that there was to be no return to slavery, so much so that many whites feared that their indifference masked some deep-laid scheme against the victors.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ELECTION OF 1876 FOR GOVERNOR.]

The heart of the Black Belt still remained under the rule of the carpet-bagger and the black. The Democratic state executive Committee considered that enough had been gained for one election, so it ordered that no whites should contest on technical grounds alone the offices in those black counties. Other methods gradually gave the Black Belt to the whites. No Democrat would now go on the bond of a Republican official and numbers were unable to make bond; their offices thus becoming vacant, the governor appointed Democrats. Others sold out to the whites, or neglected to make bond, or made bonds which were later condemned by grand juries.

This resulted in many offices going to the whites, though most of them were still in the hands of the Republicans.[2163]

Houston's two terms were devoted to setting affairs in order. The administration was painfully economical. Not a cent was spent beyond what was absolutely necessary. Numerous superfluous offices were cut off at once and salaries reduced. The question of the public debt was settled. To prevent future interference by Federal authorities the time for state elections was changed from November, the time of the Federal elections, to August, and this separation is still in force. The whites now demanded a new const.i.tution. Their objections to the const.i.tution of 1868 were numerous: it was forced upon the whites, who had no voice in framing it; it "reminds us of unparalleled wrongs"; it had not secured good government; it was a patchwork unsuited to the needs of the state; it had wrecked the credit of the state by allowing the indors.e.m.e.nt of private corporations; it provided for a costly administration, especially for a complicated and unworkable school system which had destroyed the schools; there was no power of expansion for the judiciary; and above all, it was not legally adopted.[2164]

The Republicans declared against a new const.i.tution as meant to destroy the school system, provide imprisonment for debt, abolish exemption from taxation, disfranchise and otherwise degrade the blacks. By a vote of 77,763 to 59,928, a convention was ordered by the people, and to it were elected 80 Democrats, 12 Republicans, and 7 Independents. A new const.i.tution was framed and adopted in 1875.[2165]

Later Phases of State Politics

From 1875 to 1889 neither national party was able to control both houses of Congress. Consequently no "force" legislation could be directed against the white people of Alabama, who had control and were making secure their control of the state administration. The black vote was not eliminated, but gradually fell under the control of the native whites when the carpet-bagger and scalawag left the Black Belt. In order to gain control of the black vote, carpet-bag methods were sometimes resorted to, though there was not as much fraud and violence used as is believed, for the simple reason that it was not necessary; it was little more difficult now to make the blacks vote for the Democrats than it had been to make Republicans of them; the ma.s.s of them voted, in both cases, as the stronger power willed it. The Black Belt came finally into Democratic control in 1880, when the party leaders ordered the Alabama Republicans to vote the Greenback ticket. The negroes did not understand the meaning of the manoeuvre, did not vote in force, and lost their last stronghold. A few white Republicans and a few black leaders united to maintain the Republican state organization in order that they might control the division of spoils coming from the Republican administration at Washington. Most of them were or became Federal officials within the state. It was not to their interest that their numbers should increase, for the shares in the spoils would then be smaller. Success in the elections was now the last thing desired.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ELECTION OF 1880 FOR GOVERNOR]

This clique of office-holders was almost destroyed by the two Democratic administrations under Cleveland, and has been unhappy under later Republican administrations; but the Federal administration in the state is not yet respectable. Dissatisfaction on the part of the genuine Republicans in the northern counties resulted in the formation of a "Lily White" faction which demanded that the negro be dropped as a campaign issue and that an attempt be made to build up a decent white Republican party. The opposing faction has been called "The Black and Tans," and has held to the negro. The national party organization and the administration have refused to recognize the demands of the "Lily Whites"; and it would be exceedingly embarra.s.sing to go back on the record of the past in regard to the negro as the basis of the Republican party in the South. In consequence the growth of a reputable white party has been hindered.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ELECTION OF 1890 FOR GOVERNOR]

The Populist movement promised to cause a healthy division of the whites into two parties. But the tactics of the national Republican organization in trying to profit by this division, by running in the negroes, resulted in a close reunion of the discordant whites, the Populists furnishing to the reunited party some new principles and many new leaders, while the Democrats furnished the name, traditions, and organization.

To make possible some sort of division and debate among the whites the system of primary elections was adopted. In these elections the whites were able to decide according to the merits of the candidate and the issues involved. The candidate of the whites chosen in the primaries was easily elected. This plan had the merit of placing the real contest among the whites, and there was no danger of race troubles in elections. In the Black Belt the primary system was legalized and served by its regulations to confine the election contests to regularly nominated candidates, and hence to whites, the blacks having lost their organization.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ELECTION FOR GOVERNOR 1902, UNDER NEW CONSt.i.tUTION]

The Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments in their operation gave undue political influence to the whites of the Black Belt, and this was opposed by whites of other districts. It also resulted in serious corruption in elections. There was always danger in the Black Belt that the Republicans, taking advantage of divisions among the whites, would run in the negroes again. There were instances when the whites simply counted out the negro vote or used "shotgun" methods to prevent a return to the intolerable conditions of Reconstruction. The people grew weary of the eternal "negro in the woodpile," and a demand arose for a revision of the const.i.tution in order to eliminate the ma.s.s of the negro voters, to do away with corruption in the elections and to leave the whites free. The conservative leaders, like Governors Jones and Oates, were rather opposed to a disfranchising movement. The Black Belt whites were somewhat doubtful, but the ma.s.s of the whites were determined, and the work was done; the stamp of legality was thus placed upon the long-finished work of necessity, and the "white man's movement" had reached its logical end.[2166]

The mistakes and failures of Reconstruction are clear to all. Whether any successes were achieved by the Congressional plan has been a matter for debate. It has been strongly a.s.serted that Reconstruction, though failing in many important particulars, succeeded in others. The successes claimed may be summarized as follows: (1) there was no more legislation for the negro similar to that of 1865-66, that following the Reconstruction being "infinitely milder"; (2) Reconstruction gave the negroes a civil status that a century of "restoration" would not have accomplished, for though the right to vote is a nullity, other undisputed rights of the black are due to the Reconstruction; the unchangeable organic laws of the state and of the United States favor negro suffrage, which will come the sooner for being thus theoretically made possible; (3) Reconstruction prevented the southern leaders from returning to Washington as irreconcilables, and gave them troubles enough to keep them busy until a new generation grew up which accepted the results of war; (4) by organizing the blacks it made them independent of white control in politics; (5) it gave the negro an independent church; (6) it gave the negro a right to education and gave to both races the public school system; (7) it made the negro economically free and showed that free labor was better than slave labor; (8) it destroyed the former leaders of the whites and "freed them from the baleful influence of old political leaders"; in general, as Sumner said, the ballot to the negro was "a peacemaker, a schoolmaster, a protector,"

soon making him a fairly good citizen, and secured peace and order--the "political h.e.l.l" through which the whites pa.s.sed being a necessary discipline which secured the greatest good to the greatest number.[2167]

On the other hand, it may be maintained (1) that the intent of the legislation of 1865-1866 has been entirely misunderstood, that it was intended on the whole for the benefit of the negro as well as of the white, and that it has been left permanently off the statute book, not because the whites have been taught better by Reconstruction, but because of the amendments which prohibit in theory what has all along been practised (hence the gross abuses of peonage); (2) that the theoretical rights of the negro have been no inducement to grant him actual privileges, and that these theoretical rights have not proven so permanent as was supposed before the disfranchising movement spread through the South; (3) that the generation after Reconstruction is more irreconcilable than the conservative leaders who were put out of politics in 1865-1867--that the latter were willing to give the negro a chance, while the former, able, radical, and supported by the people, find less and less place for the negro; (4) that if the blacks were united, so were the whites, and in each case the advantage may be questioned; (5) that the value of the negro church is doubtful; (6) that as in politics, so in education, the negro has no opportunities now that were not freely offered him in 1865-1866, and the school system is not a product of Reconstruction, but came near being destroyed by it; (7) that negro free labor is not as efficient as slave labor was, and the negro as a cotton producer has lost his supremacy and his economic position is not at all a.s.sured; (8) that the whites have acquired new leaders, but the change has been on the whole from conservatives to radicals, from friends of the negro to those indifferent to him. In short, a careful study of conditions in Alabama since 1865 will not lead one to the conclusion that the black race in that state has any rights or privileges or advantages that were not offered by the native whites in 1865-1866.