Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama Part 2

Smith of Tuscaloosa, the leader of the cooperationists,[47] read the platform upon which he was elected to the convention; which, in substance, was to use all honorable exertions to secure rights in the Union, and failing, to maintain them out of the Union. Allegiance, he went on to say, was due first to the state, and support was due her in any course she might adopt. If an ordinance of secession should be pa.s.sed, it would be the supreme law of the land. Kimball (c.) of Tallapoosa said that his const.i.tuents were opposed to secession, but were more opposed to Black Republicanism. Before taking action he desired a solid or united South. He agreed with General Scott that with a certain unanimity of the southern states it would be impolitic and improper to attempt coercion. To secure the cooperation of the southern states and to justify themselves to the world a southern convention should be called. However, rights should be maintained even if Alabama had to withdraw from the Union.

Watkins (c.) of Franklin stated that he would vote against the ordinance of secession in obedience to the will of the people he represented. He believed that separate secession was wrong. Edwards (c.) of Blount said that secession was unwise on the part of Alabama, while Beard (c.) of Marshall thought the best, safest, and wisest course would be to consult and cooperate with the other slave states. He favored resistance to Black Republican rule, and his const.i.tuents, though desiring cooperation, would abide by the action of the state.

Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa stated that he had voted against every proposition leading to immediate and separate secession. Yet he would give to the state, when the ordinance was pa.s.sed, his whole allegiance; and, if any attempt were made to coerce the state, would join the army.[48]

Winston (c.) of De Kalb stated that his const.i.tuents were opposed to immediate secession, yet they would, no doubt, acquiesce. He had written to his son, a cadet at West Point, to resign and come home. A convention of the slave states should be called to make an attempt to settle difficulties. Davis (c.) of Madison, who had stoutly opposed separate secession, now declared that since the meeting of the convention serious changes had occurred. Several states had already seceded and others would follow. Consequently Alabama would not be alone. Clemens (cs.) of Madison said he would vote for secession, but would not do so if the result depended upon his vote. He strongly preferred the plan proposed by the minority of the committee on secession.

During the debates there was not a single strong appeal for the Union.

There was simply no Union feeling, but an intense dislike for the North as represented by the Republican party. The cooperationists contemplated ultimate secession. They wished to make an attempt at compromise, but they felt sure that it would fail. Their plan of effecting a united South within the Union was clearly unconst.i.tutional and could only be regarded as a proposition to break up the old Union and reconstruct a new one.[49]

Political Theories of the Members

The secessionists held clear, logical views on the question before them.

They clearly distinguished the "state" or "people" from "government." No secessionist ever claimed that the right of secession was one derived from or preserved by the Const.i.tution; it was a sovereign right. Granted the sovereignty of the state, the right to secede in any way at any time was, of course, not to be questioned. Consequently, they said but little on that point.

The cooperationists were vague-minded. Most of them were stanch believers in state sovereignty and opposed secession merely on the ground of expediency. A few held a confused theory that while the state was sovereign it had no right to secede unless with the whole South. This view was most strongly advocated by Clark of Lawrence. Separate secession was not a right, he said, though he admitted the sovereignty of the state. To secede alone would be rebellion; not so, if in company with other southern states. Earnest (c.) of Jefferson said that the state was sovereign, and that after secession any acts of the state or of its citizens to protect their rights would not be treason. But unless the state acted in its sovereign capacity, it could not withdraw from the Union, and her citizens would be subject to the penalties of treason.[50] Sheffield (c.) of Marshall believed in the right of "secession or revolution." Clemens of Madison, elected as a cooperationist, said that in voting for secession he did it with the full knowledge that in secession they were all about to commit treason, and, if not successful, would suffer the pains and penalties p.r.o.nounced against the highest political crime. Acting "upon the convictions of a lifetime" he "calmly and deliberately walked into revolution."[51]

The cooperationists were generally disposed to deny the sovereignty of the convention. Most of them were former Whigs, who had never worked out a theory of government. Davis (c.) of Madison repeatedly denied that the convention had sovereign powers; sovereignty, he said, was held by the people. Clark (c.) of Lawrence complained that the convention was encroaching upon the rights of the people whom it should protect, and a.s.serted it did not possess unlimited power, but that its power was conferred by act of the legislature, which created only a general agency for a special purpose; that the convention had no power to do more than pa.s.s the ordinance of secession and acts necessary thereto. Smith (c.) said that the convention was the creature of the legislature, not of the people, and that the southern Congress was the creature of the convention.

Buford (s.) of Barbour[52] doubted whether the convention possessed legislative powers. According to his views, political or sovereign power was vested in the people; the convention was not above the const.i.tution which created the legislature. Watts (s.) of Montgomery believed that the power of the convention to interfere with the const.i.tution was confined to such changes as were necessary to the perfect accomplishment of secession.

Yelverton (s.) of Coffee summed up the theory of the majority: the convention had full power and control over the legislative, executive, and judiciary; the people were present in convention in the persons of their representatives and in them was the sovereignty, the power, and the will of the state. This was the theory upon which the convention acted.

Pa.s.sage of the Ordinance of Secession

On January 11, 1861, Yancey spoke at length, closing the debate on the question of secession. Referring to the spirit of fraternity that prevailed, he stated that irritation and suspicion had, in great degree, subsided. The majority had yielded to the minority all the time wanted for deliberation, and every one had been given an opportunity to record his sentiments. The question had not been pressed to a vote before all were ready. Though preferring a simple ordinance of secession, the majority had, for the sake of harmony and fraternal feeling, yielded to amendment by the minority. All, he said, were for resistance to Republican rule, and differed only as to the manner of resistance. Some believed in secession, others in revolution. The ordinance might mean disunion, secession, or revolution, as the members preferred. The mode was organized cooperation, not of states, but of the people of Alabama, in resistance to wrong. Yet the ordinance provided for cooperation with other states upon the basis of the Federal Const.i.tution. Every effort, he said, had been made to find common ground upon which the advocates of resistance might meet, and all parties had been satisfied. This was not a movement of the politicians, but a great popular movement, based upon the widespread, deep-seated conviction that the government had fallen into the hands of a sectional majority who were determined to use it for the destruction of the rights of the South. All were driven by an irresistible tide; the minority had been unable to repress the movement, the majority had not been able to add one particle to its momentum; in northern, not in southern, hands was held the rod that smote the rock from which flowed this flood.

Some, he said, concluded that by dissolving the Union the rich inheritance bequeathed by the fathers was hazarded. But liberties were one thing, the power of government delegated to secure them was another. Liberties were inalienable, and the state governments were formed to secure them; the Federal government was the common agent, and its powers should be withdrawn when it abused them to destroy the rights of the people. This movement was not hostile to liberty nor to the Federal Const.i.tution, but was merely a dismissal of an unfaithful agent. The state now resumed the duties formerly delegated to that agent. The ordinance of secession was a declaration of this fact and also a proposition to form a new government similar to the old. All were urged to sign the ordinance, not to express approval, but to give notice to their enemies that the people were not divided. "I now ask that the vote may be taken," he said.

[Ill.u.s.tration: CIVIL WAR LEADERS.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON STEPHENS.

WILLIAM LOWNDES YANCEY.

GENERAL L. P. WALKER, First Confederate Secretary of War. President of Convention of 1875.

WILLIAM R. SMITH, Leader of Cooperationists in 1861.

JERE CLEMENS.]

The ordinance was called up. It was styled "An Ordinance to dissolve the Union between Alabama and other States united under the Compact styled 'The Const.i.tution of the United States of America.'" The preamble stated that the election of Lincoln and Hamlin by a sectional party avowedly hostile to the domestic inst.i.tutions, peace, and security of Alabama, preceded by many dangerous infractions of the Const.i.tution by the states and people of the North, was a political wrong of so insulting and menacing a character as to justify the people of Alabama in the adoption of prompt and decided measures for their future peace and security. The ordinance simply stated that Alabama withdrew from the Union and that her people resumed the powers delegated by the Const.i.tution to the Federal government. A cooperationist amendment expressed the desire of the people to form with the other southern states a permanent government, and invited a convention of the states to meet in Montgomery on February 4, 1861, for consultation in regard to the common safety. The ordinance was pa.s.sed by a vote of 69 to 31, every delegate voting. Fifteen cooperationists voted for secession and 22 signed the ordinance.

In the convention opinions varied as to whether peace or war would follow secession. The great majority of the members, and of the people also, believed that peaceful relations would continue. All truly wished for peace. A number of the cooperationists expressed themselves as fearing war, but this was when opposing secession, and they probably said more than they really believed. Yet in nearly all the speeches made in the convention there seemed to be distinguishable a feeling of fear and dread lest war should follow. However, had war been a certainty, secession would not have been delayed or checked.

There was warm discussion on the question of submitting the ordinance to the people for ratification or rejection. The cooperationists, both before and after the pa.s.sage of the ordinance, favored its reference to the people in the hope that the measure would be delayed or defeated. No one expected that it would be referred to the people, but this was a good question for obstructive purposes. The minority report on secession declared that, in a matter of such vital importance, involving the lives and liberties of a whole people, the ordinance should be submitted to them for their discussion, and that secession should be attempted only after ratification by a direct vote of the people on that single issue.

Posey (c.) of Lauderdale said that his const.i.tuents expected the question of secession to be referred to the people, and that they would submit more willingly to a decision made by popular vote; that the ordinance was objectionable to them unless they were allowed to vote on it. He further stated that when the convention had refused to submit the ordinance to the popular vote, the first impulse of some of the cooperationists had been to "bolt the convention." However, not being responsible, they preferred to remain and aid in providing for the emergencies of the future. Kimbal (c.) of Tallapoosa said that the people were the interested parties, that sovereignty was in the people, and that they ought to decide the question.

Edwards (c.) of Blount said that his const.i.tuents expected the ordinance to be referred to them and had instructed him to use his best exertions to secure reference to the people. Bulger (c.) of Tallapoosa voted against all propositions looking toward secession without reference to the people.

Davis (c.) of Madison denied the sovereignty of the convention. He said that the vote of the people might be one way and that of the convention another. He believed that the majority in convention represented a minority of the people.

In closing the debate on this subject, Yancey (s.) of Montgomery said that, as a measure of policy, to submit the ordinance to a vote of the people was wrong. The convention was clothed with all the powers of the people; it was the people acting in their sovereign capacity; the government was not a pure democracy, but a government of the people, though not by the people. Historically the convention was the supreme power in American political theory, and submission to the people was a new doctrine. If the ordinance should be submitted to the people, the friends of secession would triumph, but irritation and prejudice would be aroused.

Yancey's views prevailed.

Establishing the Confederacy

A number of the cooperationists professed to believe that secession would result in disintegration and anarchy in the South. The secessionists were accused of desiring to tear down, not to build up. These a.s.sertions were, in fact, unfounded, since, during the entire debate, those favoring immediate secession stated plainly that they expected to reunite with the other southern states after secession. Williamson (s.) of Lowndes said that to declare to the world that they were not ready to unite with the other slave states in a permanent government would be to act in bad faith and subject themselves to contempt and scorn; united action was necessary; financial and commercial affairs were in a deplorable condition; confidence was lost, and in the business world all was gloom and despair--this could be remedied only by a permanent government. Whatley (s.) of Calhoun was unwilling for it to be said by posterity that they tore down the old government and failed to reconstruct a new; the cotton states should establish a government modelled on the Federal Union.

In accordance with these views the ordinance of secession proposed a convention of southern states, and a few days later a resolution was pa.s.sed approving the suggestion of South Carolina to form a provisional government upon the plan of the old Union and to prepare for a permanent government. Each state was to send as many delegates to the convention on February 4 as it had had senators and representatives in Congress. The Alabama convention (January 16) elected one deputy from each congressional district and two from the state at large, most of them being cooperationists or moderate secessionists.

Yancey, on January 16, read a unanimous report from the Committee on Secession in favor of forming a provisional confederate government at once. The report also stated that the people of Alabama had never been dissatisfied with the Const.i.tution of the United States; that their dissatisfaction had been with the conduct of the northern people in violating the Const.i.tution and in dangerous misinterpretation of it, causing the belief that, while acting through the forms of government, they intended to destroy the rights of the South. The Federal Const.i.tution, the report declared, represented a complete scheme of government, capable of being put into speedy operation, and was so familiar to the people that when properly interpreted they would feel safe under it. A speedy confederation of the seceded states was desirable, and there was no better basis than the United States Const.i.tution. The report recommended the formation, first, of a provisional, and later, of a permanent, government. The secessionists warmly advocated the speedy formation of a new confederacy. The cooperationists renewed their policy of obstruction. Jemison (c.) of Tuscaloosa proposed to strike out the part of the resolution relating to the formation of a permanent government.

Another cooperationist wanted delay in order that the border states might have time to take part in forming the proposed government. Others wanted the people to elect a new convention to act on the question. Yancey replied that delay was dangerous, if coercion was intended by the North; that the issue had been before the people and that they had invested their delegates with full power; that the convention then in session had ample authority to settle all questions concerning a provisional or a permanent government; that another election would only cause irritation; that delay, waiting for the secession of the border states, would be suicidal. The proposition for a new convention was lost by a vote of 53 to 36.

The convention decided to continue the work until the end. After choosing delegates (January 16) to the southern convention, which was to meet in Montgomery on February 4, the state convention adjourned until the Confederate provisional government was planned and the permanent const.i.tution written. Then the state convention met again on March 4 to ratify them. The cooperationists now proposed that the new plan of government be submitted to the people. It was right and expedient, they said, to let the people decide. Morgan[53] (s.) of Dallas said that the proposition for ratification by direct vote of the people was absurd. The people would never ratify, for too many unrelated questions would be brought in. Dargan (s.) of Mobile said that the people had conferred upon the convention full powers to act, and that a new election would hara.s.s the candidates with new issues such as the slave trade, reconstruction, etc., introduced by the opponents of secession. Stone (s.) of Pickens thought that a new election would cause angry and bitter discussions, wrangling, distrust, and division among the people; that the proposed const.i.tution was very like the United States Const.i.tution, to which the people were so devoted that they had given up the Union rather than the Const.i.tution; that Lincoln's inaugural address was a declaration of war, and a permanent government was necessary to raise money for armies and fleets. Still the cooperationists obstructed, saying that not to refer to the people was unfair and illiberal; that the convention was usurping the powers of the people, who desired to be heard in the matter; that government by a few was like a house built on the sand; that there was no danger in waiting, for the people would be sure to ratify and then would be better satisfied, etc. Finally most of the cooperationists agreed that it would be better not to refer the question to the people and the permanent Confederate const.i.tution was ratified on March 12 by the vote of 87 to 5.[54]

For the first time Yancey stood at the head of the people of the state.

They were ready to give him any office. But the cooperationists and a few secessionist politicians in the convention were jealous of his rising strength and desired to stay his progress. So Earnest (c.) of Jefferson introduced a self-denying resolution making ineligible to election to Congress the members of the state legislature and of the convention. It was a direct attack by the dissatisfied politicians upon the prominent men in the convention, and especially upon Yancey. The measure was supported by Jemison (c.) who said that it was a practice never to elect a member of a legislative body to an office created by the legislature. Clemens (cs.) thought such a measure unnecessary, as the majority necessary to pa.s.s it could defeat any undesirable candidate. Stone (s.) said that such a resolution would cost the state the services of some of her best men when most needed; that the best men were in the convention; and that the southern Confederacy should be intrusted to the friends, not to the enemies, of secession. Morgan (s.) of Dallas thought that, as a matter of policy, the congressmen would be chosen from outside of the convention.

Bragg (s.) of Mobile wanted the best men regardless of place; this was no ordinary work and the best men were needed; the people had already made a choice of the members once and would approve them again. Yancey said that in principle he was opposed to such a measure. He declared that he would not be a candidate. But he believed that the people had a right to a choice from their entire number, and that the convention had no right to violate the equality of citizenship by disfranchising the 223 members of the convention and the legislature. Yelverton (s.) of Coffee at first favored the resolution, but upon discovering that it was aimed at a few leaders and especially at Yancey, he opposed it. He did not wish the leaders of secession to be proscribed.

The resolution was lost by a vote of 46 to 50, but the delegates sent to the Provisional Congress were, with one exception, taken from outside the convention. A few politicians among the secessionists united with the cooperationists and, pa.s.sing by the most experienced and able leaders, chose an inexperienced Whiggish delegation.[55]

The African Slave Trade

The Committee on Foreign Relations reported that the power of regulating the slave trade would properly be conferred upon the Confederate government, but, meanwhile, believing that the slave trade should be prohibited until the Confederacy was formed, the committee reported an ordinance forbidding it. Morgan (s.) of Dallas opposed the ordinance because it was silent as to the cause of the prohibition. He was opposed to the slave trade on the ground of public policy. If at liberty to carry out Christian convictions, he would have Africans brought over to be made Christian slaves, the highest condition attainable by the negro. In holding slaves, the South was charged with sin and crime, but the southern people were unable to perceive the wrong and unwilling to cease to do what the North considered evil. The present movement rested, in great measure, upon their a.s.sertion of the right to hold the African in slavery. The laws of Congress denouncing the slave trade as piracy had been a shelter to those who a.s.sailed the South, and had affected the standing of the South among nations. If the slave trade were wrong, then it was much worse to bring Christian and enlightened negroes from Virginia to Alabama than a heathen savage from Africa to Alabama. Slavery was the only force which had ever been able to elevate the negro. He believed that on grounds of public policy the traffic should be condemned, but it was a question better left to the Confederate government, because the various states would not make uniform laws. There were slaves enough for twenty years and, when needed, more could be had. Reopening of the African slave trade should be forbidden by the Confederate government expressly for reasons of public policy.

Smith (c.) of Tuscaloosa said that the question of morality did not arise; the slave trade was not wrong. The heathen African was greatly benefited by the change to Christian Alabama. But no more negroes were needed; they were already increasing too fast and there was no territory for extension.

Crowded together, the white and black might degenerate like the Spaniards and natives in Mexico. He supported the ordinance as a measure to disarm foes who charged that one of the reasons for secession was a desire to reopen the African slave trade, which should be denied to the world. The slave trade would lead to war, and "If Cotton is King, his throne is peace," war would destroy him. Jones (c.) of Lauderdale did not want another negro on the soil of Alabama. The people of the border states were afraid that the cotton states would reopen the slave trade, but for the sake of uniformity the question should be left to the Confederate government. Posey (c.) of Lauderdale also thought the border states should be rea.s.sured, and said that on the grounds of expediency alone he would vote against the slave trade. There were already too many negroes; already more land was needed, and that for whites. The slave trade should be prohibited as a great evil to the South. Potter (c.) of Cherokee was astonished that the slave trade and slavery were treated as if identical in point of morality. It was a duty to support and perpetuate slavery; the slave trade was immoral in its tendency and effects; the question, however, should be settled on the grounds of policy alone.

Yelverton (s.) of Coffee[56] said that the slave trade should not now be reopened nor forever closed, but that the regulation of it should be left to the legislature. It was said that the world was against the South on the slavery question; then the South should either own all the slaves, or set them all free in deference to unholy prejudice. As the southern people were not ready to surrender the negroes, they should be at liberty to buy them in any market, subject simply to the laws of trade. Slavery was the cause of secession and should not be left in doubt. A slave in Alabama cost eight times as much as one imported from Africa. If the border states entered the Confederacy, they could furnish slaves; if they remained in the Union and thus became foreign country, the South should not be forced to buy from them alone. Slavery was a social, moral, and political blessing. The Bible sanctioned it, and had nothing to say in favor of it in one country and against it in another. To restrict the slave market to the United States would be a blow at states rights and free trade, and with slavery stricken, King Cotton would become a petty tyrant. Slavery had built up the Yankees, socially, politically, and commercially. The English were a calculating people and would not hesitate, on account of slavery, to recognize southern independence, and other nations would do likewise. Expansion of territory would come and would cause an increased demand for slaves. The arguments against the slave trade, he said, were that fanaticism might be angered, that there were too many negroes already, and that those who had slaves to sell might suffer from reduced prices. But the larger part of the people would prefer to purchase in a cheaper market, and non-slaveholders, as they grew wealthier, could become slave owners. The argument against the slave trade, he added, was usually the one of dollars and cents. The great moral effect was lost sight of, and it seemed from some arguments that Christianity did not require the Bible to be taught to the poor slave unless profit followed. The time was not far distant when the reopening of the slave trade would be considered essential to the industrial prosperity of the cotton states.

Stone (s.) of Pickens said that he would not hesitate, from moral reasons, to purchase a slave anywhere. Slavery was sanctioned by the divine law; it was a blessing to the negro. But on grounds of policy he would insist upon the prohibition of the slave trade. Too many slaves would make too much cotton; prices would then fall and weaken the inst.i.tution. Keep the prices high, and the inst.i.tution would be strengthened; reduce the value of the slaves, and the interest of the owners in the inst.i.tution would be reduced, and the border states would listen to plans for general emanc.i.p.ation. There was no territory in which slavery could expand.

Yancey (s.) explained his course in the Southern Commercial Conventions in preceding years when he had advocated the repeal of the laws against the slave trade. He thought that the laws of Congress defining the slave trade as piracy placed a stigma on the inst.i.tution, condemned it from the point of view of the government, and thus violated the spirit of the Const.i.tution by discriminating against the South. He did not then advocate the reopening of the slave trade, nor would he do so at this time. For two reasons he insisted that the Confederate Congress should prohibit the slave trade: (1) already there were as many slaves as were needed; (2) to induce the border states to enter the Confederacy.

Dowdell (s.) of Chambers proposed an amendment to the ordinance of prohibition, declaring that slavery was a moral, social, and political blessing, and that any attempt to hinder its expansion should be opposed.

He opposed reopening the slave trade, though he considered that there was no moral distinction between slavery and the slave trade. The border states, he said, need not be encouraged by declarations of policy; they would join the Confederacy anyway. Slavery might be regulated by Congress, but should not be prohibited by organic law. He expressed a wish that he might never see the day when white immigration would drive out slave labor and take its place, nor did he want social or political inequality among white people whom he believed should be kept free, independent, and equal, recognizing no subordinate except those made as such by G.o.d. The legislature, he thought, should be left to deal with the evil of white immigration from the North, so that the southern people might be kept a slaveholding people. But, he asked, can that be done with slaves at $1000 a head? And must the hands of the people be tied because a fantastical outside world says that slavery and the slave trade are morally wrong?

Watts (s.) of Montgomery proposed that the Confederacy be given power to prohibit the importation of slaves from any place. Smith (c.) of Tuscaloosa said that the proposal of Watts was a threat against the border states, which would lose their slave market unless they joined the Confederacy; that the border states must be kept friendly, a bulwark against the North.

A resolution was finally pa.s.sed to the effect that the people of Alabama were opposed, for reasons of public policy, to reopening the slave trade, and the state's delegates in Congress were instructed to insist on the prohibition.

The debates show clearly the feeling of the delegates that, on the slavery question, the rest of the world was against them, and hence, as a measure of expediency, they were in favor of prohibiting the trade. Some wished to have all the whites finally become slaveholders; others believed that the negroes were the economic and social enemies of the whites, and they wanted no more of them. But all agreed that slavery was a good thing for the negro.

Yancey (s.) introduced a resolution favoring the free navigation of the Mississippi. The North, he said, was uncertain as to the policy of the South and must be a.s.sured that the South wished no restrictions upon trade. "Free trade" was its motto. Dowdell (s.) proposed that the navigation should be free only to those states and territories lying on the river and its tributaries, while Smith (c.) thought that all navigation should remain as unrestricted and open to all as before secession. Yancey thought that absolutely unrestricted navigation would tend to undermine secession, for it would tend to reconstruct the late political union into a commercial union. Such a policy would discriminate against European friends in favor of New England enemies. As pa.s.sed, the resolution expressed the sense of the convention that the navigation of the Mississippi should be free to all the people of those states and territories which were situated on that river or its tributaries.