Chattanooga and Chickamauga Part 4

If Thomas had not occupied these pa.s.ses in the night, Bragg could have done so, and the object he had in view would then have been accomplished. Had Thomas allowed it, Bragg would have been only too glad to have withdrawn from the field and "retreated" on Rossville. Thomas did not permit it, but went there first, and Chattanooga was won.

The withdrawal involved some fighting. The movement began on the right of Reynolds. Palmer, Johnson, and Baird were to follow in succession, all leaving their skirmishers in their works.

Reynolds formed his brigades by the flank on each side of the Lafayette road, King on the right and Turchin on the left. Thus he advanced northward along the Kelly field toward Rossville. General Thomas followed at the head of the column. As they pa.s.sed a short distance beyond the south line of the field they encountered the advancing troops which had taken part in the last rebel attack. Instantly Thomas ordered Reynolds to cause Turchin to file to the left, and after thus changing front to "charge and clear them out." The line of Turchin's charge is shown on the map. Filing into the wood to the left at double-quick, he faced to the front while thus moving, and his lines darted at a run into the faces of the enemy. It was one of the bravest and most brilliant, most important and effective charges of the day--the fifth over those Kelly fields. At the same moment King, forcing his way along the road, fell on the flank of Liddell's division and broke it. Dan McCook, who had been active during the day on the flank of Forrest, advanced and opened with his artillery on the rebel rear, and after short but sharp fighting the formidable array was driven back and the way to Rossville was open.

Turchin and King moved by the roads to McFarland's Gap. Baird, Johnson, and Palmer followed over the same roads. They were attacked as they left their works and crossed the Kelly field, but order in their columns was restored as soon as they gained the shelter of the woods on the west of the road. Hazen and Wood then followed without molestation. Steedman withdrew at six o'clock from the extreme right, and Brannan was left alone on Horseshoe Ridge. The sun was down. The shadows were thickening in the woods before him, and yet Longstreet's men remained on the slopes, and several times appeared in detachments close along his lines.

Suddenly a line of Hindman's men were found on the slope where Steedman had been. By some strange oversight Brannan had not been notified that his right was unprotected. A hasty examination in the gathering dusk showed another rebel line on the slope directly in the rear, and which had come round through the gap where Steedman's right had been, and was evidently forming for an a.s.sault. The Thirty-fifth Ohio, of Van Derveer's brigade, was thrown back to face both these lines. Fragments of five regiments more, which had opportunely arrived, were given to the commander of the Thirty-fifth. His own regiment had one round and one in the guns. This was placed in front. The others, with fixed bayonets, were formed in the rear. Just before dark a rebel officer rode in on the line and asked what troops were here. He was shot by the near outposts.

Then came a scattering fire from the flank of the rebel line along the ridge, next a volley from the Thirty-fifth, and a silent awaiting results behind its line of bayonets. The volley had scattered the enemy on the ridge, and the force in the rear had withdrawn. These were the last shots on the right. Following them there was absolute quiet everywhere on the field. The stillness was painful and awful. Brannan's officers and men, peering down into the dim and smoking ravine, saw long lines of fire creeping over the leaves, and in and out among the wounded and the dead. It was a sight far more horrible than any of the pictured presentations of Dante's Inferno. From this scene, with the low wailings of the sufferers in their ears, they turned in triumph and exultant to form the rear guard of Thomas's advance to Rossville. Turchin and Willich fought last on the left and formed the rear guard there; Van Derveer covered the right. And thus the Army of the c.u.mberland at midnight occupied the pa.s.ses which made the possession of Chattanooga secure.

There had been no such disordered rush of the broken portions of the army on Chattanooga as the panic-stricken correspondent of an Eastern paper depicted, who gave visions of his own early flight to the country as news. Only a small part of the broken wing drifted to Chattanooga.

From 7,000 to 10,000 stopped at Rossville, and were fairly organized there. When Thomas's forces arrived the whole army was placed in position on Missionary Ridge, and in front of it, and remained in line of battle throughout the whole of the 21st.

At nightfall the army advanced to Chattanooga--advanced is the word; the term "retreated," so persistently used in regard to this movement has no place in the truthful history of this campaign. The Army of the c.u.mberland was on its way to Chattanooga, the city it set out to capture. It had halted at Chickamauga, on its line of advance, to fight for its objective. On the night of the 21st it began its last march for the city. Every foot of it was a march in advance, and not retreat. At sunrise of the 22d Brannan's division, which was the rear guard, reached the city, and the campaign for Chattanooga was at an end. Until that morning broke the great bulk of the Army of the c.u.mberland had never seen the place.

Thus, crowned with success, though won at terrible cost, closed the last campaign of General Rosecrans. It was matchless in its strategy, unequaled in the skill and energy with which his outnumbered army was concentrated for battle. Its stubborn, desperate, and heroic fighting throughout the two days' battle was not surpa.s.sed, and, judged by its returns of dead and wounded, not equaled in any one of the great battles of the war. It secured the city which it marched to capture. The loss was no greater than the country would have expected at any time in attaining that result. If Rosecrans had crossed the river in front of the city and captured it with even greater loss, the country would have gone wild with enthusiasm. Had he been properly supported from Washington he would have entered it without a battle, since, if there had been even a show of activity elsewhere, Bragg's army would not have been nearly doubled with re-enforcements and thus enabled to march back on Chattanooga after its retreat from the city. The reverse on the field on Sunday was not the disaster which at the time it was declared to be, and which it has ever since suited several writers of military fiction to persistently represent. The account herewith presented shows that after General Thomas consolidated his lines at 1 o'clock on Sunday not a single position was carried and held by the enemy. The withdrawal, which began soon after 5 o'clock, was not in any sense forced. There is not an officer or soldier who fought on those lines but knows that they could have been held throughout till dark.

The accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans's right is that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were swept off the field; but only five brigades of McCook's entire corps left the field, and the fragments which went from Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and Johnson's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end under Thomas on the left, were respectively from Crittenden's and McCook's corps. Wood belonged to Crittenden. Barnes's brigade, which fought on the extreme left, and part of d.i.c.k's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the large part of Crittenden's force fought to the last. Four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division were detached and cut off with the right, and a considerable part of Negley's division of Thomas went to the rear, chiefly through the bad conduct of its commander. We have seen, however, how persistently and effectively Stanley's and John Beatty's brigades of that division fought, and Beatty and General Charles Grosvenor and Sirwell and Stoughton, of these brigades, were all found fighting like private soldiers on the hill with Wood and Brannan to the last. The battle of Sunday was, then, not the fight of any one corps, but of the Army of the c.u.mberland. There was no disorderly retreat of the army on Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it. The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that point throughout the next day and until the army moved on in the night to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the moment it opened till its close. For the most part the lines fought at close range and, in the countless a.s.saults, often hand to hand. On the first day there were no field works of any kind. On the second Thomas was protected by such rude log works as could be hastily thrown together.

Brannan and Steedman were without a semblance of works. The battle in the main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within the limit of point blank range. For the second day, on the Confederate side, the contest was one continued series of brave and magnificent a.s.saults.

General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an effective force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade, with 2,061 effectives, held Chattanooga, leaving the Union force in front of Bragg slightly less than 58,000. It was several thousand less at the battle, Post's brigade of Davis'

division and three regiments of infantry and one battery being engaged in guarding supply trains.

In a letter from General Lee to President Davis, dated September 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg's actual and prospective strength are thus stated:

"If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my return from Richmond is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men; General Buckner, 16,118. He was to receive from General Johnson 9,000. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of the local troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as exceeding his expectations."

It will be well to remember, in connection with these official figures, that Bragg, after the battle, reported Longstreet's force, which was not included by Lee, at 5,000. This, according to the figures furnished General Lee, gave Bragg 81,219. According to General Johnson's correspondence, after he had sent 9,000 to Bragg, he subsequently dispatched him two small brigades, and these, later, reached him the day before the battle.

A reference to the losses on each side will show that there has been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. Rosecrans's loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, of which a large number were killed or wounded. Bragg's losses, as compiled and estimated at the War Records Office, were 17,804. Thus the entire loss for each army was over twenty-five per cent. of the entire force of each. Hill's corps of the Confederate right wing lost 2,990 out of a total 8,884. Of the 22,885 in Longstreet's left wing the loss was 7,856, with one brigade heavily engaged not reported. Longstreet's loss on Sunday afternoon was thirty-six per cent, of those engaged.

The casualties in Jackson's brigade of Cleburne's division, which a.s.saulted on Baird's front, was 35 per cent., while the Fifth Georgia, of that brigade, lost 55 per cent., and the First Confederate Regulars 43 per cent. Gregg's brigade, of Buckner's corps, lost 652 out of 1,425.

Helm's Kentucky brigade, on the Union left, lost 75 per cent. of its strength. Bate's brigade lost 7 officers killed and 61 officers wounded, and the total casualties were 607 out of 1,316. All his field officers except three were killed or wounded. The losses in Govan's brigade, of Walker's corps, exceeded 50 per cent. Deas, who fought in front of Steedman's a.s.sault, lost 745 out of 1,942. Walthall, of Walker, lost 705 out of 1,727. On the Union side Steedman in four hours lost 1,787 out of 3,700, and all were killed and wounded but one. Brannan's division had 5,998 engaged. Its casualties were 2,174, or 38 per cent. The loss in Van Derveer's brigade, of this division, in four regiments and one battery, was 840 out of 1,788 engaged, or 49 per cent. Croxton's brigade, of the same division, made up of five regiments, lost 938. Of Van Derveer's regiments the Ninth Ohio lost 50 per cent.; the Thirty-fifth Ohio, a small fraction less than 50 per cent.; the Second Minnesota 192, or exactly 50 per cent., and the Eighty-seventh Indiana about half of its number. General Wood lost 1,070 in two brigades.

These figures become the more significant when compared with the statement of losses in the world's noted battles. General Wheeler, the distinguished Confederate cavalry commander, thus vividly presented this question at the gathering of the Society of the Army of the c.u.mberland and Confederates, at Chattanooga, in 1881:

"Waterloo was one of the most desperate and b.l.o.o.d.y fields chronicled in European history and yet Wellington's casualties were less than 12 per cent., his losses being 2,432 killed and 9,528 wounded out of 90,000 men, while at Shiloh, the first great battle in which General Grant was engaged, one side lost in killed and wounded 9,740 out of 34,000, while their opponents reported their killed and wounded at 9,616, making the casualties about 30 per cent. At the great battle of Wagram Napoleon lost but about 5 per cent. At Wurzburg the French lost but 3-1/2 per cent., and yet the army gave up the field and retreated to the Rhine.

At Racour Marshal Saxe lost but 2-1/2 per cent. At Zurich Ma.s.sena lost but 8 per cent. At Lagriz Frederick lost but 6-1/2 per cent. At Malplaquet Marlborough lost but 10 per cent., and at Ramillies the same intrepid commander lost but 6 per cent. At Contras Henry of Navarre was reported as cut to pieces, yet his loss was less than 10 per cent. At Lodi Napoleon lost 1-1/4 per cent. At Valmy Frederick lost but 3 per cent., and at the great battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, sanguinary as they were, Napoleon lost an average of less than 14-1/2 per cent. At Magenta and Solferino, in 1859, the average loss of both armies was less than 9 per cent. At Konigrattz, in 1866, it was 6 per cent. At Werth, Specheran, Mars la Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan, in 1870, the average loss was 12 percent. At Linden General Moreau lost but 4 per cent., and the Archduke John lost but 7 per cent. in killed and wounded. Americans can scarcely call this a lively skirmish.

"At Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Gettysburg, Mission Ridge, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania the loss frequently reached and sometimes exceeded forty per cent., and the average of killed and wounded on one side or the other was over thirty per cent."

Those who remained at Chickamauga and fought till the night of Sunday came, when, for many regiments, every other comrade was dead or wounded, were satisfied with the result, and have always maintained that Chickamauga was fought for Chattanooga, and have so regarded it as a great and notable victory. General D. H. Hill in a recent _Century_ article thus sums up the result for the Confederate side: "A breathing s.p.a.ce was allowed him; the panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga--the objective point of the campaign--was held. There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those b.l.o.o.d.y days of September, '63.

But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga--that brilliant dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay to strike was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That 'barren victory' sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy."

The authorities at Washington, to cover their own shortcomings and inexcusable neglect, chose to deepen the erroneous impression that the Army of the c.u.mberland had been routed and driven back to Chattanooga in confusion. The removal of General Rosecrans was determined upon. In fact, it had been only a question of opportunity since the campaign opened. There was only needed the misrepresentations about Chickamauga to furnish this.

In the mean time General Rosecrans thoroughly fortified Chattanooga and was actually engaged in preparations to open the river for supplies, exactly as it was afterwards done, when he was removed. In fact, his plan was partially perfected before he crossed the river, as is shown by the fact that he made written contracts with Northern firms to have bridges completed by October 1 for the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and the Running Water at Wauhatchie. He had ordered the thorough reconnoitering of the river bank opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge--where Sherman afterward crossed with a view of a flank attack there. It was, therefore, altogether fitting and proper that the order for his relief should arrive while he was absent making a personal examination of the vicinity of Brown's Ferry, where he intended to throw a bridge to unite with Hooker from Bridgeport and open the river exactly as was afterward done. He had even notified Harker of the plan three days before and ordered him to be ready to execute his part of it. General Thomas, at first, insisted that he would resign rather than appear to acquiesce in Rosecrans's removal by accepting the command. It was at Rosecrans's earnest solicitation that he reconsidered this determination. But he did not hesitate to say that the order was cruelly unjust. When General Garfield left for Washington soon after the battle he immediately charged him to do all he could to have Rosecrans righted. These will be new statements to most, but they are true.

The survivors of the Army of the c.u.mberland should awake to great pride in this notable field of Chickamauga. Why should it not, as well as Eastern fields, be marked by monuments, and its lines accurately preserved for history? There was no more magnificent fighting during the war than both armies did there. Both sides might well unite in preserving the field where both, in a military sense, won such renown.