Chattanooga and Chickamauga Part 3

[Ill.u.s.tration: CHICKAMAUGA--SECOND DAY'S BATTLE.]

A glance at the map will show the rearrangement of the Union line.

Beginning on the left, which covered Bragg's objective--namely, the control of the Lafayette road to Chattanooga--Baird, Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds were withdrawn slightly from the ground on which they had fought the day before, and placed in strong position in the edge of the woods which skirted the Kelly farm. Brannan remained near the position to which he had been called to support Reynolds the night before. The divisions of Negley, Wood, Davis, and Sheridan and the brigade of Wilder had all been drawn back of the Lafayette road, their lines being slightly advanced from the road, leading from Crawfish Springs to the Lafayette road at Kelly's farm.

The order of the Confederate line, from its right to a point in front of Brannan's has already been stated. Here Stewart, of Buckner's corps, formed the right of Longstreet, who commanded the left wing, and, counting toward the enemy's left, the succeeding divisions were Bushrod Johnson, with Law and Kershaw in reserve, Hindman and Preston Buckner's corps was present with this wing by the courtesy of Burnside and the Washington authorities, while the latter alone were responsible for the inaction at the East which allowed Longstreet's corps to be present. By the same courtesy Walker's division from Mississippi was present with Hill's corps, and was to fight again, splendidly but unsuccessfully, on Bragg's right, as it had all the day before.

Under cover the fog in the shelter of the woods, and in the painful quiet of that Sabbath morning, the two armies had brought their lines face to face. At 9 o'clock there was scarcely any point the length of a tiger's spring between them.

Bragg had 212 regiments, organized into 42 brigades, and these in 7 divisions. There were in all 173 infantry regiments and 11 of cavalry, which were dismounted and fought as infantry, 28 cavalry regiments and 50 batteries. Rosecrans had 158 regiments, 33 brigades, 14 divisions, and 5 corps. There were 141 regiments of infantry and 18 of cavalry and 36 batteries.

Of Bragg's corps two were cavalry--Wheeler and Forrest. One division of Forrest's fought as infantry. Rosecrans had one cavalry corps of two divisions. This tremendous array was pushed close against a Union front of only two miles and a half.

At 9 o'clock that Sabbath service of all the G.o.ds of war began. It broke full-toned with its infernal music over the Union left, and that morning service continued there till noon.

Let us look a moment at the Union line. John Beatty's brigade had been stretched as a thin line from Baird's left to the Lafayette road and across it. King's regulars formed the left of Baird, Scribner his center, and Starkweather his right. He had no reserve. Johnston's division was on the right of Baird; Dodge and Baldwin, of his brigades, on the front, and Willich in reserve. Next was Palmer, with Cruft and Hazen on the line, and Grose in reserve. Reynolds, on Palmer's right, reached the Lafayette road again. He had Turchin in line and King in reserve. The Union line was protected by log barricades. It thus ran around the Kelley farm and was established from fifty to a hundred yards within the woods which skirted the great open s.p.a.ce in their rear. This field, which lay along the State road for half a mile and was a quarter of a mile wide, became the scene of almost continuous and ever brilliant fighting. Beside the great battle along the main lines surrounding it, there were during the day five distinct brigade charges over it, one of Stanley, one of Van Derveer, one of Grose, a fourth by Willich, and a fifth by Turchin.

Bragg's orders were to attack successively by divisions, from right to left. Breckinridge struck first. He came on in single line, swinging around towards the State road to gain Baird's rear. Adams was on his right, Stovall in the center, and Helm on the left. This latter brigade struck Scribner's breastworks, and was instantly shattered there. Helm rode bravely among his troops, enthusiastically urging them forward, and fell dead while thus engaged. Two of his colonels were killed, and two were wounded.

Stovall pushed in with dauntless pluck against the regulars on the left of Scribner, but King's men fought splendidly. The rebels a.s.saulted bravely but uselessly. Adams had swept in on John Beatty's thin line, and broken it. Still it fought with undaunted courage, yielding doggedly, and by the inch, and finally Adams, r.e.t.a.r.ded by the disaster on his left, was at bay. At this juncture came Stanley's brigade, from Negley, near the center, with deployed lines, and the sun on its banners. It swept over the Kelly field, from near the house, and plunged into the woods in the rear of Beatty. Well might those who were witnessing that threatening move toward the Union rear hold their breaths as Stanley disappeared, and thus wait for his volleys and their effect. In a moment they came, then his rattling line fire, then the cheer of a charge. The first attack of Breckinridge had ended in a sore defeat.

But Cleburne had in turn advanced. He, like Breckinridge, came in single line. Polk, of Cleburne, a.s.saulted Starkweather's front, while Wood of the same command extended the attack as far as the right of Baldwin. The remnants of Helm, under Colonel Lewis, still a.s.sisted against Scribner, but soon Cleburne's division was repelled at every point with terrible loss. The Confederate officers engaged describe the effect of the Union artillery throughout this attack as the most destructive in their experience. Thus Bragg's first attack had wholly failed. The Union forces were exultant, and so strong were their skirmish demonstrations that Hill, who was under orders to organize a second and much stronger attack, paused, to first prepare his own lines against a.s.sault.

Walker's reserve corps of two divisions was brought up, and its five brigades distributed along the shattered points of Breckinridge's and Cleburne's lines. The organizations of rebel divisions being thus destroyed, the attack became largely one of brigades acting independently, each rushing at the Union works. There were ten rebel brigades engaged in the movement from the Union left to Palmer's position, and beyond this point Stewart's division co-operated by a.s.saulting Reynold's narrow front and Brannan's lines. Wood, of Cleburne, who had previously stormed the angle of the Union works on Johnson's right and been repulsed, a.s.sisted by Deshler, of the same division, thinking this angle the flank of the barricades, again struck obliquely and with fury with the idea of turning them. Instead, these dashing Confederates went to pieces on Baldwin's brigade, of Johnson, and on Palmer's front. Walthall a.s.saulted the corresponding angle at Scribner's position, and though he carried his men within pistol range of the crests, he was beaten back with heavy loss. Gist, acting with Helm's (now Lewis') broken line, attacked with power, but in turn was driven back. Colquitt, still further to the right, came upon the regular brigade of King. But his line had missed direction, and was at once exposed to a withering flank fire, and overwhelmed. Colquitt fell.

Several of his most prominent officers were killed. Ector and Wilson, of Walker's second division (Liddell's), advanced to help, but without effect. Govan, however, of this same division, was successful, and by hot fighting and the weight of numbers, he bore back John Beatty's weakened line, and the situation on the Union left became at once most serious. Everything but this along the line of the second attack by Bragg's right had failed. It began to look as if rebel victory was dawning here, and that the triumph of Bragg's plan of turning the Union left had come.

For Breckinridge, in the second advance, had swung his lines much farther to his right, and by a wide left wheel had brought his right across the State road, and so between the Union left and Rossville. His left reached and slightly overlapped Beatty's left. Thus formed with lines perpendicular to the State road, he began a march directly toward the Kelly house and the rear of Reynolds, just beyond it. While the remnants of the left, so badly broken, first under Helm and then under his successor, were entangled with Beatty and Stanley, his two other brigades, Adams on the right and Stovall to the left, burst out of the woods on the north side of the Kelly field, quickly rectified their lines, threw out a heavy skirmish force, and bore rapidly down toward Reynolds. It was half a mile to his position over smooth and open ground. From the start the skirmishers could throw their bullets into Reynolds rear. It was a movement threatening dire disaster. The moment it developed in the rear of Baird, Walker's corps and Cleburne's brigades reopened their fire on the front of the barricades, while Stewart advanced on Reynolds and Brannan. Thus, taken on flank, front, and full in the rear, and outnumbered at every point, it seemed as if there was no salvation for the Union left. But it came, and at that point where Confederate victory seemed sure, full defeat fell suddenly upon them. Thomas watching the progress of Breckinridge's flank attack, had sent to Rosecrans for Brannan. At that moment the battle had not extended to the latter. But just as Rosecrans' order to go to Thomas reached Brannan signs of heavy and immediate attack on his front became apparent. He well used his discretion, and remained on the line until he could report the situation to Rosecrans. But in the mean time, in partial compliance with the order, he sent Fred Van Derveer's brigade, which const.i.tuted his reserve, to the help of the left. This brigade deployed, marched rapidly in to line toward the Kelly house, and came into the field less than two hundred yards in advance of Breckinridge's line. Though presenting its flank to the enemy when he was first discovered, it changed front in the open ground under fire, charged the rebel line, broke it, following it back into the woods, and after an hours' fighting drove these two brigades with their artillery entirely clear of the Union left. It then returned to a point near the Kelly house.

Govan, of Walker, next on the left of Breckinridge, had, however, gained a lodgment on the line which Beatty had so stubbornly held. Then came another Union charge over the Kelly field. Palmer, under Thomas's orders, sent Grose with his reserve brigade to clear Baird's immediate left. Moving from the edge of the woods back into the open field, Grose formed in double lines, moved at double-quick across the rear of Johnson and Baird, and rushed with cheers into the woods on the north side of the field. In a few moments his volleys were pouring into the face of Govan. The latter's troops fought desperately, but their supports on each flank had been previously broken, and soon, after bitter loss, gave way. The Union left was then further strengthened by placing Barnes, of Van Cleve, on the left of Beatty. It was then noon. So badly shattered was Bragg's right that it was nearly 5 o'clock before another attack could be organized on this ground. Thenceforth the Union left was safe.

Simultaneously with the appearance of Breckinridge in the Kelly field events were hastening to an appalling consummation on the Union center.

Stewart, the right of Longstreet's wing, moved to the a.s.sault in Reynold's front. With three brigades he rushed upon Turchin, who formed Reynold's advance, and Hazen, of Palmer, next on the left, while his left also involved Brannan's left. On his right he also had the co-operation of Wood's and Deshler's brigades, of Cleburne. Deshler was killed as the movement began, and Roger Q. Mills, of Texas, succeeded him.

As this was the opening of the memorable attack which led to the break in the Union center it is worthy of close attention. General Stewart, in his report, thus describes it:

"For several hundred yards both lines pressed on under the most terrific fire it has ever been my fortune to witness. The enemy retired, and our men, though mowed down at every step, rushed on at double-quick, until at length the brigade on the right of Brown broke in confusion, exposing him to an enfilading fire. He continued on, however, some fifty to seventy-five yards further, when his two right regiments gave way in disorder and retired to their original position. His center and left, however, followed by the gallant Clayton and indomitable Bate, pressed on, pa.s.sing the cornfield in front of the burnt house, and to a distance of two hundred to three hundred yards beyond the Chattanooga road, driving the enemy within his line of intrenchments and pa.s.sing a battery of four guns, which were afterward taken possession of by a regiment from another division. Here new batteries being opened by the enemy on our front and flank, heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary to retire, the command reforming on the ground occupied before the advance."

All this was going on in the front of Reynolds and Palmer, while Breckinridge, as already described, was entering the open field from the north in plain sight from their rear. Yet not a single Union soldier left the line. Standing steadfast, they first resisted, as Stewart describes, and then were incited to still greater action by the brilliant fighting of Van Derveer in their rear, which so unexpectedly brought them the much-needed relief.

Here the story reaches the event of the break in the Union lines, which is widely misunderstood, and has been most unjustly used to throw discredit on General Rosecrans. Just as Longstreet's attack was developing upon Wood's front, the latter received an order from General Rosecrans to "close upon Reynolds as fast as possible and support him."

As Brannan was between himself and Reynolds, Wood saw no other way of executing the order, which he deemed imperative, except to withdraw from line, and pa.s.s to the rear of Brannan. This he did, although the attack was just bursting on his front.

It has been persistently claimed, to General Rosecrans's detriment, that in the excitement of the height of battle he had issued a blundering order. Nothing could be more unjust. The explanation is perfectly simple. General Thomas had sent for Brannan to meet Breckinridge's flank attack. Stewart's attack had struck Reynolds with force and was rapidly developing on Brannan's front. The latter hastily consulted with Reynolds as to the propriety of withdrawing, and both being clear that to obey the order would open the line to the enemy, Brannan dispatched Van Derveer, his reserve, to the left, in partial compliance with its terms, and then reported to Rosecrans that he had deemed it vitally important to maintain his line till the commanding officer could be advised of the situation. He instantly approved Brannan's action. But just before his message arrived, upon the supposition that he had obeyed the order and gone to Thomas, the noted order to Wood to close to the left on Reynolds had been dispatched. When it reached Wood, the attack, rolling along Brannan's front, had reached his own. Had he exercised the same discretion which Brannan had so wisely displayed, all would have been well, and that nearly fatal break in the Union lines would not have occurred. But instantly on reading it, Wood rapidly withdrew his division and started in the rear of Brannan toward Reynolds. Longstreet, who had waited most impatiently till 11 o'clock before he could move a man to the attack, had solidified his lines before the Union center and left, and the moment Wood left this wide gap for him, Longstreet thrust into it the eight brigades of his central column of attack. They were formed in three lines, and advancing rapidly they opened on Brannan's right and rear and Davis' left, and greatly widened the gap. Brannan threw back his right, losing something from Connell's brigade on that flank, but, stubbornly resisting Longstreet's advance as he retired that wing of his division, he soon re-established it on Horseshoe Ridge, near the Snodgra.s.s House, on a line nearly perpendicular to the one he had occupied when Longstreet pushed through the gap left by wood. The latter had pa.s.sed rapidly to the rear of Brannan, and though subjected to heavy attack after pa.s.sing Brannan's left, he was able to establish his line on a lower ridge in the prolongation of Brannan's new position, and reaching in the direction of Reynolds. The latter officer soon retired his right slightly, and the line was again continuous, except a break between Wood and Reynolds, from Brannan's right to Barnes on Baird's left. Into this vacant s.p.a.ce Hazen moved later under orders from Thomas, and then the line on that part of the field was firmly established.

All to the right of Brannan had gone. Negley, with one brigade of his division, which was caught in the gap, had drifted toward Brannan. Here, gathering up much artillery, which he was ordered by Thomas to post on the crest overlooking the field in front of Baird's left, he took it instead to Brannan's right, and soon, without waiting to be attacked in his strong position, and although he had promised Brannan to hold it, abandoned it, and retired in haste toward Rossville, ordering all the artillery to follow him.

Davis had moved rapidly into the breastworks which Negley had occupied, and there placed his weak force of two brigades across Longstreet's advance. But after his terrific fighting of the day before he had only twelve hundred men for action, and though Carlin, and Heg's men under Martin, fought with desperation, they could do nothing but yield. They were driven in disorder to the right and rear.

At the same time Van Cleve, with his two remaining brigades in motion towards Thomas, was thrown into great disorder, though a considerable portion of them rallied with Wood.

As Davis was borne back, McCook, of the Twentieth Corps, in person led Laiboldt's brigade, of Sheridan's division, against Longstreet's advancing columns. The attack was delivered with spirit and power, but it failed in the face of overwhelming numbers, and the brigade was utterly routed. McCook was carried to the rear with it.

Next came Sheridan, with his two remaining brigades under Lytle and Bradley. The former, with splendid bearing and courage, rallied his columns, and though they were taken at every disadvantage, under the inspiration which he imparted they faced the resistless advance with desperate valor. Lytle fell where death was thickest for his comrades.

His brigade, and that of Bradley, with Wilder, who had also fought to the extremity to a.s.sist, were all borne to the rear and forced to join the fugitive columns falling off from the Union right toward Rossville.

General Rosecrans had just ridden the lines from the left, and had pa.s.sed in the rear of McCook's position, when the line was severed.

Finding the roads in rear of the right filled with retreating columns representing all corps of the army, for Negley was there from Thomas, he deemed it prudent to ride to Chattanooga and decide upon a new position in front of the place. General Crittenden's whole command, that is, three divisions, having been ordered in succession to Thomas before the break, Crittenden himself, being without command, rode into Chattanooga after Rosecrans, as did also McCook. Sheridan's division was in good order by the time it reached Rossville, and most of the troops which left the field were about that place and McFarland's Gap in fighting condition throughout the afternoon. Their numbers at 2 o'clock were from seven to ten thousand. They could easily have been led to Baird's left or Brannan's right, as the way to either flank was open. This was proved by the fact that General Garfield, Colonel Gates Thurston, and Surgeons Gross and Perkins, the medical directors of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, rode back and joined General Thomas. It is one of the myths of current Chickamauga history that Sheridan marched with his division back to the fighting line, but this is an error. He received a request at McFarland's Gap from Gen. Thomas to return to the field, but decided instead to retire to Rossville. Upon reaching the latter point he moved out on the Lafayette road toward Gen. Thomas, but did not form a junction with him. He reached the Cloud House at 7 p. m. and soon after withdrew to Rossville.

Six Confederate divisions under Longstreet had taken part in breaking the Union center and sweeping its right off the field. These were Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Preston, of Buckner's corps: Hood and McLaws, of Longstreet's Virginia troops, and Hindman's division of Polk's corps. Eight brigades of this force had first entered the gap left by Wood, and from that time till Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, and Sheridan had gone, and Brannan had established himself on Horseshoe Ridge, each of these six divisions had advanced and fought with vigor. Finally Hindman, finding no resistance on his left, wheeled to the right to a.s.sist Longstreet's center and right, which had been checked by Brannan and Wood. This brought Longstreet's six divisions together in the vicinity of Horseshoe ridge.

[Ill.u.s.tration: THE CONCENTRATION.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: KELLEY'S FARM--HORSESHOE RIDGE.]

Shortly after 2 o'clock Longstreet ordered a general a.s.sault by his wing. It was delivered with confidence and tremendous power. To meet these six divisions Brannan on the right had Croxton's brigade and part of Connell's; Wood, on the left, had Harker's brigade. With these organized commands were a part of John Beatty's, a good part of Stanley's and the Twenty-first Ohio, of Sirwell's, all of Negley; parts of the Ninth and the Seventeenth Kentucky; Forty-fourth Indiana and Thirteenth Ohio, of Van Cleve's division, with the Fifty-eighth Indiana, of Buell's brigade--in all about 4,000 men.

Against this line, hastily formed and without reserves, Longstreet launched his solid columns. They came on magnificently, wave behind wave. They met sheeted fire from the summits, and yet pressed on to hand encounters, but from these they soon recoiled. The whole line retired from the foot of the slopes, and covered by the forests organized for a second attack. It was delivered soon after 3 o'clock. Like the first, it fell on the fronts of Wood and Brannan. But while Hindman a.s.saulted the latter in front he also sent a brigade through the gap to Brannan's right to scale the ridge and gain his rear. Negley, who had held this point with abundant artillery and infantry supports, and who had promised to stay there, had promptly fled before any attack had reached him and was even then in Rossville. There was absolutely nothing to send against Hindman's left, towering there with its fringe of bayonets on the commanding ridge, and forming to sweep down on Brannan's right and rear. Longstreet and all his general officers were exultant, and though their second attack had failed everywhere, except as this lodgment was obtained on the ridge beyond Brannan, they rapidly arranged their lines for what they believed would be a final a.s.sault leading to sure victory.

But not a Union soldier moved from his place. The men clutched their guns tighter. Officers everywhere moved closer to the lines to encourage and steady them. The color-bearers set their flags firmer. And then, as if to repay such courage, help came as unexpectedly as if the hand of the Lord had been visibly extended to save. Suddenly a Union column appeared, moving with speed across the fields from the direction of the McDaniel house. It was Granger, of the reserve, with two brigades of Steedman's division. Being stationed four miles away toward Ringgold, Granger, agreeing with Steedman that they must be sorely needed on the field, had started without orders, and though sh.e.l.led by Forrest on his flank for two miles of the way, had not allowed his columns to be greatly delayed. And now Steedman was sweeping up to the foot of the hill below the Snodgra.s.s House. As he reported to Thomas, coming in from toward the Kelly farm was another well-ordered column. It proved to be Van Derveer returning from the charge upon Breckinridge in the Kelly field. The map shows how he had left Brannan's line just before the break and hastened with deployed lines toward the left; how thus deployed he had marched from the woods to be enfiladed from Breckinridge's front as the latter emerged from the woods and burst upon the Union rear. Here, under this fire, he whirled his brigade to the left, delivered a full volley at pistol range into the enemy's faces, charged into their lines on a run, drove them back on their batteries, and pursued both infantry and artillery to a point beyond the Union left, where Grose, coming from the rear of Palmer, completed the work.

The dotted line shows Van Derveer's return. He, too, had moved without orders to the sound of tremendous firing about the Snodgra.s.s house. Just as Steedman had hastily formed and a.s.saulted Hindman's forces beyond the right of Brannan, Van Derveer joined his brigade to Steedman's left and moved also to the a.s.sault. Steedman seized a regimental flag and rode with it in his hands to the top. His command was the brigades of those splendid soldiers, John G. Mitch.e.l.l and Walter C. Whittaker.

One (Whittaker's) plunged into the gorge through which Hindman's left was pouring, the rest of the line, with Van Derveer on its left, charged for the ridge. In twenty minutes it was carried and all of Hindman's forces were driven from it and out of the ravine. Whittaker had been wounded and four of his five staff officers either killed or mortally wounded. One-fifth of Steedman's force had been disabled in the charge.

Van Derveer's loss was considerable, but less in proportion, as he was not fairly in front of Hindman, as Steedman was. Twice Hindman turned his recoiling troops to recapture the position, but finally abandoned the effort and relinquished the ridge to Steedman. The center and right of Longstreet's third a.s.sault was in like manner repelled. In this movement the Fourth Kentucky, Col. R. M. Kelley, joined Van Derveer and fought with him till night.

The coming of Steedman was more than an inspiration. It was more than the holding of the right. He brought 100,000 rounds of cartridges and artillery ammunition--far more welcome than diamonds. Regiments in the line had been fighting, even at that early hour, with the bayonet and clubbed muskets. Now, when Longstreet's right came on in aid of the attempt of Hindman to hold his position on the west they were received with terrific and continuing fire, and as the lines of gray, with desperate valor, neared the summit Wood's men and Brannan's rushed at them with the bayonet and broke their ranks, rolled them down the slopes, and on Wood's front, with help of a direct fire from Aleshire's battery on the left and a terrible enfilading fire from Battery I, Fourth Regular Artillery, on Brannan's left, under those splendid young soldiers, Lieutenants Frank G. Smith and George B. Rodney, drove them in disorder beyond their artillery.

At this time both Confederate wings were calling for re-enforcements.

Bragg's reply to Longstreet was that the right was so badly shattered that it could not help him.

When Steedman's coming with four thousand men had so changed the whole current of the battle, what if the seven thousand men under Sheridan and Negley about McFarland's and Rossville, much nearer than Steedman was, had been brought up? How the officers who were there could stay themselves, or manage to keep the men, is a mystery sickening to think about.

Hindman thus tells of the attack by which he carried the ridge to the right of Brannan, before Steedman arrived:

"In a few minutes a terrific contest ensued, which continued, at close quarters, without any intermission, over four hours. Our troops attacked again and again with a courage worthy of their past achievements. The enemy fought with determined obstinacy and repeatedly repulsed us, but only to be again a.s.sailed. As showing the fierceness of the fight, the fact is mentioned that on our extreme left the bayonet was used and men were also killed and wounded with clubbed muskets."

Of the attack of Steedman's men in the ravine, where they rushed on the Confederate line with the bayonet, pushed in among the guns and killed gunners at their posts, Hindman further says: "I have never known Federal troops to fight so well. It is just to say, also, that I never saw Confederate soldiers fight better." Of the second attack upon Brannan's position, which was repulsed, Kershaw, commanding in Longstreet's troops from Virginia, said: "This was one of the heaviest attacks of the war on a single point."

Up to the time of Steedman's arrival there had been a break between Reynolds and Wood, but the flank of the former in advance of the latter somewhat covered it. Upon this point Longstreet now organized a heavy attack. But the lull on the left, arising from the rebels there having been, as Bragg expressed it, "so badly beaten back" that they could be of no service on his left, made it practicable to strengthen the Union center. Hazen was found to have ammunition, and was moved with celerity into the gap, and Grose, Johnson's reserve, replaced him. Hazen arrived none too soon. His lines were hardly established before Longstreet's right was upon him, lapping over upon Reynold's front, and then, from Reynolds to Steedman, there was one continuing h.e.l.l of battle. Garfield, who had come up with an escort, having ridden from Rossville, after reporting to Thomas, moved along the ranks of his old brigade (Harker, of Wood), encouraging the men, and giving evidence against all loiterers at the gaps in the rear that every officer and man of them could easily have reached the field.

Longstreet's columns a.s.sault at every point, as rapidly as his lines rolled back from the crest could be reformed. He had ten brigades in front of Brannan and Steedman, while these officers had only four unbroken in organization, and fragments of two others. One brigade of Preston, which a.s.saulted Wood and Hazen's line, had over 2,000 men in the movement. The successive movements, rather the tremendous dashes of these lines against the hill, was like the advance of breakers with which ocean storms attack the sh.o.r.e. But, as surely, each wave with its crest of steel, its spray of smoke, and its glitter of fire broke and swept back with dead and wounded in its terrible undertow. It was treason, but magnificent. Such was the scene which these soldiers of Thomas saw on the Snodgra.s.s Hill throughout the afternoon till dusk.

To relieve the left Polk was ordered at 3 o'clock, to attack in force with the whole right wing. But it required much time to organize those battered lines for a.s.sault, but when done, it was, indeed, formidable.

The second map will make it plain. Cleburne, with four brigades, was deployed before Palmer and Johnson. Jackson and Polk's brigades lapped over Baird. Cheatham was in a second line. The map gives his position wrongly, though it is taken from the original official map in the War Department. Ranged further to the right, and crossing the State and Lafayette road at McDaniel's, and thus ma.s.sed against the Union left, were the divisions of Breckinridge and Liddell, Armstrong's dismounted cavalry division of Forrest, and Forrest's artillery. While Grose, of Preston, was a.s.saulting Hazen and Wood this attack on the Union left began. But, as before, the brigades that moved up to the log breastworks were speedily shattered, though this time they took their artillery through the thickets with them, pushing it by hand.

Once more, as the a.s.sault was made on Baird's left, there came a Union charge across the Kelly field, the fourth for the day. This time it was Willich, the reserve of Johnson. Withdrawing from line and facing north, he swept along on the run and with cheers. His lines dashed into the woods at the point where Stanley and Grose had charged before, and without a halt sprang into the faces of the advancing Confederates.

King's regulars and Barnes gave brave help, and once more the immediate left was cleared. The force on the road by the McDaniel house, though unbroken, was not advanced. Later, an a.s.sault on Reynolds and Palmer was ordered, but, naturally, it was feeble after so many repulses at the breastworks. At half-past 5 there was quiet again along the Union left.

Longstreet, however, in front of the right, was active for another hour, though at every point unsuccessful.

At half-after 5 General Thomas, having full discretion, decided to withdraw to occupy the pa.s.ses in his rear at McFarland and Rossville, which controlled the roads to Chattanooga. His line was solid at every point. Both wings of the Confederates were at bay. Their right was too much broken to successfully a.s.sault the Union left. The Union right, though its ammunition ran low, and its officers were constantly searching the boxes of the killed and wounded for cartridges, was becoming practiced in the use of the bayonet against a.s.saulting lines, and in spite of the persistence of Longstreet's men, had begun to feel comfortable in its position. The whole line could have been held until night. But daylight was wanted to set the army in orderly motion toward the gaps which controlled the city. After that was accomplished the darkness afforded the needed cover to complete the movement. It was because Chattanooga, and not the Chickamauga woods, was the objective of the campaign that the army withdrew to Rossville. It was in no sense a military retreat.