Calvinistic Controversy Part 7

1. That it is inconsistent with the doctrine of const.i.tutional depravity. This is granted by the supporters of the theory, and hence const.i.tutional depravity is no part of their system. All the arguments therefore that have been adduced in favour of derived, inherent depravity, or that can be urged in favour of this doctrine, will stand directly opposed to this view of regeneration. The arguments in favour of our views of depravity need not be repeated; and the reader is referred to a previous number in which this point has been discussed.

2. Another objection to this theory of regeneration is, that it makes _entire_ sanctification take place at the time of regeneration.

Conversion, holiness, are nothing more than a decision of the will; and since the will can never be _more than decided_, of course the decision at regeneration is the _perfection of holiness_. On this ground, therefore, though Christians are exhorted to "cleanse themselves from all filthiness of flesh and spirit, _perfecting holiness_ in the fear of the Lord;" though the saints are commanded to "grow in grace," to "confess their sins," that they may be "cleansed from _all unrighteousness_," though some of the Corinthian Christians were "carnal and walked as men," and for that reason were, after years of experience, only _babes_ in Christ--still, if we embrace this sentiment, we must call the convert, at his first spiritual breath, as holy as he ever _can be_ in any of the subsequent stages of his experience! Surely the apostles taught not this! And yet so strongly are men impelled forward by their systems, this doctrine of perfect holiness at conversion is the very sentiment that many of the advocates of the New Divinity are now propagating--a clear proof that it necessarily follows from their theory of conversion. This of itself, it strikes me, ought to destroy the doctrine.

3. Another bearing of this hypothesis, and one which I think must prove fatal to it, is, that the Scriptures represent this change to be chiefly in the affections, whereas this doctrine makes it exclusively in the will. That the Scriptures place the change in the affections chiefly, I suppose will not be denied. If it should be, without stopping here to quote specific pa.s.sages, or use many arguments, one consideration alone will be sufficient to set the question at rest.--True evangelical holiness consists in love to G.o.d and man; and sin is loving the creature rather than the Creator. The apostle brings into view both the regenerate and the unregenerate state in this pa.s.sage--"Set your affection on things above, and not on things on the earth." Numerous are the pa.s.sages which teach that love to G.o.d is the essence of the Christian character. The affections, therefore, are the seat of this change. But we are told by this new theory the change is in the will. It is only to resolve to serve G.o.d, and we are converted.--Either this theory, therefore, or the Bible account of this matter must be wrong.

To avoid this difficulty, it may be said, that a change of the will implies a change of the affections. But this is changing the position--which is, that a decision of the will is regeneration. If however this new position be insisted upon, it can be reconciled with the phraseology used only by making a change of the affections a mere _subordinate_ part of regeneration, whereas the Scriptures make the change consist essentially in this. But there is still a more serious difficulty in this idea, that the change of the will implies a change in the affections. It necessarily implies that the affections are at all times under the control of the will. But this is as unphilosophical as it is unscriptural. It is even directly contrary to the observation and knowledge of men who have paid only common and casual attention to mental phenomena. The will is oftener enthralled by the affections, than the affections by the will. Even in common and worldly matters let a man try by an effort of the will to beget love where it does not exist, or to transfer the affections from one object to another, and how will he succeed? Will love and hatred go or come at his bidding? You might as well attempt, by an act of the will, to make sweet bitter, or bitter sweet to the physical taste. How much less can a man, by an act of the will, make all things new, and transfer the heart from the grossness of creature love to the purity of supreme love to G.o.d. The Apostle Paul has taught us his failure in this matter. When he "would do good, evil was present with him." "For," says he, "the good that I would do, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do." And this is the fact in most cases of genuine awakening. Resolutions are formed, but the current of the unsanctified affections sweeps them away. Over the untowardness of the unregenerate heart the will has, in fact, but a feeble influence; and this is the reason why the man, struggling with the corruptions of his heart, is driven to despair, and exclaims, "O! wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

We shall see hereafter how the action of the will is indispensable in regeneration; but not in this _direct_ way to change and control the affections, by the power of its own decisions. When I find my will capable of doing this, I must have an essentially different intellectual character from the one I now have.

Since the Scriptures make the new birth a change of affections, and this theory makes it a change of volitions; and especially since the affections cannot be transferred from _earth_ to _heaven_ by a _mere act of the will_, therefore the doctrine which teaches and implies these views must be false.

4. This idea of the character of sin and of the new birth makes man sinless, at particular times, even _without_ regeneration. I do not mean by this that he is not obnoxious to punishment for past unholy volitions. But if sin consists only in voluntary exercise, whenever the mind does not act; or whenever its action is not under the control of the will, there is nothing of sin personally appertaining to the man.--When the action of the will is suspended by an all-absorbing emotion of wonder or surprise--in sound sleep when the mental states, if there are any, are not under the control of the will--in cases of suspended animation, by drowning, fainting, or otherwise--in short, whenever the mind is necessarily wholly engrossed, as is often the case, by some scientific investigation, or matter of worldly business, not of a moral character, then, and in every such case, whatever may be the guilt for past transgressions, there is no personal unholiness. And by the same reasoning we may show that the regenerate pa.s.s a great portion of their time without any personal holiness!

5. According to the theory we are opposing, regeneration, strictly speaking, means nothing. The work of grace, by which a sinner is made meet for heaven, embraces two essential points, _pardon_ and _renewal_.

The former is not a positive change of character, but a relative change, from a state of condemnation to a state of acquittal. But as regeneration, if it have any appropriate meaning, cannot mean a mere change of relation, any construction or system that forces such a meaning upon it does, in fact, do it away. Hence, being _born again, being renewed, being created anew, being sanctified, being translated from darkness to light, being raised from the dead_, and numerous other scripture expressions, are figurative forms of speech, so foreign from the idea they are used to express, that they are worse than unmeaning--they lead to error. But if these expressions mean any thing more than pardon, what is that meaning? This doctrine makes the princ.i.p.al change take place in the _neighbourhood_ of the will; not in the will itself, meaning by that, the mental power by which we put forth volitions. This _faculty_ of the mind is sound, and needs no change--all the other mental susceptibilities are sound, the essence of the mind and the susceptibilities of the mind are perfectly free from any moral perversion. It is the mental _action_ that is bad.--What is there then in the man that is to be changed? Do you say his volitions? But these he changes every hour. Do you say, he must leave off wrong volitions, and have right ones? This too he often does. "But he must do it with right motives," you say, "this acting from _right motives_ is the regenerate state." Indeed! Suppose then that he has resolved to serve G.o.d, from right motives, what if he should afterward resolve, from false shame or fear, to neglect a duty, is he now unregenerate? This is changing from regenerate to unregenerate, from _entire_ holiness to _entire_ unholiness with a breath. Truly such a regeneration is _nothing_. But you say, after he has once submitted, he now has a "governing purpose"

to serve G.o.d, and this const.i.tutes him regenerate; aye, a _governing_ purpose that _does not govern_ him. Let it be understood, you cannot divide a volition; it has an entire character in itself; and if it be unholy, no preceding holy volition can sanctify it. Hence every change of volition from wrong to right, and from right to wrong, is a change of state, so that regeneracy and unregeneracy play in and out of the human bosom in the alternation of every criminal thought or every pious aspiration. Is this the Bible doctrine of the new birth? And yet this is all you can make of it, if you resolve it into the mere action of the will.

6. This doctrine of self-conversion, by an act of the will, is directly contrary to Scripture. It would be tedious to me and my readers to quote all those pa.s.sages that attribute this work directly to the Holy Spirit, and that speak of it as a work which _G.o.d himself_ accomplishes for, and in us. There is one pa.s.sage which is much in point, however, and is sufficient of itself to settle this question. "But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of G.o.d, even to them that believe on his name. Who were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of G.o.d," John i, 12, 13. This is a two-edged sword--it cuts off, as we have remarked before, pa.s.sive and unconditional regeneration on the one hand; and also, as we may now see, self conversion by an act of the will, on the other. I know not how words can be put together, in so small a compa.s.s, better to answer the true objects of destroying these two opposite theories of regeneration, and a.s.serting the true theory. Here is, first--the _receiving of Christ,_ the _believing on his name_--this is the condition. Second, Christ gives the "power," viz. strength and privilege, to become the sons of G.o.d. This is the regeneration. Third--This becoming "the sons of G.o.d," or being "born," is not in a _physical way_, by flesh and blood, nor yet by _human will_, but of or by G.o.d. Can any thing be clearer or more decisive?

Indeed the very terms, _regeneration, born, birth_, &c, imply of themselves another and an efficient agent; and then to connect these with the Divine agency, as the Scriptures have done some half dozen times in the phrase, "born of G.o.d," and several other times in the phrase, "of the Spirit:" to have this called being "begotten again," and the like, is enough, one would think, if words have any meaning, to show that man does not change his own heart. The same may be said of the terms _resurrection, translation, creation, renewal_, and various other terms the Scriptures use to express this change. Jesus Christ claimed that he had "power to lay down his life, and _to take it again;_" but this is the only instance of self-resurrection power that we read of; and even this was by his Divine nature; for he was "quickened by the Spirit," and raised "by the power of G.o.d." But these theorists teach that man has power to lay down his life, and then, after he is "dead in trespa.s.ses and sins," he has power to take his life again. Truly this is giving man a power that approaches very near to one of the Divine attributes. To Christ alone does it belong "to quicken whom he will." To change the heart of the sinner is one of the Divine prerogatives, and he that attempts to convert himself; and trusts to this, will find in the end that he is _carnal_ still. For "whatsoever is born of the flesh is flesh, but whatsoever is born of the Spirit is spirit."

Let me not here be misunderstood. I shall endeavour to show, in its proper place, the conditional agency of man in this work. I have only time to add, in this number, that I consider those scriptures which press duties upon the sinner as applying to this conditional agency. And even those strong expressions which sometimes occur in the Bible, requiring the sinner to "make himself a new heart"--"to cleanse his hands and purify his heart," &c, will find an easy solution and a pertinent application in this view of the subject. For if there are certain pending conditions, without which the work will not be accomplished, then there would be a propriety, while pressing this duty, to use expressions showing that this work was conditionally, though not _efficiently_, resting upon the agency of the sinner.

In my next I shall endeavour to show that there is no intermediate _Calvinistic_ ground between the two theories examined in this number.

If that attempt prove successful, and if in this it has been found that the two theories examined are enc.u.mbered with too many embarra.s.sments to be admitted, then we shall be the better prepared to listen to the teachings of the Scriptures on this important and leading doctrine of the Christian faith.

NUMBER XIV.

REGENERATION, CONTINUED.

An inconsistency in any received theory is constantly driving its supporters to some modification of their system. This is a redeeming principle in the human mind, and greatly encourages the hope that truth will finally triumph.

It has already been noticed that the doctrine of entire pa.s.sivity, in regeneration, is so pressed with difficulties that it has sought relief in the opposite notion of self-conversion. But this latter hypothesis is, in turn, enc.u.mbered, if possible, with still greater embarra.s.sments.

The presumption therefore is, that the truth lies between them; and it will doubtless be found, by a fair and thorough investigation, that this is the fact. But here the question arises, Can _Calvinists_ consistently occupy any such middle ground? In other words, retaining the other peculiarities of Calvinism, can our Calvinistic brethren a.s.sume any position between these two extremes which will avoid the difficulties of both? A brief examination, it is hoped, will decide this question.

_Third Theory_.--Dr. Tyler is a highly respectable clergyman of the Calvinistic faith, and is now at the head of the theological school in East Windsor, Conn., which was got up with the avowed purpose of counteracting the New-Haven theology. We should not therefore suspect him of leaning too much toward the New Divinity. He tells us that the only depravity is to be unwilling to serve G.o.d--that there is "no other obstacle in the way of the sinner's salvation except what lies in his own will"--that "to be born again is simply to be made willing to do what G.o.d requires." What is this but the New Divinity? The will is here made, most explicitly, the sole seat of depravity; and regeneration is an act of the will. But every act of the will is the sinner's _own act_, and therefore the agent, by that act of the will which const.i.tutes regeneration, converts himself.--Perhaps Dr. Tyler will say, the sinner in this case does not convert himself, because he is "_made willing_."

G.o.d makes him willing "in the day of his power." It is remarkable what a favourite phrase this is with the Calvinists. It is borrowed from the third verse of the hundred and tenth Psalm, "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." Now although the word "made" is not in the text; although there is not the _slightest_ evidence that the text speaks of regeneration at all, but on the contrary, it is most evidently intended to describe the character and conduct of G.o.d's people, viz. the regenerate; and although every scholar, at least, among the Calvinists, knows this as well as he knows his right hand from the left, yet we hear it repeated by the learned and the ignorant, at all times and places--"G.o.d's people are made willing in the day of his power." It is not only a gross perversion of a Scripture phrase, but its repet.i.tion, in this perverted sense, renders it wearisome and sickening. But, waiving this, it becomes us to ask whether there is any more rational or Scriptural ground for the idea itself than there is for this use of the text. What is meant by making the soul willing? I confess I cannot understand it. Is it meant that G.o.d _forces_ the soul to be willing?

This is a contradiction in terms. To say that G.o.d acts directly on the will, and thus changes its determination by superior force, is to destroy its freedom--is to produce a volition without motive or reason--which would, at any rate, be an anomalous action of the will.

And what is still more fatal to the theory, it implies _no act_ of the sinner whatever, but an irresistible act of the Divine power, which therefore necessarily throws the theory back upon the doctrine of pa.s.sive conversion. There is no avoiding this conclusion, I think, on the ground that G.o.d changes the action of the will, by an exertion of power upon the will itself. If, to avoid this, it should be said that the will is not changed by a direct act of power, but influenced to a holy determination indirectly, through the medium of motives, presented by the Holy Spirit--then and in that case we should be thrown forward on to the self-conversion system. The sinner's voluntary act, by which he regenerated himself, would be as truly and entirely _his own_ as any other act of the will; therefore he would be self-regenerated. This also would be regeneration, not by the Holy Spirit, but _by the truth;_ which is another feature of the New Divinity. This also would make all depravity consist in the will, or rather in its _acts;_ which has been shown in the preceding number to be unscriptural as well as unphilosophical. This objection is valid, whether the depravity is supposed to be in the _power_ of willing, or in the _acts_ of the will.

But since, in Dr. Tyler's view, to will in one direction is depravity, and to will in another direction is regeneration, and since all that motives _can_ do is, not to change the will itself, but only prompt it to new voluntary states, it follows conclusively that Dr. T. makes all holiness and all unholiness consist in volitions; and therefore the _moral-exercise_ system is true; which is another feature of the New Divinity. Truly I may repeat, we do not need another theological seminary in Connecticut to teach this doctrine.

Finally, according to this theory of Dr. T., he and all those who reason like him, are chargeable, I think, with a palpable paralogism--they reason in a circle. They say, in the express language of Dr. Tyler, "All men may be saved if they will"--"No man is hindered from coming to Christ who is willing to come"--that is, since to will and to be willing is to be regenerated, this language gravely teaches us, "All men may be saved, if they _are regenerated_"--"No man is hindered from coming to Christ (to be regenerated) who _is regenerated!_" And indeed this view of regeneration not only makes learned divines talk nonsense, but the Scriptures also. The invitation, "Whosoever will, let him come," &c, must mean, "Whosoever _is regenerate_, let him come," and so of other pa.s.sages. Thus this theory of Dr. Tyler, and of the many who hold with him, is so closely hemmed in on both sides, that it must throw itself for support, either upon the doctrine of pa.s.sivity, or self-conversion; at the same time that in other respects it involves itself in inconsistent and anti-scriptural dogmas.

But that we may leave no position unexamined, let us take another view of the subject. Suppose, instead of saying regeneration is simply a change of the will, it should be argued that a change of the will implies a change of the affections, and this therefore is included in regeneration. Then I would ask, whether this change of the affections is in the order of cause and effect, or in the order of time, _prior_ or _subsequent_ to the act of the will. If this change is prior to any action of the will in the case, then the sinner has no voluntary co-operation in the work; and this brings us up once more upon the doctrine of pa.s.sive regeneration. The heart is changed before the subject of the change acts. If the action of the will precedes the change of the heart, then this change will be effected in one of two ways. Either this anterior volition does itself change the heart; or it is a mere preparatory condition, on _occasion of which_ G.o.d changes the heart. In the former case the man himself would change his own heart, and this is self-conversion; and in the latter alternative we have a conditional regeneration wrought by the Holy Ghost, and this is the very doctrine for which _we contend_, in opposition to Calvinism. If it should be said, this change of the will and this change of the heart take place independent of each other, that would not help the matter, since in this view the change of _heart_ would be pa.s.sive and unconditional. Thus whichever way this system turns, its difficulties press upon it still, and it finds no relief. Indeed there can, as I conceive, be no intermediate Calvinistic theory of regeneration, and there _can be_ but two other alternatives--either G.o.d must renew the heart, independent of all co-operation on the part of the subject of this change--and this is the old doctrine of unconditional Divine efficiency--or the first acceptable act of the will must be regeneration; and this is the new doctrine of _self-conversion_. Let the reader, let any one reflect closely on this subject, and I cannot doubt but he will say with me, _There is no third alternative_. The nature of the case will admit of none. The former theory may not contradict many of those scriptures that speak of _Divine efficiency_ in the work of grace upon the heart, but it is utterly incompatible with those that urge the sinner to duty.--The latter theory corresponds well with the urgent injunctions to duty, so abundant in the Scriptures, but is wholly irreconcilable with those that speak of Divine efficiency. The true theory must answer to both; and must also correspond with all the other parts of the Christian system. Is there such a theory? Every honest inquirer after truth will embrace it doubtless, if it can be presented--for truth, wherever, and whenever, and by whomsoever discovered, is infinitely to be preferred to error, however long and fondly it may have been cherished. Such a theory I will now try to present--and although I may fail in making it very explicit, and in bringing forward all its defences, yet if the general outlines can be seen and be defended, it will, I trust, commend itself to the favourable notice of the reader.

_Scripture Doctrine of Regeneration_.--I approach this subject by laying down the two following fundamental principles:--

1. The work of regeneration is performed by the direct and efficient operations of the Holy Spirit upon the heart.

2. The Holy Spirit exerts this regenerating power only on conditions, to be first complied with by the subject of the change.

The first principle I deem it unnecessary to defend farther than it has been defended in the foregoing remarks. It is not objected to by any orthodox Christians that I know of, only so far as the new views of self-conversion, and of conversion by moral suasion, may be thought an exception. And this we have reason to hope will be an exception of limited extent and short duration. The sentiment conflicts so directly with such a numerous cla.s.s of scriptures, and with the most approved principles of mental philosophy; and has, at the same time, such a direct tendency to annihilate all the essential features of regeneration, it cannot long find encouragement in a spiritual Church.

It may however make many converts for a time, for men are fond of taking the work of salvation into their own hands; but if it should, between such converts and the true Church there will ultimately be a separation as wide as that which now separates orthodoxy and Socinianism.

The other fundamental principle seems to follow, almost of necessity, from the scriptures that so abundantly point out the sinner's duty and agency, in connection with his conversion. The principle, however, is strenuously opposed by all cla.s.ses of Calvinists. The opposite of this is in fact the essential characteristic of Calvinism, if any _one_ notion can be so called; for however much the Calvinistic system may be modified, in other respects, this is clung to as the elementary germ which const.i.tutes the ident.i.ty of the system. Even the New Divinity, which makes so much of human agency, does not allow it a _conditional action_--it allows of no intermediate volition between the mental states of worldly love and Divine love, as the occasion on which the transfer is made, or the conditional hinge on which the important revolution is accomplished. On the contrary, it considers the volition itself as the transfer--the volition const.i.tutes the _entire change_. Thus warily does Calvinism, in all its changes, avoid conditional regeneration. Hence if I were called upon to give a general definition of Calvinism, that should include all the species that claim the name, I would say, _Calvinists are those who believe in unconditional regeneration_. For the moment this point is given up by any one, all parties agree that he is not a Calvinist.

But why is conditional regeneration so offensive? Is it because the Scriptures directly oppose it? This is hardly pretended. It is supposed, however, by the Calvinists, that to acknowledge this doctrine would require the renunciation of certain other doctrines which are taught in the Scriptures. This lays the foundation for the objections that have been made against this doctrine. It is objected that _a depraved sinner cannot perform an acceptable condition until he is regenerated_--that _G.o.d cannot consistently accept of any act short of that which const.i.tutes regeneration_--that _the idea of a conditional regeneration implies salvation by works, in part at least, and not wholly by grace_.

I have mentioned these objections in this connection, not so much to attempt, at this moment, a direct refutation of them, as to advert to what I conceive to be the ground of the difficulty in the minds of those making the objections. It appears to me that the difference between us results princ.i.p.ally from a difference of our views in respect to the const.i.tution and the const.i.tutional action of the mind itself. The philosophical part of our theology will be modified very much by our views of the philosophy of mind. Let it be granted then:--

1. That the mind is possessed of a moral susceptibility, generally called _conscience_, which lays the foundation of the notions of right and wrong, and by which we feel the emotions of approval or disapproval for our past conduct, and the feelings of obligation with respect to the present and the future; and that even in an unregenerate state this susceptibility often operates in accordance with its original design, and therefore agreeably with the Divine will.

2. That the understanding or intellect, which is a general division of the mind, containing in itself several distinct susceptibilities or powers, may, in an unregenerate state of the mind, be so enlightened and informed on the subjects of Divine truth as to perceive the right and the wrong; and as to perceive also, to some extent at least, the way of salvation pointed out in the Gospel.

3. That the affections and propensities (sometimes called the heart) are the princ.i.p.al seat of depravity--and these are often arrayed in direct hostility to the convictions of the judgment and the feelings of moral obligation.

4. That the will, or that mental power by which we put forth volitions, and make decisions, while it is more or less, directly or indirectly, influenced by the judgment, the conscience, and the affections, is in fact designed to give direction and unity to the whole mental action; and it always accomplishes this, where there is a proper harmony in the mental powers. But by sin this harmony has been disturbed, and the unholy affections have gained an undue ascendancy, so that, in the unregenerate, in all questions of preference between G.o.d and the world, in spite of the judgment, of conscience, and of the will, the world is loved and G.o.d is hated.

5. That in those cases where we cannot control our affections by a direct volition, we may, nevertheless, under the promptings of conscience, and in the light of the judgment, resolve against sin--but these resolutions, however firmly and repeatedly made, will be carried away and overruled by the strength of the carnal mind. This shows us our own weakness, drives us to self-despair, until, under the enlightening influences of grace, and the drawings of the Spirit, the soul is led to prayer and to an abdication of itself into the hands of Divine mercy, through Christ; and _then_, and on _these conditions_, the Holy Spirit changes the character and current of the unholy affections--and _this is regeneration_.

In laying down the preceding postulates I have endeavoured to express myself with as much brevity, and with as little metaphysical technicality as possible; for the reason that they are designed to be understood by all. Bating the deficiencies that may on this account be noticed by the philosophical reader, I think it may be a.s.sumed that these, so far as the powers and operations of the mind are concerned, embrace the basis and general outlines of what we call _conditional regeneration_. I am not aware that they are in opposition to an one principle of Scripture theology, or mental philosophy. And if this process is found consonant with reason and Scripture, in its general features, it will be easy to show that its relative bearings are such as most happily harmonize all the doctrinal phenomena of the Gospel system.

We plant ourselves then upon these general positions, and as ability will permit, or truth may seem to justify, shall endeavour to defend them against such objections as may be antic.i.p.ated, or are known to have been made against any of the principles here a.s.sumed.

1. It may be objected perhaps that this is making too broad a distinction between the different mental powers, giving to each such a distinctive action and operation as to infringe upon the doctrine of the mind's unity and simplicity. It is believed, however, the more this point is reflected upon by an attentive observance of our own minds, or the minds of others, the more satisfied shall we be that the principles here a.s.sumed are correct. That there are these distinct properties of mind no one doubts. It is in accordance with universal language, to speak of the intellect, of the conscience, of the will, and of the affections, as distinct properties of the mind. The properties of mind are as clearly marked by our consciousness, as the properties of matter by our senses. And although, in consequence of the invisibility of mind, there is doubtless a more perfect unity in each individual mental property, than in each distinct quality of matter, still each of the mental qualities has its appropriate and distinctive character.

Calvinists themselves acknowledge this. They allow we have a moral sense which tests good or evil, even in an unregenerate state; they allow the intellect may perceive and approve of truth, even when the heart rejects it; they allow that to perceive and to judge, to feel moral obligation and to will, are distinct operations of the mind; and that our perceptions and our conscience may be right, when our affections are wrong. So far then we are agreed, and so far they make distinctions in the mind, as wide as any that have been claimed in the principles above laid down. Theologians, I grant, have, in many instances, confounded in their reasonings the will and the affections. And this has also sometimes been done by writers on the philosophy of the mind. But it is most evident, I think, they have done this without good reason. Mr.

Locke says, "I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other." This he thinks is an error, of which "any one who turns his thoughts inward upon what pa.s.ses in his own mind" will be convinced. Rev. Professor Upham, of Bowdoin College, Maine, himself a Calvinist, as is generally supposed, in a late excellent treatise on the will, a.s.serts, and clearly proves, I think, that "_the state of the mind, which we term volition, is entirely distinct from that which we term desire_." Nay, he proves that desires and volitions are often in direct opposition. Hence as love implies desire, our volitions may often conflict with our love. And this is precisely the state the awakened sinner is in when he "would do good, but evil is present with him."

2. It may be said, and has sometimes been said, that this view of the subject involves a contradiction; that it is the same as to say, the man wills against his preference, or in other words, he wills what he does not choose. I cannot answer this objection better than by an argument in Professor Upham's work, already alluded to, in which he says, of a similar objection on this very subject, "It will be found on examination to resolve itself into a verbal fallacy, and naturally vanishes as soon as that fallacy is detected." "It is undoubtedly true that the common usage of language authorizes us to apply the terms choice and choosing indiscriminately to either the desire or volition; but it does not follow, and is not true, that we apply them to these different parts of our nature in precisely the same sense." "When the word choice implies desire at all, it has reference to a number of desirable objects brought before the mind at once, and implies and expresses the ascendant or predominant desire." "At other times we use the terms choice and choosing in application to the will--when it is applied to that power, it expresses the mere act of the will, and nothing more, with the exception, as in the other case, that more than one object of volition was present, in view of the mind, before the putting forth of the voluntary act. It is in fact the circ.u.mstance that two or more objects are present, which suggests the use of the word choice or choosing, in either case." "But the acts are entirely different in their nature, although under certain circ.u.mstances the same name is applied to them."

Hence he adds, "The contradiction is not a real, but merely a verbal one. If we ever choose against choosing, it will be found merely that choice which is volition, placed against that choice which is desire."

And this is nothing more than to say that volitions and desires may conflict with each other, which we know to be the fact in numerous instances.

If in reply to the foregoing, and in farther defence of the objection, it should be urged, that there could be not only no motive for the volition in this case, but that it would in fact be put forth against all motive, since the feelings of the heart would be of a directly opposite character, I reply, that it is not true that there would be no motive for the action of the will, in opposition to the sinful affections. It is seen already that the judgment in the awakened sinner is against continuing in sin, and the rebukes of the conscience for the past, and its admonitions for the future, are powerful motives in opposition to the unholy affections. The feelings of compunction and of moral obligation gain great accessions of strength, moreover, from the terrors of the Divine law, which alarm the fears, and from the promises of the Gospel, which encourage the hopes of the awakened sinner. And it is especially and emphatically true that under the existing influence of these fears and hopes, the voice of conscience is most effectual in prompting the sinner to "flee from the wrath to come," and "lay hold on the hope set before him." Can it be said then that there is no motive for a volition, or a mental effort that shall conflict with the unsanctified affections?

3. Again it is said, for every inch of this ground is disputed, that the action of the mind under such motives is purely selfish, and cannot therefore perform conditions acceptable to G.o.d. To this it may be replied, that to be influenced by motives of self preservation and personal salvation is not criminal; nay, it is commendable. In proof of this but one argument is necessary. G.o.d moves upon our fears and hopes, for the _express purpose_ of inducing us to forsake sin, and serve him; and he applies these motives to man in his unregenerate state. This is so obvious a fact, it is presumed none will deny it. But is it wrong for us to be prompted to action by those considerations which G.o.d himself urges upon us? If he attempts to excite our fears and hopes to prompt us to a course of self preservation, can it be wrong for us to be influenced by this means, and in this direction? I should hardly know how to hold an argument with a man that should a.s.sert this--and yet this sentiment is implied in the objection now under examination.

Beside, these acts conditional to regeneration are not wholly, perhaps not chiefly, from motives of personal interest. Our moral feelings have a great part in this work. And it is princ.i.p.ally by arousing an accusing conscience that fear and hope aid in the performance of the conditions of regeneration. But whatever proportion there may be of the ingredients of personal fear and hope in the feelings that enter into this conditional action of the mind, it is certain that the fear of the consequences of sin, and the hope to escape them, are not themselves criminal, much less then are they capable of rendering a complex state of the mind, of which they are but a part, unacceptable to G.o.d. Indeed this objection to a mental act, merely because it is prompted by self love, has always been to me a matter of wonder. Selfishness is a term which we generally use in a bad sense, and we mean by it that form of self love that leads us to seek our own gratification at the expense and the injury of others, or in opposition to the will of G.o.d. But that self love which leads us to seek our own highest interests, and especially our eternal interests, without injury to others, and in accordance with the Divine will, is never thought criminal, I believe, except where one has a particular system to support by such a notion. But that system is itself of a doubtful character which requires such an argument to sustain it.

4. Another objection which has been made to one of the principles above laid down is, that "it is the province of the will to control the affections, and not the affections the will; and that the will always possesses the power to do this, even in an unregenerate state." If so, then man has power, at any time, by an act of the will, to love G.o.d. Let him try--let that unholy sinner try. Can he succeed? You say perhaps, for so the Calvinists have said, "He can if he will;" that is, he can will to love G.o.d if he does will to love G.o.d! This is no great discovery surely, and it is certainly no proper answer to the question. I ask it again, Can he, by a direct act of the will, love G.o.d? Do you say, by varying the form of the answer, "He can if he chooses?" If you mean by choice the act of the will, this is the same answer over again, the folly of which is so apparent. But if you mean by choice the desires of his heart, then your answer amounts to this: If the desires of the heart are in favour of loving G.o.d, he can, by an act of the will, love him.

But if the desires of the heart are in favour of loving G.o.d, the love is already begotten, and there is no need of the act of the will to produce it. In that case your proposition would be, the sinner can love G.o.d by an act of the will, _if he loves him!_ the absurdity of which is too evident to require comment. It is thus that the coils of error run into each other in endless circles.

But, perhaps, to help the argument, if possible, it may be urged that the will can decide in favour of a closer examination, and by voluntary attention may get such strong perceptions of truth as will give it the voluntary power over the heart. To this I would reply, in the first place, this is giving up the argument, it is acknowledging that certain preparatory acts of the will are necessary before the mind can love G.o.d--but _this is conditional regeneration_. And it may be farther maintained, in opposition to this sentiment that the mere perception of truth, even when united with conscience, and personal fear and hope, is not sufficient to give the will power over the unrenewed affections. In proof of this, Scripture might be adduced; but reserving the Scripture argument for the present, we may quote good Calvinistic authority in proof that the will may be enthralled by the affections. Professor Upham says, "Whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always a greater or less degree of enthralment." And then he proceeds to show how the mind may be enslaved by the _propensities_, _appet.i.tes_, _affections,_ and _pa.s.sions_. He ill.u.s.trates; for example, the progress of this enthralment in the case of an appet.i.te for strong drink; which, "like a strong man armed, violently seizes the will, binds it hand and foot, and hurls it into the dust." Again he says, "There are not unfrequently cases where the propensities and pa.s.sions have become so intense, after years of repet.i.tion, as to control, or in other words, enthral the voluntary power almost entirely." (Treatise on the Will.) Dr. Griffin, also an able Calvinistic writer, says, in decided terms, "The judgment of the intellect and the decisions of the will are both controlled by the heart."

The idea of the enthralment of the will, however, may be objected to on another ground, viz. that if admitted it would destroy accountability, since none are accountable for what they cannot avoid. But I have not said they cannot avoid it; neither have I said we are not voluntary either in keeping or discarding the unholy heart. I a.s.sert directly the contrary. Every probationer decides whether he will be holy or happy.

But his decisions to be holy are effectual only when he seeks that from G.o.d which he cannot do for himself. Then, and then only, will G.o.d give him the victory over the old man, with the deceitful l.u.s.ts of the heart.

_But this is conditional regeneration_.