Calvinistic Controversy Part 4

Let us examine them. Of one of them we cannot doubt, unless we doubt all primary truths, viz. That the human mind is free. It is presumed, if the question come to this, that they must either give up human liberty or the dogma of predestination, candid Calvinists themselves would not hesitate; they would say, the _former_ must stand, whatever becomes of the _latter_. If I am correct here, it follows that, predestinarians themselves being judges, the doctrine of predestination is not so clear as some other moral truths. But is there any thing clearer than that man ought not to be held accountable for what is unavoidable? that he ought not to be held to answer for volitions that are efficiently controlled by a superior? To me this is as clear as consciousness itself can make it, and I think it must be to mankind in general. If I am correct, then we come to the conclusion at once, that to believe in the compatibility of predestination with human liberty and accountability does more violence to the laws of belief than it would to discard predestination.

Whatever, therefore, may _seem_ to be favourable to this doctrine, should be sacrificed to a stronger claim upon our belief in another direction. But, that the argument may be set in as strong light as possible, let the evidence of predestination be adduced. What is it? It is not consciousness certainly; and it is almost as clear that it is not moral demonstration by a course of reasoning. The most I believe that has ever been said, in the way of moral demonstration, has been in an argument founded on foreknowledge, which argument, it is supposed by the author, is fairly disposed of in the sermon on predestination, by reasoning which has not, to his knowledge, ever been refuted. A refutation has been attempted, I grant, by some of the reviewers of the sermon, but the only apparent success that attended those attempts was, as we have already seen, in consequence of their taking the very ground of the sermon, and building the decrees of G.o.d upon a prior view and knowledge of all possible contingencies. If consciousness and reasoning are taken away from this doctrine, it has nothing left to stand upon but testimony. And no testimony but Divine will here be of any authority; and does revelation prove this doctrine? In the sermon on predestination it was stated that "there was not a single pa.s.sage in the Bible which teaches directly that G.o.d hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s;"

and it is not known to the writer, that among the different reviews of the sermon it has even been attempted to show that the statement was incorrect. But if a solitary pa.s.sage could have been adduced, should we not have heard of it? The evidence from Scripture then, if there is any, is indirect, and merely by inference. And even this indirect testimony is far from being the best of its kind; so, at least, a great portion of believers in revelation think.

Now, candid reader, if you have carefully followed the chain of thought thus far, let me ask you to pause and propound for yourself, and honestly answer the following question--"Is there so much evidence in favour of predestination, that I should do more violence to my own reason, and the laws of belief, by rejecting it, than I should by believing that this doctrine is compatible with free agency and accountability?" Indeed, Calvinists themselves have so felt the force of these difficulties, when the terms predestination and free will have been understood in their common and obvious sense, that they have attempted a variety of explanations of these terms to do away, if possible, the apparent discrepancy. These attempts have been the princ.i.p.al cause of those changes and modifications in the Calvinistic system, alluded to in a former number. The various explanations and definitions that have been given to foreordination, have already been noticed. We have seen how every effort failed of affording any relief to the system, until we came down to the last; I mean that of the New-Haven divines. This new theory does indeed avoid the difficulty, but avoids it only by giving up the doctrine! Any thing short of this amounts to nothing; it stands forth still the "_absolute decree_," fixed as fate, and fixing, strong as fate, all the acts of subordinate intelligences.

Any _real_ modification of it is a virtual renunciation, and a subst.i.tution in its stead of the public and consistent decree of Heaven, "He that believeth shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be d.a.m.ned."

Not succeeding as was hoped in such a definition of predestination as would harmonize the opposing propositions, repeated trials have been made to define and explain _human liberty_ and the _power of choice_, so as to _bend_ these into a coincidence with the _inflexible decree_. This brings us back to the inquiry started above: "What is this power of choice?" Now as this is a point more metaphysical in its nature than the proposition embracing the decrees, so there is more ground for laboured argument and refined speculation. Only one theory, however, needs to be particularly noticed:--1. Because it is the most plausible of any other, so that if this will not bear the test, it is probable no other will; and 2. Because this is the theory which is now pretty generally, and perhaps almost universally adopted by the Calvinists; I mean the Calvinistic doctrine of motives. It is in substance this: the power of choice is that power which the mind has of acting in view of motives, and of deciding according to the strongest motive. The strength and direction of volition are always in accordance with the motive. And this relation between mind and motives is fixed by the very const.i.tution of our natures, so that it may be said there is a const.i.tutional necessity that the mind should be controlled by motives. These motives are mult.i.tudinous and various.--All conceptions and perceptions of the mind, from whatever cause, productive of pleasure or pain, exciting emotions of love or aversion, are motives; or, more properly, perhaps, the causes of these mental states are motives. Between these motives and the mind there is such a connection, that the _former_ not only excite, but control the _latter_, in all its volitions. The nature of this relation is of course beyond the limits of human investigation: all we can say is, such is the nature of motives and of mind. Such is the theory. The arguments by which it is defended are in substance the following --experience and observation. We are conscious, it is said, of acting from motives, and it is universally understood that others also act from motives. It is on this principle that we govern ourselves in our intercourse with men; by this we calculate with moral certainty, in many instances, what will be the conduct of a man in a given case; and, upon such calculations, we form most of our maxims, and rules of conduct in social life: nay, it is said a man that will act without a reason must be insane--that, on this ground, whenever a man acts it is common to inquire what _induced_ him. What motive had he? That even children, at a very early age so readily recognize this principle, that they are constantly inquiring why do you do this or that. Such are the strongest arguments by which this theory is sustained--arguments too strong it is supposed to be overthrown.

I object to the sovereign control of the mind by motives. But in offering my objections, it should first be observed that no man, in his senses, it is presumed, will deny that motives have an important influence in determining our volitions. Nor is it necessary, in order to oppose the doctrine of the controlling power of motives, to deny that the power of volition may have been waked up to action, in the first instance, by motive influence, or that the mind ever after may, in all its volitions, be more or less under this influence. As these are points which do not materially affect the question at issue between us and the Calvinists, they may be left out of the discussion for the present. The question is this--Has the mind a self-determining power, by which it can spontaneously decide, independent of the _control_ of motives, or is the mind absolutely controlled by motives? We maintain the former--our opponents the latter. By establishing our position, we disprove theirs--by disproving theirs we establish ours--and it is believed that theirs can be directly disproved, and ours directly established; at least so far as we can hope to arrive at demonstration on these extremely difficult points.

1. My first objection to this doctrine of motive influence is, that most of the arguments by which it is defended, as directly and certainly prove that the Divine mind is subject to the absolute control of motives as that human minds are. It is argued, that to maintain the doctrine of spontaneous volition, independent of the _control_ of motives, involves the absurdity, that "our volitions are excited without any intelligent reasons whatever, and as the effect, consequently, of nothing better than a mere brute or senseless mechanism." (_Views in Theology_, p.

163.)--Now if this has any bearing on the question, it relates not to human mind and human volition merely, but to _mind in general_, and must apply to the Divine mind. The same may be said, in fact, of most of the arguments that are brought in favour of this doctrine. Calvinists are convinced of this--and hence this also is a part of their creed. It was defended by Dr. Edwards, and is thus avowed by Professor Upham, in his System of Mental Philosophy. Speaking of the control of motives, he says, "Our condition, in this respect, seems to be essentially the same with that of the Supreme Being himself--he is _inevitably_ governed in all his doings, by what, in the great range of events, is wisest and best." (Vol. ii, p. 381.) Thus the Divine Being is, according to this theory, and by the express showing of the leading advocates of the theory, "_inevitably_" made a subordinate to a superior. It is believed there is no avoiding this conclusion; and what then? Why then the doctrine makes G.o.d a necessary agent, and leads to atheism! It is nearly, if not exactly, the same as the old heathen doctrine of fate.

The ancient heathens supposed that Jupiter himself, the omnipotent father of the G.o.ds and men, must yield to fate. Modern Christians teach that there is a certain fitness of things, certain const.i.tutional relations, existing independent of the Divine will, which G.o.d himself cannot supersede, but to which he must yield. How does this sink, at once, both the natural and moral perfections of G.o.d! The exercises of his wisdom and goodness are nothing more than the result of certain fixed and irresistible influences. Fixed not by G.o.d himself, for that would be to give up the doctrine; for in that case, in the order of cause and effect, the Divine mind must have acted without control of motive, if this law of motive influence did not exist until the Divine volition willed it into being and if he could once act independent of this control, he might so act for ever; and the argument built on the absurdity of volition, without an intelligent reason, is contradicted.

But if that argument has any weight, it fixes, in the order of cause and effect, a paramount influence eternally antecedent to the exercise of the Divine mind, and controlling that mind with irresistible sway. This is fate! This is atheism! Once set up an influence that controls the Divine mind, call that influence what you will, _fitness of things--fate--energy_ of nature--or necessary relation, and that moment you make G.o.d a subordinate; you hurl him from his throne of sovereignty, and make him the instrument of a superior. Of what use is such a Deity?

Might we not as well have none! Nay better, as it seems to me, if under the control of his own native influence he is led to create beings susceptible of suffering, and fix the relations of those beings to the motives around them such, that by a law of their nature they are "inevitably" led to sin and endless wo! Is it to be wondered at, that many Calvinists have become infidels? This doctrine of motives is the very essence of the system of Spinoza, whose deity was the _energy of nature!_ The supreme controlling power of Dr. Edwards and his followers is the _energy of motives_, which exists in the nature of things, anterior to the will of G.o.d. Can any one point out any essential difference between the two systems?

Such are the objections to _any arguments_ in favour of the doctrine that motives "inevitably" control the volitions of intelligent beings _in general_, involving of course the highest intelligence. But if any are disposed to give up this doctrine, as essential to intelligent volition in general, and choose to maintain it only in respect to the volitions of some particular intelligent beings; then they must give up all the strongest of their arguments. If G.o.d is free from this _control_, they must acknowledge also, or give some reason for their dissent, that he may, if he chooses, make and sustain subordinate intelligences, having the same freedom from this control; and if they acknowledge that there is nothing in the nature of the case that renders this an impossibility, then they must show, if they can, that though G.o.d _might_ const.i.tute beings otherwise, he has _so const.i.tuted man_ as to render him incapable of choice, except _when_ and _as_ motives direct, by an inevitable influence. But in attempting this they must meet other difficulties in their course, which, it is believed, will greatly embarra.s.s the system. These difficulties, however, together with the arguments which I design to advance directly in favour of the opposite view, must be reserved for another number.

NUMBER IX.

MORAL AGENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY, CONTINUED.

Another argument against the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is, that it leads to materialism. The doctrine, it will be recollected, is this: When the mind is brought into connection with objects of choice, it is _inevitably_ led, by a law of its nature, to the selection of one rather than of the other, unless there is a _perfect equality_ between them; in which case I suppose, of course, the mind must remain in equilibrium; for if it moves only by the influence of motives, and to the same degree and in the same direction with motive influence, of course when it is equally attracted in opposite directions it must be at rest! It is on this ground that Leibnitz maintained that G.o.d could not make two particles of matter in all respects alike; because, in that case, being "inevitably" governed by motives in his decisions, he could not determine where to place them, both having the same influence on his mind for a location in the same place! The same writer represents this motive influence, also, as frequently imperceptible, but not the less effectual, and not the less voluntary! And to ill.u.s.trate it makes the following comparison:--"It is as if a needle, touched with a loadstone, were sensible of and pleased with its turning to the north, for it would believe that it turned itself independent of any other cause, not perceiving the insensible motions of the magnetic power." This statement of Leibnitz, who had paid great attention to this philosophical theory, is important in several respects. It is, in the first place, an acknowledgment that consciousness is against the doctrine; and it is also a concession that the mind is _imposed upon_, in this matter, by the Creator. But with respect to the argument, that this doctrine leads to materialism, this quotation is important, because it shows that one of the most _philosophical_, if not one of the most _evangelical_ of the defenders of this doctrine, considered the law of motive influence similar to the law of magnetic attraction, differing only in being accompanied by sensation and a deceptive consciousness. And what says its great evangelical champion in this country, Dr. Edwards? He compares our volitions to the vibrations of a scale beam, the different ends of which are respectively elevated or depressed as the opposite weights may chance to vary. What is this but teaching that motions of mind are governed by the same fixed laws as those of matter, and that volitions are perfectly mechanical states of mind? What the advocates of this doctrine charge on the opposite theory belongs, by their own showing, to their own system.--_They_, not we, make choices the result of animal instinct, or senseless mechanism. I know Professor Stuart, in his late exposition of the Romans, seems to reprobate these comparisons; and while he contends, as I should think, as strenuously as Dr. Edwards, for a complete and efficient control of the Divine Being over all our volitions, he appears to think that there is a great difference between the laws of intellectual and material action. So, indeed, do we think.

But we think that difference consists in the mind's being free from that control for which the professor contends; and we believe when he contends for that control in the volitions of the mind, he contends for that which, from the nature of the case, entirely destroys the other part of his hypothesis, viz. that the operations of the mind are free, and essentially different from mechanical motion or the laws of attractive influence in the material world. If the attractive power of motives over the mind is any thing different from the law of gravitation or magnetic attraction, what is that difference? Should any one say, I cannot tell; I ask then, How does he know but it is _that very power_ for which Arminians contend? Most probably it is that power. Or will it be said, the difference between motive influence and gravity is consciousness? I reply, Consciousness is no part of the relation between motives and the power of choice. I see not indeed how it affects that relation at all. And this the comparison of Leibnitz, already alluded to, clearly ill.u.s.trates. Look at that flowing stream; it hastens on most freely, and by the law of its own nature down the gentle declivities or more precipitous slopes of its meandering channel. Suppose now that Omnipotence should impart consciousness to the particles of the continuous current, it would then wake up to perceive the action and feel the pleasure of its own delightful motions. It would roll on still by the law of its own nature, and would feel that it was free to move according to its own _inclination_ and voluntary tendency, for its will would of course be in the direction of its _motive_, or in other phrase, its _gravitating_ influence. But could it turn its course and roll back its waters to their fountains? It could if it was so _inclined_. But its present _inclination_ is toward the bottom of the valley or the bosom of the ocean, and thither, by the relation that exists between its particles and the gravitating influence of the earth, it rolls on _with the utmost freedom_, though with the utter impossibility of changing its own course, without an inversion of the gravitating power. Let the hand of Omnipotence invert the slope of the mountain, and to! with the same freedom these very waters roll back again to their original fountains!

Thus it is with the human mind. It is conscious of being free to move in the direction of its inclinations, but require it to turn its course and move in the current of its volitions, in an opposite direction, and it would be utterly impossible, until Omnipotence himself should change the motive influence.--"G.o.d is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of choices."

We see, therefore, that this doctrine of motive influence leads to materialism, for it makes the a.n.a.logy between mental and material action so complete that it destroys all idea of _intellectual power_.

Philosophically speaking, there is no _power_ in the laws of nature.

What we express by the _power_ of attraction, or repulsion, or decomposition, is nothing more than the uniformity of the Divine agency.

Does the earth attract elevated bodies to its surface?--This is not an energy inherent in nature; it is the G.o.d of nature acting by a uniform law. This is all that any intelligent man can mean by the power of nature. We, however, use the word _power_ in an accommodated sense in these cases, but always I think in connection with that portion of matter that _appears_ to act, and not _that_ which is acted upon. The magnet, we say, has power to attract iron, because iron is attracted toward the magnet, and not the magnet toward the iron. The antecedent, or that which takes the lead in the motion, is more properly said to have the power, or is the efficient cause. If then we allow of the use of the term power at all, to express the relation of cause and effect, growing out of a philosophical const.i.tution of things, the term should be applied to the antecedent, and not to the consequent. In the case before us, mental action is not the cause of the motive, but the motive is the cause of the mental action: therefore we should say motives have _power_ to act upon the mind, and the mind has a _susceptibility_ of being acted upon. Dr. Reid has well observed, that a power to be acted upon is no power, or "it is a _powerless power_," which is philosophically absurd. Therefore we come to the conclusion that the mind has no _power_ of _choice_, but has a _susceptibility_ of being drawn into a state called volition by the power of motives. It will avail nothing, as I conceive, to say that there is evidently a difference between the susceptibility of the mind in this case, and the susceptibility of matter in other cases, unless it be shown what that difference is: for when that difference is pointed out, it will doubtless be found to be what is in direct opposition to the motive theory. It is the misfortune of the Calvinistic system that it often has to a.s.sume positions to keep itself in countenance, which positions themselves are a virtual abandonment of the system. So the New-Haven divines have done to support predestination, and to this all Calvinists are driven in their attempts to reconcile free will, or the power of choice, with their doctrine of motives, dependence &c. We may be told in the case before us, that "when the mind is acted upon it is then excited to action." But how excited to action? Is the action any stronger than the motive influence?--Is it carried beyond this influence? or in a different direction? To answer any _one_ of these questions in the affirmative is to give up the theory; but to answer them in the negative is to attribute to the mind nothing more than the inertia of matter. The _motives_ are (under G.o.d) the _agent_, the _mind_ is the _pa.s.sive object_, and the _volition_ is the _effect_. Can any one say then, on this theory, that the mind has the power of choice? It has no power in the first place, because its volitions are the result of philosophical necessity; and it has no power, secondly, because it is not the cause of its own volitions, but in these volitions it is the pa.s.sive subject of foreign influences. Now, so far as moral action is concerned, how does this differ from materialism? It is true mental action differs from material action in some a.s.sociated circ.u.mstances; it is accompanied by consciousness; but as consciousness of itself cannot give accountability, and as it gains nothing in this respect by being a.s.sociated with such kind of mental action as results from philosophical necessity, it appears plain that man is not accountable; and if not accountable, it is more than probable that he has no future existence, and thus again we are driven to materialism and to deism, if not to atheism.

That man is not _accountable_ upon the principle we are opposing, might have been made a distinct argument; but I have connected it with the argument that this doctrine leads to materialism because they imply each other. If materialism is true, we are not accountable, and if we are not accountable, materialism is probably true; and both are true, as I conceive, if the Calvinistic doctrine of motives is true.

It may, however, be urged by the advocates of this theory, that the mind is not wholly pa.s.sive, because we are conscious of putting forth a mental energy and making a responsible volition; _that_ I am ready to grant, but then our consciousness is a fallacy if this system be true; and on the contrary, if consciousness be true, this system is false. I believe no one who pays attention to his own mind will doubt of having this consciousness. But does that prove the truth of this theory? It is one thing to be conscious of having this energy of mind and responsible volition, and another to be conscious that the theory in question is true; indeed this consciousness destroys the theory.

Should it be urged in opposition to the alleged tendency of this system to materialism, that different minds are not uniformly influenced by the same motives, nor the same minds at different times, and therefore, in this respect, it is evident that the laws of mind and of matter differ; I reply, It is precisely so with matter; for _that_ attracts or repels according to its different magnetic or electrical states; or should it be urged that mind differs from matter, and shows itself to be possessed of a peculiar energy, because it has power to suspend its decisions, to review the subject, to investigate, &c; I answer, this it cannot do without a motive; and this it _must_ do if the motive preponderate in that direction, but not otherwise.

To have a proper view of this subject let us go back to the first perception. Could the mind, according to this doctrine, act otherwise than in coincidence with the motive influence of this perception; or could it even suspend the volition this influence was calculated to produce, until a second and more powerful motive was introduced? If it could, then this doctrine is false; if it could not, then the mind, like matter put in motion, must move on invariably in the same direction, and with the same velocity of thought for ever, or until a new motive should counteract the influence of the former! This is emphatically the _vis inertia_ of matter. The bare statement of which seems sufficient to overthrow the theory.

Another objection to this doctrine of motives is, it leads to the notion of regeneration by _moral suasion_ merely. There has been much said of late, by the various writers in the old and the _new_ school, on this point. The new school are charged with holding that the _truth alone_, without any immediate agency of the Holy Spirit, converts the sinner.

This is considered by the old school Calvinists as a fatal error. But why so? If motives _govern_ the mind, with absolute sway, all you _need_ to convert a sinner, is to bring a motive strong enough to induce him to choose G.o.d as his chief good, and he is converted. Until you do this there is no conversion, it is impossible for the Holy Ghost to convert a sinner in any other way than by motives, for choice of good we are told is conversion; there is no choice without a motive, and the strongest motive governs choice absolutely; therefore motive is the omnipotent power that changes the sinner's heart. This is the legitimate result of The Calvinistic premises. We have more than once had occasion to wonder that Calvinists should revolt at the result of their own doctrines; here we have another instance of it; here too we have the enigma of "_natural ability_" unriddled. The human mind, by the const.i.tution of its nature, has the power of choosing according to the influence of the strongest motive; and therefore, so far as this can be called a power, it has the natural power to convert itself; and this is the reason why "_make you a new heart_" is the burden of almost every sermon and exhortation in modern preaching; all the sinner has to do is to choose, in view of motives, and he is converted. And here, too, is unravelled that other mystery which we have been so puzzled to understand, viz. that although all possess the natural power to convert themselves, yet no man ever did convert himself without the special interposition of the Divine agency; for, observe, G.o.d keeps the motives in his own hands; "G.o.d is the determiner of perceptions, and perceptions are the determiners of _choices;_" that is, of _conversions;_ for to choose in a particular way, is to be converted. Whenever, therefore, he is disposed to let the sinner convert himself, according to his natural power; that is, when he is disposed to overpower the mind by an irresistible motive, he brings the motive and mind in contact, and _it is done_. Thus the sinner has as much power to convert himself as he has to resolve to eat when he is hungry; for all the power he has to do either, is a susceptibility of being operated upon, and controlled by the strongest motive; and thus you see, also, that _G.o.d_ converts the sinner, because he supplies the motive that influences the choice; and here, too, is seen the occasion for misquoting so frequently and misapplying so universally, that pa.s.sage in the Psalms: "[My] people shall be [made] willing in the day of [my] power." That is, when G.o.d applies the controlling motive to influence to a right choice, then shall the sinner, by a law of his nature, _become willing to be converted_. Such are the wonderful philosophical discoveries of modern theology! This is the way for man to convert _himself_ by natural power, and this is the way for _G.o.d_ to convert him, without the aid of _super_ natural power! Well might a divine of this cast, whom I heard preach not long since, say of regeneration, "There is nothing supernatural or miraculous in it." For surely it is one of the most natural things in the world, according to this theory, to be converted. It is only to be operated upon by a motive, according to the law of his natural const.i.tution, and the man is converted.

This _philosophy of Christian experience_ has led modern orthodoxy to the very borders of natural religion. Another step, and we can do without a Holy Ghost or a Divine Saviour. We will sit down with the philosopher in his study, and _work out_ a religious experience, as philosophically as a skilful casuist can solve a question of morals; we will show the _rationale_ of the whole process, and demonstrate it so clearly, that infidels shall lose all their objections to the Gospel, and be induced to "_submit_" to G.o.d with scarcely a change of theory.

Hereafter let no man say, that the work of regeneration is a mystery--that in this work we cannot tell whence the regenerating influence comes, or whither it goes; for it comes through the philosophical channel of motive influence by which it introduces a "governing purpose" into the mind, and the work is done. Let no man hereafter say that his "faith stands not in the wisdom of man, but in the power of G.o.d;" or "if any man would be wise let him become a fool that he may be wise;" or "the wisdom of man is foolishness with G.o.d;"

for lo, the philosophy of regeneration is at length explained! and the whole secret is found to consist in the philosophical relation between motives and mind!! Can any one wonder, after this, that in Geneva, in Germany, and in New-England, Calvinism has finally resulted in Socinianism? And can any one help trembling for a large portion of the orthodox Churches among us at the present day? Grant that there is an increase of zeal, a greater stir among the people, more revivals, &c; all these, with a good foundation, would promise well for the Church; but we fear there is a worm at the root. By this it is not intended to insinuate that the work is always spurious and the professed conversions unsound. In many instances it is undoubtedly the reverse of this. It might be expected after the people had been lulled for a long time under the paralyzing opiates of old-fashioned Calvinism, that this new and _apparently_ opposite theory should rouse many to action. "I had been taught," said a man not far from this, "that I must wait G.o.d's time to be converted, and I waited many years in vain; but more recently I have been instructed that I might convert myself; I set about the work, and I believe it is done!" Now this, which in the relation borders upon the ludicrous, might have been a genuine conversion. His new views might only have been sufficient to arouse him to a co-operation with the Holy Spirit in his conversion; and this may have been the case with thousands. In their practical effects two opposite errors may, in individual cases, neutralize each other.--But is either therefore safe?

Will the general effect be salutary? Let the history of the Church speak; and in view of that record I confess I fear for our common Zion.

But let not the old Calvinists lay this blame, and charge this danger upon the new school; the new school doctrine is a legitimate scion from that root which they have cultivated with such a.s.siduity and care. It grows out of the doctrine of motives, it springs from the idea of the entire dependence of the human mind for each and all its volitions upon the directing influence of Omnipotence, whatever may be the theory by which that influence is explained.

Another argument in opposition to this doctrine is found in the consideration, that we are constantly liable to disappointment in most of our calculations respecting human agents.--Though we may judge something of what will be the conduct of men in given circ.u.mstances, yet our calculations are very far from coming up to mechanical exactness.

Motives have some influence; but that influence is very variable and uncertain. Why is this? It is not so in matter; the same causes will produce the same effects to the end of time. But we see many choose, without being able to give what, _in their own estimation_, is a valid reason; they did thus because they chose to do so; they act in defiance of the strongest motives, drawn from whatever source. We see the greatest possible caprice in the volitions of men; we see their minds starting aside, and putting on the greatest possible and unaccountable mental states, in a way and form that baffles all human calculation, and will for ever baffle it. A man may spend all his life in trying to reduce to uniformity the phenomena of human volitions, and thereby to fix, in an unerring code, the laws that govern them, and he may hand his labours to his successor, and so on to the end of time, and after all, that living, spontaneous, thought-producing essence which we call the human soul, will slide from our grasp and elude all our calculations. If this consideration should have no direct weight in opposition to the theory I am opposing, it will at least show the absurdity of defending this system by what is called the _known regularity_ and _uniform phenomena_ of human volitions. To talk of _uniformity_ here, is to talk of, to say the least, what does not exist.

In the examination of this subject, we find that the arguments in favour of the motive theory are generally of the negative kind; they are not so much direct proofs of the truth of the theory, as they are attempts to show the absurdity of denying it. But when statements of this kind are accompanied by no arguments, they need only be met by a denial. "We are conscious," say the theorists, "of being controlled by motives:" I reply, we are not conscious of this control, but we are conscious of the contrary fact. We know, indeed, that motives have their influence; but we know also that the mind has an influence over motives, and probably a greater influence than motives have over _it_. The mind is conscious too of having an influence over itself, and of possessing a self-directing energy, a spontaneous power, and its consciousness of responsibility is predicated on this power of spontaneity. Only let the mind become clearly conscious that motives beyond its power and influence have an irresistible power in controlling its decisions, and you would as certainly remove from man all sense of responsibility, as in those cases now, where the spasmodic motion of the muscle is not the result of the will.

It is said again, that to deny this control "involves the absurdity that our volitions are exerted without any intelligent reasons, and are the result of a brute or senseless mechanism." It appears to me, however, that a system which represents the will as mechanically governed by motives, as weights turn the scale beam, makes man a machine; while the theory that gives the mind a spontaneous power and energy of its own, makes him what he is, _an intelligent, responsible agent_.

Since, then, these negative arguments in favour of the theory that motives control the mind, are _a.s.sertions_ and not _proofs;_ and since the theory itself leads to _fate_, to _atheism_, to _materialism_, to _conversion_ by mere _moral suasion_, to the subversion of _human liberty_ and _moral responsibility_, we must believe the theory false.

But against the theory of the spontaneous power of the mind, none of these objections lie. It accords too with consciousness; and is, in fact, the only theory on which the responsibility of a moral agent can be predicated. The opposite view claims our a.s.sent to two incongruous and apparently contradictory propositions, between which there is not only no agreement, but an evident repugnancy. This is the embarra.s.sment in the one case, and it is fatal to the theory.

If there are embarra.s.sments in the other case, and what theory of mind or matter has not its _inexplicables?_--these embarra.s.sments are evidently of another kind; it is not the want of light to see how two antagonist principles can agree, the repugnancy of which must be the more apparent as light increases, but it is from the known limits to human knowledge. The princ.i.p.al embarra.s.sment to the theory we defend is, we cannot understand the _manner_ in which this faculty of the mind operates. But this is no more difficult than to understand the manner in which other faculties of the mind operate. To make this last statement clear, the reader is desired to recollect that the mind is not divided into parts and members like the body. When we talk of the _faculties_ of the mind, we should understand the power that the entire mind has to act in this or that way. Thus we say, the mind has the faculties of will and of memory, that is, the mind, as a whole, has the powers of choosing, and of calling up its past impressions. Now if any one will tell me _how_ the mind remembers, I will tell him how it wills; and I have the same right to ask him what causes the memory to remember, as he has to ask me what causes the will to will. In both cases it may be said, the mind _remembers_ and _wills_ because this is its nature--G.o.d _made it so_. When you a.n.a.lyze until you come to the original elements, or when you trace back effects until you come to first principles, you must stop.--And if you will not receive these first principles because you cannot explain them farther, then indeed you must turn universal skeptic. I frankly acknowledge I cannot tell _how_ the mind acts in its volitions. And let it be understood that the motive theory, with all its other embarra.s.sments, has this one in common with ours.--Can its advocates tell me _how_ motives act upon the mind? True philosophy is an a.n.a.lysis of const.i.tuent principles, or of causes and effects, but the origin of these relations and combinations is resolvable only into the will of the Creator. _It is so, because G.o.d hath made it so_. And the nature of these relations is beyond the reach of the human mind. However impatient we may be at these restrictions, they are limits beyond which we _cannot_ go; and our only duty in the case is, submission.

I am aware, however, that what I have now said may, without farther explanation, especially when taken in connection with a principle of philosophy already recognized, be considered as an important concession to my opponents. I have before stated, in substance, that in the material world there is, strictly speaking, no such thing as _power;_ that the efficiency of the laws of nature is, in fact, the Divine energy operating in a uniform way. "Let it be granted," a Calvinist might say, "that what we call the operation of second causes is universally the supreme Intelligence operating in a uniform way, and it is all we ask to defend our system. Then it will be granted, that in each volition of the human mind the operation of the will is nothing more than the energy of the Divine mind operating in a uniform way."

To this I reply, Though matter, on account of its inertia, cannot in any proper sense be said to have power, yet the same is not true of mind. If any one thinks it is, then the supreme Mind itself has not power. In other words, as both matter and mind are inert, and cannot act only as acted upon, there is no such thing as _power_ in the universe! and thus we again land in atheism. But if _mind_ has power, as all theists must grant, then the _human_ mind may have power. If any one can prove that it is impossible, in the nature of things, for the Supreme Being to create and sustain subordinate agents, with a spontaneous power of thought and moral action, to a limited extent, in that case we must give up our theory. But it is presumed no one can prove this, or will even attempt to prove it. We say, G.o.d has created such agents, and that they act, in their responsible volitions, uncontrolled by the Creator, either directly or by second causes. We are expressly told, indeed, that G.o.d made man "in his own image;" his _moral_ image doubtless. Man, then, in his own subordinate sphere, has the power of originating thought, the power of spontaneous moral action: this, _this only_, is the ground of his responsibility. Will it be said that this puts man entirely out of the control of his Creator? I answer, By no means. It only puts him out of the control of such direct influences as would destroy his moral liberty. Does the power of moral action, independent of the magistracy and the laws, destroy all the control of the civil government over malefactors? How much less in the other case? G.o.d can prevent all the mischief that a vicious agent might attempt, without throwing any restraint upon his responsible volitions. It is thus that he "makes the wrath of man praise him, and the remainder of wrath he restrains."

Let it be understood, then, from this time forward, by all, as indeed it has been understood heretofore by those who have carefully examined the subject, that when the Calvinists talk about "free will," and "human liberty," they mean something _essentially different_ from what we mean by these terms; and, as it is believed, something essentially different from the _popular_ meaning of these terms. They believe in human liberty, they say, and the power of choice, and we are bound to believe them; but we are also bound not to suffer ourselves to be deceived by terms. _Theirs_ is a liberty and power of a moral agent to will _as he does_, and _not otherwise_. _Ours_ is an unrestricted liberty, and a spontaneous power in all responsible volitions, to _choose as we do_, or _otherwise_.

Thus far I have examined the mind in its power of choosing good or evil, according to its original const.i.tution. How far this power has been affected by sin, on the one hand, or by grace, on the other, is a question that will claim attention in my next.

NUMBER X.

MORAL AGENCY AS AFFECTED BY THE FALL, AND THE SUBSEQUENT PROVISIONS OF GRACE.

MY last number was an attempt to prove that G.o.d created man with a spontaneous power of moral action; and that this was the only ground of his moral responsibility. It is now proposed to inquire how far this power has been affected by the fall, and the subsequent provisions of grace. The doctrine of the Methodist Church on these points is very clearly expressed by the 7th and 8th articles of religion in her book of Discipline.

1. "Original sin standeth not in the _following_ of Adam, (as the Pelagians vainly talk,) but it is the corruption of the nature of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, and that continually."

2. "The condition of man after the fall of Adam is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and works, to faith and calling upon G.o.d: wherefore we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to G.o.d, without the grace of G.o.d by Christ preventing us, (going before to a.s.sist us,) that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will."

It is not pretended here that any intellectual faculties are lost by sin, or restored by grace; but that the faculties that are essential to mind have become corrupted, darkened, debilitated, so as to render man utterly incapable of a right choice without prevenient and cooperating grace. As muscular or nervous power in a limb, or an external sense, may be weakened or destroyed by physical disease, so the moral power of the mind or an inward sense may be weakened or destroyed by moral disease.

And it is in perfect accordance with a.n.a.logy, with universal language, and with the representations of Scripture, to consider the mind as susceptible, in its essential nature, of this moral deterioration. If any one should say he cannot understand what this moral defect is, I would answer by asking him if he can tell me what the essence of mind is? And if he chooses to object to this kind of depravity, because he cannot understand it, in its essence, he should turn materialist at once; and then, as he will find equal difficulty to tell what the essence of matter is, and in what its weakness and disorder essentially consist, he must turn universal skeptic.--The simple statement is, _the soul has become essentially disordered by sin;_ and as no one can prove the a.s.sertion to be unphilosophical or contrary to experience, so I think it may be shown from Scripture that this is the real state of fallen human nature. And it may also be shown that this disorder is such as to mar man's free agency. There is a sense, indeed, in which all voluntary preference may be considered as implying free agency. But voluntary preference does not necessarily imply _such a free agency_ as involves moral responsibility. The mind may be free to act in one direction, and yet it may so entirely have lost its moral equilibrium as to be utterly incapable, of its own nature, to act in an opposite direction, and therefore not, in the full and responsible sense, a free agent. It is not enough, therefore, to say, "Free agency (of a responsible kind) consists in the possession of understanding, conscience, and will;" (see Christian Spectator for September, 1830;) unless by _will_ is meant the spontaneous power already alluded to. The understanding may be darkened, the conscience may be seared or polluted, the will, that is, the power of willing, may, to all good purposes, be inthralled; and this is what we affirm to be the true state and condition of unaided human nature.

It will be farther seen that the above account of human nature does not recognize the distinction of _natural_ and _moral_ ability. The fact is, man's inability is both natural and moral; it is natural, because it is const.i.tutional; and it is moral, because it relates to the mind. To say a fallen man has natural power to make a right choice, because he has the faculties of his mind entire, is the same as to say that a paralytic man has the natural power to walk, because he has his limbs entire. It appears to me that the whole of this distinction, and the reasoning from it, proceed on the ground of a most unphilosophical a.n.a.lysis of mind and an unwarranted definition of terms. The simple question is, Has fallen man, _on the whole_, the power to make a right choice, or has he not? We say without grace he has not. And therefore fallen man is not, in the responsible sense of that term, a free agent without grace.

This view of the subject is not novel in the Church. I readily acknowledge that a doctrine is not therefore true, because it has been held by many, and can be traced back to antiquity, unless it can be proved to be Scriptural. The fact, however, that a doctrine has been generally received in the Church, ent.i.tles it to respect and to a careful examination, before it is discarded. Hence to those who have only read modern Calvinistic authors on this subject, it may be a matter of surprise to learn that not only the more ancient fathers, but even St. Austin himself, the introducer of predestination into the Church, and Calvin, and the synod of Dort, were all supporters of sentiments substantially the same as are here vindicated--I say, those who have only read modern Calvinistic authors will be surprised to learn this, because these authors treat this doctrine as though it were so unreasonable and absurd as scarcely to be tolerated in the view of common sense. Though it may have an influence with some, in a paucity of better reasons, to scout a doctrine from the Church by calling it absurd, yet the candid will not readily give up an old doctrine for a new, without good reason.

I had at first thought of quoting pretty freely from some of the fathers, and especially from the early Calvinists, to show their views on this point. But it may not be necessary, unless the statements here made should be denied. Let therefore one or two quotations from Calvin and from the synod of Dort, both of which I think Calvinists will acknowledge as good Calvinistic authority, suffice. Calvin denies all power to man, in his apostasy, to choose good, and says that, "surrounded on every side with the most miserable necessity, he (man) should nevertheless be instructed to aspire to the good of which he is dest.i.tute, and to _the liberty of which he is deprived_." The synod of Dort decided thus:--"We believe that G.o.d--formed man after his own image, &c, _capable in all things to will_ agreeably to the will of G.o.d." They then speak of the fall, and say, "We reject all that is repugnant to this concerning the free will of man, since man is but a _slave to sin_, and has nothing of himself, unless it is given him from heaven." And speaking of the change by grace, they add, "The will thus renewed is not only actuated and influenced by G.o.d, but _in consequence of this influence becomes itself active_." And to show that Calvin did not consider the voluntary acts of a depraved sinner as proof of free will, he says, "Man _has not an equally free election of good and evil_, and can only be said to have free will, because he does evil voluntarily, and not by constraint;" and this he ironically calls "egregious liberty indeed! if man be not compelled to serve sin, but yet is such a willing slave that his will is held in bondage by the fettors of sin." These quotations, I think, show satisfactorily that the early Calvinists believed man to have lost his power to choose good by apostasy, and can only regain it by grace. It is true, they generally believed that whenever this grace was imparted to an extent to restore to the mind the power of choosing good, it was regenerating grace. And herein they differ from the Arminians, who believe that grace may and does restore the power to choose good before regeneration. This, however, does not affect the point now under examination, but involves a collateral question, which will be examined in its proper place. One thought more, and I pa.s.s to the arguments on the main questions in the articles quoted above. These articles are taken from the 9th and 10th of the articles of the Church of England. Our 8th is indeed identically the same as the 10th of the Church of England; and the latter part of that article, commencing, "Wherefore, &c," is taken substantially from St.

Austin himself. Thus much for the Calvinistic authority of the doctrine we defend. To which, if it were necessary, we might add quotations from Beza, Dr. Owen, a decided Calvinist, and many of the ancient fathers.

Nay, the Remonstrants declared, in the presence of the synod of Dort, that this was "the judgment of all antiquity."

Let us now notice some arguments in favour of this doctrine.

1. The doctrine above stated, and now to be defended, must be true, as is believed, since only this view of man's condition will accord with the Scripture account of depravity. If the Scriptures teach that man is const.i.tutionally depraved, that a blight and a torpor have come over his moral nature, comparable to sleep, to disease, and to death, how can it be otherwise than that this should affect his power to choose good? Had man any too much moral power in the first instance to const.i.tute him an accountable moral agent? And if he had not, has he enough now that his mind has become darkened, his judgment perverted, and his moral powers corrupted and weakened? Or will it be denied that the moral energies of his nature have been impaired by sin? If not, how has he been affected?

Let any one spend a thought on this question, and decide, if he can, what definite vicious effect can be produced on man's moral nature which will not necessarily imply a weakening and an embarra.s.sment of his original power to a right choice. Should it be said that his power is somewhat weakened, but he has enough left to const.i.tute him free to choose good, this would imply that before the loss he had more than enough! Besides, such an idea would rest on the principle that man's moral nature was not _wholly_ vitiated. It is said, I know, that all the embarra.s.sment which man has to a right choice is a disinclination to moral good. But if this disinclination to good be derived and const.i.tutional, it exists in the mind previous to any act of choice, and is therefore the very thing we mean--it is this very thraldom of the mind which utterly incapacitates it to choose good. If it be asked whether disinclination can ever be so strong as to destroy the freedom of the will to act in one particular direction? I answer, most unhesitatingly, Yes; and if that disinclination is either created or derived, and not the result of an antecedent choice, the possessor is not morally obligated to act in opposition to it, unless he receive foreign aid to help his infirmities, and to strengthen him for a contrary choice.