Bush At War Part 17

There was some discussion of what might const.i.tute victories, but Rice quickly came back to political problems. "We need a strategy for Kandahar." Kandahar, population 225,000, was the spiritual home of the Taliban.

The CIA man described the Taliban. "If they're hunkered down in Kandahar while the Northern Alliance is making progress in Kabul, that will incentivize the tribes to defect. And remember, in the higher elevations they may shut down, but in the lower levels we can still have activity."

The CIA had received a cable from the chief of station in Islamabad that day. Based on multiple sources, including the new Pakistani intelligence chief, the cable said that the bombings had so far been a big political disappointment and were not dividing the Taliban. "Taliban leadership remains united and defiant around Mullah Omar, while tribal commanders sit firmly on the fence waiting to see who will prevail before committing themselves." In other words, splitting the Taliban was a fantasy. It was very sobering. Maybe the enemy was stronger than they had imagined.

THE REPORTS OF threats were so intense that Tenet recommended that the FBI take the unusual step of issuing a national warning of possible terrorist attacks "over the next several days." He did it so forcefully that FBI Director Mueller had little choice but to act. The warning went out in the late afternoon: "Certain information, while not specific as to target, gives the government reason to believe that there may be additional terrorist attacks within the United States and against U.S. interests overseas over the next several days."

If Mueller had failed to comply, and there had been a terrorist attack, he might never have been forgiven. But the warning lacked details because none of the credible intelligence had specifics such as time, place or method of attack. It was more the high number of intercepts and other intelligence reporting that triggered Tenet's reaction. Given what had happened on September 11, better to overreact than underreact.

Cheney worried the intelligence agencies might be trying to cover their a.s.ses but he didn't voice any objection.

The president said later, "National alerts are very interesting issues, if you think about it. First of all, we never had had a national alert." He worried, "How many national alerts does it take to numb the American psyche?" The threats were serious. "Tenet is not a person who scares easy," he said, but he also disclosed that there was a mind game of sorts being played with bin Laden and his terrorists.

"We came to the conclusion at this point in time that a national alert was important to let the enemy know that we were on to them," the president said. In other words if something was planned and the other side saw the FBI announcing a national alert, there was a chance, perhaps remote, they might be delayed or even deterred. Bush said that the alert was "trying to get in their mind as much as anything else."

The alert was big national news as Americans attempted to figure out what it meant.

That evening, President Bush held a televised press conference, his first in prime time since taking office. He delivered a short opening statement before taking questions. He said little that was new, though he did offer the Taliban another opportunity to turn over bin Laden.

"I will say it again: If you cough him up and his people today that we'll reconsider what we're doing to your country," Bush said. "You still have a second chance. Just bring him in, and bring his leaders and lieutenants and other thugs and criminals with him."

Ann Compton of ABC News asked a question that stuck with the president 10 months later. "What are Americans supposed to look for and report to the police or the FBI?"

"Well, Ann, you know if you find a person that you've never seen before getting in a crop duster" - one of the suspected methods for terrorists to deliver chemical or biological agents - "that doesn't belong to you, report it."

The room erupted in laughter.

AT THE NSC on Friday, October 12, Rumsfeld said no strikes were planned for that day, the first Friday of the bombing campaign. Friday was the Muslim Sabbath. The pause would emphasize that the U.S. was not at war with Muslims.

Hank, the CIA special operations chief, gave a ground report. "CIA is integrating the CINC's air plus the Northern Alliance ground. They have an order to hold fast. The CINC will hit targets over the next three or four days. Then he's going to release the Northern Alliance. They will then have three and a half weeks of movement until snows in the mountains and they'll be able to work the lower elevations until December."

"Baghlan is going to defect," Hank continued, "and it will link up." Baghlan was a province and city about 100 miles north of Kabul between the Northern Alliance forces in the northeast and General Dostum's forces, which were to the west. "We'll link up the Northern Alliance forces, we'll open the land bridge from Uzbekistan to Dostum via Mazar-e Sharif. They'll take Herat and then we'll have an air base and we'll make an air base in the south.

"The Northern Alliance think they can get to Kabul. They have no intention or capability to go south of Kabul."

Bush asked Tenet, "How do you get the Northern Alliance to accept the Pashtun tribes?"

"The U.N. administration."

"It's okay by me," Bush said. "No problem with the U.N. doing Kabul."

"We've got to work on the Shamali Plains north of Kabul," Hank said.

"Look," said Rice, "we need not just a solution for Kabul, we also need to start thinking about the Afghan government."

"They'll cross the Shamali Plains and we will have some influence as to the process of entering Kabul," Tenet said, referring to the Northern Alliance forces.

"Do we want to free them to move south with impunity?" asked Bush.

Cheney answered, "It's not as strong a case to take Kabul as there was last week. Outskirts is enough given the other things that we are doing."

"We're in Logar and Nangahar Provinces," Hank said of his CIA team. "We're looking for al Qaeda targets there."

They discussed intelligence that indicated 100 or so people per day were going from Pakistan into Afghanistan to join the Taliban. There was some talk of sealing the border. It seemed an impossible idea, not practical given the hundreds of miles of mountainous and rough terrain, some of the most formidable in the world. There were few roads. Getting from one point to another could only be done on foot, with mules, or on horseback.

They talked about trying to encourage defections in Paktia and Paktika Provinces.

"Even if they are not going to fight," Tenet said, "we want to help them exercise control of their province. This will deny territory to the Taliban and squeeze them."

The vexing problem of getting the Special Forces teams into Afghanistan was addressed. The Russians had intervened to help get the CIA team in through Tajikistan. Maybe they could help again.

"Look," said the president, "I oppose using the military for nation building. Once the job is done, our forces are not peacekeepers. We ought to put in place a U.N. protection and leave, but if fighting resumes and the Taliban come back from the hills, who has to stabilize the situation?"

"Well, the new ent.i.ty has to have a capacity to defend itself," Powell replied.

"Well, our covert action network will remain," Tenet added.

The CIA might have to continue to use its suitcases of cash.

JAWBREAKER, STILL THE only American on-the-ground, in-country presence, was trying to find bombing targets. Calls from the U.S. military were coming in at night, Can you verify this target? Get the coordinates? Do you have U.S. eyes on target? The team was not that night-capable and was using Russian maps. The Russian coordinates had to be translated to English maps with pencils and rulers. The team did not have the laser equipment to designate a target appropriately for the precision bombs. They also did not have direct communications with the U.S. bombers. They were supposed to provide intelligence, not act as spotters. They tried at times, and resisted at times.

This is not the way to do this, Gary concluded.

"Just hit the front lines for me," General Fahim told him. Bomb the Taliban and al Qaeda on the other side. "I can take Kabul, I can take Konduz if you break the line for me. My guys are ready." Fahim was short and stocky, looked like a thug, seemed to have had his nose broken about three times. His forces were decked out in new uniforms, supposedly waiting for the carpet bombing to begin so they could attack.

One night General Franks's headquarters sent a message to Gary saying essentially: You have provided intelligence that says there's an enemy position at the following coordinates. Is that really the enemy there? Are there any friendly forces around?

We can't verify, Gary answered. We are not going to say where the targets are good. We don't have the wherewithal.

He tried to keep focused on the intelligence mission.

Arif, the Alliance intelligence chief, was expanding contacts on the other side of the battle line - Taliban, al Qaeda and their sympathizers. Information came in that Dr. Zawahiri, bin Laden's No. 2, was in the Kabul area.

There's big money to be made if you can ambush Zawahiri, Gary said, promising millions in cash. He visited Fahim's general who was in charge on the Shamali Plains. The general was even more bullish, saying the Alliance could take Kabul in a day if the front lines were broken with U.S. bombing. The bombing around the country wasn't accomplishing anything, the general said. His men were intercepting some Taliban radio communications showing that the Taliban were unimpressed. The general was disappointed. He pointed at the Taliban lines, Look, there is where the enemy is. Blowing up some depot in Kandahar wasn't doing anything for them.

Gary concluded that the bombing might be making the chain of command back in Washington feel good, but it wasn't working.

THE NSC MET at 9:30 A.M., Monday, October 15. John McLaughlin was sitting in for Tenet. "We have the right to fly over Tajikistan without restriction," he announced. "The second CIA team is going to join up with Dostum." The CIA team, designated "Alpha," was going in on Wednesday near Mazar. They were hoping to get some Special Forces A-teams in for target spotting very soon. "Once released," he said, "the Northern Alliance will need guidance - we'll need to give guidance to the Northern Alliance about whether they should take over Kabul."

"Do they have enough troops in the north to go both west and south?" the president asked. South was to Kabul and west was toward Konduz.

"The Northern Alliance believes they have enough troops to do both at once," replied McLaughlin. "Winter will slow us down in the Panjshir Valley, but we'll still be able to fight on the Shamali Plains."

Armitage was representing the State Department since Powell was on a trip to Pakistan and India. "In 1996," he said, "Tajik-Uzbek control of Afghanistan helped spark the Taliban. It could now create a civil war. We should ask the Northern Alliance to stop at the frontier of Kabul."

Bin Laden "could be hiding in Kabul or in the Jalalabad area," Cheney said. "We need to get into that area and clean it out."

The president said again, "Before we give them the green light to go into Kabul, let's get them on the outskirts and then decide how it looks."

"That'll suggest to the Northern Alliance that we only want our objectives," Cheney said. It was important to show we were interested in their agenda too.

"Why not let them base on the outskirts of the city," Bush retorted, "and they can conduct the missions that they want on the inside."

"Let's see if we can carry out this arrangement by basing them on the outside of the city, bringing in Pashtuns. And we'll arrange for control of Kabul and use it for humanitarian a.s.sistance," McLaughlin offered.

"Well, you know, the land bridge and squeezing the Taliban out of the north was an initial objective. Now we think we can put pressure on Kabul too," Bush said.

"We've hit most of what we think they have," Rumsfeld said. "On targets, we're working on Mazar and Konduz. We're not working on the Shamali Plains yet. The reason is we cannot find the forces deployed there. When we have the people on the ground, then we may be able to find them." He then gave a rundown of when his Special Forces teams were getting in. Twelve more people were to go in with the CIA's existing Northern Alliance team, and over the next four days more were expected: a 12-man Special Forces team, another CIA team just south of Mazar, then a second and third Special Forces team. when his Special Forces teams were getting in. Twelve more people were to go in with the CIA's existing Northern Alliance team, and over the next four days more were expected: a 12-man Special Forces team, another CIA team just south of Mazar, then a second and third Special Forces team.

"There's anecdotal evidence that we're beginning to affect morale," General Franks said. "We did 110 to 120 sorties, some on the Shamali Plains," correcting Rumsfeld, who had just told them they were not working the Shamali Plains. They had found very few targets of opportunity. "We hit two camps, we think. We made the first use of the AC-130 gunships." The slow-flying planes, equipped with a 105mm howitzer and a Gatling gun, could spray 1,800 rounds per minute, laying down a withering carpet of fire so intense that Afghans said they "breathed fire."

"The AC-130 gunship, the old Puff the Magic Dragon during Vietnam, was way more effective than a Northern Alliance cavalry," the president would later recall. "It is a lethal weapon. My reaction was, if you've got a shot at the enemy, take it in any way you can."

"Will there be movement next week on both the north and Kabul?" Bush asked.

"I think that it's likely to be the case," McLaughlin replied.

Rice and Armitage said they had asked the Uzbeks for a base where they could leave perhaps up to 1,000 U.S. troops over the winter.

"I don't want to nation-build with troops," Bush said yet again.

"We need to focus on getting UBL," said Cheney yet again.

"We need to keep digging on the timetable," the president said. "If they can move south we want them to do it before winter, but we need to try to work on accommodation." They were losing their focus, he said. "There's been too much discussion of post-conflict Afghanistan. We've been only at it for a week. We've made a lot of progress, we've got time. It may take a while. A rush to a conclusion oh Afghanistan after just one week is too premature. This is a different kind of a deal. We're making progress, we're isolating, we've got him on the run."

Cheney asked about reports of defections. "We validate some, but mostly in the south," answered McLaughlin. "We'll ask the Northern Alliance to try and validate some of them."

Hadley, taking notes in a steno pad, was thinking that they were having too many meetings that week. Fatigue was starting to show. Full throttle for over a month wasn't good. People were running out of gas. At the princ.i.p.als' meeting that evening without the president, Rice and the others returned to Kabul. They weren't getting anywhere, but they couldn't let the issue go.

Earlier that morning, NBC had announced that an a.s.sistant to Tom Brokaw, its anchorman, had tested positive for cutaneous anthrax received in a letter. But the most startling development of the day was the discovery that a letter opened in the offices of Senate Majority Leader Daschle tested for traces of anthrax.

"Anthrax Scare Comes to Capitol Hill," said The Washington Post headline the next morning.

TENET WAS IN London for a memorial service for Sir David Sped-ding, former chief of the British Secret Intelligence Service, MI6. Spedding had been one of Tenet's mentors in the intelligence world. Tenet wanted to pay his respects, but he also had some business with two important players. First was the current chief of the British service, Sir Richard Dearlove. The CIA and MI6 were cooperating on certain counterterrorist operations in the Afghanistan theater and around the world. The second person was King Abdullah of Jordan, also attending the memorial service. The CIA was subsidizing the Jordanian service to the tune of millions of dollars a year.

MCLAUGHLIN STARTED OFF the 9:30 A.M. NSC meeting on October 16 with good news. "The second CIA team gets in tonight. Links up to Dostum."

Rumsfeld and Armitage asked about how to get military hardware to the Northern Alliance. Can the CIA do it, can Defense do it?

Each had an edge to his voice. They had had an unpleasant relationship, 10 months old, that had begun before all the senior positions in the administration had been filled. Powell had been pushing Armitage to become Rumsfeld's deputy, and Rumsfeld had agreed to interview Armitage. Rumsfeld had begun the interview by saying that he understood Armitage was a straight-shooter so he wanted to be direct with him. "You've got less than a 50-50 chance of becoming my deputy," he said.

"Mr. Secretary, I've got zero chance of becoming your deputy," Armitage replied.

That morning, Rumsfeld vented some of his frustration at the delays of getting the Special Forces teams into Afghanistan. "It's important to get our people on the ground," said Rumsfeld. "The CINC and the Northern Alliance are in communication. The CINC says he's ready to stop the bombing when the Northern Alliance says so. We're relying on what the Northern Alliance tells CIA about readiness." The plan was to halt bombing when the Northern Alliance was ready to attack the Taliban. That way the U.S. bombs would not land on friendly Alliance forces. "The CINC has done all he can do until he gets better targeting information and the Northern Alliance moves to generate targets," he said.

Word that the Alliance wanted the U.S. to bomb the Taliban front lines before they moved had apparently not filtered up to the defense secretary.

At one point, Rumsfeld's frustration boiled over. "This is the CIA's strategy," he said. "They developed the strategy. We're just executing the strategy."

McLaughlin disagreed. "Our guys work with the CINC," he said gently, knowing that Tenet's position always was that General Franks was the boss. "We're supporting the CINC. The CINC is in charge."

"No," Rumsfeld argued, "you guys are in charge. You guys have the contacts. We're just following you in." The secretary of defense was distancing himself. "We're going where you tell us to go."

"I think what I'm hearing is FUBAR," Armitage said.

Why? What do you mean? asked the president. He knew FUBAR means f.u.c.ked Up Beyond All Recognition. It was an old military expression, reserved for when things were really haywire.

"I don't know who's in charge," Armitage answered.

Card saw everyone in the room brace. There was a pall.

"I'm in charge," Bush said.

"No, no, no, no, Mr. President," Armitage replied, trying to recover, "that wasn't about you. I know who's in charge here, no question about it, Mr. President.

"I want to know who's in charge out there. It's about who's taking responsibility on the ground over there."

"That's the kind of discussion that frustrates me," the president recalled later, "because I like clarity. You can design a system so that n.o.body is held accountable." He was frustrated to hear the discussion because it looked like Defense and CIA were talking past each other. His concern was, "If there is failure, n.o.body shows up to - who do you look to to fix it?

"Sometimes things are best left unsaid, and let them kind of hash it out, and kind of get their emotions out. ... It's hard for a deputy to go against a princ.i.p.al in a debate at an NSC meeting," the president said.

"I looked at Condi Rice and said, 'Get this mess straightened out.' "

Card could see a shotgun wedding between the military and the CIA. He didn't remember anybody saying, Gee, yeah, we're looking forward to this new arrangement.

As the meeting continued, Bush said, "We have to unleash these guys. We cannot have this discussion one week from now."

"We're nowhere in the south and we need to get there," Rumsfeld said.

"In five weeks the snow will not prevent operations on Kabul, but it does matter in the north," interjected Bush. "Therefore, the north should be the priority."

"What are the impediments to troops in the south?" Rice asked.

McLaughlin answered that the CIA did not have its best contacts in the south and it was hard to get to them from Pakistan. There was no Southern Alliance.

"CIA and DOD need to produce on the south in the next two to three days," Rice said firmly.

"It's much more dangerous in the south. There's no enclaves, we have to create enclaves," McLaughlin said.

"The alternative is to create an enclave - build an airfield. I've got a candidate in Helman Province," Rumsfeld said. It was due west of Kandahar. "I have to ask Franks to look at it."

After the meeting, Rice motioned Rumsfeld into the little office used by the Situation Room director.

"Don," she said, "this is now a military operation and you really have to be in charge." Their strategy was a cross between a covert operation and a military operation but there was a point where it moved from being mostly covert to being mostly military. That point was now.

"I know that," Rumsfeld replied, "but I don't want to be seen to be usurping what the CIA is trying to do. It's also George's operation."

"One person's got to be in charge of this, and it's you."