Beaumarchais and the War of American Independence Volume II Part 11

The 11th of February, Beaumarchais wrote to Vergennes: "Everyone knows the evil which that officer wishes to do me. Having made to myself a law to explain to no one the wise and pressing motives which oppose themselves to the departure of that officer, and owing to the necessity of preventing his indiscretions, I am liable to be taxed with a design to persecute him, whom on the contrary I have from the first endeavored to advance and have aided in sincere good faith.... It is neither in my character nor in my principles to revenge myself on anyone-I should be obliged to pa.s.s my life at that odious business...."

"Neither the orders of Vergennes nor the interference of Beaumarchais or Deane having prevented du Coudray from crossing the Atlantic, the evil which followed was inevitable. Arrived in America, he hastened to accuse Beaumarchais of the very acts which he himself had attempted to perform, and he accused not him alone, but in consequence Silas Deane of complicity, as well as the Comte de Vergennes." (_Doniol_ II, p. 353.)

"Dreaming of great position in America, he built upon the order to retain him on the continent, and gave it out as an intrigue of Beaumarchais." He at once issued a pamphlet to Congress, in which he explained, "It is to my credit alone, and to my zeal in your service, that you are indebted for the extent of the aid accorded to your commissioner, and in nothing to the Sieur de Beaumarchais; everything was finished when he arrived." He further dilated upon the greed of gain which characterized the French agent, and accused him of fraud in his dealings with the colonies. To minds already prepossessed with similar ideas, this pamphlet was not calculated to increase the confidence of Congress in the good faith either of their commissioner or of his friend. During the two months preceding the open exposure of the perfidy of this officer, the difficulty of the situation of Beaumarchais hardly can be overestimated. "Denounced by the conspiracies of du Coudray as being only incited by desire for lucre; obliged to resort to complicated expediencies in order to spare the Government the recriminations of the English, constrained to defend himself against the mistrust aroused even in the spirit of M. de Vergennes by his at times inevitable indiscretions; forced to fall back on justifications which might seem equivocal, he lent himself to doubt, even to suspicion." (_Doniol_ II, p. 308.) On the 30th of January he wrote to M. de Vergennes:

"When one writes to a minister whom one respects and cherishes, one is very much embarra.s.sed to find terms to explain a fact like the one that suffocates me. After Mr. Deane had shown during a month a very bad humor, and saying to myself the whole time that there was something very mysterious in the delay of the vessels at Havre, I was anxious to have an explanation of his offensive tone. He replied that, tired himself of not knowing where the blame lay, he had the honor to send you a memoir by M. Lee, and that the latter reported that Your Excellency had clearly a.s.sured him that for a long while there had been no obstacle on the part of the ministry and that if I said there was, it could only be an imposture of mine or of M. Montieu. Pardon, M. le Comte, if after swallowing all the other bitter pills without complaint, this rests in my throat and strangles me in pa.s.sing. Your Excellency will perhaps be so good as to cast a glance over the four letters that I join to this, written by me to M. de Sartine the 3rd, 18th, 22d and 29th of January. They will inform you of the true state of affairs if it is possible that you are ignorant of it, and you will tell me afterwards up to what point you order me to keep silent and sacrifice myself. This blow crushes me and makes me desire that my whole conduct as a vigilant man and faithful servitor be promptly examined and with the utmost rigor. It is impossible for me to take an instant's repose until you have accorded me this grace. Read, I beg you, my letters to M. de Sartine and judge of my suffering."

Vergennes immediately replied, and the whole situation grew brighter.

Beaumarchais wrote the next day, February 1, 1777, "I sincerely thank you for your goodness in tranquilizing me. I have force against everything except your discontent. Never judge me without hearing me, this is the only favor I ask. I know well that you are accused of irresolution, which is very far from your character. Afterwards they cast upon me the reflections of their discontent, making you speak, so that I may feel it more keenly-I will never believe anything again. I have the intimate consciousness that I do my best and even the best that can be done under the circ.u.mstances. Across all the obstacles that surround me, a small success pays me for great labor. I feel myself already light-hearted again since yesterday's letters have told me that three of my vessels have started." Beaumarchais was thus after so many delays given full power to act. On the 4th of February, 1777, he wrote to Vergennes:

"At last I have my delivery.... It is a pity that the Dutch should be destined to have the princ.i.p.al gain from the transport of these materials. No matter, the most important thing is, not to let America come to grief through lack of good munitions...."

By the beginning of March ten vessels of Roderigue Hortales et Cie. were floating towards America. The seventh of that month he announced the fact to Vergennes: "Never," he wrote, "has commercial affair been pushed with so much vigor, in spite of obstacles of every nature which have been encountered. May G.o.d give it good success!"

"Beaumarchais," says M. de Lomenie, "naturally expected soon to receive very many expressions of grat.i.tude from Congress, as well as very much Maryland and Virginia tobacco. He did not even receive a reply to his letters." Nevertheless, he continued to send out ships laden with supplies, all through the spring and summer, receiving from his agents alone information of their safe arrival.

The failure of Congress to ratify the conditions offered by its commissioner would have brought to ruin the commercial house of Roderigue Hortales et Cie. in spite of the subsidy of two millions with which it had been founded, had not the Government again come to its a.s.sistance. But though the ministers in general, and Vergennes in particular, never entirely deserted Beaumarchais, other and wholly different measures for aiding the Americans were now seriously occupying their attention. The colonies in declaring themselves free from British rule had forced upon France the necessity of coming to some definite decision. This she was slow in doing, but so inevitable was it that she should take an active part in the great struggle that already the measures necessary for the arming and equipping of her forces were being discussed in her councils, while the nation, gone mad with enthusiasm, was urging her forward in the pathway which could lead to nothing but open war.

[Ill.u.s.tration: LAFAYETTE]

CHAPTER XX

_"Never Greece, never Rome, never any people of the ancient world, exposed the motives of its independence with a more n.o.ble simplicity, nor based them upon more evident truths."_

_Gudin de la Brenellerie, Histoire de Beaumarchais._

The Declaration of Independence and Its Effect in Europe-Beaumarchais's Activity in Getting Supplies to America-Difficulties Arise About Sailing-Treachery of du Coudray-Lafayette's Contract with Deane-His Escape to America-Beaumarchais's Losses-Baron von Steuben Sails for America in Beaumarchais's Vessel, Taking the Latter's Nephew, des Epinieres, and His Agent, Theveneau de Francy-The Surrender of Burgoyne-Beaumarchais Finds Himself Set Aside While Others Take His Place-Faces Bankruptcy-Vergennes Comes to His a.s.sistance.

"The Act," says _Doniol_ (I, p. 561), "which proclaimed to the civilized world the inst.i.tution of the American Republic and which was destined to open a new phase of civilization, was announced in Europe only as an incident, secondary to the resistance of the rebels.

"The English Government would not admit that the solemn act produced any visible emotion in London. In the beginning Garnier, the French Amba.s.sador, was no more struck than the cabinet of London by the page of political philosophy put into being by the declaration of Congress, and which was to respond so loudly in the country of Voltaire and the Encyclopaedia." In France, "when it became known," continues Doniol, "it produced the most vivid sensation which was possible to create a century ago by the means of publicity then existing."

But though the action of the colonies was greeted with wild enthusiasm by the populace, the government remained cold and undemonstrative. Silas Deane had written to Congress, January 17, 1777, "The hearts of the French people are universally for us and the opinion for an immediate war with Great Britain is very strong, but the court has its reasons for postponing a little longer."

The chief cause of the apparent inaction of the government arose from the ruined condition of its finances. Beaumarchais, as was seen in the last chapter, already had been commissioned to draw up a plan of finance which should aid in the present crisis. This he had done, basing his scheme of reform upon the wise and prudent measures adopted by the great Sully. He endeavored to prove that these reforms would, if put into execution, cause such an increase of revenue as would enable France safely to declare war, without increasing the rate of taxation or incurring the risk of bankruptcy. His scheme, however, had been set aside. On the 30th of March, 1777, he addressed a lengthy memoir to the prime minister, M. le Comte de Maurepas, of which the following is an extract:

" ... I have doubtless explained badly my ideas of help for the Americans, since it seems that you have not adopted them. The fear of giving you too much to read makes me concise to the point of being perhaps obscure.... Read the letter of M. Deane....

Judge if a good Frenchman, a zealous subject of the King, a good servitor of M. de Maurepas, who respects him and wishes to see his administration honored among all the people of the world, judge if he can support your constant refusal to lend him a hand, the earnest solicitations of America at bay, and the insolent triumph of armed England.... M. le Comte, spare your servitors the sorrows of one day hearing you reproached with having been in a position to save America at small cost and you have not done it, to tear her from the yoke of England and to unite her to us by commerce, and that you have neglected it.

"Hear me, I pray you; you distrust too much your own powers and my resources; and above all I fear that you do not sufficiently esteem the empire, which your age and your wisdom gives you over a young prince whose heart is formed, but whose politics are still in the cradle. You forget that that fresh young soul has been turned and brought back from very far. He is tractable, helpless, weak in his whole being. You forget that while dauphin, Louis XVI had an invincible repugnance to the old parliaments, yet that their recall honored the first six months of his reign; you forget also that he swore never to be vaccinated, yet that eight days afterwards he had the vaccine in his arm. No one is ignorant of this, and no one will excuse you for not employing the beautiful power of your place in causing to be adopted the great things which you have in your mind.

"If you find my liberties too daring, go back to their respectful motives, and you will pardon them to my attachment.

"It was not play on my part, M. le Comte, when attaching myself to you, I said with feeling: 'I shall never have a day of true happiness, if your administration pa.s.ses away without having accomplished the three greatest acts which could ill.u.s.trate it: the humiliation of England by the union of America and France; the re-establishment of the finances, following the plan of Sully, which I have placed several times at your feet, and the rendering of civil existence to protestants.... These three things are to-day in your hands; I wish only the honor of having often recalled them to you. What work, M. le Comte, what success more beautiful, could crown your career? After such actions, there is no death. The dearest existence of man, his reputation, survives all and becomes eternal. Hear me then, I beg you, in favor of the Americans. Remember that the deputies await my answer to dispatch a courier who will carry encouragement or desolation into Congress.... Do not render my pains unfruitful, through not concurring in them, and may the recompense of my works be the honor of having made them acceptable to you!

"I am, with the most respectful devotion, M. le Comte,

"Your very, etc., "de Beaumarchais."

To all this Maurepas made no reply, and the unhappy agent, still hara.s.sed and thwarted in his plans, wrote to Vergennes:

"April 13, 1777.

" ... If I do my duty, as M. de Maurepas had before the goodness to say to me, in presenting without ceasing and under all its faces, the picture of so important an affair, permit me to represent to you, M. le Comte, what you know better than I, that loss of time, silence and indecision are even worse than refusal.

Refusal is a deed, one can act afterwards, but from nothing, nothing ever comes-it remains nothing...."

[Ill.u.s.tration: GENERAL JOHN SCHUYLER]

In the same letter he warmly pleaded his own cause. "In so far as I work alone," he said, "my secret is secure. If the indiscretion of the officers of the _Amphitrite_ and their foolish chief make known the destination of the vessel, what can I do more than you? I defy any man in this country, beginning with the ministers themselves, to cite either what name, what charge, from what port and for what destination I have sent the vessels dispatched since.... In a word, M. le Comte, now that all is in operation, when the first pains and labors of so vast an establishment have obtained a certain success, when my profound disdain for the idle gossip of society has turned aside the babblers and now that I can a.s.sure the happy consequence of the enterprise, do you refuse to concur any longer? and does my active perseverance inspire the same in no one?... In the name of Heaven, of honor, of the interests of France, r.e.t.a.r.d no longer your decision, M. le Comte! Confer again with M. de Maurepas. No object is more important, and none so pressing.

"In the instant of closing this letter, I receive one from Nantes, by which I am informed of the refusal to provide sailors, and so my richest ship is stopped at the moment it is ready to sail.... I implore you, M.

le Comte, promptly to arrange with M. de Sartine what is necessary for the departure of my vessel.... I hope to go myself for your orders upon very many objects Thursday evening, if you do not send them before. I recommend the Americans to your remembrance and their advocate to your good will.... The hour of the post has pa.s.sed while I was writing. I send this therefore by a man on horseback."

In striking contrast to the outspoken and independent tone a.s.sumed by Beaumarchais when addressing the ministers, is the friendly yet authoritative manner which he employs when it is question of a subordinate. To de Francy, his confidential agent, he had written February 28, 1777, in relation to the dispatching of the _Amphitrite_, after it had been brought back by du Coudray: "We shall have to say, like Bartholo (one of the characters in the _Barbier de Seville_) '_le diable est entre dans mon affaire_,' and remedy as best we may the evil that is past, by preventing its happening again. Give the enclosed letter to M. du Coudray. I send it to you open, in order that you may reply in my behalf to his objections, should he make any. Show to Captain Fautrelle, the enclosed order which we give him, in quality of proprietor of the vessel which he commands, and take his word of honor to conform to it entirely. I received yesterday a letter from my nephew along with yours. As unreasonable as the rest of them, my nephew seems to be unwilling to go back to his place on the _Amphitrite_. You can understand the little attention which I pay to such childishness. Simply recommend him again to the special care of M. de Conway and to the Chevalier de Bore. Command the captain to receive on board M. le Marquis de la Rouerie, who comes to us with special recommendations. Give to the Captain the general rule and the secret of the route. If the force of circ.u.mstances obliges him to put into Santo Domingo, arrange with him and M. de Conway not to stop there, but to write to the governor of the island in order to notify him that the fear of some unlucky encounter, alone prompted the drawing up of the fict.i.tious order in regard to the destination of the _Amphitrite_, and take from him a new fict.i.tious order for France, in order to shelter yourself by that order in case you encounter an English vessel between Santo Domingo and the true destination of the ship. You know very well that all the precautions of the Ministry are taken in accord with us; it is upon this that we can count.

"As soon as the _Amphitrite_ has set sail, go on to Nantes, where, by the way, you will probably find _le Mercure_ started, because it is ready now to set sail. Good-bye, my dear Francy. Come quickly back to Paris. You have trotted about enough for this time; other work awaits you here: but I will be there to divide it with you. Bring me back this letter."

The fear of a possible reconciliation of the colonies with Great Britain, which constantly haunted the agent of the French Government, had of late been greatly augmented. The 8th of March, 1777, he had written to Vergennes:

"Sunday morning.

"M. le Comte; Another letter you will say. Will they never stop!

Eh! how can I stop, M. le Comte, when new objects unceasingly excite my attention and my vigilance? A private secretary of Lord Germaine arrived yesterday, secretly sent to Messrs. Deane and Franklin. He brings propositions of peace. The most superb recompenses are promised him if he succeeds." ...

Monday morning, he wrote ... "America is doing the impossible to hold her own. But be sure that she cannot go much farther without you, or without a reconciliation with Great Britain.... While I am treating with you, I warn you that England is secretly attempting to treat with M. Franklin.... Deane is regarded as a formidable obstacle to any project of adjustment: They will attempt to dislodge him at whatever price. My news is so positive as to the intention of the ministers that my conjectures become facts. They have the project to compel Deane to leave France, and to make of him the expiatory victim." A short time before Beaumarchais had written to the same minister: "The doctor Franklin at this moment, wishes to send away M. Deane from France. My special object is to prevent his leaving. The manly firmness of this Republican alone, can arrest the insinuations of every kind employed against the doctor."

As a matter of fact, Franklin was well aware of the dismay which the noise of his secret communications with agents of Great Britain had caused the ministers, nor did he desire to allay their suspicions. He knew well the value for France of an alliance with the colonies, at least supposing the fact of their independence. He knew, also, how far it was to the interest of England to prevent such an alliance. So long as France remained outwardly inactive, Franklin did nothing to allay the fears of the one government nor to weaken the hopes of the other, although there can be no doubt that in his heart he was bent only upon concluding a treaty with France. In March, 1777, he wrote: "I did not come to make peace, but to procure the aid of European powers to permit us to defend our liberty and our independence, which it is certainly to their interest to guarantee, because our great and growing commerce will be open, and cease to be the monopoly of England.... I think we shall be capable with a little help, of defending our possessions long enough, so that England will be ruined if she persists in destroying us.... I flatter myself to live to see my country established in peace and prosperity, while Great Britain will no longer be so formidable a figure among the powers of Europe." There also seems no doubt but that he had at last secretly concurred with Deane in aiding the escape of Lafayette from the restrictions imposed upon him by the French government, although subsequently, the whole blame was allowed to rest upon Deane alone.

The situation in regard to Lafayette was as follows: Some time during the year 1775, the young Marquis who was then scarcely eighteen, and who was serving under the Comte de Broglie at the garrison of Metz, was present at a dinner given in the fortress where the English Duke of Gloucester was guest. The latter was bitterly opposed to the policy of George III in regard to America, and at table spoke freely of the uprising among the colonists; it was then, so Lafayette tells us in his memoirs, that he formed the resolution of offering his services to the insurgents. Through the intervention of De Broglie, the Baron von Kalb, a Prussian general serving in France, introduced to Silas Deane on November 5, 1776, the young marquis with two of his cousins who had formed the same determination to offer their services to America. Silas Deane received them with enthusiasm, and promised all high positions in the American Army (see _Doniol_ Vol. II, p. 63). Eleven other officers were added and the entire group were to sail from Havre on _La Seine_, one of the fleet of Hortales et Cie. when the order already spoken of, came from the government to prevent further operations of the house.

Moreover, a special prohibition was issued regarding the young officers, because it was of great importance for the French Government to seem to oppose the enlistment of such prominent members of the high n.o.bility as Lafayette and his colleagues. Nothing daunted, Lafayette, whose fortune made him independent, bought a vessel of his own, _La Victoire_, and having decided "to go in spite of everything and without regard to consequences" secretly negotiated with Deane, and set sail, April 20, 1777, with some twenty other commissioned officers.

The agreement which had been drawn up between them was signed by Lafayette, the Baron von Kalb, and Silas Deane; it bore the date of December 7, 1776, although it was not really issued until February, 1777. This discrepancy was owing to the fact that since the arrival of Franklin in December, Deane's commission had changed in nature, so that he no longer was empowered to enlist officers for the American service.

The date of December 7, 1776 had been chosen because on that day the two n.o.blemen had been presented to the American Commissioner and an informal engagement entered into. This was immediately before the arrival of Franklin in France.

The true patriotism which inspired Deane led him to adopt this subterfuge, feeling as he did that the services of so brilliant an officer as Lafayette, and one belonging to such an ill.u.s.trious house, would be of sufficient value to his country to warrant the irregularity of the act. The Baron von Kalb had originally, it would seem, stipulated with Deane for a considerable salary, part of which was to be paid in advance. (See _Our French Allies_, Stone, p. 39.) Deane rightly understood the effect which would be produced in the different courts of Europe by the daring deed of the young n.o.bleman and foresaw the consequent fury of the English which could not help but hasten the final decision of the ministry. Therefore he willingly concurred in the designs of Lafayette, aiding them to the utmost of his power (_Doniol_, Vol. II, Chap. VII). Congress afterwards disavowed all the commissions granted by Deane, so that most of the officers were obliged to return to France. Lafayette and the Baron von Kalb, having fortunes of their own, were willing to serve without pay; they were therefore given appointments. The romantic escape of the young n.o.bleman caused all the commotion that was expected of it. The Capital went wild with exultation, openly vindicating his act, while the anger of the English knew no bounds.

England, indeed, had good grounds for discontent with the conduct of her rival. "Public opinion in London," says Doniol, "was more and more for war. France everywhere was accused of aiding the colonies.... It was said that open war was preferable to the insidious peace which we pretended to maintain while according every advantage to the revolted colonies."-(_Doniol_ II, p. 455.) Other causes of grievance, especially in regard to the protection granted to American vessels in all French ports, were constantly coming up. "England," says Doniol, "incriminated especially the authorities of Martinique. According to Lord Weymouth, the Americans armed openly in the island, favored by the most notable persons. So much pressure was brought to bear upon the French Government by the English Amba.s.sador, that, not yet ready for war, it was forced to grant the satisfaction which was demanded. As in previous instances, the blow fell heaviest upon Beaumarchais. July 1, 1777, he wrote:

"I have just received news that afflicts me.... M. de Bouille, the new governor of Martinique, has notified the merchants that it is agreed between the courts of France and England, that the English Navy seize the French vessels coming from their islands, taking all the commodities of America which they find.... This is so impossible, that though I have read it, I still cannot believe it!

"Afternoon.... I am indeed, in despair to receive the confirmation of that trying announcement. It seems certain that France has ceded to the English the right to seize all French vessels coming from the islands, which are charged with American commodities. What distress, M. le Comte, could have brought about such an arrangement?... I learn by letters from Cape Francis of the 18th of May, that the cargo of the _Ametie_, happily arrived in that port, has started for America, divided on several American and Bermudan vessels, bought at my cost at Santo Domingo for....