Battle Ready Part 23

Several months after his arrival at CENTCOM, Zinni at last made a trip to the region. His primary orientation was to check out the forces-what were out there, what they were doing, seeing them on the ground, getting briefs. But he also visited senior military commanders and national leaders.

During his visit, he attended a number of social events with Arabs . . . he would attend many others over the next years. People in that part of the world don't sharply distinguish business from social.

Zinni:

In the Arab world, they conduct business far more casually than we do at home-or in Europe, the Pacific, and other places where I'd served. In America or Europe, the meetings are structured. There's a timetable and an agenda. You limit small talk-and feel guilty when you indulge in it. You tick off items that must be covered. And once they're covered, you instantly move on.

That's not the way Arabs like to do business. They don't jump directly into the "big issues"; they prefer a far more casual mix . . . and not because they don't understand the issues. Rather, it's the way they connect and take the cut of a man. Personal relations and trust built out of friendship are more important than just signing paper agreements. They'll sit around a room and drink coffee, eat some nice food, laugh a little, and have an easygoing conversation about their families, hunting, the weather, or anything else that doesn't seem terribly important. In time, they'll subtly work their way toward the business at hand and deal with it. But don't try to rush them.

When Westerners have tried that-even CINCs-it's led to problems.

Our way of conducting business just doesn't work there. When we try it, we're not well received. Yet politeness, graciousness, and hospitality are so inbred in Arabs that we may not recognize that they've turned off to us. They will always be polite to guests. Hospitality is more than just a nice civility in that part of the world; it's a duty and obligation. To be inhospitable or impolite is a sin. On the other hand, they really take to people who like their kind of personal interaction. But doing that right is truly an art.

An art I've always enjoyed practicing.

It's interesting to watch Washington insiders out there dealing with Arabs. In Washington, everyone is comfortable with formality. That's how they do business. It goes with the pin-striped suits.

During one of our crises with Saddam Hussein, Secretary Cohen and I went to several countries in the region to obtain permission to bomb Iraq. Okay, our way of doing things: You hand them the paper and they read the fine print and sign on the dotted line. No problem. . . . Only, that's not how Arabs operate. They don't directly tell you yes or no. They have ways of signaling their intention, but the signals aren't clear unless you understand them.

In one country, Secretary Cohen pressed and pressed and he got nowhere; they didn't want to give an answer. But as we were leaving, they said, "You must always know we are your friends."

After we walked out, Cohen said, "Did we get an answer?"

"Yes, we did," I said. "We can do it."

"I didn't hear that."

"Yes, in the end when they told you they'd always be our friends, that was their answer. That meant they were telling you to go ahead and do it. Don't make an issue of it."

In another country, we were told, "Please, don't ask us to do this."

This really meant: "Do what you've gotta do. No one's going to interfere. But don't ask us the question that we don't want to answer, either way."

Americans are of course always looking for the hard-and-fast no-yes.

In many other cultures, such as the Israelis', people are frank, blunt, and to the point; and they see anything less than that as a sign of less than full friendship. With good friends, you should be that honest and open. You're only polite to people you're not close to or don't like.

Each culture ticks differently. It isn't that the basic values are different, it's that there are cultural subtleties and cultural sensitivities that you really need to understand.

Early in 1997, General Peay was approaching the end of his tour as CINC. Though it was customary to alternate the job between Army and Marines, Zinni did not expect to be offered the job. No one ever before had risen from the DCINC position at CENTCOM to become commander. So Zinni was knocked off his feet when General Krulak told him he was nominating him as General Peay's successor. . . . It was a surprise; yet there was no job in the world Zinni would rather have had. It was the part of the world where his fighting experience, cultural experience, personal connections, and knowledge could be best used by his country.

But first a big obstacle had to be pa.s.sed.

Zinni was informed that General Shalikashvilli, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed his nomination, supporting instead his good friend Butch Neal (whose credentials for the job were superb), on the grounds that Zinni was far too "outspoken" and could not be "controlled." Zinni had a hard time understanding the chairman's objections (they had worked well together during Operation Provide Comfort), but he took a stoic approach to the situation: If the chairman didn't support his nomination, it wouldn't go through. Live with it.

That meant his career was effectively over. He told his wife to make quick retirement plans; he took the transition course for retiring military personnel; they bought property in Virginia, and talked to architects and contractors about building their retirement home.

General Krulak and the Secretary of the Navy, John Dalton, submitted both names, Zinni's and Neal's. Zinni was grateful, but convinced it wouldn't matter. He went through what seemed to be a pro forma interview with the Secretary of Defense, Bill Cohen, and waited for the inevitable moment when he would call Butch Neal with his congratulations.

A few weeks later, Zinni got hit with another stunner: Secretary Cohen called to tell him he was the administration's pick for CINC of CENTCOM; his nomination had been forwarded to the Senate for approval.

Tony Zinni:

After getting over the shock, I set about gathering advice about the emerging challenges of the command and its future direction in the dynamic environment we faced in our AOR. In time I expected these ideas would contribute to a new CENTCOM strategy for our region; I had thoughts on that score that I wanted to develop.

Of all the advice I received, three people-Joe h.o.a.r, Binnie Peay, and Ed Fugit-gave me the wisest counsel.

General h.o.a.r emphasized relationships. "In that part of the world, personal relationships are often more important than formal agreements," he told me. "Remember our days as advisers in Vietnam. There we knew the value of building trust and friendship."

The outgoing CINC's political adviser (POLAD) reinforced General h.o.a.r. Ed Fugit, an experienced diplomat and deeply familiar with our region, advised me to connect personally with both the leaders and the people. "But you can take that even farther," he continued, "by showing interest in their culture and society. Do that and you build trust and confidence."

I warmed to this approach. Too often we get caught up in crises, rushing around with requests, programs, and policy positions, without taking the time to listen to the concerns of the people who have to live with our decisions.

"And choose your POLAD well," he concluded. "It's the most important personnel decision you'll make." He was right; and I had the good fortune to select as my POLAD Larry Pope, a former amba.s.sador, Arabic speaker, and brilliant diplomat . . . and my right hand for the next three years.

General Peay's advice came on the final day of his command. "Be your own man," he told me, "and don't feel obliged to follow my strategy. The AOR is dynamic. You'll have to reevaluate and update the command's strategy and policies. You must take a fresh look, as all new CINCs should, and put your own personal touch on our tasks."

I was grateful for his encouragement . . . and his blessing. Binnie Peay had become a friend and mentor. He had sought my input on every issue, trusted me to make critical decisions, and left me with a command in excellent condition to meet the many crises and threats we later had to face. His focus on building our war-fighting capabilities is still paying off.

ON AUGUST 13, 1997, I became the sixth commander in chief of the United States Central Command. I became the sixth commander in chief of the United States Central Command.

STRATEGY, POLITICS, AND THE NEW AMERICAN EMPIRE.

Tom Clancy: Tony Zinni will take the rest of the chapter.

My immediate priority as CINC was to reshape our strategy in the light of our ever-changing AOR and the emerging global strategy of the Clinton administration. We needed a structure, a horizon, and goals to meet the many challenges in this most risky part of the world. Without these, our day-to-day work would have no focus.

CENTCOM had twenty countries in its AOR (soon to be twenty-five) -a diverse region that spanned an area from East Africa through the Middle East to Southwest and Central Asia and into the Indian Ocean. Yet the command's near-total focus was on the Persian Gulf and our long-standing problems with Iran and Iraq-our major threats in the region. We were operating under a national security strategy called "Dual Containment," whose objective was to protect Gulf energy resources, contain both Iraq and Iran, and maintain local stability. We were the only unified command with two major "theater of war" requirements (as we say in the military): fight Iraq, or fight Iran.

These threats were not about to go away. Yet other parts of the AOR were heating up, requiring us to broaden our focus beyond the Gulf States.

Weapons of ma.s.s destruction were proliferating all through the region. The Iraqis had used them in the '80s. The Iranians were acquiring them. Pakistan and India were in serious conflict over Kashmir and tossing ever louder threats at each other (Pakistan was in CENTCOM's AOR; India was in PACOM's); our relationship with Pakistan had soured for all sorts of political reasons; and both countries were nuclear powers.

Afghanistan was a catastrophe.

East Africa-Somalia, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia-were trouble spots.

Terrorist activity was picking up.

We'd had little recent contact with Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Somalia. Developing relationships with Yemen, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and the Seych.e.l.les required new engagement programs. Long-standing relationships with Egypt, Jordan, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman had to be maintained and strengthened. We had to rebuild our shaky relations with Pakistan. And a little later, most of the Muslim states of Central Asia that had split off from the Soviet Union-Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan-were added to CENTCOM's AOR. Each had its own special problems (including a civil war in Tajikistan).

CENTCOM found itself in a bubbling pot of crises from one end to the other. We had to develop a CENTCOM strategy to handle them . . . without necessarily using military force-or else only as a last resort. We needed to help build stability in this troubled region, in my view, or we would pay the price in the long run.

A regional conference was scheduled at CENTCOM headquarters for early 1998, and I wanted to firm up the strategy by then.

We were not approaching this process with a blank slate. Since ours was probably the most volatile region in the world, we were starting with thirteen preexisting war plans, an exceptionally large number for a unified command. These come out of taskings from the Secretary of Defense to prepare to counter either a specific threat or sometimes more generic situations, like what we call "consequence management." Let's say somebody explodes a nuclear device or uses other WMD. We had operational plans to police up these situations. Other plans dealt with Iraq or Iran. Others were aimed at generic missions such as "keeping the Gulf open for the free flow of oil." And so on. Each plan had a real possibility of execution, given the nature of the region.

These plans gave us a war-fighting orientation that we were well postured to deal with, thanks to the work of General Peay. We now needed to expand and broaden the strategy beyond that dimension.

In order to get a better fix on all the issues, I talked first to my commanders, then sought input from friendly leaders of the nations in our AOR and from U.S. diplomats with expertise in the area, to ensure that we were all working in sync.

For the bigger picture, we turned to President Clinton's emerging National Security Strategy, with its stress on engagement and multilateral-ism. The military implementation of this strategy is the job of the Secretary of Defense, whose National Military Strategy looks at the National Security Strategy from a specifically military point of view. Every four years, the Secretary of Defense presents to Congress and the President what is called "the Quadrennial Defense Review," which offers still more specifics about how the military side of defense is going to execute the National Security Strategy. It directs the Unified Commands to build new strategies for our a.s.signed regions based on these concepts. The QDR directed the CINCs to "shape, respond, and prepare." This reflected not only the war-fighting responsibilities (respond, prepare), but the new charge to "shape" our areas of responsibility.

The Secretary of Defense also directed the CINCs to prepare Theater Engagement Plans for our AORs. This is our strategy for engaging with the countries with whom we have relations on a day-to-day basis. Specifically, it is our plan for helping friendly countries build their militaries, for cultivating and building coalitions for security cooperation, and for welding together viable multilateral teams to deal collectively with the chronic problems we face and to better stabilize the region. In other words, it is the "friendly" side of our overall strategy.

THE FIRST problem CENTCOM had to fix was the near-total focus on the Persian Gulf. To that end, I decided to "subregionalize" our strategy, by breaking the AOR into four subregions-East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southwest Asia, and Egypt and Jordan-and developing a strategy and programs for each. This approach would ensure that our Gulf-centric tendency did not detract from the programs and relationships we developed in other areas. Though I knew this would not be a clean separation-many interests overlapped-I felt we could accommodate that. problem CENTCOM had to fix was the near-total focus on the Persian Gulf. To that end, I decided to "subregionalize" our strategy, by breaking the AOR into four subregions-East Africa, the Persian Gulf, Central and Southwest Asia, and Egypt and Jordan-and developing a strategy and programs for each. This approach would ensure that our Gulf-centric tendency did not detract from the programs and relationships we developed in other areas. Though I knew this would not be a clean separation-many interests overlapped-I felt we could accommodate that.

Because the nations of each subregion had their own problems, we also had an articulated strategy for each country. In addition, I a.s.signed each of our military components "focus" countries that fit their capabilities and their compatibility with the militaries of these nations. This spread the burden and balanced the span of control in managing our various engagement programs and crisis response requirements.

I then broke down our strategic goals into three areas: war fighting, engagement, and development.

The war-fighting goals were designed to have in place the right plans, forces, and basing options for any possible crisis. We also built a basis for responding to crises cooperatively with regional allies through training, exercises, military a.s.sistance, intelligence sharing, military schooling, and the like.

Three more practical war-fighting issues also had to be dealt with.

The first was agreement on a Joint Fires standing operating procedure (SOP) to coordinate fires on the battlefield. Up to this point, the services had been unable to agree on a joint doctrine for battlefield coordination, direction, and procedures for our air and ground-based fires systems. This may have seemed to be a mere intellectual issue back in the States, but for us it was life or death. In our AOR, war was always a near possibility. If war broke out, without coordination of fires we could expect serious friendly fire casualties or even battlefield failures. We couldn't wait for the services to work through their bickering and rivalries. I therefore directed my component commanders to work together to produce the CENTCOM Joint Fires SOP (if they hit issues they couldn't resolve, I told them I would make the call). These superb professionals delivered, providing an SOP that their services and service chiefs accepted (although only for the CENTCOM AOR).

My second objective was to finish work already started under General Peay to set up a command element, or small forward headquarters, in the AOR for each of my components, providing them command facilities they could rapidly fall into if the balloon went up. When I became CINC, the Navy already had its full headquarters in the region, and the Air Force had its air operations center there. But I also wanted the Army and Marine Corps to establish a forward element for the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC), which would run the coordinated ground battle in Kuwait. As a result, we established Joint Task Force (JTF) Kuwait; and I had the CENTCOM Special Operations Command establish a forward command element in Qatar. This gave me a base to build on for all the functional component headquarters (air, ground, naval, and special operations) if we had to quickly respond to a crisis. Though this was controversial and caused grumblings among rear echelon doctrinal purists, who didn't understand the purpose of these JTFs forward, we ignored their criticisms.

My third objective-never fully accomplished during my tenure-was to create one logistics command for the theater, to control and coordinate the ma.s.sive logistics effort we would have to undertake in a major crisis. The system of separate and competing service and coalition systems, all putting stress on the limited lines of communications and infrastructure in the region, would really cause us problems if we didn't have one umbrella organization to pull all the support needs together and ensure security for our rear area networks.

Though the components developed a basic design before I left command, and the U.S. Army was chosen to be the core of this joint/combined Theater Support Command for CENTCOM, the plan drew criticism and resistance again from doctrinal traditionalists, who didn't understand the realities of the battlefield; and I was unable to accomplish this innovation before I left.

OUR ENGAGEMENT goals were designed to build strong security relationships and allied capabilities, and to enhance the education of military leaders and familiarize them with principles and values that drove our military system. Though much of this area was related to war fighting, it went beyond that to work in cooperative areas that were not strictly military, such as environmental security issues and natural disaster responses. This built the day-to-day military relationships and capabilities needed to respond to crises and work as a combined team. goals were designed to build strong security relationships and allied capabilities, and to enhance the education of military leaders and familiarize them with principles and values that drove our military system. Though much of this area was related to war fighting, it went beyond that to work in cooperative areas that were not strictly military, such as environmental security issues and natural disaster responses. This built the day-to-day military relationships and capabilities needed to respond to crises and work as a combined team.

OUR DEVELOPMENT goals were objectives for establishing new relationships, improving regional stability, and countering emerging threats. They were also related to the development of CENTCOM itself as it evolved to meet future challenges and a changing defense environment. These were the primary "shaping" efforts directed by the QDR. goals were objectives for establishing new relationships, improving regional stability, and countering emerging threats. They were also related to the development of CENTCOM itself as it evolved to meet future challenges and a changing defense environment. These were the primary "shaping" efforts directed by the QDR.

In designing this ambitious strategy, we cooperated closely with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and our State Department partners at emba.s.sies in the AOR and at the regional bureaus in State's Washington headquarters. Our strategy also reflected ideas contained in the Clinton administration's new global strategy . . . and from my own lifetime experience in the military, in conflict resolution, and in peacemaking.

The Clinton strategy represented a significant shift in the way the United States related to the rest of the world. Though the administration did not always handle this shift as effectively as they could have, their overall approach was, in my view, correct. Unfortunately, the Clinton strategy lacked the resources to be fully and effectively implemented.

In America, we look at the world from two powerfully opposed angles of vision. We are either "engaged" or "isolationist."

The engaged-people like Wilson, Marshall, and Truman-believe we can prevent conflicts by actively shaping the environment that produces them, by directly involving our military, diplomatic, and economic capabilities in the world to make conditions better, to stabilize the various regions, to build partnerships, and to do it collectively-by using the UN and regional (or larger) multilateral coalitions and inst.i.tutions. In the long run, they see engagement as less costly than any of the alternatives.

The isolationists fight this view. They see the world as so big, so messy, so out of control, that n.o.body can fix it. And even if we could help a little here or there, dozens of other hopeless cases lie festering. And besides, who says we have any responsibility for the rest of the world anyway? Who made us the policemen of the world? We should be bringing troops home, not committing them to useless foreign "engagements." Who said we have to suffer all the risks and shoulder all the costs of making the world better? Foreign aid is just another way to throw good money down a bottomless hole. We could use it better at home tending-and protecting-our own garden. Yes, we have friends whom we will continue to support. We have interests that we will protect. But that's all the involvement in the world that we want or need. During the Clinton years, Congress generally tended to back the isolationist side and was not supportive of providing resources for engagement.

"Engagement" was not an airy concept (though many portrayed it that way). It came with nitty-gritty specifics (though these varied, depending on whether the country in question was an adversary, a friend, or potentially a friend). We had very formal ways to "engage" both militarily and diplomatically (the two had to work in tandem). And we expected these to lead to clear and specific results.

For example, in a form of military engagement we call "Security a.s.sistance," 73 73 specific components-foreign military sales, foreign military financing, provision of excess defense articles, training, education in our school system, intelligence sharing, and so on-were expected to create a formal and developing military-to-military relationship. specific components-foreign military sales, foreign military financing, provision of excess defense articles, training, education in our school system, intelligence sharing, and so on-were expected to create a formal and developing military-to-military relationship.

Thus when we embarked on a new relationship of engagement (as we did in my time with the Central Asian states or Yemen), we'd usually begin programs informally, in a small way, and later we'd make them more formal . . . put them into one or more of the categories, set up a program to develop their actual resources, set up and fund joint training programs, and the like. In other words, engagement might start informally, but it was expected to grow into a more formal relationship. I felt that if we were more aggressive and planned and coordinated engagement programs better-military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, etc.-we could truly "shape" a more stable, secure, and productive environment in troubled regions of the world.

THE CLINTON administration's engagement policies had the added effect of building on a process that the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the end of the Cold War had already started-the expansion of the role of the CINCs in their regions. Goldwater-Nichols, pa.s.sed in the mid-'80s, gave more power to the CINCs, but primarily as war fighters. By the end of the '90s, Goldwater-Nichols had come into bloom; the CINCs had become far more than war fighters; and the Clinton administration gave the CINCs all around the world a mission to shape their regions and use multilateral approaches in ways that went beyond the CINCs' traditional military role. administration's engagement policies had the added effect of building on a process that the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the end of the Cold War had already started-the expansion of the role of the CINCs in their regions. Goldwater-Nichols, pa.s.sed in the mid-'80s, gave more power to the CINCs, but primarily as war fighters. By the end of the '90s, Goldwater-Nichols had come into bloom; the CINCs had become far more than war fighters; and the Clinton administration gave the CINCs all around the world a mission to shape their regions and use multilateral approaches in ways that went beyond the CINCs' traditional military role.

This was not simply a wish. The administration strongly promoted and stressed this change; and they made it very clear that they wanted the CINCs to implement it.

But not everyone welcomed it, including the CINCs themselves. The change came because there was no other choice. No one else could do the job.

When I took over as commander of CENTCOM, I found a tremendous void in the diplomatic connections in our AOR. There was a void in expanding the personal relationships that Generals h.o.a.r and Peay had worked hard to create. There was a void in establishing and implementing policy.

The void came from several causes.

One, the State Department had not been given the resources they needed to do their job. The neo-isolationists had cut foreign aid, leaving the State Department without the wherewithal-the people, the money, the programs-to make the impact they should have been making.

Two, while the end of the Cold War had greatly diminished any chances of a world-spanning conflict, crises had begun to pop up all over the place; and the military found itself involved in confronting all of them, even those that were not totally military problems.

Three, the CINCs now had resources the State Department did not have; the power of the CINCs was now growing (a reality recognized throughout our region); and the CINCs soon became the chief conduit to personal connections and to the resources State did not have. Much of what got done was done through the CINCs.

During my time as a CINC, I was asked to carry out presidential and other diplomatic missions that would normally have fallen to diplomats. I'm sure such things frustrated the State Department, but I don't think they disapproved. In fact, they were very supportive. It was more a case of: "Well, if we can't do it, at least somebody is taking care of it. If it's the CINCs, then G.o.d bless them."

Like most CINCs, I tried to work very closely with the State Department. In every country, our amba.s.sador is the President's representative. I never did anything that an amba.s.sador did not know of and approve.

Moreover, the CINCs often had more personal presence and far more connections than the amba.s.sadors. In many countries in CENTCOM's region, for example, the senior government leadership is also the senior military leadership. This is not our system (and the downsides are obvious), yet the fact had practical consequences. They were usually more comfortable with soldiers than with diplomats in many cases.

In fact, more often than not, the amba.s.sadors were very glad we were there. We not only brought them the connections we'd made, but we provided them with the ability to get things done they couldn't ordinarily do . . . some small, some larger.

Anything we did for the amba.s.sadors had to have some military overlap. We couldn't simply blatantly set up an aid program. But even here we had some room to maneuver. In Africa, for example, we might be engaged in teaching a country's military how to conduct peacekeeping or humanitarian operations, and we might set up training exercises in the villages. I would send out my military veterinarians, dentists, and doctors (who needed the training; they needed to practice these kinds of operations) to go into the villages with the African country's military, and they'd conduct the exercises together. In the context of the military exercise, we'd build an orphanage or paint a school or set up a clinic as a Civic Action project. We'd be providing our guys with useful training while showing the African troops actually how to do it; and at the same time, we were benefiting needy people. When the exercises were over, we would have the American amba.s.sador cut the ribbon for the new clinic. It was important, in my mind, to always demonstrate civilian leadership of our military and the close cooperation between our diplomats and soldiers.

The countries of Central Asia are p.r.o.ne to frequent and often devastating natural disasters such as earthquakes and mud slides (made all the more devastating because buildings are often made from mud bricks). When disasters. .h.i.t, the normal procedure in these countries is to call in the military to preserve order and help pick up the pieces. We take care of this mission in a very different way. Our national military normally does not get involved. Rather, our National Guard units in the states are trained to handle the aftermath of earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and the like.

We decided to hold conferences on disaster a.s.sistance in some of these countries. They brought their fire, police, emergency service units, and military; we brought experts from the U.S., who showed them how to intermix the civilian and military and cooperate with each other; and we did all this in the name of the U.S. amba.s.sadors.

We held other conferences in the region on environmental security issues-justifying them from the point of view that the military had to be good stewards of the environment, too. (We actually have many restrictions aimed at protecting the environment; and, of course, military training can damage it.) And sometimes the military is called in to police the environment-oil spills, violation of protected fisheries, hazardous waste, and so on.

In organizing environmental security conferences, the term "security" was key. An "environmental" conference on disposing of hazardous waste, for example, would not have played well back at the Pentagon. We had to have a "military" or "security" connection. Armed with that, we could bring in the EPA to talk about how to deal with hazardous waste material. Then I could bring in the amba.s.sador and expand the conference to other issues-even human rights. (Human rights issues are very important militarily when you are trying to teach the importance of "winning hearts and minds" to military forces with no history of these considerations in their operations.) All of these forms of engagement build strong relationships with the various countries. They tie in important military and nonmilitary programs. And from there we are able to move on to more sophisticated joint training and military a.s.sistance projects that promote strong military-to-military relationships and build better capabilities. Everybody benefits.