Battle Ready Part 16

MY FIRST order of business as Jim Jamerson's deputy was to set up a Joint Operations Center at Incirlik that turned his predominantly Air Force command into a joint task force. order of business as Jim Jamerson's deputy was to set up a Joint Operations Center at Incirlik that turned his predominantly Air Force command into a joint task force.

I brought with me a few key people from the J-3 staff who physically set up the Joint Operations Center. They took care of all the necessary nuts and bolts-the communications, the internal systems, the planning; and they began to make the a.s.sessment of what else we needed.

My next order of business was to connect with d.i.c.k Potter, who was just getting out in the field, and see what was going on out there.

My first visit to the camps via one of Potter's MH-53 helos was a shock. In fact, to call the forty-three locations where the refugees had ma.s.sed "camps" was a real stretch. We had over 500,000 refugees strewn over freezing, desolate hilltops, all with desperate looks on their faces. Most had come with little to help them survive in the snow. Many were city or town dwellers with no experience living in the wild. n.o.body had enough clothes to keep warm; everybody was shivering and shaking, not only from the cold but from hunger. Everybody was desperate for food. Children were dying. Mothers were sc.r.a.ping out little graves.

When our two CH-53s made their first lifts of food into the camps, they were swarmed by panicked mothers who desperately threw their babies onto the choppers. (The Kurds were incredibly fertile. We learned later that seventy percent of Kurdish women of childbearing age were pregnant. Infant mortality was high.) The brutal slaughter along the way by Saddam's troops had only added to their trauma.

The Turkish military had been doing all they could to provide order and security (I have to hand it to them), and they were also providing food, medicine, and shelter, but far from enough to begin to cover what the refugees needed for survival. More important, the Turks were insistent that the Iraqi Kurds remain close to the border (even when that resulted in many deaths from exposure), forcibly preventing them from coming down the mountains into Turkey. In their eyes, the refugees were an Iraqi problem and not a Turkish problem . . . and they did not want to add the Iraqi Kurds to the problems they already had with their own Kurdish population.44 It did not take d.i.c.k Potter long to realize the magnitude of the potential humanitarian disaster we faced. He had originally gone in with a single battalion from the 10th Special Forces Group (commanded by Colonel Bill Tangney45); but early that first week he requested that the entire 10th Group (two additional battalions) be sent into the camps to stabilize these sites. His request was immediately granted; and the rest of the group had begun to ar- rive by the end of the week. This act saved tens of thousands of lives. Though more than 10,000 people perished in the flight from Iraq and later in the camps, this number would have been far larger had the relief effort not have been accomplished so swiftly. The efforts of the 10th Special Forces Group was the most significant contribution to that effort. rive by the end of the week. This act saved tens of thousands of lives. Though more than 10,000 people perished in the flight from Iraq and later in the camps, this number would have been far larger had the relief effort not have been accomplished so swiftly. The efforts of the 10th Special Forces Group was the most significant contribution to that effort.46 Another pressing order of business was to learn as much as I could about these people: I had never heard of the Kurds before this operation. Fortunately, a U.S. Army intelligence officer, Nelgun Nesbit, who had grown up in Turkey before immigrating to the U.S., was available to fill in our ignorance; she was with us giving expert advice from very early in the mission. Her language capability and knowledge of the Kurds proved invaluable. Nell provided much of the information that we based our planning on. (She later went on to become a colonel in the Army.) Nell was a.s.sertive, self-confident, and knew her own mind. She did not blindly follow the party line, which tended to upset the traditionalists; but I liked her. She got things done.

The point she repeatedly emphasized: We didn't understand how the Kurds' social system worked. As a consequence, we were trying to connect with them in ways that didn't match their culture . . . picking the wrong people to deal with (a fact that I had already started to realize).

In the camps, we initially tried to connect with people we'd have normally linked up with-the ones who spoke English, the doctors, the lawyers, the teachers, the Western-educated. Many of these types came forward and curried our favor, but nothing was coming out of it. So then we looked for the political leadership-the mayors, the provincial executives. Still nothing was happening.

Nell Nesbit made it plain that we had to forget all of that Western thinking and reach out to the tribal chiefs (the Kurds are a tribal society) and figure out how the tribes were structured.

She brought in a Kurdish schoolteacher who answered my questions about social structure and decision making by mapping out the Kurdish tribal and political structures: how Kurds do things, who makes the decisions in the society. These were important issues for us as we tried to determine who were the actual leaders in the camps.

There were two major political factions among the Kurds. One was the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), under the leadership of Masoud Barzani (the son of a legendary resistance fighter), and the other was the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under Jalal Talabani, who had broken away from Barzani's group to form his own faction. Each faction had a tribal, political, and geographical base (the KDP-the stronger of the two-had power in the west, while the PUK had power in the east).47 Each had its own militia; and each had been contending with the other-sometimes violently-for years. They did, however, cooperate during Operation Provide Comfort. Each had its own militia; and each had been contending with the other-sometimes violently-for years. They did, however, cooperate during Operation Provide Comfort.

The Kurdish fighters (the militias of each faction) were called "Peshmerga," which meant "those who face death." They were tough, battle-hardened guerrilla fighters who'd proved more than a match for Saddam's soldiers, man for man, but had been no match for the artillery barrages, air attacks, and gas attacks they'd been subjected to during their many years of resisting Saddam.

We also found others in the camps, including Turcomans, a.s.syrian Christians, Chaldeans, and Arab Iraqis . . . all fleeing Saddam's brutal regime. Some were defectors from his own government and personal staff.

DURING THE first week, we were really scrambling. Potter and his Green Berets on the ground were taking an a.s.sessment of what had to be done in the camps. We were working to connect with the Turks. NGOs were trying to get in with medical supplies; and the UN had also started to move in some teams. We had to set up procedures for working with both of them. All the while, we were setting up the civil-military operations center. But by the end of the week, we had managed to put all this together and were functioning adequately. first week, we were really scrambling. Potter and his Green Berets on the ground were taking an a.s.sessment of what had to be done in the camps. We were working to connect with the Turks. NGOs were trying to get in with medical supplies; and the UN had also started to move in some teams. We had to set up procedures for working with both of them. All the while, we were setting up the civil-military operations center. But by the end of the week, we had managed to put all this together and were functioning adequately.

As we were working to stabilize the people in the hills, General Galvin and others were soliciting NATO and international support. Soon we were getting offers of medical, transportation, and combat units. and others were soliciting NATO and international support. Soon we were getting offers of medical, transportation, and combat units.

From April to June, we delivered seventeen thousand tons of supplies to the camps, while d.i.c.k Potter's guys took control of the chaos. They organized the camps and ended the "survival of the fittest" atmosphere.

As time went on, we began to realize that the airdrops were not the most efficient way to deliver supplies to the camps. The airdrops quickly provided emergency supplies to the most remote areas; but they were highly inefficient, and very expensive. Bundles ended up all over the hillsides; and then we couldn't control the distribution once they were on the ground.

We knew we had to shift increasingly to helo delivery and eventually ground transportation. But that was easier to talk about than to do. The road networks up in the mountains were ghastly. There'd already been serious accidents that had cost us some people. So before we could switch from air to ground, we had to improve the mountain roads and consolidate the refugees in more accessible locations.

Toward the end of April, Amba.s.sador Abramowitz advised us to contract for Turkish food, tents, and transportation. This was wise advice. The change reduced costs by four-fifths-a huge saving. Turkish food was more in line with the refugees' normal diet (they didn't like the relatively expensive MREs we'd been giving them). Instead of the military tents we'd been forced to use in the camps (also expensive, and we never had nearly enough of them), we were able to contract with Turk tentmakers who took tarpaulins and other ready-to-hand materials and turned them cheaply into usable shelters. Several thousand Turkish truckers, who'd been put out of work because of the sanctions against Iraq (most drove oil tanker trucks), took the big oil tanks off their frames, turned them into open-bed rigs, and went back to doing what they did best-navigate the tricky and dangerous mountain roads. They moved the food and supplies into the mountains. All of this gave a big boost to the Turkish economy-badly hurt by the cutoff of trade with Iraq-which encouraged Turkish support for all of our programs.

The emba.s.sy sent us an excellent liaison team headed by Marc Grossman, the Deputy Chief of Mission. Their excellent advice and close coordination were invaluable.

AS WINTER turned to spring and the snows melted, our problems did not ease. Though we had supplied the refugees with food and shelter, the summer temperatures of up to 120 degrees in these locations would bring diseases and water shortages. The weak and traumatized refugee population-crammed into small areas, drinking, bathing, urinating, and defecating into an already contaminated water supply-was very susceptible to disease. And, sure enough, we began to see cholera, dysentery, and other communicable diseases. turned to spring and the snows melted, our problems did not ease. Though we had supplied the refugees with food and shelter, the summer temperatures of up to 120 degrees in these locations would bring diseases and water shortages. The weak and traumatized refugee population-crammed into small areas, drinking, bathing, urinating, and defecating into an already contaminated water supply-was very susceptible to disease. And, sure enough, we began to see cholera, dysentery, and other communicable diseases.48 Some of the Kurds from the towns didn't have a clue about basic sanitary procedures, such as: You don't c.r.a.p upstream and then draw your drinking water downstream. The Special Forces troops saved thousands of lives simply by educating people about adhering to proper sanitary conditions.

The end of the snow cover also meant the end of most of our water supplies. It was clear that we would soon have no water in the hills-a truly dangerous situation. There was only one solution to both the disease and the water problems: We had to move the refugees down from the mountains. We couldn't keep them up there. Since it was clear that they weren't going to be allowed to move farther north into Turkey, there was only one direction we could safely take them-south.

The initial plan we worked out with General McCarthy was to make an incursion into a valley in northern Iraq and set up huge refugee camps there.

By that time, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had set up a liaison office with our JTF. Because they are used to dealing with refugees, they proved to be enormously helpful. Right away, they tossed cold water on the idea of creating refugee camps. "Don't build them," they warned. "They become miserable, and you'll be running them for years. These people have to go home.

"If you have to make camps, make them austere. They should only serve as transient facilities."

Since Washington was not ready to make the political decision to take over northern Iraq, we began to establish a few camps as an interim measure as we worked on plans for a more permanent solution. northern Iraq, we began to establish a few camps as an interim measure as we worked on plans for a more permanent solution.

After centuries of oppression, the Kurds had learned how to be tough survivors and to keep stoic through their suffering. But, fearing Saddam, they refused to leave the apparent safety of the Turkish border and go down to the new camps. We took videos and showed the Kurdish leaders how they'd have greatly improved quality of life and security in our new camps. They still balked.

But after much persuasion, we convinced them to send a delegation down to check out what we were building.

They didn't like what they saw: We were building the camps like military camps, with everything lined up in lines, grids, and squares. "We can't live like that," they said. Their communities had a very different kind of structure from our "straight line" military alignment. "We build our communities around cl.u.s.ters of cul-de-sacs. We like to have several families facing inward."

They then insisted on redesigning the camps, to make them more reflect their community structure, and on actually taking part in their construction. This was a good idea. It not only gave them the kind of environment they were comfortable with, it let them buy into the whole process. At the same time, it made us realize that the UN was right about the camps. They weren't going to work as a long-term solution.

So then we thought, "Okay, we'll stretch out a little bit more and take part of northern Iraq. At least we can get some people into camps and others into their villages."

In several stages, we took the northern part of the Kurdish areas, stretching to the provincial capital of Dohuk (sixty kilometers south of the Turkish border) and out toward Iran. (There were thousands of Kurdish refugees across the border in Iran, whom the Iranians were taking care of. These refugees also wanted to come back home.) But the UN was persistent: "If you're going to get a little bit pregnant, get all the way pregnant. Take them all home."

They were right again; and we made an a.s.sessment of what it would take to move them there.

ONCE THE decision was made to enter Iraq, we knew we would need additional forces. We also had to expand our own organization in order to control these new forces and coordinate our operations with those of the UN, the NGOs, the aid and security forces from other nations, and the agencies of our own government that had joined the humanitarian relief effort. decision was made to enter Iraq, we knew we would need additional forces. We also had to expand our own organization in order to control these new forces and coordinate our operations with those of the UN, the NGOs, the aid and security forces from other nations, and the agencies of our own government that had joined the humanitarian relief effort.

The JTF became a CTF (Combined Task Force), with the inclusion of forces from twelve other nations (including Great Britain, France, Spain, and Italy). Lieutenant General John Shalikashvilli (General Saint's deputy at USAREUR, and, later, as a four-star general, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) was sent to command the CTF; Jim Jamerson became the deputy commander; and I moved to chief of staff. Shali (as everyone calls him) had the command until June. Then Jim and I resumed our original billets.

A subordinate JTF (JTF Alpha) under d.i.c.k Potter's command was responsible for the refugees in the mountain camps and getting them back into Iraq. Another JTF (JTF Bravo) was formed under Major General Jay Garner, U.S. Army, to enter Iraq and secure the Security Zones we were establishing. The Air Forces component was under the command of Brigadier General Jim Hobson. A Civil Affairs Command was formed under Brigadier General Don Campbell; and a Combined Support Command (CSC) for logistics under Army Brigadier Hal Burch. We also put in place a Military Coordination Center (MCC) under Army Colonel d.i.c.k Nabb, to work coordination with the Kurds and the Iraqis. There was a DART (Disaster a.s.sistance Response Team) team led by Dayton Maxwell,49 and over sixty NGOs and PVOs (Private Volunteer Organizations) were also working with us. and over sixty NGOs and PVOs (Private Volunteer Organizations) were also working with us.

The allied contributions to Provide Comfort were significant. The French, under the command of Major General Maurice LePage, a superb French Marine paratrooper, provided mobile combat teams that cleared the routes from the mountain camps back down into Iraq. The Royal Marines, under General Robin Ross, whose units had just returned from Northern Ireland, provided an excellent force for initial entry into the cities in the Security Zone. The Italians, under Lieutenant General Mario Buscemi, provided elaborate hospitals. The large brigades contributed by the French, British, Italians, and Spanish allowed us to give them each a sector of the Security Zone. General Shali ran this coalition brilliantly, with few (if any) written agreements. Marine paratrooper, provided mobile combat teams that cleared the routes from the mountain camps back down into Iraq. The Royal Marines, under General Robin Ross, whose units had just returned from Northern Ireland, provided an excellent force for initial entry into the cities in the Security Zone. The Italians, under Lieutenant General Mario Buscemi, provided elaborate hospitals. The large brigades contributed by the French, British, Italians, and Spanish allowed us to give them each a sector of the Security Zone. General Shali ran this coalition brilliantly, with few (if any) written agreements.

We pieced together this highly nontraditional, ever-evolving organization on the go. Though some of its components were first-time structures, they met the task. Even so, these strange new structures bothered many older officers. This made me come to realize that nontraditional operations like ours were best handled by younger, more innovative officers who could think outside the traditional and rigid wartime doctrine with which the older officers had grown up.

General Shalikashvilli, a highly intelligent and capable senior officer and a real internationalist, was extremely effective dealing with the Iraqis and the thirteen-nation coalition. I learned a lot from watching him do that kind of business-persuading people, coordinating at that level. But when it came to the technical, tactical, and operational side of things we were trying to put in place, he was very traditional. He liked to follow standard Army doctrine.

For example, when we were looking at how to handle the Security Zones in Iraq, I said, "We'll create a joint task force, we'll stick it out front, with Jay Garner and d.i.c.k Potter in charge."

"No, wait a minute," he protested. "You're going to put a joint task force under a joint task force? Is that doctrinally correct?"

"General Shalikashvilli," I said, "who gives a s.h.i.t? It'll work. We should not worry about doctrine here."

And when we started to change the refugees' transition camps to reflect the Kurds' cultural needs, he was skeptical. "What's wrong with the way we built them?" he laughed. . . . In time, he came to accept the need for cultural sensitivity (which I thought was essential; we constantly emphasized this in our briefs); but I felt he didn't think it was really all that important.

OUR AREA of operations was roughly the size of Kansas, encompa.s.sing 83,000 square miles of rugged mountainous territory, with little infrastructure. The biggest challenge after the initial crisis was to establish a logistics distribution system in this austere and rugged environment. The transportation system was frail, it was austere; the road networks were extremely limited. of operations was roughly the size of Kansas, encompa.s.sing 83,000 square miles of rugged mountainous territory, with little infrastructure. The biggest challenge after the initial crisis was to establish a logistics distribution system in this austere and rugged environment. The transportation system was frail, it was austere; the road networks were extremely limited.

Normally, the services provide logistics support to their own service components, while each nation similarly provides their own logistics to their own components. That's an okay system under normal circ.u.mstance. But it did not reflect the realities we faced-an omnium-gatherum of nations, services, and agencies all trying to force their stuff through the fragile infrastructure, all at the same time. We had major humanitarian and military demands on the distribution system (besides our military supplies and equipment, we were handling relief supplies contributed by over thirty nations), and n.o.body was pulling it together. We had no central management, no prioritization, and very thin security. It was like forcing a gallon of water through a soda straw.

We could see right away that we needed to put in place a centrally designed distribution system, with forward staging bases and interim bases, where we could build up stocks of supplies which everybody could draw from.

The component commanders-Garner and Potter-fought this; each wanted to run his own logistics support. I had constant battles over this issue with them, two of my closest friends. They were shouting at me and I was shouting at them. "Don't mess with our logistics," they kept telling Shali. "We're running our own show. We need our own stuff here."

From the other direction, our logisticians were begging me to convince General Shali to form a Combined Support Command. But when I told him the logistics were going to break, and we were going to see a real disaster, he was reluctant to change the book-dictated system.

Finally, when it was totally obvious that it was either change or endure the world's most embarra.s.sing traffic jam, he made the decision to set up the CSC.

We opened small Humanitarian Service Support Bases (HSSB) in a "hub and spoke" system that let us stretch our reach well into Iraq. We brought down Army Brigadier Hal Burch (a USAREUR logistics commander), and he set it up.

OUR UNORTHODOX command structures eventually caught the attention of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. During a visit in May, Colin Powell, who is a very quick study, was initially impressed with how well the operation was going, but wasn't clear how we had it all organized. The easiest way to explain that was to show him our organizational chart. . . . The chart was of course as weird as our organization; but we had done what we could to draw the lines and links and labels according to the proper doctrinal procedures. So we had lines for "Operational Control" and for "Tactical Control" and so on. Of course, when Powell looked at the chart, he saw right through it. "Is this for real?" he asked. "Tell me the truth. What kind of control do you really have here? What are your real lines of authority? Is it Operational Control?" command structures eventually caught the attention of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. During a visit in May, Colin Powell, who is a very quick study, was initially impressed with how well the operation was going, but wasn't clear how we had it all organized. The easiest way to explain that was to show him our organizational chart. . . . The chart was of course as weird as our organization; but we had done what we could to draw the lines and links and labels according to the proper doctrinal procedures. So we had lines for "Operational Control" and for "Tactical Control" and so on. Of course, when Powell looked at the chart, he saw right through it. "Is this for real?" he asked. "Tell me the truth. What kind of control do you really have here? What are your real lines of authority? Is it Operational Control?"

"Sir," I told him, "what we really do is HAND CON (Handshake Control). We work out our problems on the fly and shake hands on the deals. We don't have time to do anything else."

He laughed. He loved that. It became one of General Powell's favorite stories.

OUR RELATIONSHIP with the Iraqis was predictably tricky. Though the war was obviously over, the Iraqi forces in the north still presented a problem. Unlike units in the south, they had not experienced combat with superior American and Coalition power; and they were not as cowed. Later, after several units from southern Iraq were moved north, we used to watch with fascination how the southern and the northern Iraqi units reacted when our planes flew over their positions. Those who had faced us in the south during the war waved nervously and looked for cover, while the northern troops were more frequently defiant, and once in a while even fired at our planes. with the Iraqis was predictably tricky. Though the war was obviously over, the Iraqi forces in the north still presented a problem. Unlike units in the south, they had not experienced combat with superior American and Coalition power; and they were not as cowed. Later, after several units from southern Iraq were moved north, we used to watch with fascination how the southern and the northern Iraqi units reacted when our planes flew over their positions. Those who had faced us in the south during the war waved nervously and looked for cover, while the northern troops were more frequently defiant, and once in a while even fired at our planes.

The Military Coordination Center was set up to maintain contact with the Iraqi military; and an Iraqi, Brigadier General Nashwan Danoon, was a.s.signed as our point of contact.50 For more important meetings with General Shali, the Iraqis sent a Lieutenant General Saber from Baghdad. For more important meetings with General Shali, the Iraqis sent a Lieutenant General Saber from Baghdad.

As we moved the refugees back to their homes in the south, we increased the size of the Security Zone and demanded the Iraqi military pull back. They were-unsurprisingly-reluctant to do that; and on several occasions we had to threaten them. A show of force always brought compliance (we had in all sixteen incidents of hostile fire with the Iraqis51).

Eventually, we decided to create a zone that allowed all 500,000 of the Kurds to return home . . . and we also decided to help them repair their homes and make them livable. We not only repaired much of the damage to the areas evacuated by the fleeing population, we provided services and utilities to forty-one communities until their local services could be reestablished.

At this point, we realized that wasn't going to be enough. We just couldn't leave them on their own. We had to make sure the Iraqis didn't return once we pulled out.

To emphasize that point, the Iraqis ma.s.sed seventeen divisions on the borders of the Security Zone we had formed. These divisions were there to block further expansion and to seal off the zone . . . and to convey a threatening posture toward the Kurds. As a result, we established what was called "the Green Line" as the border of the Security Zone. None of the Iraqis were allowed to pa.s.s it. Our air cover in the no-fly zone (which was larger than the Security Zone) further ensured the good behavior of the Iraqi military.

The process of moving the refugees and managing the Iraqis went through several stages. In the beginning, we agreed to allow the Iraqis a police presence in the Security Zone; but it quickly became clear that idea was a non-starter. The Iraqis' idea of a "police presence" was the Mukhabarat-their secret police.

The Kurds were dead set against any Iraqi government presence, and the Peshmerga set about eliminating it the old-fashioned way-by killing the Mukhabarat and other Iraqi officials. Eventually, all Iraqi government presence was removed from the Security Zone. Mukhabarat and other Iraqi officials. Eventually, all Iraqi government presence was removed from the Security Zone.

Another agreement that didn't work out was the protection arrangement for Saddam's eight lavish palaces in the region. We had approved a plan that allowed the Iraqis to retain military security over the palaces; but when an Iraqi unit guarding one of them opened fire on a British Royal Marine patrol, the Marines blasted the Iraqis; and that ended the agreement.

Saddam's private airfield at Sirsenk was turned into a logistics base for our operations. Our troops made pen sets from its black marble wall panels and pa.s.sed them out "Compliments of Saddam."

At one point, I went out to see one of the palaces. It was still under construction, occupying the top of an imposing hill; and it was ma.s.sive-like a fairy-tale castle. Luxurious villas were scattered down the hillside; and water pumped up to the top flowed down the side of the hill in a system of water-falls. Underneath the hilltop castle was a vast tunnel complex. At first, we thought this may have been for WMD storage; but it turned out to be for something like a casino. It was shocking to see these grand structures in the midst of the poverty of the local population.

During the same trip, I visited the villages that had been ga.s.sed by the Iraqis in 1988 . . . a chilling sight. They were not only empty of people, but the Iraqis had left not one stone upon another. The Kurds who'd made their homes there had asked to return; but when we did soil tests, we found dangerous toxic chemical traces that made return impossible.

THE HUMANITARIAN aspects of the operation were of course its primary focus. Except for our Civil Affairs officers, this was a new experience for most of us; and it led to many coordination problems. aspects of the operation were of course its primary focus. Except for our Civil Affairs officers, this was a new experience for most of us; and it led to many coordination problems.

When the NGOs started showing up, most of them had had no experience working with us, we had had no experience working with them, and there was mutual suspicion.52 They were all wonderful, well-meaning humanitarians; but they all seemed to think they could do their own thing without much They were all wonderful, well-meaning humanitarians; but they all seemed to think they could do their own thing without much coordination with the common effort: NGO planes would suddenly show up in our airs.p.a.ce demanding landing permission, unable to understand why we had a hard time accommodating them. coordination with the common effort: NGO planes would suddenly show up in our airs.p.a.ce demanding landing permission, unable to understand why we had a hard time accommodating them.

To minimize these problems, we established a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) under Civil Affairs control to coordinate with the NGOs, DART, and the UNHCR. Though friction between the military and the relief agencies continued (on a much smaller scale), the CMOC provided an excellent forum to work out the problems. EUCOM established a Civil Agency Response Element (CARE) at their headquarters that helped a great deal to sort out problems at the Unified Command and Washington levels.

In spite of our mutual problems, working with the NGOs and the various government agencies like DART and the Centers for Disease Control was not at all a bad experience. I learned a lot from the teams advising us. Each of them provided valuable lessons in their specialty areas (water, food, medical care, etc.) that I would use later in missions of this sort.

From the CDC I learned about the nature of diseases-the cycle, the causes, and the treatment . . . the conditions that lead to them, the signs that diseases are spreading, and what you have to do to prevent that. This was a totally unique experience . . . and it's not an instrument you normally find in the military tool kit.

Cholera, for example, is difficult to cure-especially in the case of children. The kids will initially seem to be improving, but they're really not. They'll look like they're getting better; then they'll sink down; then they seem to be getting a little better; and then they sink down a little more. The process is really a gradual decline, but you'll find upswings that give you hope. The upswings can fool you.

I also learned a lot from the teams sent in by Medecins Sans Frontieres Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors Without Borders). They are not only fine doctors; they are also culturally sophisticated in dealing with refugees and third world peoples. They had serious concerns about the level of care we were providing. (Doctors Without Borders). They are not only fine doctors; they are also culturally sophisticated in dealing with refugees and third world peoples. They had serious concerns about the level of care we were providing.

The Kurds needed a great deal of medical help instantly. To fill that need, we brought in what we had-technically advanced military medical units and field hospitals. (I observed a major operation at a Belgian field hospital, where they were doing elective surgery. It was a world-cla.s.s facility.) Our idea was to come in and lay down a ma.s.sive effort . . . really flood the place. But when we pulled out, we'd leave a tremendous void. That is, we were bringing in a level of care that couldn't be maintained after we left.

By way of contrast: when Doctors Without Borders work within a third world environment, they try to leave something behind that can be maintained. It's the old idea: You just don't hand people fish, you try to leave the skill of fishing behind. They know how to leave the skill behind far better than we in the military do. And I took many lessons from this which I used later in Somalia and elsewhere.

RETURNING REFUGEES to their country of origin was no simple task. The large number of international laws and regulations created to safeguard the rights of refugees generate a large administrative and technical burden. This was the first operation at this level of civil-military coordination; and many lessons learned emerged that would be useful in future operations. For example, I had never known before that there's a difference between "displaced persons" within borders and "refugees." Each cla.s.s has rights, but the rights of displaced people are not the same as the rights of refugees. to their country of origin was no simple task. The large number of international laws and regulations created to safeguard the rights of refugees generate a large administrative and technical burden. This was the first operation at this level of civil-military coordination; and many lessons learned emerged that would be useful in future operations. For example, I had never known before that there's a difference between "displaced persons" within borders and "refugees." Each cla.s.s has rights, but the rights of displaced people are not the same as the rights of refugees.

Processing all that took a great deal of our time and energy; but it was all necessary. You a.s.sume all these people want to go home; but that a.s.sumption is not totally correct. Some Kurds did not want to go back. Some were simply too paralyzed with fear to move. We knew they couldn't stay in the hills. But we couldn't just herd them into trucks and carry them wherever we thought it best to take them. We had to convince them we would protect them and take care of them before we could get their agreement. It was not easy.

Every single Kurd had to have written doc.u.mentation spelling out that they weren't going home under duress and that they understood what they were doing. Forms had to be filled out for each Kurd, and somebody had to fill them. That meant Potter's guys in the camps had to interview every adult among the 500,000 Kurds and take care of all the necessary paperwork.

Later, each Kurd had to be continuously accounted for-where they started from, where they were at that particular moment, where they would end up. We set up a transit system with checkpoints, way stations, and the like, to keep track of everybody; but of course things didn't work out the way we planned. Some of the Kurds moved out without telling anybody . . . just took their donkeys or whatever and went back down the trails. We were losing count. "My G.o.d," Shali told me one day, "I've lost 100,000 Kurds. Where have they gone?" We sent recon airplanes to find out, but we didn't have much luck with that. The Kurds had simply scattered into the hills. We had to trust that they knew their way home.

Over the course of Operation Provide Comfort, eight tasks had evolved for the CTF (and the operative word here is evolved): 1. Provide immediate relief and stabilize the population in place. Provide immediate relief and stabilize the population in place. 2. 2. Build a distribution system/infrastructure for continuous logistics support. Build a distribution system/infrastructure for continuous logistics support. 3. 3. Establish a Security Zone in northern Iraq. Establish a Security Zone in northern Iraq. 4. 4. Construct temporary facilities, i.e., transit centers, way stations, support centers, etc. Construct temporary facilities, i.e., transit centers, way stations, support centers, etc. 5. 5. Transfer the refugee population to the temporary sites. Transfer the refugee population to the temporary sites. 6. 6. Transition the humanitarian operation to the international relief organizations. Transition the humanitarian operation to the international relief organizations. 7. 7. Provide continuous security for all aspects of the operation. Provide continuous security for all aspects of the operation. 8. 8. Enable the ultimate return of the refugees to their homes. Enable the ultimate return of the refugees to their homes.

The mission was continually changing. We didn't just get instructions up front, look at the expected end state, and go and do it. We were probing our way through every stage-often thinking when we reached one stage that we were at the end state. But then we'd see other paths opening that we'd have to follow. Once we'd stabilized the refugees in the hills, we realized we had to move them out of the hills; then we realized we had to put them in a sustainable area; then we realized we had to bring them home; then we realized we had to protect them from the Iraqis. Tasks emerged from other tasks. We were developing them as we went. And we had no idea what the end state would be until we got there.

By mid-June, the Kurds were back in their homes, and we were able to withdraw our ground forces back to Turkey. There we established a temporary base for a ground reaction force just inside the border at a town called Silopi. Though humanitarian airlift missions were no longer required, continuous combat air patrols were maintained over the Kurdish areas, and the MCC remained in the Security Zone. The ground troops left Silopi in July.

On July 24, Provide Comfort I ended and Provide Comfort II began. General Shalikashvilli returned to USAREUR, Jim Jamerson resumed command, and I went back to being the deputy. With the ground troops gone, Provide Comfort became an air operation again. Only the MCC and a CSAR capability remained on the ground.

Now that the air operations had transformed into combat patrols, and the Rules of Engagement gave only Jim Jamerson and me authority to order certain responses to Iraqi threats, Jim felt that I needed greater familiarity with air operations. I was not only thoroughly briefed, but I was taken on a flight in a two-seater F-16 to get a hands-on feel for what the pilots faced. And since we had an aircraft carrier in support, I also flew in a Navy A-6-including a series of catapult shots and traps aboard the carrier. This valuable experience served me well in future joint tours of duty.

Later, when Jamerson left and Brigadier General Glenn Profitt took command, I was asked by General Galvin to stay on to provide continuity.

I finally returned to EUCOM in November.

Provide Comfort evolved into Operation Northern Watch, and continued on for well over a decade until Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

OPERATION PROVIDE HOPE.

By the end of 1991, it was becoming increasingly evident to Secretary of State Baker that the New World Order was not happening. The twelve republics that had split off from the former Soviet Union-many of them nuclear-armed-were not going to blossom painlessly into democracies and free-market economies. That much-desired outcome faced serious obstacles. Baker concluded that achieving world stability required helping the FSU recover by means of a new international Marshall Plan.

This was a gigantic undertaking, with many uncertainties: Could the U.S. muster the international community, use NATO, bring in the j.a.panese and other developed nations, and get the necessary resources? And then, how would this undertaking be received in the FSU itself?

Baker's vision was to jump-start this post-Cold War Marshall Plan by means of a humanitarian airlift of food, medicine, and other supplies to the republics of the FSU. The operation, called "Provide Hope," was conducted by the U.S. military during January and February of 1992. Once that was under way, Baker hoped other countries would join the effort. He foresaw down the road not just a humanitarian gesture but a follow-up international effort to reconstruct the economies and political systems of the FSU, to encourage investment, to provide the technical expertise needed to bring them up to international standards, and to show them how to operate in the international community.