Area Handbook for Romania Part 19

The invasion of Czechoslovakia marked something of a turning point in Romania's relations with COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet enunciation of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine--the concept that the protection of socialism in any communist state is the legitimate concern of all communist states--was intended as a clear warning to the Ceausescu regime.

Pressures mounted on Romania to cooperate more fully in the Warsaw Pact and to agree to a supranational planning body within the framework of COMECON. Economic conditions as well as the political and military pressures pushed the Ceausescu regime toward closer cooperation with COMECON, although the Romanians continued to resist the Soviet efforts toward economic integration.

As a result of these pressures, the 1968-70 period was one of relative pa.s.sivity for the Romanians in foreign affairs, although the period was marked by several important events, including the visit of President Richard M. Nixon to Romania in August 1969 and the long-delayed signing of the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in July 1970. By early 1971 the Ceausescu regime again became more a.s.sertive of its independent line in foreign policy.

Principles of Foreign Policy

According to the 1965 Const.i.tution, the foreign policy of the country is based on strict respect for the principles of national independence and sovereignty, equality of rights, noninterference in internal affairs, and interstate relations based on mutual advantage. The Const.i.tution declares the nation's desire to maintain friendly and fraternal relations with all socialist states as well as to promote friendship and cooperation with states of other sociopolitical systems. Partic.i.p.ation in international organizations is directed toward the furthering of peace and international understanding.

Spokesmen for the regime have repeatedly a.s.serted these principles as the only acceptable basis for relations between states both within and outside the world communist movement. In contrast to the Soviet position that socialism can only be fully realized by transcending national forms, Romanian policy gives primary emphasis to the distinct requirements of the nation. At the same time, however, Romania recognizes the duties of each socialist state toward cooperative and mutually advantageous relations with all socialist nations and fraternal communist parties.

In keeping with these principles the PCR has rejected the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty of socialist states. Instead, regime spokesmen have a.s.serted that within the socialist system all Marxist-Leninist parties are equal and have the exclusive right to determine appropriate solutions for their own problems and manage their own affairs. Romanian policy maintains that relations between socialist states must be based on equal rights, complete trust, mutual respect, and fraternal cooperation. In defending the country's policies, PCR leaders have repeatedly argued that, because the construction of communism is being carried out under a great variety of conditions, there will inevitably be different opinions regarding the forms and procedures employed as well as different points of view regarding international problems. Such differences, however, should not affect relations between socialist states or the unity of the socialist movement.

In response to Soviet calls for socialist solidarity, a ranking member of the PCR Standing Presidium declared, "it would be unrealistic to think that fourteen socialist countries spread over three continents, each with its specific characteristics, should show themselves strictly identical in the building of a new society." Additional party statements insisted that each country must be allowed to apply the principles of Marxism-Leninism to its own particular conditions and that no general line for all parties could be established. In adjusting Marxism-Leninism to national needs each party must be able to make its own unique contribution to the enrichment of the entire communist movement.

During the negotiations for the renewal of the friendship treaties with the other Warsaw Pact countries, the Ceausescu government repeatedly stressed that its own formula for developing international relations with noncommunist nations was based on the same principles as those applied to socialist states and that Romania was open to the establishment of such relations "without regard for difference in the social order." A party spokesman a.s.serted that the country's foreign relations are not determined by short-term circ.u.mstances that are valid at one moment and superseded the next but by policies directed at long-term cooperation in all fields of common interests.

PCR policy has sought to support the country's independent political stance by increasing its economic independence. This has led to the rejection of COMECON attempts to integrate the economies of its member states and to establish a division of labor among them. Instead, the PCR has followed a policy aimed at the industrialization of the country, based on the proposition that an expanded industrial base is what is most needed for Romania's overall economic development.

In the same manner that the PCR has resisted complete integration into COMECON, the regime has also opposed Soviet plans for the fuller integration of military forces under the Warsaw Pact. Romanian objections to such integration stem from a concern for the preservation of the country's national sovereignty and a desire to limit Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. PCR leaders have described military blocs and the existence of foreign troops and military bases on the territory of other states as being incompatible with national independence and as the primary obstacles to cooperation among nations. On the other hand, party spokesmen have frequently stated that, as long as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is continued, the socialist countries will be forced to maintain the Warsaw Pact.

CONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Policy Formation

The Const.i.tution a.s.signs to the Grand National a.s.sembly the responsibility for establishing the general line of foreign policy and a.s.signs its implementation to the Council of Ministers. It is the Council of State, however, that is given the overall executive functions of ratifying international treaties and establishing diplomatic relations with other states. As the head of state, the president of the Council of State is charged with representing the country in its international relations.

In practice, however, the basic foreign policy decisions are made by the Standing Presidium of the PCR rather than the Grand National a.s.sembly.

Owing to the fact that the same men occupy leading positions in both party and government, decisions reached in the Standing Presidium are promulgated as decisions of the Council of State. Party spokesmen have described the country's foreign policy as being the result of the "unitary thinking and action of the leading party bodies based on the principle of collective leadership" (see ch. 8; ch. 9).

Within the PCR, foreign policy decisions are channeled through the Central Committee's directorate for international affairs, which in turn transmits them in the form of directives to the appropriate government agencies and oversees their implementation. A commission on foreign policy in the Grand National a.s.sembly functions largely to channel party decisions to the a.s.sembly for its official approval.

As head of the PCR and president of the Council of State, Ceausescu personally exercised the primary decisionmaking powers in matters of foreign policy just as he did in domestic affairs. Observers of Eastern European politics also ascribe influential roles in the determination of foreign policy to Prime Minister Maurer and Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu.

Since coming to power in 1965 Ceausescu has been the dominant figure in the political life of the country and its princ.i.p.al spokesman in international affairs. Believing in the importance of personal diplomacy, Ceausescu has made frequent visits to other nations and cultivated personal relationships with other heads of state. The prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs have also made frequent visits to other states to foster international support for the country's foreign policy. Manescu had developed broad international contacts during his term as president of the twenty-second session of the UN General a.s.sembly in 1967.

Administration of Foreign Affairs

The Council of Ministers is charged with the coordination and implementation of foreign policy and exercises these responsibilities through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Since decisionmaking powers rest in the top echelons of the party, the ministries function almost exclusively as administrative agencies. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the implementation of party directives in the country's foreign diplomatic relations and in the areas of educational, cultural, and scientific relations with other states and with international organizations. The Ministry of Foreign Trade functions as the central organ for the country's international trade and economic activities.

In early 1972 the organizational structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained essentially the same as it had been established after the adoption of the new Const.i.tution of 1965. The ministry is organized into six geographical departments, twelve functional directorates, and three administrative offices. The geographical directorates are designated as: the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; the Balkans and the Near East; Western and Central Europe; North America and South America; Africa and the Middle East; and the Far East and Southeast and South Asia.

The functional directorates are: international organization; cultural relations; political synthesis; economic relations; legal and treaties; consular; press; protocol; personnel; finance, accounting, and work organization; technical and administrative; and secretariat. The three administrative offices are designated the Chancellery, the Office of Services to the Diplomatic Corps, and the Legal Office. The entire organization functioned under the direction of the minister of foreign affairs and five deputy ministers.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade is organized into nine bureaus, a legal office, and an office for protocol. Bureaus listed under the ministry in 1970, the latest year for which information was available in early 1972, included: economic relations with socialist countries; economic relations with developed capitalist countries; economic relations with emerging nations; currency and plan coordination; imports and exports; personnel and training; administration; budgets; and accounting. The ministry functions under the direction of the minister of foreign trade, four deputy ministers, and a secretary general.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In early 1972 diplomatic relations were maintained with ninety-six countries and the so-called Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam (Viet Cong). Of these, forty-two governments maintained emba.s.sies in Bucharest. Nine other governments conducted relations through their emba.s.sies in Moscow; seven, through their emba.s.sies in Belgrade; two through their emba.s.sies in Prague; and one, through its emba.s.sy in Athens. The total includes Brazil, with which relations were maintained at the legation level, and Spain and San Marino, where Romania maintained consulates. Thirty-two of the states with which Romania maintained diplomatic relations had not established permanent emba.s.sies or legations in the country as of early 1972. Trade relations were conducted with several other states with which the government had not established formal diplomatic ties (see ch. 14).

Relations with Communist States and Communist Parties

The Soviet Union

Romania's pursuit of an independent foreign policy has resulted in frequent conflicts with the Soviet Union and tense relations between the two states. In general, the policy disagreements have centered on Romania's unwillingness to partic.i.p.ate more fully in the Warsaw Pact, rejection of the concept of economic integration under COMECON, refusal to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and development of a foreign policy toward the West that runs contrary to Soviet desires. Soviet leaders have interpreted the Romanian policies as a direct challenge to the leading role of the Soviet party in the world communist movement and a rejection of the PCR's obligations to promote "socialist solidarity."

The general policy differences between the two countries were repeatedly demonstrated during the 1967-71 period in such instances as the Romanian establishment of diplomatic relations with West Germany, the refusal to follow the Soviet lead in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the refusal to partic.i.p.ate in the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and Ceausescu's strong denunciation of the action, and the rejection of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty.

Perhaps the most important element complicating relations with the Soviet Union has been Romania's refusal to take the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute. In keeping with its policy of maintaining friendly and fraternal relations with all socialist states, the Ceausescu regime has cultivated relations with the People's Republic of China and is thought by some observers to have played a role in the establishment of contacts between the Communist Chinese and the United States. In mid-1971 Romanian leaders also mediated the restoration of relations between the People's Republic of China and Yugoslavia. These actions led to charges in the Soviet press that Romania was organizing an anti-Soviet bloc in the Balkans under the patronage of the People's Republic of China.

Despite the ups and downs of Soviet-Romanian relations throughout the period of the Ceausescu regime, the two states signed a twenty-year treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual a.s.sistance in July 1970.

This treaty replaced a similar 1948 accord that had been set to expire in 1968 but continued in force under an automatic five-year renewal clause. Negotiated before the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the actual signing of the treaty was delayed because of strained relations between the two states and Soviet attempts to insert a clause containing the essence of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Ceausescu government refused to renegotiate the original agreement, however, and the treaty was finally signed at ceremonies in Bucharest.

Brezhnev did not attend the ceremonies and, in contrast to similar Soviet treaties with other Eastern European communist states, which were signed by both the party leaders and the prime ministers of each country, the Soviet-Romanian treaty was signed only by the prime ministers. Coming in the midst of serious disagreements between the two countries, the signing of the treaty was considered by some observers as a formality and something of a smokescreen intended to cover a widening split.

Other Communist States

In general, relations with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, and Poland mirrored Romania's relations with the Soviet Union. The communist leaders of these countries followed the Soviet lead in the policy differences with the Ceausescu regime and, although each state had friendship treaties that expired in 1968 and 1969, only the treaty with Czechoslovakia was renewed before the Soviet-Romanian treaty was signed. The Czechoslovakia treaty was concluded during the period of the government of Alexander Dubcek before the 1968 invasion.

In its relations with the Eastern European communist regimes Romania had adhered to the principle of cultivating fraternal relations with all socialist countries despite policy differences. Long-term bilateral trade agreements were concluded with Hungary and Bulgaria in late 1969, and the major portion of the country's foreign trade continued to be with COMECON states throughout 1970 and 1971. Visits on the ministerial level were regularly exchanged. Relations with the East German regime proved more difficult, however, the major obstacle being Romania's establishment of diplomatic ties with West Germany in early 1967.

Despite the recognition of the West German government, however, the Ceausescu regime has continued to insist on the reality of two German states and has pressed for international recognition of East Germany.

Relations with Bulgaria had been generally cool throughout the latter period of the Gheorghiu-Dej regime but improved significantly after Ceausescu came to power in Romania in 1965. By the beginning of 1968, however, the policies pursued by the Ceausescu regime led to serious differences, although formal amenities continued to be observed.

Relations remained correct but not cordial until after the signing of the Soviet-Romanian treaty of friendship and alliance in July 1970. This action paved the way for improved relations with Bulgaria, and in September Ceausescu met with Bulgarian prime minister Todor Zhivkov, marking the first top-level bilateral contact between the two governments in three years. This meeting was followed by the exchange of a series of high-level delegations with the announced purpose of improving relations and increasing cooperation.

Friction with Hungary arose in mid-1971 over the Romanian region of Transylvania and the sizable Hungarian minority residing there. In the period of strained--Soviet-Romanian relations, the Budapest regime revived the Transylvanian minority question in order to put pressure on the Ceausescu government. Frequent visits of Soviet emba.s.sy personnel to Transylvania added to the concern of Romanian leaders, who initiated increased efforts to meet the needs and expectations of the country's minority groups (see ch. 4; ch. 9). By February 1972, tension between Hungary and Romania had eased and a friendship treaty was renewed.

Relations with Albania and Yugoslavia differed from those with the other Eastern European communist regimes, as neither partic.i.p.ated in the Warsaw Pact and both had also pursued policies independent of the Soviet Union. In 1960 Albania sided with the Communist Chinese in the Sino-Soviet dispute and withdrew its amba.s.sadors from all the Eastern European countries after Khrushchev denounced the Albanian regime at the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1961. The Romanian position of neutrality in regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute opened the way for improved relations with Albania, and the Ceausescu government returned its amba.s.sador to Tirana in 1964.

The Ceausescu regime has maintained that the policies of the Albanian Communists (the Albanian Workers' Party) are legitimate manifestations of socialism developed according to national needs. Common fears of Soviet designs against their countries after the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia brought about increased cooperation between the two governments.

Relations with Yugoslavia had progressed along lines of mutual interest throughout the period of the Ceausescu regime, and close cooperation had developed between the Romanian and Yugoslav heads of state as they sought each other's support for their independent foreign policies. The PCR was the only Eastern European party to send a delegation to the Ninth Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1969.

Although the two governments indicated almost identical views on all important international issues, they manifested widely divergent approaches to domestic affairs and, owing to the fact that their economies are not complementary, economic relations between the two countries have not kept pace with political relations. Efforts to increase economic relations resulted in a new five-year trade agreement in 1971 designed to increase the exchange of goods by 128 percent in the period covered. Cooperation between the two states was also demonstrated in the joint construction of the Iron Gate hydroelectric station on the Danube (see ch. 3).

During 1971 the PCR renewed efforts to promote cooperative relations among the Balkan states. The regime emphasized that the geographical isolation and the socialist systems of Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania make for common interest in increased economic, political, and cultural cooperation. Observers of Eastern European politics pointed out that Romania shares lengthy borders with Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Soviet Union and that improving relations with the other Balkan states would serve to overcome the country's relative physical isolation.

PCR leaders have also called for all of the Balkan area, including both the communist and the noncommunist states, to be designated a nuclear free zone and for the removal of United States military bases from the area. Observers pointed out that the Ceausescu regime believed that such actions would serve to reduce the strategic significance of Romania in the eyes of the Soviet leaders and possibly result in greater tolerance for Romanian deviation from the Soviet line. Political observers also attributed the growing willingness of Albania and Yugoslavia to increase cooperation and give support to Romania's initiatives for the Balkan area to the growth of Soviet naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Ceausescu regime successfully cultivated relations with the People's Republic of China and persisted in the development of these relations despite tremendous pressures from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states. An important byproduct of these relations has been increased economic exchanges between the two countries; in late 1970 the Communist Chinese extended Romania a long-term, interest-free credit amounting to the equivalent of US$244 million.

In June 1971 Ceausescu made a twenty-five day visit to Asia that included nine days in mainland China, the first such visit by a party leader of a Warsaw Pact state since the Sino-Soviet dispute became public. In a joint communique the Communist Chinese and Romanian leaders emphasized the necessity of sovereign and equal relations among all communist states and parties. Ceausescu reiterated his government's support for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations and a.s.serted that the rightful sovereignty over Taiwan belonged to the Peking regime. In August 1971 a Communist Chinese military delegation attended the twenty-seventh anniversary celebrations of the liberation of Romania from n.a.z.i occupation.