An Unfinished Life Part 43

p. 523: "provoke the Viet Minh": FRUS: Laos Crisis, FRUS: Laos Crisis, 734-35. 734-35.

p. 523: "he might make a public statement": Ibid., 741-42.

pp. 523-24: "indicated both his support": Ibid., 760-61.

p. 524: "to maintain vis-a-vis": Ibid., 758-60, 767.

p. 524: JFK-NSK messages: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 134-36. 134-36.

p. 524: RFK and Bolshakov: Guthman and Shulman, 258-59, 337; Beschloss, Crisis Years, Crisis Years, 152-53. 152-53.

p. 525: NSK message to JFK: RFK to JFK, June 19, 1962, Box 80, POF.

p. 525: The Times Times report and JFK response: Salinger to JFK, May 24, 1962, Box 65A, POF. report and JFK response: Salinger to JFK, May 24, 1962, Box 65A, POF.

p. 525: JFK hoped that Hanoi: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 543-46; Gibbons, 120-21. 543-46; Gibbons, 120-21.

p. 525: McNamara and U.S. optimism: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 546-56; Gibbons, 121-22; Neil Sheehan, 289-91; Shapley, 159-61. 546-56; Gibbons, 121-22; Neil Sheehan, 289-91; Shapley, 159-61.

p. 526: Taylor reported: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 660-63. Also Naftali, 660-63. Also Naftali, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. I, 165, and Gibbons, 104-5. vol. I, 165, and Gibbons, 104-5.

p. 526: "tremendously encouraged": FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 655-57. 655-57.

p. 526: JFK told Thuan: Ibid., 667, 671-72.

p. 526: "made clear": Roswell L. Gilpatric OH. Also see Bird, 223; NSAM No. 182, Aug. 24, 1962, in FRUS: National Security Policy, 1961-1963, FRUS: National Security Policy, 1961-1963, 381-83; and David Kaiser, 139-40. 381-83; and David Kaiser, 139-40.

p. 526: McNamara's withdrawal plan: Gibbons, 125-26.

p. 527: "thought very highly": Guthman and Shulman, 46, 418, 421.

p. 527: "symbolized the idea": Halberstam, Best and Brightest, Best and Brightest, 264. 264.

p. 527: JFK himself said: Quoted in Beschloss, Crisis Years, Crisis Years, 402. 402.

p. 527: "Men can't understand": Bradlee, Conversations, Conversations, 230. 230.

p. 527: "Why is it": Halberstam, Best and Brightest, Best and Brightest, 269. 269.

p. 527: "unnecessary trips": Memo of the President's Instructions at the Laos/Vietnam Briefing, May 2, 1962, Box 320, NSF.

p. 527: "formally involved": Memo of JFK Meeting with Congressional Leaders, Feb. 21, 1962, Box 345, NSF.

p. 527: Concession to Joint Chiefs: Memo for Bundy, Oct. 4, 1962, Box 320, NSF.

p. 528: "What can we do": Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 166. vol. II, 166.

p. 528: "The closer one gets": Quoted in Lawrence Freedman, 360-61.

p. 528: "adjunct of a dictatorship": Quoted in Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, A Thousand Days, 984. 984.

p. 528: The press: FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, FRUS: Vietnam, 1962, 656, 661-62, 671-72. Also, Naftali and Zelikow, 656, 661-62, 671-72. Also, Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 165; C. V. Clifton to McGeorge Bundy, Mar. 6, 1962, Box 320, NSF. vol. II, 165; C. V. Clifton to McGeorge Bundy, Mar. 6, 1962, Box 320, NSF.

p. 528: Time Time's coverage: Henry Luce to JFK, Sept. 15, 21, 1962; JFK to Luce, Oct. 2, 1962, Box 31, POF.

p. 529: JFK sympathized: See Halberstam, chap. 11.

p. 529: Response to the Baldwin story: Naftali, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. I, 186-201. vol. I, 186-201.

p. 529: Directives about the press: Joe Alsop to Evelyn Lincoln, Oct. 3, 1962; "Joe Alsop called," n.d.; Alsop to JFK, Nov. 24, 1962; McGeorge Bundy to Alsop, Nov. 27, 1962, Box 27, POF. Sorensen, 360.

p. 530: JFK to NSK, Mar. 5, 1962: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 115. 115.

p. 530: JFK's numerous exchanges and differences with Moscow: Ibid., 362-65, 369-72, 401-3, 405-6, 411-14, 425-26, 438-41; Naftali, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. I, 86-88, 162. Also see NSK, vol. I, 86-88, 162. Also see NSK, Khrushchev Remembers, Khrushchev Remembers, 536. 536.

p. 530: Public relations setback: Seaborg, 164-66; FRUS: Arms Control, FRUS: Arms Control, 510-14; JFK to Rusk and McNamara, July 19, 1962, Box 88, POF; Naftali, 510-14; JFK to Rusk and McNamara, July 19, 1962, Box 88, POF; Naftali, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. I, 117. vol. I, 117.

p. 530: "I just see": Naftali, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. I, 47-51. vol. I, 47-51.

p. 531: "Domestic policy": Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, A Thousand Days, 426. 426.

p. 531: "Creative governments": Schlesinger to Orvil Dryfoos, July 5, 1962, with a note to JFK, July 5, 1962, attached, Box 65A, POF.

pp. 531-32: JFK's proposals and response to the Soviets: PPP: JFK, 1962, PPP: JFK, 1962, 649-50, 652-55; Seaborg, 167-71. 649-50, 652-55; Seaborg, 167-71.

p. 532: JFK's search for a Berlin formula: Lawrence Freedman, 112-16. Also see conversations with Adzhubei in FRUS: Soviet Union, FRUS: Soviet Union, 356-60; 356-60; FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962, FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962, 780-84; and JFK-NSK exchanges in 780-84; and JFK-NSK exchanges in FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 81-84, 92-95, 118-26. 81-84, 92-95, 118-26.

p. 532: "Matters relating to": FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 133 and 137-47. 133 and 137-47.

p. 532: "consistent failure": Ibid., 143.

p. 532: Incidents at the Wall: Lawrence Freedman, 118-19.

pp. 532-33: NSK's fears and Bolshakov conversation with RFK: RFK to JFK, Mar. 16, 1962, Box 80, POF; Salinger, 248; Fursenko and Naftali, 155, 185.

p. 533: NSK's response: Fursenko and Naftali, 185-86, and Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, 512. 512.

p. 533: Conversation with Udall: FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 1962-1963, FRUS: Berlin Crisis, 1962-1963, 308-10. 308-10.

pp. 533-34: Sorensen told Dobrynin: FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1045-47. 1045-47.

p. 534: JFK's view of NSK: Guthman and Shulman, 27-28, 311. Sulzberger, 808-13.

p. 534: Thompson told JFK: Naftali, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. I, 270. vol. I, 270.

Chapter 16: To the Brink-and Back

p. 535: For an up-to-date review of the missile crisis literature, see Mark J. White, "New Scholarship on the Cuban Missile Crisis," Diplomatic History, Diplomatic History, Winter 2002, 147-53. Winter 2002, 147-53.

p. 535: Cardona asked Bundy: FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 777-78. 777-78.

p. 535: JFK told Cardona: Richard Goodwin to JFK, April 14, 1962; and "Topics Discussed During Meeting of Dr. Cardona with the President," April 25, 1962, Box 45, NSF.

p. 535: NSK's worries about Cuba: Fursenko and Naftali, 166-79.

pp. 535-36: NSK's decision to deploy missiles: Ibid., chaps. 9 and 10; Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Khrushchev, Nuclear Weapons, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Cold War International History Project, Cold War International History Project, Winter 1998, 251-61. Winter 1998, 251-61.

p. 536: Fursenko and Naftali took the phrase "one h.e.l.l of a gamble" from JFK, who used it at an Oct. 22 meeting with congressional leaders about invading Cuba. See May and Zelikow, 264, for the quote, and 35-39.

p. 537: For the 1959 Soviet missile deployment, see Matthias Uhl and Vladimir I. Ivkin, "'Operation Atom': The Soviet Union's Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the German Democratic Republic, 1959," Bulletin: Cold War History Project, Bulletin: Cold War History Project, Fall/Winter 2001, 299-306. Soviet expert Raymond Garthoff, who was a member of the National Board of Intelligence Estimates, remembers the deployment in East Germany. He knew of no evidence that JFK or anyone else high in his administration, including John McCone, knew about this earlier deployment. Conversation with Garthoff, Mar. 19, 2002. Fall/Winter 2001, 299-306. Soviet expert Raymond Garthoff, who was a member of the National Board of Intelligence Estimates, remembers the deployment in East Germany. He knew of no evidence that JFK or anyone else high in his administration, including John McCone, knew about this earlier deployment. Conversation with Garthoff, Mar. 19, 2002.

p. 537: "but there is no evidence": FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1002-10, especially 1004 and 1007. 1002-10, especially 1004 and 1007.

p. 537: "We have no": FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 12. 12.

pp. 537-38: "for the sake of" and "Nothing will be": Fursenko and Naftali, 194-97.

p. 538: "Now, as to Cuba": FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1047-48. 1047-48.

pp. 538-39: Pressures on JFK: FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 923-24, 947-58, 968, 1033-34; Fursenko and Naftali, 198-206; and three Sept. 4, 1962, conversations about Cuba in Naftali and Zelikow, 923-24, 947-58, 968, 1033-34; Fursenko and Naftali, 198-206; and three Sept. 4, 1962, conversations about Cuba in Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 19-80. vol. II, 19-80.

p. 539: Preparation of the statement: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 33-51. vol. II, 33-51.

p. 539: "The major danger": Ibid., p. 42.

p. 539: The statement: FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1038. 1038.

pp. 539-40: "What is our policy?": Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 61-62, 71. vol. II, 61-62, 71.

p. 540: Robert Frost: New York Times, New York Times, Sept. 10, 1962. Sept. 10, 1962.

p. 540: JFK's reaction: Stewart Udall OH.

p. 540: Democratic senators: Mike Mansfield to JFK, Sept. 12, 1962, Box 31, POF.

pp. 540-41: JFK news conference, Sept. 13, 1962: PPP: JFK, 1962, PPP: JFK, 1962, 674-75. 674-75.

p. 541: CIA a.s.sessment: Special National Intelligence Estimate, Sept. 19, 1962, in FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1070-80. 1070-80.

p. 541: NSK to JFK, Sept. 28, 1962: FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, FRUS: Kennedy-Khrushchev, 152-61. 152-61.

p. 541: Senate resolution: New York Times, New York Times, Sept. 21, 1962. Sept. 21, 1962.

p. 541: Schlesinger urged: Schlesinger Memo, Sept. 24, 1962, in FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1084-86. 1084-86.

p. 541: "The question is": William Jordan to W. W. Rostow, Oct. 10, 1962, Box 415, NSF.

p. 542: Kennedy further instructed and Khrushchev canceled: FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1081; 1081; FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, FRUS: Cuban Missile Crisis, 6-7, 10-13; Fursenko and Naftali, 206-17; Richard Reeves, 366-67. 6-7, 10-13; Fursenko and Naftali, 206-17; Richard Reeves, 366-67.

pp. 542-43: "a first-hand sighting": FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, FRUS: Cuba, 1961-62, 1083-84. 1083-84.

p. 543: U-2 flights: Ibid., 1054; Fursenko and Naftali, 212.

p. 543: Bundy and McCone: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 14. 14.

p. 543: Bolshakov carried: Fursenko and Naftali, 219.

p. 543: JFK Oct. 9 decision and weather conditions: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 17; Fursenko and Naftali, 220-21. 17; Fursenko and Naftali, 220-21.

p. 543: Dobrynin-Bowles conversation: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 26-29. 26-29.

p. 544: Leak to Reston: New York Times, New York Times, Oct. 12, 1962; Richard Reeves, 367. Oct. 12, 1962; Richard Reeves, 367.

p. 544: Results of the U-2 mission and Bundy's decision to wait until morning: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 29-30. 29-30.

p. 544: The 8:45 A.M. A.M. meeting and JFK's response: Richard Reeves, 368. meeting and JFK's response: Richard Reeves, 368.

pp. 545-47: The 11:45 Ex Comm meeting: For partic.i.p.ants and seating: May and Zelikow, 39-43; Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 397. The initial discussion: Naftali and Zelikow, 397-403. vol. II, 397. The initial discussion: Naftali and Zelikow, 397-403.

p. 547: Oct. 16, morning discussion: Ibid., 404-27.

pp. 547-48: Ad lib remarks: O'Donnell and Powers, 315-16.

p. 548: Evening meeting: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 427-68. vol. II, 427-68.

p. 549: RFK and JFK on Pearl Harbor: Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, 507; Brinkley, 154-74; Chace, 398-99. 507; Brinkley, 154-74; Chace, 398-99.

p. 550: For an overview of activities on Oct. 17, see May and Zelikow, 118-21.

pp. 550-51: Summaries of the meetings, including McCone's with JFK, AES to JFK, and RFK's memo: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 94-106. 94-106.

pp. 551-53: Thursday, Oct. 18, meeting: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 516-72. vol. II, 516-72.

p. 553: JFK-Gromyko conversation: FRUS: Missile Crisis, FRUS: Missile Crisis, 110-14. 110-14.

p. 553: JFK-Lovett conversation: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 573-74. vol. II, 573-74.

p. 553: Gromyko's reaction: Fursenko and Naftali, 231-32.

p. 553: Lovett's advice and RFK's agreement: Naftali and Zelikow, Presidential Recordings, Presidential Recordings, vol. II, 573-74. vol. II, 573-74.

pp. 553-54: Late-night meeting: Ibid., 576-77. The JFK quote is on 512.

p. 554: Considered canceling the trip: O'Donnell and Powers, 315; and PPP: JFK, 1962, PPP: JFK, 1962, 797-805. 797-805.