An Outline of Sexual Morality Part 2

Modern society has gone, I contend, as much astray in drifting to the extreme of considering all things permissible, as has Puritanism in regarding the s.e.x-act outside marriage as in all circ.u.mstances a deadly evil. And I can only marvel that this latter att.i.tude is taken up so often in the name of the Christian religion, when its Founder, while declaring that at the last day it would be "more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah than for the Scribes and Pharisees," also said to the woman taken in adultery, "Neither do I condemn thee; go thy way, from henceforth sin no more."

Chapter 6: Divorce

In leaving the moorland of general principles for the fields of particular problems it will be convenient to group s.e.x natures under three heads: (1) the normal or hetero-s.e.xual, (2) the invert or h.o.m.o-s.e.xual, and (3) the neuter or s.e.xless. It is necessary only to add that it will not be possible to deal in more than the merest outline with any of these important questions.

The most prominent of the problems concerned with the normal group is that of divorce. The problem arises because on the one hand there is a sense that marriage ought to be a permanent state, while on the other, there are many human exigences which go to break up particular marriages.

Separation, without permission to re-marry, is of course an admitted remedy. But the question then arises whether parties so separated will continue to live as celibates; and as it appears certain that the vast majority will not, we have to ask whether it is better to legalise the fresh unions which are formed, or to permit adultery.

Every modern State has wrestled with this problem, and for the most part ineffectually. Where there is no divorce, as in England before 1857,[10]

or among the poorer cla.s.ses who cannot afford divorce, irregular unions and prost.i.tution undoubtedly flourish. Where a compromise is introduced, the permanence of marriage, and therefore of the home, becomes correspondingly impaired, while there are left a number of unhappy cases for which divorce is not allowed.[11] The English civil law is particularly unhappy in its compromise. It is based on the Protestant interpretation of the pa.s.sage in St. Matthew already mentioned, namely that divorce is permissible where adultery has occurred, and it goes on to make it easier for the husband to sue for divorce when the wife has committed adultery than for the wife to do so in the reverse circ.u.mstances. Hence it places a premium on adultery, and exaggerates its importance as regards other sins. It deliberately incites an unhappy wife to commit adultery in order to obtain relief--she can usually evade the vigilance of the King's Proctor--and it singles out adultery as a worse sin than, let us say, cruelty or habitual drunkenness, for which divorce is not at present obtainable. In fact it is difficult to find any logical or moral defence for the English law as it stands.

Let us first see how far the popular critics of the Catholic doctrine of indissoluble marriage are wrong. They regard marriage as simply a contract, from which it follows that divorce should be obtained by mutual consent, or even on the application of one of the parties. But this ignores, among other things, one vital natural law. Marriage begets parenthood, and between the parents of the same child there is a definite and permanent relationship. No Act of Parliament can make men and women cease to be the parents of their own children. Nor, even in childless marriages, is the sense of permanence an artificial convention which can be abolished by the decree of a court. The deeper the love, the more permanent must its nature tend to be. Love is not a contract; it is a spiritual bond.

It is impossible, I contend, to think of a normally healthy marriage without realizing that both the man and woman naturally enter into it with the a.s.sumption that it will be a permanent relationship. The possibility of a family, the break-up of the maiden life--even the furnishing of a home, is evidence of a strong probability in the minds of the parties that the step which is being taken is something more than a temporary contract.

Indeed, the marriage is only temporary if unhappiness arises. Men and women marry because they want to enter into as permanent a relationship as possible; they enter into it because, as they say, they wish to "settle down." The natural desire of man is that marriage should be permanent.

A reversion to free love would be more than the undoing of the evolution from animal to man. It would completely change the basis of human society.

And in proportion as any divorce law encourages the conception of a temporary contract this dangerous instability of home-life is threatened.

Americans sometimes describe their own laws as approaching the "ideal."

"The question will soon be," wrote a journalist describing the American "smart set," "who is to be your husband next year?"--or, "Has your last season's wife re-married yet?" This is of course an exaggeration; but it is a warning as to logical developments.

In fact, divorce tends to create itself. Divorce is only applied for where the marriage is unhappy. A fair proportion of unhappy marriages arise because they have been hastily entered into; with due inquiry many of them could have been prevented. But the easier divorce is to obtain, the more incentive will be given to enter into these hasty marriages--the type of union which so often gives rise to divorce.

On the other hand, whatever their cause, there are marriages in which all trace of love has disappeared, and it may fairly be argued that the union is dead. Thus a husband may, in later years, become incurably insane or habitually drunk. There are many unions in which the one party has married in blind infatuation only to discover that the partner is so contemptible a creature as to destroy all vestige of love. Such unions remain marriages in formality only; their pretended existence is a sacrilege, particularly if there are no children and the husband and wife are not therefore co-related as parents.

For all such cases the Catholic Church permits divorce (_a mensa et thoro_)--or separation, as it is known in civil law, without permission to re-marry. The issue, therefore, becomes simply a question as to whether it is right to expect the parties so separated to remain celibate.

In an outline such as this, I suppose that one can only attempt a summary reply to these questions. If, for a moment, we are to exclude the complications of a subsequent love-affair there appears to me to be no reason whatever why any man or woman should not remain celibate during the lifetime of the divorced partner. The _journalese_ theory that it is unnatural and unhealthy for people so to remain is simply untrue, so long as the celibacy takes the form of sublimation or trans.m.u.tation and not repression. The complication of an intense love-romance however, is a serious proposition. Ought two people in love to remain s.e.xually apart simply because one of them is still married to, let us say, an incurable lunatic? In principle there seems to be every reason why they should; no actual physical or mental harm is done to them, provided they have a sufficiently developed will-power to transfer their s.e.x-desire into other channels of activity. The sacrifice will be immense, but it is no more than any man has to make who refrains from marrying his beloved because he is too poor or is suffering from some disease which may affect his children. In this case the sacrifice is offered for the supremely important principle that only G.o.d, by the act of death, can undo the vinculum of the original marriage.

But I am equally sure that most people under these or less intense circ.u.mstances will not remain celibate.

Therefore, to descend from theory to practice, I see no alternative but to draw a rigid line between civil and religious marriages. The State must make its own arrangements and go its own way. But there should always be a higher type of marriage where the Catholic Church has been invoked for her blessing. And for those who choose to ask for this sacrament, the union should be irrevocable, save by death. The parties will receive that sacrament knowing what a heavy responsibility they are a.s.suming. And it is only right that the Church should be far more particular in refusing to prost.i.tute her sacramental grace on unions which ought not to be consummated. She ought, I conceive, rigidly to inquire into the desirability of the union, and not to give her blessing unless she is satisfied that both parties are giving their consent with as full a knowledge of the facts as is humanly possible. Equally she should refuse her ministrations where she is unconvinced that love is the motive of the marriage. I see no reason why some form of sponsorship should not be demanded.

And I think it may be argued that a consent without a knowledge of the facts is not a valid consent, and that such a union is null. I should welcome a careful extension of the decree of nullity, for that reason.

Chapter 7: Eugenics and Prost.i.tution

The doctrine that love is the only motive for s.e.x--that physical expression is pure only so far as it is the sacramental accidence of love--leads to important conclusions. There is, for instance, a cla.s.s of moralist who teach that the s.e.x-act in marriage must only be for the purpose of procreation. It would follow from this that it is immoral for s.e.x intimacies to occur between a man and his wife once she has pa.s.sed a certain age. In the ideal marriage, so this school of thought affirms, copulation is strictly regulated and occurs only when the moment is favourable for generation.

To this theory I cannot subscribe. It runs counter to the doctrine in which I believe. It Changes the s.e.x-act from an incident or a result to a means or a cause. It is really immoral because it lays emphasis on the physical. This cold-blooded calculation of the times when s.e.x is to be thus physically expressed is the exact opposite of the principle by which love directs and the act merely occurs, with no purpose but to express love physically.

This leads us to a consideration as to how far those practices between man and woman are moral in which procreation cannot result. It is interesting to note that the English law holds that "unnatural" acts between husband and wife are criminal. Although it is true that prosecution cannot occur unless there is an absence of consent, for otherwise there would be no evidence--these acts are apparently regarded as _per se_ criminal in nature. And this indeed is a logical position, when we remember the standpoint which the State adopts towards all s.e.x questions.

To this cla.s.s of conduct artificial preventatives are closely allied. A chaos of opinion rages over this subject, from the neo-malthusian who advocates the practice as a necessity, to the purist who talks of "child-murder." It seems clear that this latter designation is an unwarrantable exaggeration; to prevent the possibility of life coming into existence cannot by any strain of imagination be confused with destroying what is actually alive. On the other hand, the moral test which we are applying to all these problems hardly acquits the practice. It is difficult to think of preventatives without being conscious that premeditation of the physical act is being emphasized, and the ideal of a natural incident almost banished. To prepare for a thing is to insist on its importance. The minds of the two parties must almost necessarily be focussed--though not absolutely necessarily--on the physical s.e.x-act.

There is no doubt however that, apart from ideals, preventatives are a means of averting more serious evils. This is not the place to enter into a detailed consideration of eugenics. We can only face the blatant fact that thousands of degenerate parents continue each year to breed degenerate children. The moral aspect with which alone I am dealing, is that this is a crime against the community; however irresponsible or ignorant the perpetrators, they are helping to burden the State with an altogether undesirable progeny. Now, whether they are allowed to marry or not, there is not the least likelihood that they will desist from s.e.xual intercourse. Therefore, it seems to me an obviously lesser evil to remove all excuse for procreation by placing within reach the artificial means of prevention.

In this, just as in the divorce problem, we have to determine whether it is better to insist on an ideal, which we know the majority will not keep, or to legislate down to the majority. There is no doubt in my own mind that to legislate on an ideal is not only impracticable but dangerous. I may believe, for instance, that it would be a higher ideal to live on vegetables and fruit rather than to slaughter animals and drink their blood. But even so, I should vehemently oppose a law which attempted to impose vegetarianism.

I believe, too, that every moral influence should be brought to bear against marriages where the physical or mental degeneracy[12] of the parents renders the use of preventatives desirable. I wish to emphasize that the ideal towards which we should set our faces is that of fewer but healthier marriages. Both Church and State should, I feel, take pains to a.s.sure themselves that these undesirable elements are absent in all unions which they are respectively called upon to solemnize. And I emphasize this because I believe that we are suffering far too much from the popular fallacy and the smug Puritanic doctrine that the cure for all s.e.xual proclivities is for men and women to marry, and that once they marry all things are s.e.xually permissible. It is not only irritating, but it is a fallacy, for men who are comfortably married to declare that there is "really no s.e.x-problem." There is probably as much immorality within the married state as outside it; and far from it being the duty of every man to marry, there are many men whose duty it is not to do so.

Closely allied with eugenics is the problem of venereal disease, and out of this again, arises the problem of prost.i.tution. How far is prost.i.tution tolerable, so that a medical system of registration should be introduced into England? We have seen why prost.i.tution is immoral; it is concerned with the physical side of s.e.x, and with little else. But no thoughtful man could reasonably advocate the suppression of prost.i.tution by law. The result of such a measure, at the present state of national development, would be deplorable, even if it were practicable. People do not become moral because they are frightened to do what they still want to do. It is always a confession of the weakness of religion or moral influences where you have to fall back on the police-force of the State for support. In moral questions, State prosecution seems only to be justifiable where the liberty of individuals, or the welfare of the community, is endangered.

Prost.i.tution[13] as an evil can only be treated by the slow process of moral education. Of that I shall speak later. But it is worth while remembering in this connexion, that the feminist movement must have a beneficial effect, to some extent, on prost.i.tution. Largely, it is an economic problem. If a woman were able to earn a decent wage, it is inconceivable that she should wish to submit herself to every voluptuous patron who happens to come along. Education and economic independence must tend largely to breed dissatisfaction with such a slavish occupation. It will not do so entirely, for a certain percentage of women are prost.i.tutes because they hunger for promiscuous s.e.x intercourse.

That some serious attempt must be made, not merely to alleviate, but to prevent venereal disease, is evident to all who are aware how widespread it has become. And it may therefore be pointed out that it would not be impossible to prosecute the prost.i.tute, suffering from these diseases, without introducing the vexed question of registration and official recognition of prost.i.tution. All unmarried men and women below a certain age could be compelled to submit to periodical medical examination, and if any person was found to have solicited, after having been certified as infected, prosecution would lie. Probably a storm of protest would be aroused against an alleged interference with individual privacy. But the danger of syphilis may necessitate such a law, and after all, no one is being asked to do more than that to which every soldier and sailor has to submit.

We have seen that love, and therefore marriage, naturally contains the sense of permanence. There is also a sense of distaste towards incest, and of the apparently natural evils arising therefrom. No-one will deny that the State and the Catholic Church are scientifically justified in insisting upon some table of prohibited degrees. How far this distaste is essentially natural I do not know. I imagine that a sister who had been separated from her brother since birth, and who did not know that he was her brother, might fall in love with him. But the scientific dangers of such marriages would remain.[14]

The Church of England some years ago found herself immersed in a storm of controversy over the Deceased Wife's Sister Act. To most men her att.i.tude seemed pedantic and unworthy of serious attention. The English Church is unfortunate: her apparently narrow ecclesiasticism was really the result of a liberal policy at the time of the Reformation. During the Middle Ages the Church had extended her prohibited degrees to such an extent that it must have been difficult to know whom one could marry without a dispensation.[15] Only a person more than four degrees removed from the other party was an eligible partner without dispensation, the degrees so being reckoned as to include even second cousins. The English Church swept away these anomalies and concentrated on an irreducible minimum of prohibition up to three degrees (reckoned in direct ascending and descending generation from the common ancestor)--thus sacrificing all regulation against marriage between first cousins, who are four degrees removed.

The real opposition to the ecclesiastical att.i.tude was, however, that any affinity, as distinguished from consanguinity, should be a bar to marriage. The unhappy deceased wife's sister was merely a convenient representative. But this is a controversy which is not sufficiently imminent to engage us in these pages.

Chapter 8: The h.o.m.os.e.xual Temperament

We must now pa.s.s from the normal or hetero-s.e.xual to the second-cla.s.s of s.e.x-temperament. This is the h.o.m.os.e.xual--that in which the individual's s.e.x attraction is directed towards the same s.e.x. And here it will be necessary to utter a note of warning. The s.e.x instinct lies so deep in human nature that many men are incapable of regarding s.e.x characteristics save through their own temperamental colour. Normal men are frequently found, for instance, of such underdeveloped mental faculties that they start out with an immense s.e.x prejudice against the h.o.m.os.e.xual. Without being able to consider the question impartially they abhor this variety as an unspeakable evil. It is essential that we should place such critics outside the area of practical investigation. The h.o.m.os.e.xual tendency may be as evil as they imagine it to be, but we must only arrive at that conclusion as a result of impartial and incontestable reason. And any man who cannot undertake that inquiry is as valueless for our purpose as are his prejudicial opinions; he must simply go back to the nursery.

Let us therefore, as far as is individually possible, attempt to treat this question with an open mind. And accordingly we shall find it most convenient first to consider the various att.i.tudes which have been taken up with regard to this difficult problem.

The legal or State att.i.tude we have already to some extent antic.i.p.ated.

The State looks with suspicious eyes on any influence which tends to sterilize the birth-rate. Accordingly, in England, h.o.m.os.e.xuality is branded as a crime for which a heavy sentence can be p.r.o.nounced. It is true that legally this sentence, under the Criminal Amendment Act, can only be inflicted for the physical s.e.x-act itself; but this includes any a.s.sault or any behaviour which may be construed as an attempt to lead up to the commission of the act. And, accordingly, any man is legally under suspicion if he is thought to be h.o.m.os.e.xual, even though no perpetration of the physical offence can be alleged against him. The hideous system of blackmail is thus encouraged by the law. Once a man is understood to be subject to these proclivities, it is a.s.sumed that sooner or later he will commit the offence, and he is watched, if not by the over-busy police, by those idle persons who trade upon the legal att.i.tude toward this problem.

Any conversation or literature on the subject is suppressed, so far as is possible, by the State, because the physical expression being a crime, all that may become an incentive to the crime is itself criminal.

We have already mentioned the basic fallacy of the legal att.i.tude. It does not follow that because a line of conduct may decrease the birth-rate, it is therefore wrong. Celibacy, as we have seen, may be an actual virtue.

But in this particular instance there is a still more serious error. The English law, by branding h.o.m.os.e.xuality as a crime, a.s.sumes that it is a deliberate perversion; for it would be obviously ridiculous to punish a man for doing what he could not help doing. Even the law is not so illogical as to sentence a madman to penal servitude because he insists on being mad. No, the State regards the h.o.m.os.e.xual as one who has of his own choice a.s.sumed this form of s.e.x temperament, in the same way as a man decides to rob or forge a signature. The legal att.i.tude _must_ rest on this supposition, for otherwise its policy would be flagrantly unjust. And accordingly we find the law cla.s.sifying this family of behaviour as "unnatural."

Now, if there is one fact which is clear from an investigation of the problem, it is that this supposition is as false as it is possible for any supposition to be. Let it be granted that a certain number of h.o.m.os.e.xual offences are committed by persons who are s.e.xually normal in temperament. There remains the whole body of h.o.m.os.e.xuals, of those, that is to say, in whom the h.o.m.ogenic attraction is as integral a part of their nature as the appreciation of music or the love of colour. Abundant proof of this contention is to hand. There have been thousands of individuals in every age, including the present, who have never heard of h.o.m.os.e.xuality,[16] have never met other h.o.m.os.e.xuals, or come into contact with anything approaching h.o.m.os.e.xual practice; and yet they have been h.o.m.os.e.xual all their lives. I have known persons who believed that no one else in the world shared their aspirations, and also have suffered tortures because of their supposed isolated abnormality.

The State att.i.tude simply ignores this factor, and accordingly reveals itself as unscientific.

It is true that perhaps by such an agency as psycho-a.n.a.lysis reasons could be found in many of these cases why the individual had developed on inverted s.e.x lines; home repressions, the system of early education, the age of the parents, these or other influences, may have produced a complex which has switched the s.e.x-nature on to a particular path. But these reasons do not necessarily show the result to be artificial; it is our very nature indeed which these influences construct. It is impossible to trace an exact line between the inherent nature and the effect which outside influences have had upon it. We must, and we do in fact, regard the permanent and fundamental traits, however derived, as "natural."

Moreover psycho-a.n.a.lysis definitely indicates that there is a h.o.m.os.e.xual period through which all individuals inevitably pa.s.s.

The State theory that the temperament is "unnatural" cannot therefore be supported on any grounds, except in the cases where it is deliberately a.s.sumed by normal persons. In most cases it is natural to the individual's nature, and not "unnatural," but "abnormal."

Once this simple scientific truth is grasped the legal att.i.tude is seen to crumble in all directions. The case for criminal prosecution rests logically on the a.s.sumption that unless h.o.m.os.e.xual practices are rigidly suppressed they will spread. And since their increase would seriously diminish the birth-rate the State is necessarily anxious to avert this danger. But it is an odd perversion which imagines that sober respectable citizens are only restrained from indulging in h.o.m.os.e.xual vice by the threat of penal servitude! Once the scientific truth is grasped and h.o.m.os.e.xuality is seen to be, except in a small number of cases, the natural temperament of a small minority, it will be realized that normal persons are not likely to wish to commit unnatural acts, whether there is or there is not a penal law; nor can any Act of Parliament prevent h.o.m.os.e.xuals from being h.o.m.os.e.xual.