An Essay on the Slavery and Commerce of the Human Species Part 7

We come now to the third order of _involuntary_ slaves, "to convicts." The only argument that the sellers advance here, is this, "that they have been found guilty of offences, and that the punishment is just." But before the equity of the sentence can be allowed two questions must be decided, whether the punishment is _proportioned_ to the offence, and what is its particular _object_ and _end_?

To decide the first, we may previously observe, that the African servitude comprehends _banishment_, a _deprivation_ of _liberty_, and many _corporal_ sufferings.

On _banishment_, the following observations will suffice. Mankind have their _local_ attachments. They have a particular regard for the spot, in which they were born and nurtured. Here it was, that they first drew their infant-breath: here, that they were cherished and supported: here, that they pa.s.sed those scenes of childhood, which, free from care and anxiety, are the happiest in the life of man; scenes, which accompany them through life; which throw themselves frequently into their thoughts, and produce the most agreeable sensations. These then are weighty considerations; and how great this regard is, may be evidenced from our own feelings; from the testimony of some, who, when remote from their country, and, in the hour of danger and distress, have found their thoughts unusually directed, by some impulse or other, to their native spot; and from the example of others, who, having braved the storms and adversities of life, either repair to it for the remainder of their days, or desire even to be conveyed to it, when existence is no more.

But separately from these their _local_, they have also their _personal_ attachments; their regard for particular men. There are ties of blood; there are ties of friendship. In the former case, they must of necessity be attached: the const.i.tution of their nature demands it. In the latter, it is impossible to be otherwise, since friendship is founded on an harmony of temper, on a concordance of sentiments and manners, on habits of confidence, and a mutual exchange of favours.

We may now mention, as perfectly distinct both from their _local_ and_ personal_, the _national_ attachments of mankind, their regard for the whole body of the people, among whom they were born and educated. This regard is particularly conspicuous in the conduct of such, as, being thus _nationally_ connected, reside in foreign parts. How anxiously do they meet together! how much do they enjoy the fight of others of their countrymen, whom fortune places in their way!

what an eagerness do they show to serve them, though not born on the same particular spot, though not connected by consanguinity or friendship, though unknown to them before! Neither is this affection wonderful, since they are creatures of the same education; of the same principles; of the same manners and habits; cast, as it were, in the same mould; and marked with the same impression.

If men therefore are thus separately attached to the several objects described, it is evident that a separate exclusion from either must afford them considerable pain. What then must be their sufferings, to be forced for ever from their country, which includes them all? Which contains the _spot_, in which they were born and nurtured; which contains their _relations_ and _friends_; which contains the whole body of the _people_, among whom they were bred and educated.

In these sufferings, which arise to men, both in bidding, and in having bid, adieu to all that they esteem as dear and valuable, _banishment_ consists in part; and we may agree therefore with the ancients, without adding other melancholy circ.u.mstances to the account, that it is no inconsiderable punishment of itself.

With respect to the _loss_ of _liberty_, which is the second consideration in the punishment, it is evident that men bear nothing worse; that there is nothing, that they lay more at heart; and that they have shewn, by many and memorable instances, that even death is to be preferred. How many could be named here, who, having suffered the _loss_ of _liberty_, have put a period to their existence! How many, that have willingly undergone the hazard of their lives to destroy a tyrant! How many, that have even gloried to perish in the attempt! How many b.l.o.o.d.y and publick wars have been undertaken (not to mention the numerous _servile_ insurrections, with which history is stained) for the cause of _freedom_!

But if nothing is dearer than _liberty_ to men, with which, the barren rock is able to afford its joys, and without which, the glorious fun shines upon them but in vain, and all the sweets and delicacies of life are tasteless and unenjoyed; what punishment can be more severe than the loss of so great a blessing? But if to this _deprivation_ of _liberty_, we add the agonizing pangs of _banishment_; and if to the complicated stings of both, we add the incessant _stripes, wounds_, and _miseries_, which are undergone by those, who are sold into this horrid _servitude_; what crime can we possibly imagine to be so enormous, as to be worthy of so great a punishment?

How contrary then to reason, justice, and nature, must those act, who apply this, the severest of human punishments, to the most insignificant offence! yet such is the custom with the Africans: for, from the time, in which the Europeans first intoxicated the African princes with their foreign draughts, no crime has been committed, no shadow of a crime devised, that has not immediately been punished with _servitude_.

But for what purpose is the punishment applied? Is it applied to amend the manners of the criminal, and thus render him a better subject? No, for if you banish him, he can no longer be a subject, and you can no longer therefore be solicitous for his morals. Add to this, that if you banish him to a place, where he is to experience the hardships of want and hunger (so powerfully does hunger compel men to the perpetration of crimes) you force him rather to corrupt, than amend his manners, and to be wicked, when he might otherwise be just.

Is it applied then, that others may be deterred from the same proceedings, and that crimes may become less frequent? No, but that _avarice_ may be gratified; that the prince may experience the emoluments of the sale: for, horrid and melancholy thought! the more crimes his subjects commit, the richer is he made; the more _abandoned_ the subject, the _happier_ is the prince!

Neither can we allow that the punishment thus applied, tends in any degree to answer _publick happiness_; for if men can be sentenced to slavery, right or wrong; if shadows can be turned into substances, and virtues into crimes; it is evident that none can be happy, because none can be secure.

But if the punishment is infinitely greater than the offence, (which has been shewn before) and if it is inflicted, neither to amend the criminal, nor to deter others from the same proceedings, nor to advance, in any degree, the happiness of the publick, it is scarce necessary to observe, that it is totally unjust, since it is repugnant to _reason_, the dictates of _nature_, and the very principles of _government_.

CHAP. VII.

We come now to the fourth and last order of slaves, to _prisoners of war_. As the _sellers_ lay a particular stress on this order of men, and infer much, from its _antiquity_, in support of the justice of their cause, we shall examine the principle, on which it subsisted among the ancients. But as this principle was the same among all nations, and as a citation from many of their histories would not be less tedious than unnecessary, we shall select the example of the Romans for the consideration of the case.

The law, by which prisoners of war were said to be sentenced to servitude, was the _law of nations_[043]. It was so called from the universal concurrence of nations in the custom. It had two points in view, the _persons_ of the _captured_, and their _effects_; both of which it immediately sentenced, without any of the usual forms of law, to be the property of the _captors_.

The principle, on which the law was established, was the _right of capture_. When any of the contending parties had overcome their opponents, and were about to destroy them, the right was considered to commence; a right, which the victors conceived themselves to have, to recall their swords, and, from the consideration of having saved the lives of the vanquished, when they could have taken them by the laws of war, to commute _blood_ for _service_. Hence the Roman lawyer, Pomponius, deduces the etymology of _slave_ in the Roman language.

"They were called _servi_[044], says he, from the following circ.u.mstance. It was usual with our commanders to take them prisoners, and sell them: now this circ.u.mstance implies, that they must have been previously _preserved_, and hence the name." Such then was the _right of capture_. It was a right, which the circ.u.mstance of _taking_ the vanquished, that is, of _preserving_ them alive, gave the conquerors to their persons. By this right, as always including the idea of a previous preservation from death, the vanquished were said _to be slaves_[045]; and, "as all slaves," says Justinian, "are themselves in the power of others, and of course can have nothing of their own, so their effects followed the condition of their persons, and became the property of the captors."

To examine this right, by which the vanquished were said to be slaves, we shall use the words of a celebrated Roman author, and apply them to the present case[046]. "If it is lawful," says he, "to deprive a man of his life, it is certainly not inconsistent with nature to rob him;" to rob him of his liberty. We admit the conclusion to be just, if the supposition be the same: we allow, if men have a right to commit that, which is considered as a greater crime, that they have a right, at the same instant, to commit that, which is considered as a less. But what shall we say to the _hypothesis_? We deny it to be true. The voice of nature is against it. It is not lawful to kill, but on _necessity_. Had there been a necessity, where had the wretched captive survived to be broken with chains and servitude? The very act of saving his life is an argument to prove, that no such necessity existed.

The _conclusion_ is therefore false. The captors had no right to the _lives_ of the captured, and of course none to their _liberty_: they had no right to their _blood_, and of course none to their _service_. Their right therefore had no foundation in justice. It was founded on a principle, contrary to the law of nature, and of course contrary to that law, which people, under different governments, are bound to observe to one another.

It is scarce necessary to observe, as a farther testimony of the injustice of the measure, that the Europeans, after the introduction of Christianity, exploded this principle of the ancients, as frivolous and false; that they spared the lives of the vanquished, not from the sordid motives of _avarice_, but from a conscientiousness, that homicide could only be justified by _necessity_; that they introduced an _exchange_ of prisoners, and, by many and wise regulations, deprived war of many of its former horrours.

But the advocates for slavery, unable to defend themselves against these arguments, have fled to other resources, and, ignorant of history, have denied that the _right of capture_ was the true principle, on which slavery subsisted among the ancients. They reason thus. "The learned Grotius, and others, have considered slavery as the just consequence of a private war, (supposing the war to be just and the opponents in a state of nature), upon the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_. Now as the law of nature, which is the rule of conduct to individuals in such a situation, is applicable to members of a different community, there is reason to presume, that these principles were applied by the ancients to their prisoners of war; that their _effects_ were confiscated by the right of _reparation_, and their _persons_ by the right of _punishment_."--

But, such a presumption is false. The _right of capture_ was the only argument, that the ancients adduced in their defence. Hence Polybius; "What must they, (the Mantinenses) suffer, to receive the punishment they deserve? Perhaps it will be said, _that they must be sold, when they are taken, with their wives and children into slavery_: But this is not to be considered as a punishment, since even those suffer it, by the laws of war, who have done nothing that is base." The truth is, that both the _offending_ and the _offended_ parties, whenever they were victorious, inflicted slavery alike. But if the _offending_ party inflicted slavery on the persons of the vanquished, by what right did they inflict it? It must be answered from the presumption before-mentioned, "by the right of _reparation_, or of _punishment:_" an answer plainly absurd and contradictory, as it supposes the _aggressor_ to have a _right_, which the _injured_ only could possess.

Neither is the argument less fallacious than the presumption, in applying these principles, which in a _publick_ war could belong to the _publick_ only, to the persons of the _individuals_ that were taken. This calls us again to the history of the ancients, and, as the rights of reparation and punishment could extend to those only, who had been injured, to select a particular instance for the consideration of the case.

As the Romans had been injured without a previous provocation by the conduct of Hannibal at Saguntum, we may take the treaty into consideration, which they made with the Carthaginians, when the latter, defeated at Zama, sued for peace. It consisted of three articles[047].

By the first, the Carthaginians were to be free, and to enjoy their own const.i.tution and laws. By the second, they were to pay a considerable sum of money, as a reparation for the damages and expence of war: and, by the third, they were to deliver up their elephants and ships of war, and to be subject to various restrictions, as a punishment. With these terms they complied, and the war was finished.

Thus then did the Romans make that distinction between _private_ and _publick_ war, which was necessary to be made, and which the argument is fallacious in not supposing. The treasury of the vanquished was marked as the means of _reparation_; and as this treasury was supplied, in a great measure, by the imposition of taxes, and was, wholly, the property of the _publick_, so the _publick_ made the reparation that was due. The _elephants_ also, and _ships of war_, which were marked as the means of _punishment_, were _publick_ property; and as they were considerable instruments of security and defence to their possessors, and of annoyance to an enemy, so their loss, added to the restrictions of the treaty, operated as a great and _publick_ punishment. But with respect to the Carthaginian prisoners, who had been taken in the war, they were retained in _servitude:_ not upon the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_, because the Romans had already received, by their own confession in the treaty, a sufficient satisfaction: not upon these principles, because they were inapplicable to _individuals:_ the legionary soldier in the service of the injured, who took his prisoner, was not the person, to whom the _injury had been done_, any more than the soldier in the service of the aggressors, who was taken, was the person, who had _committed the offence:_ but they were retained in servitude by the _right of capture_; because, when both parties had sent their military into the field to determine the dispute, it was at the _private_ choice of the legionary soldier before-mentioned, whether he would spare the life of his conquered opponent, when he was thought to be ent.i.tled to take it, if he had chosen, by the laws of war.

To produce more instances, as an ill.u.s.tration of the subject, or to go farther into the argument, would be to trespa.s.s upon the patience, as well as understanding of the reader. In _a state of nature_, where a man is supposed to commit an injury, and to be unconnected with the rest of the world, the act is _private_, and the right, which the injured acquires, can extend only to _himself:_ but in _a state of society_, where any member or members of a particular community give offence to those of another, and they are patronized by the state, to which they belong, the case is altered; the act becomes immediately _publick_, and the _publick_ alone are to experience the consequences of their injustice. For as no particular member of the community, if considered as an individual, is guilty, except the person, by whom the injury was done, it would be contrary to reason and justice, to apply the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_, which belong to the people as a collective body, to any individual of the community, who should happen to be taken. Now, as the principles of _reparation_ and _punishment_ are thus inapplicable to the prisoners, taken in a _publick_ war, and as the _right of capture_, as we have shewn before, is insufficient to int.i.tle the victors to the _service_ of the vanquished, it is evident that _slavery_ cannot justly exist at all, since there are no other maxims, on which it can be founded, even in the most equitable wars.

But if these things are so; if slavery cannot be defended even in the most _equitable_ wars, what arguments will not be found against that servitude, which arises from those, that are _unjust?_ Which arises from those African wars, that relate to the present subject? The African princes, corrupted by the merchants of Europe, seek every opportunity of quarrelling with one another. Every spark is blown into a flame; and war is undertaken from no other consideration, than that _of procuring slaves:_ while the Europeans, on the other hand, happy in the quarrels which they have thus excited, supply them with arms and ammunition for the accomplishment of their horrid purpose. Thus has Africa, for the s.p.a.ce of two hundred years, been the scene of the most iniquitous and b.l.o.o.d.y wars; and thus have many thousands of men, in the most iniquitous manner, been sent into servitude.

FOOTNOTES

[Footnote 043: _Jure Gentium_ servi nostri sunt, qui ab hostibus capiuntur. Justinian, L. 1. 5. 5. 1.]

[Footnote 044: _Serverum_ appellatio ex eo fluxit, quod imperatores nostri captivos vendere, ac per hoc _servare_, nec occidere solent.]

[Footnote 045: Nam sive victoribus _jure captivitatis_ servissent, &c. Justin, L. 4. 3. et pa.s.sim apud scriptores antiquos.]

[Footnote 046: Neque est contra naturam spoliare eum, si possis, quem honestum est necare. Cicero de officiis. L. 3. 6.]

[Footnote 047: 1. Ut liberi suis legibus viverent. Livy, L. 30. 37. 2.

Decem millia talentum argenti descripta pensionibus aequis in annos quinquaginta solverent. Ibid. 3. Et naves rostratas, praeter decem triremes, traderent, elephantosque, quos haberent domitos; neque domarent alios; Bellum neve in Africa, neve extra Africam, injussu P. R.

gererent, &c. Ibid.]

CHAP. VIII.

We shall beg leave, before we proceed to the arguments of the _purchasers_, to add the following observations to the substance of the three preceding chapters.

As the two orders of men, of those who are privately kidnapped by individuals, and of those who are publickly seized by virtue of the authority of their prince, compose together, at least[048], nine tenths of the African slaves, they cannot contain, upon a moderate computation, less than ninety thousand men annually transported: an immense number, but easily to be credited, when we reflect that thousands are employed for the purpose of stealing the unwary, and that these diabolical practices are in force, so far has European _injustice_ been spread, at the distance of a thousand miles from the factories on the coast. The _slave merchants_, among whom a quant.i.ty of European goods is previously divided, travel into the heart of the country to this amazing distance. Some of them attend the various markets, that are established through so large an extent of territory, to purchase the kidnapped people, whom the _slave-hunters_ are continually bringing in; while the rest, subdividing their merchandize among the petty sovereigns with whom they deal, receive, by an immediate exertion of fraud and violence, the stipulated number.

Now, will any man a.s.sert, in opposition to the arguments before advanced, that out of this immense body of men, thus annually collected and transported, there is even _one_, over whom the original or subsequent seller can have any power or right? Whoever a.s.serts this, in the first instance, must, contradict his own feelings, and must consider _himself_ as a just object of prey, whenever any daring invader shall think it proper to attack _him_. And, in the second instance, the very idea which the African princes entertain of their villages, as _parks_ or _reservoirs_, stocked only for their own convenience, and of their subjects, as _wild beasts_, whom they may pursue and take at pleasure, is so shocking, that it need only be mentioned, to be instantly reprobated by the reader.

The order of slaves, which is next to the former in respect to the number of people whom it contains, is that of prisoners of war. This order, if the former statement be true, is more inconsiderable than is generally imagined; but whoever reflects on the prodigious slaughter that is constantly made in every African skirmish, cannot be otherwise than of this opinion: he will find, that where _ten_ are taken, he has every reason to presume that an _hundred_ perish. In some of these skirmishes, though they have been begun for the express purpose of _procuring slaves_, the conquerors have suffered but few of the vanquished to escape the fury of the sword; and there have not been wanting instances, where they have been so incensed at the resistance they have found, that their spirit of vengeance has entirely got the better of their avarice, and they have murdered, in cool blood, every individual, without discrimination, either of age or s.e.x.