An Essay on Mediaeval Economic Teaching Part 10

[Footnote 2: P. 173.]

Father Kelleher uses in support of his contention a very ingenious argument drawn from the doctrine of usury. As we said in the first chapter, and as we shall prove in detail in the next section, the prohibition of usury was simply one of the applications of the theory of equivalence in contracts--in other words, it was the determination of the just price to be paid in an exchange of money for money. If, asks Father Kelleher, the common estimation was the final test of just price, why was not moderate usury allowed? That the general opinion of the community in the Middle Ages was undoubtedly in favour of allowing a reasonable percentage on loans is shown by the constant striving of the Church to prevent such a practice. Nevertheless the Church did not for a moment relax its teaching on usury in spite of the almost universal judgment of the people. Here, therefore, is a clear example of one contract in which the standard of value is clearly objective, and it is only reasonable to draw the conclusion that the same standard which applied in contracts of the exchange of money should apply in contracts of the sale of other articles.

Father Kelleher's contention seems to be completely supported by the pa.s.sage from Nider which we have cited above, to the effect that the common estimation ceases to be the final test of the just price when the contracting parties know or believe that the common estimation has erred.[1] This seems to us clearly to show that the common estimation was but the most generally received test of what the just price in fact was, but that it was in no sense a final or irrefutable criterion.[2]

[Footnote 1: _De Cont. Merc._, ii. xv. Nider was regarded as a very weighty authority on the subject of contracts (Endemann, _Studien_, vol. ii. p. 8).]

[Footnote 2: The argument in favour of what we have called the 'objective' theory of the just price is strengthened by the consideration that goods do not satisfy mere subjective whims, but supply real wants. For example, food supplies a real need of the human being, as also does clothing; in the one case hunger is appeased, and in the other cold is warded off, just as drugs used in medical practice produce real objective effects on the person taking them.]

The theory that the just price was objective seems to be accepted by the majority of the best modern students of the subject. Sir William Ashley says: 'The fundamental difference between the mediaeval and modern point of view is... that with us value is something entirely subjective; it is what each individual cares to give for a thing. With Aquinas it was entirely objective; something outside the will of the individual purchaser or seller; something attached to the thing itself, existing whether he liked it or not, and that he ought to recognise.'[1] Palgrave's _Dictionary of Political Economy_, following the authority of Knies, expresses the same opinion: 'Perhaps the contrast between mediaeval and modern ideas of value is best expressed by saying that with us value is usually something subjective, consisting of the mental determination of buyer and seller, while to the schoolmen it was in a sense objective, something intrinsically bound up with the commodity itself.'[2] Dr. Ryan agrees with this view: 'The theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a.s.sumed that the objective price would be fair, since it was determined by the social estimate. In their opinion the social estimate would embody the requirements of objective justice as fully as any device or inst.i.tution that was practically available. For the condition of the Middle Ages and the centuries immediately following, this reasoning was undoubtedly correct. The agencies which created the social estimate and determined prices--namely the civil law, the guilds, and custom--succeeded fairly in establishing a price that was equitable to all concerned.'[3] Dr. Cleary says: 'True, the _pretium legale_ is regarded as being a just price, but in order that it may be just, it supposes some objective basis--in other words, it rather declares than const.i.tutes the just price.'[4] Haney is also strongly of opinion that the just price was objective. 'Briefly stated, the doctrine was that every commodity had some one true value which was objective and absolute.'[5] The greater number of modern students therefore who have given most care and attention to the question are inclined to the opinion that the just price was not subjective, but objective, and we see no valid reason for disagreeing with this view, which seems to be fully warranted by the original authorities.

[Footnote 1: _Op. cit._, vol. i. pt. i. p. 140.]

[Footnote 2: Art. 'Justum Pretium.']

[Footnote 3: 'The Moral Aspect of Monopoly,' by J.A. Ryan, D.D., _Irish Theological Quarterly_, in. p. 275; and see _Distributive Justice_, pp. 332-4.]

[Footnote 4: _Op. cit._, p. 193.]

[Footnote 5: _History of Economic Thought_, p. 75.]

--7. _The Mediaeval Att.i.tude towards Commerce_.

Before pa.s.sing from the question of price, we must discuss the legitimacy of the various occupations which were concerned with buying and selling. The princ.i.p.al matter which arises for consideration in this regard is the att.i.tude of the mediaeval theologians towards commerce. Aquinas discusses the legitimacy of commerce in the same question in which he discusses just price, and indeed the two subjects are closely allied, because the importance of the observance of justice in buying and selling grew urgent as commerce extended and advanced.

In order to understand the disapprobation with which commerce was on the whole regarded in the Middle Ages, it is necessary to appreciate the importance of the Christian teaching on the dignity of labour. The principle that, far from being a degrading or humiliating occupation, as it had been regarded in Greece and Rome, manual labour was, on the contrary, one of the most n.o.ble ways of serving G.o.d, effected a revolution in the economic sphere a.n.a.logous to that which the Christian sanctification of marriage effected in the domestic sphere.

The Christian teaching on labour was grounded on the Divine precepts contained in both the Old and New Testaments,[1] and upon the example of Christ, who was Himself a working man. The Gospel was preached amongst the poor, and St. Paul continued his humble labours during his apostolate.[2] A life of idleness was considered something to be avoided, instead of something to be desired, as it had been in the ancient civilisations. Gerson says it is against the nature of man to wish to live without labour as usurers do,[3] and Langenstein inveighs against usurers and all who live without work.[4] 'We read in Sebastian Brant that the idlers are the most foolish amongst fools, they are to every people like smoke to the eyes or vinegar to the teeth. Only by labour is G.o.d truly praised and honoured; and Trithemius says "Man is born to labour as the bird to fly, and hence it is contrary to the nature of man when he thinks to live without work."'[5] The example of the monasteries, where the performance of all sorts of manual labour was not thought inconsistent with the administration of the sacred offices and the pursuit of the highest intellectual exercises, acted as a powerful a.s.sertion to the laity of the dignity of labour in the scheme of things.[6] The value of the monastic example in this respect cannot be too highly estimated. 'When we consider the results of the founding of monasteries,' says Dr.

Cunningham, 'we find influences at work that were plainly economic.

These communities can be best understood when we think of them as Christian industrial colonies, and remember that they moulded society rather by example than by precept. We are so familiar with the attacks and satires on monastic life that were current at the Reformation period, that it may seem almost a paradox to say that the chief claim of the monks to our grat.i.tude lies in this, that they helped to diffuse a better appreciation of the duty and dignity of labour.'[7]

[Footnote 1: Gen. iii. 19; Ps. cxxvii. 2; 2 Thess. iii. 10. The last-mentioned text is explained, in opposition to certain Socialist interpretations which have been put on it, by Dr. Hogan in the _Irish Ecclesiastical Record_, vol. xxv. p. 45.]

[Footnote 2: Wallon, _op. cit._, vol. iii. p. 401.]

[Footnote 3: _De Cont._, i. 13.]

[Footnote 4: _De Cont._]

[Footnote 5: Janssen, _op. cit._, vol. ii. pp. 93-4.]

[Footnote 6: Leva.s.seur, _Histoire des Cla.s.ses ouvrieres en France_, vol. i. pp. 182 _et seq_.]

[Footnote 7: _Western Civilisation_, vol. ii. p. 35.]

The result of this teaching and example was that, in the Middle Ages, labour had been raised to a position of unquestioned dignity. The economic benefit of this att.i.tude towards labour must be obvious. It made the working cla.s.ses take a direct pride and interest in their work, which was represented to be a means of sanctification. 'Labour,'

according to Dr. Cunningham, 'was said to be pregnant with a double advantage--the privilege of sharing with G.o.d in His work of carrying out His purpose, and the opportunity of self-discipline and the helping of one's fellow-men.'[1] 'Industrial work,' says Leva.s.seur, 'in the times of antiquity had always had, in spite of the inst.i.tutions of certain Emperors, a degrading character, because it had its roots in slavery; after the invasion, the grossness of the barbarians and the levelling of towns did not help to rehabilitate it.

It was the Church which, in proclaiming that Christ was the son of a carpenter, and the Apostles were simple workmen, made known to the world that work is honourable as well as necessary. The monks proved this by their example, and thus helped to give to the working cla.s.ses a certain consideration which ancient society had denied them. Manual labour became a source of sanctification.'[2] The high esteem in which labour was held appears from the whole artistic output of the Middle Ages. 'Many of the simple artists of the time represented the saints holding some instrument of work or engaged in some industrial pursuit; as, for instance, the Blessed Virgin spinning as she sat by the cradle of the divine Infant, and St. Joseph using a saw or carpenter's tools.

"Since the Saints," says the _Christian Monitor_, "have laboured, so shall the Christian learn that by honourable labour he can glorify G.o.d, do good, and save his own soul."'[3] Work was, alongside of prayer and inseparable from it, the perfection of Christian life.[4]

[Footnote 1: _Christianity and Economic Science_, pp. 26-7.]

[Footnote 2: _Op. cit._, vol. i. p. 187.]

[Footnote 3: Janssen, _op. cit._, vol. ii. p. 9.]

[Footnote 4: Wallon, _op. cit._, vol. i. p. 410.]

It must not be supposed, however, that manual labour alone was thought worthy of praise. On the contrary, the necessity for mental and spiritual workers was fully appreciated, and all kinds of labour were thought equally worthy of honour. 'Heavy labourer's work is the inevitable yoke of punishment, which, according to G.o.d's righteous verdict, has been laid upon all the sons of Adam. But many of Adam's descendants seek in all sorts of cunning ways to escape from the yoke and to live in idleness without labour, and at the same time to have a superfluity of useful and necessary things; some by robbery and plunder, some by usurious dealings, others by lying, deceit, and all the countless, forms of dishonest and fraudulent gain, by which men are for ever seeking to get riches and abundance without toil. But while such men are striving to throw off the yoke righteously imposed on them by G.o.d, they are heaping on their shoulders a heavy burden of sin. Not so, however, do the reasonable sons of Adam proceed; but, recognising in sorrow that for the sins of their first father G.o.d has righteously ordained that only through the toil of labour shall they obtain what is necessary to life, they take the yoke patiently on them.... Some of them, like the peasants, the handicraftsmen, and the tradespeople, procure for themselves and others, in the sweat of their brows and by physical work, the necessary sustenance of life. Others, who labour in more honourable ways, earn the right to be maintained by the sweat of others' brows--for instance, those who stand at the head of the commonwealth; for by their laborious exertion the former are enabled to enjoy the peace, the security, without which they could not exist. The same holds good of those who have the charge of spiritual matters....'[1] 'Because,' says Aquinas, 'many things are necessary to human life, with which one man cannot provide himself, it is necessary that different things should be done by different people; therefore some are tillers of the soil, some are raisers of cattle, some are builders, and so on; and, because human life does not simply mean corporal things, but still more spiritual things, therefore it is necessary that some people should be released from the care of attending to temporal matters. This distribution of different offices amongst different people is in accordance with Divine providence.'[2]

[Footnote 1: Langenstein, quoted in Janssen, _op. cit._, p. 95.]

[Footnote 2: _Summa Cont. Gent_., iii. 134.]

All forms of labour being therefore admitted to be honourable and necessary, there was no difficulty felt about justifying their reward.

It was always common ground that services of all kinds were ent.i.tled to be properly remunerated, and questions of difficulty only arose when a claim was made for payment in a transaction where the element of service was not apparent.[1] The different occupations in which men were engaged were therefore ranked in a well-recognised hierarchy of dignity according to the estimate to which they were held to be ent.i.tled. The Aristotelean division of industry into _artes possessivae_ and _artes pecuniativae_ was generally followed, the former being ranked higher than the latter. 'The industries called _possessivae_, which are immediately useful to the individual, to the family, and to society, producing natural wealth, are also the most natural as well as the most estimable. But all the others should not be despised. The natural arts are the true economic arts, but the arts which produce artificial riches are also estimable in so far as they serve the true national economy; the commutation of the exchanges and the _cambium_ being necessary to the general good, are good in so far as they are subordinate to the end of true economy. One may say the same thing about commerce. In order, then, to estimate the value of an industrial art, one must examine its relation to the general good.'[2]

Even the _artes possessivae_ were not all considered equally worthy of praise, but were ranked in a curious order of professional hierarchy.

Agriculture was considered the highest, next manufacture, and lastly commerce. Roscher says that, whereas all the scholastics were agreed on the excellence of agriculture as an occupation, the best they could say of manufacture was _Deo non displicet_, whereas of commerce they said _Deo placere non potest_; and draws attention to the interesting consequence of this, namely, that the various cla.s.ses of goods that took part in the different occupations were also ranked in a certain order of sacredness. Immovables were thought more worthy of protection against execution and distress than movables, and movables than money.[3] Aquinas advises the rulers of States to encourage the _artes possessivae_, especially agriculture.[4] The fullest a.n.a.lysis of the order in which the different _artes possessivae_ should be ranked is to be found in Buridan's _Commentaries on Aristotle's Politics_. He places first agriculture, which comprises cattle-breeding, tillage, and hunting; secondly, manufacture, which helps to supply man's corporal needs, such as building and architecture; thirdly, administrative occupations; and lastly, commerce. The Christian Exhortation, quoted by Janssen,[5] says, 'The farmer must in all things be protected and encouraged, for all depend on his labour, from the monarch to the humblest of mankind, and his handiwork is in particular honourable and well pleasing to G.o.d.'

[Footnote 1: Aquinas, _Summa_, II. ii. 77, 4; Nider, _op. cit._, II.

x.]

[Footnote 2: Brants, _op. cit._, p. 82.]

[Footnote 3: _Geschichte_, p. 7.]

[Footnote 4: _De Regimine Principum_, vol. ii. chaps, v. and vi.]

[Footnote 5: _Op. cit._, vol. i. p. 297.]

The division of occupations according to their dignity adopted by Nicholas Oresme is somewhat unusual. He divides professions into (1) honourable, or those which increase the actual quant.i.ty of goods in the community or help its development, such as ecclesiastical offices, the law, the soldiery, the peasantry, artisans, and merchants, and (2) degrading--such as _campsores, mercatores monetae sen billonatores.'_[1]

No occupation, therefore, which involved labour, whether manual or mental, gave any ground for difficulty with regard to its remuneration. The business of the trader or merchant, on the other hand, was one which called for some explanation. It is important to understand what commerce was taken to mean. The definition which Aquinas gives was accepted by all later writers: 'A tradesman is one whose business consists in the exchange of things. According to the philosopher, exchange of things is twofold; one natural, as it were, and necessary, whereby one commodity is exchanged for another, or money taken in exchange for a commodity in order to satisfy the needs of life. Such trading, properly speaking, does not belong to traders, but rather to housekeepers or civil servants, who have to provide the household or the State with the necessaries of life. The other kind of exchange is either that of money for money, or of any commodity for money, not on account of the necessities of life, but for profit; and this kind of trade, properly speaking, regards traders.' It is to be remarked in this definition, that it is essential, to const.i.tute trade, that the exchange or sale should be for the sake of profit, and this point is further emphasised in a later pa.s.sage of the same article: 'Not every one that sells at a higher price than he bought is a trader, but only he who buys that he may sell at a profit. If, on the contrary, he buys, not for sale, but for possession, and afterwards for some reason wishes to sell, it is not a trade transaction, even if he sell at a profit. For he may lawfully do this, either because he has bettered the thing, or because the value of the thing has changed with the change of place or time, or on account of the danger he incurs in transferring the thing from one place to another, or again in having it carried by hand. In this sense neither buying nor selling is unjust.'[2] The importance of this definition is that it rules out of the discussion all cases where the goods have been in any way improved or rendered more valuable by the services of the seller. Such improvement was always reckoned as the result of labour of one kind or another, and therefore ent.i.tled to remuneration.

The essence of trade in the scholastic sense was selling the thing unchanged at a higher price than that at which it had been bought, for the sake of gain.[3]

[Footnote 1: _Tractatus de Origine, etc., Monetarum_.]

[Footnote 2: _Tractatus de Origine, etc., Monetarum_, ad. 2.]

[Footnote 3: 'Fit autem mercatio c.u.m non ut emptor ea utatur sed ut earn carius vendat etiam non mutatam suo artificio; illa mercatio dicitur proprie negotiatio' (Biel, _op. cit._, IV. xv. 10.)]

The legitimacy of trade in this sense was only gradually admitted. The Fathers of the Church had with one voice condemned trade as being an occupation fraught with danger to the soul. Tertullian argued that there would be no need of trade if there were no desire for gain, and that there would be no desire for gain if man were not avaricious.

Therefore avarice was the necessary basis of all trade.[1] St. Jerome thought that one man's gain in trading must always be another's loss; and that, in any event, trade was a dangerous occupation since it offered so many temptations to fraud to the merchant.[2] St. Augustine proclaimed all trade evil because it turns men's minds away from seeking true rest, which is only to be found in G.o.d, and this opinion was embodied in the _Corpus Juris Canonici_.[3] This early view that all trade was to be indiscriminately condemned could not in the nature of things survive experience, and a great step forward was taken when Leo the Great p.r.o.nounced that trade was neither good nor bad in itself, but was rendered good or bad according as it was honestly or dishonestly carried on.[4]

[Footnote 1: _De Idol_., xi.]

[Footnote 2: Ashley, _op. cit._, vol. i. pt. i. p. 129.]

[Footnote 3: See _Corpus Juris Canonici_, Deer. I.D. 88 c. 12.]