A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine Glory Part 17

This point has been already indirectly considered, but it is worthy of a more direct and complete examination. It is very remarkable that although Dr. d.i.c.k admits he cannot reconcile the scheme of imputation with the character of G.o.d, or remove its seeming hardships, not to say cruelty, he yet positively affirms that "it is a proof of the goodness of G.o.d."(168) Surely, if the covenant of works, involving the imputation of sin, as explained by Dr. d.i.c.k, be a "_proof_ of the divine goodness," it cannot but appear to be too severe. But as this point, on which he scarcely dwells at all, is more elaborately and fully discussed by President Edwards, we shall direct our attention to him.

"It is objected," says Edwards, "that appointing Adam to stand in this great affair as the moral head of his posterity, and so treating them as _one_ with him, is injurious to them." "To which," says he, "I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise; that such a const.i.tution was so far from being _injurious_ to Adam's posterity any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, attended with a more eligible _probability_ of a _happy_ issue than the latter would have been; and so is a const.i.tution that truly expresses the goodness of its Author." Now, let us see how this is _demonstrated_.

"There is a _greater tendency_ to a happy issue in such an appointment,"

says he, "than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself; especially on these accounts: (1.) That Adam had _stronger motives to watchfulness_ than his posterity would have had; in that, not only his own eternal welfare lay at stake, but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a state of complete _manhood_ when his trial began."(169) In the first place, then, the const.i.tution for which Edwards contends is "an expression of the divine goodness," because it presented stronger motives to obedience than if it had merely suspended the eternal destiny of Adam alone upon his conduct. The eternal welfare of his posterity was staked upon his obedience; and, having this stupendous motive before him, he would be more likely to preserve his allegiance than if the motive had been less powerful. The magnitude of the motive, says Edwards, is the grand circ.u.mstance which evinces the goodness of G.o.d in the appointment of such a const.i.tution. If this be true, it is very easy to see how the Almighty might have made a vast improvement in his own const.i.tution for the government of the world. He might have made the motive still stronger, and thereby made the appointment or covenant still better: instead of suspending merely the eternal destiny of the human race upon the conduct of Adam, he might have staked the eternal fate of the universe upon it.

According to the argument of Edwards, what a vast, what a wonderful improvement would this have been in the divine const.i.tution for the government of the world, and how much more conspicuously would it have displayed the goodness of its Divine Author!

Again, the scheme of Edwards is condemned out of his own mouth. If this scheme be better than another, because its motives are _stronger_, why did not G.o.d render it still more worthy of his goodness, by rendering its motives still more powerful and efficacious? Edwards admits, nay, he insists, that G.o.d might easily have rendered the motives of his moral government perfectly efficacious and successful. He repeatedly declares that G.o.d could have prevented all sin, "by giving such influences of his Spirit as would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it." If the goodness of a const.i.tution, then, is to be determined by the strength of its motives, as the argument of Edwards supposes, then we are bound, according to his principles, to p.r.o.nounce that for which he contends unworthy of the goodness of G.o.d, as being radically unsound and defective.

This is emphatically the case, as the Governor of the world might have strengthened the motives to obedience _indefinitely_, not by augmenting the danger, but by increasing the security of his subjects; that is to say, not by making the penalty more terrific, but by giving a greater disposition to obedience.

The same thing may be clearly seen from another point of view. Let us suppose, for instance, that G.o.d had established the const.i.tution or covenant, that if Adam had persevered in obedience, then all his posterity should be confirmed in holiness and happiness; and that if he fell, he should fall for himself alone. Would not such an appointment, we ask, have been more likely to have been attended with a happy issue than that for which Edwards contends? Let us suppose again, that after such a const.i.tution had been established, its Divine Author had really secured the obedience of Adam; would not this have made a "happy issue" perfectly certain? Why then was not such a const.i.tution established? It would most a.s.suredly have been an infinitely clearer and more beautiful expression of the divine goodness than that of Edwards. Hence, the philosophy of Edwards easily furnishes an unspeakably better const.i.tution for the government of the world, than that which has been established by the wisdom of G.o.d! Is it not evident, that the advocates of such a scheme should never venture before the tribunal of reason at all? Is it not evident, that their only safe policy is to insist, as they sometimes do, that we do not know what is consistent, or _inconsistent_, with the attributes of G.o.d, in his arrangements for the government of the world? Is it not evident, that their truest wisdom is to be found in habitually dwelling on the littleness, weakness, misery, and darkness of the human mind, and in rebuking its arrogance for presuming to pry into the _mysteries_ of their system?

The vindication of the divine goodness by Edwards, is, we think it must be conceded, exceedingly weak. All it amounts to is this,-that this scheme is an expression of the goodness of G.o.d, because, in certain respects, it is better than a scheme which might have been established. So far from showing it to be the best possible scheme, his philosophy shows it might be greatly improved in the _very respects_ in which its excellency is supposed to consist. In other words, he contends that G.o.d has displayed his goodness in the appointment of such a const.i.tution, on the ground that he might have made a worse; though, according to his own principles, it is perfectly evident that he might have made a better! Is this to express, or to deny, the absolute, infinite goodness of G.o.d? Is it to manifest the glory of that goodness to the eye of man, or to shroud it in clouds and darkness?

Edwards also says, that "the goodness of G.o.d in such a const.i.tution with Adam appears in this: that if there had been no _sovereign, gracious_ establishment at all, but G.o.d had proceeded on the basis of mere _justice_, and had gone no farther than this required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his posterity, that they should have performed _perfect, perpetual obedience_." The italics are all his own. On this pa.s.sage, we have to remark, that it is built upon unfounded a.s.sumptions.

It is frequently said, we are aware, that if it had not been for the redemption of the world by a "sovereign, gracious" dispensation, the whole race of man might have been justly exposed to the torments of h.e.l.l forever. But where is the proof? Is it found in the word of G.o.d? This tells us what _is_, what _has been_, and what _will be_; but it is not given to speculate upon what _might_ be. For aught we know, if there had been no salvation through Christ, as a part of the actual const.i.tution and system of the world, then there would have been no other part of that system whatever. We are not told, and we do not know, what it would have been consistent with the justice of G.o.d to do in relation to the world, if there had been no remedy provided for its restoration. Perhaps it might never have been created at all. The work of Christ is the great sun and centre of the system as _it is_; and if this had never been a part of the original grand design, we do not know that the planets would have been created to wander in eternal darkness. We do not know that even the justice of G.o.d would have created man, and permitted him to fall, wandering everlastingly amid the horrors of death, without hope and without remedy. We find nothing of the kind in the word of G.o.d; and in our nature it meets with no response, except a wail of unutterable horror. We like not, we confess, those vindications of G.o.d's goodness, which consist in drawing hideous, black pictures of his justice, and then telling us that it is not so dark as these. We want not to know whether there might not be darker things in the universe than G.o.d's love; we only want to know if there could be anything brighter, or better, or more beautiful.

The most astounding feature of this vindication of the divine goodness still remains to be noticed. We are told that the const.i.tution in question is good, because it was so likely to have had a "happy issue." And when this const.i.tution was established by the sovereign will and pleasure of G.o.d, the conduct of Adam, it is conceded, was perfectly foreseen by him.

At the very time this const.i.tution was established, its Divine Author foresaw with perfect absolute certainty what would be the issue. He knew that the great federal head, so appointed by him, would transgress the covenant, and bring down the curse of "death, temporal, spiritual, and eternal," upon all his posterity. O, wonderful goodness! to promise eternal life to the human race on a condition which he certainly foreknew would not be performed! Amazing grace! to threaten eternal death to all mankind, on a condition which he certainly foreknew would be fulfilled!

This cannot be evaded, by a.s.serting that the same difficulty attaches to the fact, that G.o.d created Adam foreseeing he would fall. His foreknowledge did not necessitate the fall of Adam. It left him free as G.o.d had created him. Life and death were set before him, and he had the power to stand, as well as the power to fall. He had no right to complain of G.o.d, then, if, under such circ.u.mstances, he chose to rebel, and incur the penalty. But if the scheme of Edwards be true, the descendants of Adam did not have their fate in their own hands. It did not depend on their own choice. It was necessitated, even prior to their existence, by the divine const.i.tution which had indissolubly connected their awful destiny, their temporal and eternal ruin, with an event already foreseen. And the const.i.tution binding such awful consequences to an event already foreseen, is called an expression of the goodness of G.o.d!

Suppose, for example, that a great prince should promise his subjects that on the happening of a certain event, over which they had no control, he would confer unspeakable favours upon them. Suppose also, that at the same time he should declare to them, that if the event should not happen, he would load them with irons, cast them into prison, and inflict the greatest imaginable punishments upon them during the remainder of their lives. Suppose again, that at the very time he thus made known his _gracious intentions_ to them, he knew perfectly well that the event on which his favour was suspended would not happen. Then, according to his certain foreknowledge, the event fails, and the penalty of the covenant or appointment is inflicted upon his subjects:-they are cast into prison; they are bound in chains, and perpetually tormented with the greatest of all imaginable evils:-not because they had transgressed the appointment or sovereign const.i.tution, but because an event had taken place over which they had no control. Now, who would call such a ruler a good prince? Who could conceive, indeed, of a more cruel or deceitful tyrant? But we submit it to the candid reader, if he be not more like the prince of predestination, than the great G.o.d of heaven and earth?

This scheme of imputation, so far from being an expression of infinite goodness, were indeed an exhibition of the most frightful cruelty and injustice. It would be a useful, as well as a most curious inquiry, to examine the various contrivances of ingenious men, in order to bring the doctrine of imputation into harmony with the justice of G.o.d. We shall briefly allude to only two of these wonderful inventions,-those of Augustine and Edwards. Neither of these celebrated divines supposed that a foreign sin, properly so called, is ever imputed to any one; but that the sin of Adam, which is imputed to his descendants, is their own sin, as well as his.(170) But here the question arises, How could they make Adam's sin to be the sin of his descendants, many of whom were born thousands of years after it was committed?

Augustine, as is well known, maintained the startling paradox, that all mankind were present in Adam, and sinned in him. In this way, he supposed that all men became partakers in the guilt of Adam's sin, and consequently justly liable to the penalty due to his transgression. Augustine was quite too good a logician not to perceive, that if all men are responsible for Adam's sin, because they were in him when he transgressed, then, it follows, that we are also responsible for the sins of all our ancestors, from whom we are more immediately descended. This follows from that maxim of jurisprudence, from that dictate of common-sense, that a rule of law is coextensive with the reason upon which it is based. Hence, as Wiggers remarks: "Augustine thought it not improbable that the sins of ancestors _universally_ are imputed to their descendants."(171) This conclusion is clearly set forth in the extracts made by the translator of Wiggers.(172) If this scheme be true, we know indeed that we are all guilty of Adam's sin; but who, or how many of the human race, were the perpetrators of Cain's murder beside himself, we cannot determine. Indeed, if this frightful hypothesis be well founded, if it form a part of the moral const.i.tution of the world, no man can possibly tell how many thefts, murders, or treasons, he may have committed in his ancestors. One thing is certain, however, and that is, that the man who is born later in the course of time, will have the more sins to answer for, and the more fearful will be the acc.u.mulation of his guilt; as all the transgressions of all his ancestors, from Adam down to his immediate parents, will be laid upon his head.

Clearly as this consequence is involved in the fundamental principle of Augustine's theory, the good father could not but reel and stagger under it. "Respecting the sins of the other parents," says he, "the progenitors from Adam down to one's own immediate father, _it may not improperly be debated_, whether the child is implicated in the evil acts and multiplied original faults of _all_, so that each one is the worse in proportion as he is later; or that, in respect to the sins of their parents, G.o.d threatens posterity to the third and fourth generation, because, _by the moderation of his compa.s.sion_, he does not further extend his anger in respect to the faults of progenitors, lest those on whom the grace of regeneration is not conferred, _should be pressed with too heavy a burden in their own eternal d.a.m.nation_, if they were compelled to contract by way of origin (_originaliter_) the _sins_ of _all_ their preceding parents from the commencement of the human race, and _to suffer the punishment due to them_.(173) Whether, on so great a subject, anything else can or cannot be found, by a more diligent reading and scrutiny of the Scriptures, I dare not hastily affirm."(174)

Thus does the st.u.r.dy logician, notwithstanding his almost indomitable hardihood, seem to stand appalled before the consequences to which his principles would inevitably conduct him. Having followed those principles but a little way, the scene becomes so dark with his representations of the divine justice, that he feels constrained to retrace his steps, and arbitrarily introduce the divine mercy, in order to mitigate the indescribable horrors which continually thicken around him. Such hesitation, such wavering and inconsistency, is the natural result of every scheme which places the decisions of the head in violent conflict with the indestructible feelings of the heart.

In his attempt to reconcile the scheme of imputation with the justice of G.o.d, Edwards has met with as little success as Augustine. For this purpose, he supposed that G.o.d had const.i.tuted an ident.i.ty between Adam and all his posterity, whereby the latter became partakers of his rebellion.

"I think it would go far toward directing us to the more clear conception and right statement of this affair," says he, in reference to imputation, "were we steadily to bear this in mind, that G.o.d, in every step of his proceedings with Adam, in relation to the covenant or const.i.tution established with him, looked on his posterity as being _one with him_. And though he dealt more immediately with Adam, it yet was as the _head_ of the whole body, and the _root_ of the whole tree; and in his proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches as if they had been then existing in their root. From which it will follow, that both guilt, or exposedness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he and they had all coexisted, like a tree with many branches; allowing only for the difference necessarily resulting from the place Adam stood in as head or root of the whole. Otherwise, it is as if, in every step of proceeding, every alteration in the root had been attended at the same instant with the same alteration throughout the whole tree, in each individual branch. I think this will naturally follow on the supposition of their being a const.i.tuted _oneness_ or _ident.i.ty_ of Adam and his posterity in this affair."(175) As the sap of a tree, Edwards has said, spreads from the root of a tree to all its branches, so the original sin of Adam descends from him through the generations of men.

In the serious promulgation of such sentiments, it is only forgotten that sin is not the sap of a tree, and that the whole human race is not really one and the same person. Such an idea of personal ident.i.ty is as utterly unintelligible as the nature of the sin and the responsibility with which it is so intimately a.s.sociated. Surely these are the dark dreams of men, not the bright and shining lights of eternal truth.

Before we take leave of President Edwards, we would remark, that he proceeds on the same supposition with Calvin,(176) Bates,(177) Dwight,(178) d.i.c.k, and a host of others, that suffering is always a punishment of sin, and of "sin in them who suffer."(179) "The light of nature," says Edwards, "or tradition from ancient revelation, led the heathen to conceive of death as in a peculiar manner an evidence of divine vengeance. Thus we have an account, that when the barbarians saw the venomous beast hang on Paul's hand, they said among themselves, 'No doubt, this man is a murderer, whom, though he hath escaped the seas, yet vengeance suffereth not to live.' "(180) We think that the barbarians concluded rashly: it is certain that St. Paul was neither a murderer nor a G.o.d. Nor, indeed, if the venomous beast had taken his life, would this have proved him to be a murderer, any more than its falling off into the fire proved him to be a G.o.d, according to the rash judgment of the barbarians. There is a better source of philosophy, if we mistake not, than the rash, hasty, foolish judgments of barbarians.

Section III.

The imputation of sin not consistent with human, much less with the divine goodness.

There are few persons whose feelings will allow them to be consistent advocates of the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin. "To many other divines," says Bishop Burnet, "this seems a harsh and inconceivable opinion: it seems repugnant to the justice and goodness of G.o.d to reckon men guilty of sin which they never committed, and to punish them in their souls eternally for that which is no act of theirs."(181) It certainly "seems very hard," as the author says, "to apprehend how persons who have never sinned, but are only unhappily descended, should be, in consequence of that, under so great a misery." But how to escape the pressure of this stupendous difficulty is the question. There are many who cannot endure it; or rather, there are very few who can endure it; but, as Bishop Burnet says, they find no difficulty in the idea of temporal punishment on account of Adam's sin. "This, they think, is easily enough reconcilable with the notions of justice and goodness, since this is only a temporary _punishment_ relating to men's persons."(182) But do they not sacrifice their logic to their feelings? Let us see.

This view of a limited imputation, and a limited _punishment_, is not confined to the Church of England. It prevails to a greater or less extent in all denominations. But President Edwards has, we think, unanswerably exposed the inconsistency of its advocates. "One of them supposes," says he, "that this sin, though truly imputed to INFANTS, so that thereby they are exposed to a proper _punishment_, yet is not imputed to them in such a _degree_, as that upon this account they should be liable to _eternal_ punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to _temporal death_, or _annihilation_; Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely more guilty of it than his posterity. On which I would observe, that to suppose G.o.d imputes, not _all_ the guilt of Adam, but only _some little part_ of it, relieves nothing but his _imagination_. To think of poor little infants bearing such torments for Adam's sin, as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it; but it does not at all relieve one's _reason_. There is no rule of reason that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the _whole_ of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, but will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in _part_; for all the reasons (if there be any) lie against the _imputation_, not the _quality_ or _degree_ of what is imputed. If there be any rule of reason that is strong and good, lying against a proper derivation or communication of guilt from one that acted to another that did not act, then it lies against all that is of that nature.... If these reasons are good, all the difference is this: that to bring a _great_ punishment on infants for Adam's sin, is a _great_ act of injustice, and to bring a comparatively _smaller_ punishment is a smaller act of injustice; but not, that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of injustice as the other."(183)

We hold this to be a solid and unanswerable argument; and we hold also, that G.o.d can no more commit a small act of injustice than a great one.

Hence, in the eye of _reason_, there is no medium between rejecting the whole of the imputation of Adam's sin, and ceasing to object against the imputation of the whole of it, as inconsistent with the justice and goodness of G.o.d. We may arbitrarily wipe out a portion of it in order to relieve our _imagination_; but this brings no relief to the calm and pa.s.sionless reason. It may still the wild tumults of emotion, but it cannot silence the voice of the intellect. Why not relieve both the _imagination_ and the _reason_? Why not wipe out the whole dark film of imputation, and permit the glad eye to open on the bright glory of G.o.d's infinite goodness?

The wonder is, that when Edwards had carried out his logic to such a conclusion, he did not regard his argument as a perfect _reductio ad absurdum_. The wonder is, that when he had carried out his logic to the position, that it might well consist with the justice of G.o.d to impute the whole of Adam's sin to "poor little infants," as he calls them, and then cause them to endure "eternal torments for it," his whole nature did not recoil from such a conclusion with indescribable horror. For our part, highly as we value logical consistency, we should prefer a little incoherency in our reasoning, a little flexibility in our logic, rather than bear even one "poor little infant" on the hard, unyielding point of it into the torments of h.e.l.l forever.

St. Augustine was the great founder of the doctrine of the imputation of sin. But although he did more than any other person to give this doctrine a hold upon the mind of the Christian world, it never had a perfect hold upon his own mind. So far from being able to reconcile it with the divine goodness, he could not reconcile it with his own goodness. For this purpose, he employed the theory that all the posterity of Adam were, in the most literal sense, already _in him_, and sinned in him-in his person; and that Adam's sin is therefore justly imputed to all his posterity.(184) He also appeals to revelation. "St. Augustine," as Father Almeyda truly says, "and the fathers who follow him, take the fundamental principle of their doctrine (which affirms that infants without baptism will endure eternal pain) from the sentence which the Supreme Judge is to p.r.o.nounce at the last day. We know that the Lord, dividing the human race into two portions, will put the elect on the right hand, and the reprobate on the left; and he will say to those on the left, Depart into eternal fire. St.

Augustine then argues, that infants will not be on the right, because Jesus Christ has positively excluded all those who shall not _be born again of water_ and of the Holy Spirit: then they will be on the left; and thus they will be comprehended in the d.a.m.nation of eternal fire, which the Lord will p.r.o.nounce against those who shall be on the left side: for having no more than two hands, and only two places and two sentences, since, then, there are infants which G.o.d does not favour, it follows that they will be comprehended in the sentence of the reprobate, which is not only a privation of the sight of G.o.d, but also the pain of fire."(185) Such is the ground, and such the logic, on which St. Augustine and his followers erected that portentous scheme, that awful speculation, which has so long cast a dark cloud over the glory of the Christian world, and prevented it from reflecting the bright, cheering beams of the divine goodness.

But, what! could St. Augustine find rest in his own views,-in his own logic? Did he really banish all non-elect infants into the region of penal fire and everlasting woe? If he adhered to the literal meaning of the words of revelation, as he understood them, he was certainly bound to do so; but did he really and consistently do it? Did he really bind the "poor little" reprobate, because it had sinned in Adam, in chains of adamant, and leave it to writhe beneath the fierce inquisitorial fury of the everlasting flames? Did he really extract the vials of such exquisite and unprovoked wrath from the essence of infinite goodness itself? No: this was reserved for the superior logic and the sterner consistency of an iron age. But since it has been extracted, we may devoutly thank Almighty G.o.d, that it is now excluded from the hearts of men calling themselves Christians, and kept safely bottled up in their creeds and confessions.

St. Augustine could not endure the insufferable consequences of his own doctrine. Hence, in writing to his great friend, St. Jerome, he said, "in all sincerity: when I come to treat of the punishment of infants, believe _that I find myself in great embarra.s.sment, and I absolutely know not what to reply_." Writing against Julian, he adds: "_I do not say that those who die without baptism will be punished with a torment such that it would be better for them if they had never been born._" And again: "Those who, besides original sin which they have contracted, have not committed any other, will be subjected to a pain the most mild of all."(186) Thus by adopting a wrong interpretation, the principles of which were but little understood in his time, St. Augustine banished all unbaptized infants from the kingdom of light; but yet he could hardly find it in his heart to condemn them to the outer darkness. He had too great a regard for the word of G.o.d, as he understood it, to permit non-elect infants to reign with Christ in heaven; and, on the other hand, he was too severely pressed by the generous impulses of his nature, nay, by the eternal dictates of truth and goodness, to permit him to consign them really to the "fire prepared for the devil and his angels." Hence, although Christ knew of "but two places," he fitted up a third, to see them in which, was, as Edwards would say, "more agreeable to his imagination."

It was the sublime but unsteady genius of St. Augustine that caused this doctrine of the d.a.m.nation of infants to be received into the Christian world, and find its way into the council of Trent. That celebrated council not only adopted the views of St. Augustine on this subject, but also most perfectly reflected all his hesitation and inconsistency. Widely as its members differed on other points, they all agreed that unbaptized infants should be excluded from the kingdom of heaven. There was but little unanimity however, as to the best method of disposing of them. The Dominicans fitted up a dark, subterraneous cavern for them, in which there is no fire, at least none such as that of the infernal regions, and in which they might be at least as happy as monks. This place was called _Limbo_-which, we suppose, is to Purgatory, about what the varioloid is to the smallpox. The Franciscans, more humane in their doctrine, determined that "dear little infants," though they had never felt the sanctifying influences of holy water, should yet reside, not in dark caverns and holes of the earth, but in the sweet light and pure air of the upper world. Well done, n.o.ble Franciscan! we honour thee for thy sweet fancy! Surely thou wert not, like other monks, made so altogether fierce by dark keeping, that thou couldest not delight to see in G.o.d's blessed, beautiful world, a smiling infant!

Others insisted, that unbaptized infants would be condemned to become philosophers, and turn out the authors of great discoveries. This may seem a terrible d.a.m.nation to some persons; but, for our part, if we had been of that famous council, it is likely we should have been in favour of this decree. As the most agreeable punishment we could imagine, we should have been for condemning them, like the fallen angels of Paradise Lost, to torment themselves with reasonings high,-

"Of providence, foreknowledge, will, and fate, Fix'd fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute."

And if any of them had been found to possess no very great apt.i.tude for such speculations, then, rather than they should find "no end in wandering mazes lost," we should have condemned them to turn poets and "build the lofty rhyme."

So completely did the spirit of a blind exegesis triumph over the light of reason in the time of Augustine, that even Pelagius and his followers excluded unbaptized infants from the kingdom of heaven, because our Saviour had declared that a man could not enter therein, except he be born of water and of the Spirit. It is true, they did not banish them into "the fire prepared for the devil and his angels," nor into Limbo, nor into dark holes of the earth; on the contrary, they admitted them to the joys of eternal life, but not into the kingdom of heaven.(187) Thus, the Pelagians brought "poor little infants" as near to the kingdom of heaven as possible, without doing too great violence to the universal orthodoxy of their time.

But as we cannot, like the Church of Rome, determine the fate of infants by a decree, we must take some little pains to ascertain how it has been determined by the Supreme Ruler of the world. For this purpose we shall first show, that there is suffering in the world which is not a punishment for sin, and then declare the great ends, or final causes, of all natural evil.

Section IV.

The true ends, or final causes, of natural evil.

We have often wondered that grave divines should declare that there could be no natural evil, or suffering, under the administration of G.o.d, except such as is a punishment for sin _in the person upon whom it is inflicted_.

We have wondered, that in declaring none but a tyrant could ever permit the innocent to suffer, they have entertained no fears lest they might strengthen the cause of atheism. For if it be impossible to justify the character of G.o.d, except on the principle that all suffering is merited on account of sin in the object of it, then it is easy to see, that the atheistical argument against the goodness of G.o.d is unanswerable. The atheist might well say: "Do we not see and know that the whole animal creation suffers? Now for what sin are they punished? The inferior animals, you will admit, are not capable of committing actual sin, any more than infants are; and Adam was not their federal head and representative. Hence, unless you can show for what sin they are _punished_, you must admit that, according to your own principles, G.o.d is a tyrant." How Dr. d.i.c.k, or Dr. Dwight, or President Edwards, or Calvin, would have answered such an argument, we cannot determine. For although they all a.s.sume that there can be no suffering under the good providence of G.o.d, except it be a punishment for sin in the object of it, yet, so far as we know, they have not made the most distant allusion to the suffering of the inferior animals. Indeed, they seem to be so intently bent on maintaining the doctrine of the imputation of sin to infants, that they pay no attention, in the a.s.sumption of the above position, either to the word of G.o.d, or to the great volume of nature spread out before them.

But we find the difficulty noticed in a prize essay of three hundred pages, on the subject of native depravity, by Dr. Woods. The author a.s.sumes the same ground with Edwards, that all suffering must be justified on the ground of justice; and hence he finds a real and proper sin in infants, in order to reconcile their sufferings with the character of G.o.d.

This is the only ground, according to Dr. Woods, on which suffering can be vindicated under the administration of a perfect G.o.d. Where, then, is the real and proper sin in the inferior animals to justify their sufferings?

This difficulty occurs to the distinguished author, and he endeavours to meet it. Let us see his reply. It is a reply which we have long been solicitous to see, and we now have it from one of the most celebrated theologians of the present day.

"Some suppose," says he, "that infants suffer as irrational animals do, without reference to a moral law or the principles of a moral government.

A strange supposition indeed, that _human beings_ should for a time be ranked with beings which are not human, that is, mere animals." He is evidently shocked at such an insult offered to poor little infants. He will not allow us, for one moment, to take the whole race of man, "during the interesting period of infancy, cut them off from their relation to Adam, degrade them from the dignity of human beings, and put them in the rank of brute animals,-and then say, they _suffer as the brutes do_....

This would be the worst of all theories,-the farthest off from Scripture and reason, and the most revolting to all the n.o.ble sensibilities of man."

Now, it is really refreshing to find these allusions to "the dignity of human beings" in a writer of this school; and especially in Dr. Woods, who has so often rebuked others for their pride, when they have imagined that they were only engaged in the laudable enterprise of a.s.serting this very dignity, by raising men from the rank of mere machines. It is so refreshing, indeed, to find such allusions in Dr. Woods, that we could almost forgive a little special pleading and bad logic in his attempt to vindicate the "dignity of human beings," which should have been an attempt to vindicate the goodness of G.o.d.