A Review of Edwards's Part 9

The first, supposes that opposition of will is possible, but insufficient;--for example: it is possible for me to place myself in opposition to a rushing torrent, but my opposition is insufficient, and the progress of the torrent relatively to me is _necessary_.

The second does not take will into consideration at all, and applies to subjects where opposition of will is not supposable; for example, logical necessity, a is b, and c is a, therefore c is b: mathematical necessity, 2 x 2 = 4. The centre of a circle is a point equally distant from every point in the circ.u.mference: metaphysical necessity, the existence of a first cause, of time, of s.p.a.ce. Edwards comprehends this second kind of necessity under the general designation of metaphysical or philosophical. This second kind of necessity undoubtedly is absolute.

It is impossible to conceive of these subjects differently from what they are. We cannot conceive of no s.p.a.ce; no time; or that 2 x 2 = 5, and so of the rest.

Necessity under both points of view he distinguishes into particular and general.

Relative necessity, as particular, is a necessity relative to individual will; as general, relative to all will.

Metaphysical necessity, as particular, is a necessity irrespective of individual will; as general, irrespective of all will.

Relative necessity is relative to the will in the connexion between volition and its sequents. When a volition of individual will takes place, without the sequent aimed at, because a greater force is opposed to it, then the sequent of this greater force is necessary with a particular relative necessity. When the greater force is greater than all supposable will, then its sequents take place by a general relative necessity. It is plain however, that under all supposable will, the will of G.o.d cannot be included, as there can be no greater force than a divine volition.

Metaphysical necessity, when particular, excludes the opposition of individual will. Under this Edwards brings the connexion of motive and volition. The opposition of will, he contends, is excluded from this connexion, because will can act only by volition, and motive is the cause of volition. Volition is necessary by a particular metaphysical necessity, because the will of the individual cannot be opposed to it; but not with a general metaphysical necessity, because other wills may be opposed to it.

Metaphysical necessity, when general, excludes the opposition of all will--even of infinite will. That 2 x 2 = 4--that the centre of a circle is a point equally distant from every point in the circ.u.mference--the existence of time and s.p.a.ce--are all true and real, independently of all will. Will hath not const.i.tuted them, nor can will destroy them. It would imply a contradiction to suppose them different from what they are. According to Edwards, too, the divine volitions are necessary with a general metaphysical necessity, because, as these volitions are caused by motives, and infinite will, as well as finite will, must act by volitions, the opposition of infinite will itself is excluded in the production of infinite volitions.

Now what is the simple idea of necessity contained in these two points of view, with their two-fold distinction? _Necessity is that which is and which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is_.

1. An event necessary by a relative particular necessity, is an event which is and cannot possibly not be or be otherwise by the opposition of an individual will.

2. An event necessary by a relative general necessity, is an event which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise by the opposition of all finite will. In these cases, opposition of will of course is supposable.

3. An event is necessary by a metaphysical particular necessity, when it is, and admits of no possible opposition from the individual will.

4. An event is necessary by a metaphysical general necessity, when it is, and cannot possibly admit of opposition even from infinite will.

All this, however, in the last a.n.a.lysis on Edwards's system, becomes absolute necessity. The infinite will is necessarily determined by a metaphysical general necessity. All events are necessarily determined by the infinite will. Hence, all events are necessarily determined by a metaphysical general necessity. Particular and relative necessity are merely the absolute and general necessity viewed in the particular individual and relation:--the terms characterize only the manner of our view. The opposition of the particular will being predetermined by the infinite will, which comprehends all, is to the precise limit of its force absolutely necessary; and the opposite force which overcomes the opposition of the particular will, produces its phenomena necessarily not only in reference to the particular will, but also in reference to the infinite will which necessarily pre-determines it.

Having thus settled the definition of necessity, and that too, on Edwards's own grounds, we are next to inquire, what is the opposite idea of contingency, and whether it has place as a rational idea?

Necessity is that which is, and which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is. Contingency then, as the opposite idea, must be _that which is, or may be, and which possibly might not be, or might be otherwise than it is_. Now, contingency cannot have place with respect to anything which is independent of will;--time and s.p.a.ce;--mathematical and metaphysical truths, for example, that all right angles are equal, that every phenomenon supposes a cause, cannot be contingent, for they are seen to be real and true in themselves. They do not arise from will, nor is it conceivable that will can alter them, for it is not conceivable that they admit of change from any source. If the idea of contingency have place as a rational idea, it must be with respect to causes, being, and phenomena, which depend upon will. The whole creation is the effect of divine volition. "G.o.d said, let there be light, and there was light:" thus did the whole creation come to be.

Now every one will grant, that the creation does not seem necessary as time and s.p.a.ce; and intuitive truths with their logical deductions, seem necessary. We cannot conceive of these as having not been, or as ceasing to be; but we can conceive of the creation as not having been, and as ceasing to be. No s.p.a.ce is an impossible conception; but no body, or void s.p.a.ce, is a possible conception; and as the existence of body may be annihilated in thought, so, likewise, the particular forms and relations of body may be modified in thought, indefinitely, different from their actual form. Now, if we wish to express in one word this difference between s.p.a.ce and body, or in general this difference between that which exists independently of will, and that which exists purely as the effect of will, we call the first necessary; the second, contingent.

The first we cannot conceive to be different from what it is. The second we can conceive to be different from what it is. What is true of the creation considered as a collection of beings and things, is true likewise of all the events taking place in this creation. All these events are either directly or mediately the effects of will, divine or human. Now we can conceive of these as not being at all, or as being modified indefinitely, different from what they are;--and under this conception we call them contingent.

No one I think will deny that we do as just represented, conceive of the possibility of the events and creations of will, either as having no being, or as being different from what they are. This conception is common to all men. What is the meaning of this conception? Is it a chimera? It must be a chimera, if the system of Edwards be true; for according to this, there really is no possibility that any event of will might have had no being at all, or might have been different from what it is. Will is determined by motives antecedent to itself. And this applies to the divine will, likewise, which is determined by an infinite and necessary wisdom. The conception, therefore, of the possibility of that which is, being different from what it is, must on this system be chimerical. But although the system would force us to this conclusion, the conception still reigns in our minds, and does not _seem_ to us chimerical;--the deduction from the system strangely conflicts with our natural and spontaneous judgements. There are few men who would not be startled by the dogma that all things and all events, even the constantly occuring volitions of their minds, are absolutely necessary, as necessary as a metaphysical axiom or a mathematical truth,--necessary with a necessity which leaves no possibility of their being otherwise than they actually are. There are few perhaps of the theological abettors of Edwards's system, who would not also be startled by it. I suppose that these would generally attempt to evade the broad conclusion, by contending that the universal necessity here represented, being merely a metaphysical necessity, does not affect the sequents of volition; that if a man can do as he pleases, he has a natural liberty and ability which relieves him from the chain of metaphysical necessity.

I have already shown how utterly futile this attempted distinction is--how completely the metaphysical necessity embraces the so called natural liberty and ability. If nothing better than this can be resorted to, then we have no alternative left but to exclaim with Sh.e.l.ley, "Necessity, thou mother of the world!" But why the reluctance to escape from this universal necessity? Do the abettors of this system admit that there is something opposed to necessity? But what is this something opposed to necessity? Do they affirm that choice is opposed to necessity? But how opposed--is choice contingent? Do they admit the possibility that any choice which is, might not have been at all, or might have been different from what it is?

We surely do not distinguish choice from necessity by merely calling it choice, or an act of the will. If will is not necessitated, we wish to know under what condition it exists. Volition is plainly under necessity on Edwards's system, just as every other event is under necessity. And the connexion between volition and its sequents is just as necessary as the connexion between volition and its motives. Explain,--why do you endeavour to evade the conclusion of this system when you come to volition? why do you claim liberty here? Do _you_ likewise have a natural and spontaneous judgement against a necessitated will? It is evident that while Edwards and his followers embrace the doctrine of necessity in its cardinal principles, they shrink from its application to will. They first establish the doctrine of necessity universally and absolutely, and then claim for will an exception from the general law,--not by logically and psychologically pointing out the grounds and nature of the exception, but by simply appealing to the spontaneous and natural judgements of men, that they are free when they do as they please: but no definition of freedom is given which distinguishes it from necessity;--nor is the natural and spontaneous judgement against necessity of volition explained and shown not be a mere illusion.

There is an idea opposed to necessity, says this spontaneous judgement--and the will comes under the idea opposed to necessity. But what is this idea opposed to necessity, and how does the will come under it? Edwards and his followers have not answered these questions--their attempt at a solution is self-contradictory and void.

Is there any other idea opposed to necessity than that of contingency, viz.--that which is or may be, and possibly might not be, or might be otherwise than it is? That 2 x 2 = 4 is a truth which cannot possibly not be, or be otherwise than it is. But this book which I hold in my hand, I can conceive of as not being at all, or being different from what it is, without implying any contradiction, according to this spontaneous judgement.

The distinction between right and wrong, I cannot conceive of as not existing, or as being altered so as to transpose the terms, making that right which now is wrong, and that wrong which now is right. But the volition which I now put forth to move this pen over the paper, I can conceive of as not existing, or as existing under a different mode, as a volition to write words different from those which I am writing. That this idea of contingency is not chimerical, seems settled by this, that all men naturally have it, and entertain it as a most rational idea.

Indeed even those who hold the doctrine of necessity, do either adopt this idea in relation to will by a self-contradiction, and under a false position, as the abettors of the scheme which I am opposing for example, or in the ordinary conduct of life, they act upon it. All the inst.i.tutions of society, all government and law, all our feelings of remorse and compunction, all praise and blame, and all language itself, seem based upon it. The idea of contingency as above explained, is somehow connected with will, and all the creations and changes arising from _will_.

That the will actually does come under this idea of contingency, must be shown psychologically if shown at all. An investigation to this effect must be reserved therefore for another occasion. In this place, I shall simply inquire, how the will may be conceived as coming under the idea of contingency?

The contingency of any phenomenon or event must depend upon the nature of its cause. A contingent phenomenon or event is one which may be conceived of, as one that might not have been at all, or might have been different from what it is; but wherein lies the possibility that it might not have been at all, or might have been different from what it is? This possibility cannot lie in itself, for an effect can determine nothing in relation to its own existence. Neither can it lie in anything which is not its cause, for this can determine nothing in relation to its existence. The cause therefore which actually gives it existence, and existence under its particular form, can alone contain the possibility of its not having existed at all, or of its having existed under a different form. But what is the nature of such a cause? It is a cause which in determining a particular event, has at the very moment of doing so, the power of determining an opposite event. It is a cause not chained to any cla.s.s of effects by its correlation to a certain cla.s.s of objects--as fire, for example, is chained to combustion by its correlation to a certain cla.s.s of objects which we thence call combustibles. It is a cause which must have this peculiarity in opposition to all other causes, that it forbears of itself to produce an effect which it may produce, and of any given number of effects alike within its power, it may take any one of them in opposition to all the others; and at the very moment it takes one effect, it has the power of taking any other. It is a cause contingent and not necessitated. The contingency of the event, therefore, arises from the contingency of the cause. Now every cause must be a necessary or not necessary cause. A necessary cause is one which cannot be conceived of as having power to act differently from its actual developements--fire must burn--gravitation must draw bodies towards the earth's centre. If there be any cause opposed to this, it can be only the contingent cause above defined, for there is no third conception. We must choose therefore between a universal and absolute necessity, and the existence of contingent causes. If we take necessity to be universal and absolute, then we must take all the consequences, likewise, as deduced in part II.

There is no possible escape from this. As then all causes must be either necessary or contingent, we bring will under the idea of contingency, by regarding it as a contingent cause--"a power to do, or not to do,"[5]--or a faculty of determining "to do, or not to do something which we conceive to be in our power."[6]

We may here inquire wherein lies the necessity of a cause opposed to a contingent cause? Its necessity lies in its nature, also. What is this nature? It is a nature in fixed correlation with certain objects, so that it is inconceivable that its phenomena might be different from those which long and established observation have a.s.signed to it. It is inconceivable that fire might not burn when thrown amid combustibles; it is inconceivable that water might not freeze at the freezing temperature. But is this necessity a necessity _per se_, or a determined necessity? It is a determined necessity--determined by the creative will. If the creative will be under the law of necessity, then of course every cause determined by will becomes an absolute necessity.

The only necessity _per se_ is found in that infinite and necessary wisdom in which Edwards places the determining motives of the divine will. All intuitive truths and their logical deductions are necessary _per se_. But the divine will is necessary with a determined necessity on Edwards's system,--and so of all other wills and all other causes, dependent upon will--the divine will being the first will determined. We must recollect, however, that on Edwards's theory of causation, a cause is always determined out of itself; and that consequently there can be no cause necessary _per se_; and yet at the same time there is by this theory, an absolute necessity throughout all causality.

Now let us consider the result of making will a contingent cause. In the first place, we have the divine will as the first and supreme contingent cause. Then consequently in the second place, all causes ordained by the divine will, considered as effects, are contingent. They might not have been. They might cease to be. They might be different from what they are. But in the third place, these causes considered as causes, are not all contingent. Only will is contingent. Physical causes are necessary with a determined necessity. They are necessary as fixed by the divine will. They are necessary with a relative necessity--relatively to the divine will. They put forth their _nisus_, and produce phenomena by a fixed and invariable law, established by the divine will. But will is of the nature, being made after the image of the divine will. The divine will is infinite power, and can do everything possible to cause. The created will is finite power, and can do only what is within its given capacity. Its volitions or its efforts, or its _nisus_ to do, are limited only by the extent of its intelligence. It may make an effort, or volition, or _nisus_, to do anything of which it can conceive--but the actual production of phenomena out of itself, must depend upon the instrumental and physical connexion which the divine will has established between it and the world, external to itself. Of all the volitions or _nisus_ within its capacity, it is not necessitated to any one, but may make any one, at any time; and at the time it makes any one _nisus_ or volition, it has the power of making any other.

It is plain, moreover, that will is efficient, essential, and first cause. Whatever other causes exist, are determined and fixed by will, and are therefore properly called secondary or instrumental causes. And as we ourselves are will, we must first of all, and most naturally and most truly gain our idea of cause from ourselves. We cannot penetrate these second causes--we observe only their phenomena; but we know ourselves in the very first _nisus_ of causation.

To reason therefore from these secondary causes to ourselves, is indeed reversing the natural and true order on this subject. Now what is the ground of all this clamour against contingency? Do you say it represents phenomena as existing without cause? We deny it. We oppose contingency not to cause, but to necessity. Do you say it is contrary to the phenomena of physical causation,--we reply that you have no right to reason from physical causes to that cause which is yourself. For in general you have no right to reason from the laws and properties of matter to those of mind. Do you affirm that contingency is an absurd and pernicious doctrine--then turn and look at the doctrine of an absolute necessity in all its bearings and consequences, and where lies the balance of absurdity and pernicious consequences? But we deny that there is anything absurd and pernicious in contingency as above explained.

That it is not pernicious, but that on the contrary, it is the basis of moral and religious responsibility, will clearly appear in the course of our inquiries.

After what has already been said in the preceding pages, it perhaps is unnecessary to make any further reply to its alleged absurdity.

There is one form under which this allegation comes up, however, which is at first sight so plausible, that I shall be pardoned for prolonging this discussion in order to dispose of it. It is as follows: That in a.s.signing contingency to will, we do not account for a volition being in one direction rather than in another. The will, it is urged, under the idea of contingency, is indifferent to any particular volition. How then can we explain the fact that it does pa.s.s out of this state of indifferency to a choice or volition?

In answer to this, I remark:--It has already been made clear, that selection and particular determination belong to every cause. In physical causes, this selection and particular determination lies in the correlation of the nature of the cause with certain objects; and this selection and particular determination are necessary by a necessity determined out of the cause itself--that is, they are determined by the creative will, which gave origin to the physical and secondary causes.

Now Edwards affirms that the particular selection and determination of will take place in the same way. The nature of the will is correlated to certain objects, and this nature, being fixed by the creative will, which gave origin to the secondary dependent will, the selection and particular determination of will, is necessary with a necessity determined out of itself. But to a necessitated will, we have nothing to oppose except a will whose volitions are not determined by the correlation of its nature with certain objects--a will, indeed, which has not its nature correlated to any objects, but a will indifferent; for if its nature were correlated to objects, its particular selection and determination would be influenced by this, and consequently its action would become necessary, and that too by a necessity out of itself; and fixed by the infinite will. In order to escape an absolute and universal necessity, therefore, we must conceive of a will forming volitions particular and determinate, or in other words, making a _nisus_ towards particular objects, without any correlation of its nature with the objects. Is this conception a possible and rational conception? It is not a possible conception if will and the sensitivity, or the affections are identical--for the very definition of will then becomes that of a power in correlation with objects, and necessarily affected by them.

But now let us conceive of the will as simply and purely an activity or cause, and distinct from the sensitivity or affections--a cause capable of producing changes or phenomena in relation to a great variety of objects, and conscious that it is thus capable, but conscious also that it is not drawn by any necessary affinity to any one of them. Is this a possible and rational conception? It is indeed the conception of a cause different from all other causes; and on this conception there are but two _kinds_ of causes. The physical, which are necessarily determined by the correlation of their nature with certain objects, and will, which is a pure activity not thus determined, and therefore not necessitated, but contingent.

Now I may take this as a rational conception, unless its palpable absurdity can be pointed out, or it can be proved to involve some contradiction.

Does the objector allege, as a palpable absurdity, that there is, after all, nothing to account for the particular determination? I answer that the particular determination is accounted for in the very quality or attribute of the cause. In the case of a physical cause, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to be necessarily correlated to the object. In the case of will, the particular determination is accounted for in the quality of the cause, which quality is to have the power to make the particular determination without being necessarily correlated to the object. A physical cause is a cause fixed, determined, and necessitated. The will is a cause contingent and free. A physical cause is a cause instrumental of a first cause:--the will is first cause itself. The infinite will is the first cause inhabiting eternity, filling immensity, and unlimited in its energy. The human will is first cause appearing in time, confined to place, and finite in its energy; but it is the same in kind, because made in the likeness of the infinite will; as first cause it is self moved, it makes its _nisus_ of itself, and of itself it forbears to make it; and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its objects, it has the power of selecting by a mere arbitrary act, any particular object. It is a cause, all whose acts, as well as any particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted for in itself alone. This does not make the created will independent of the uncreated. The very fact of its being a created will, settles its dependence. The power which created it, has likewise limited it, and could annihilate it. The power which created it, has ordained and fixed the instrumentalities by which volitions become productive of effects.

The man may make the volition or _nisus_, to remove a mountain, but his arm fails to carry out the _nisus_. His volitions are produced freely of himself; they are unrestrained within the capacity of will given him, but he meets on every side those physical causes which are mightier than himself, and which, instrumental of the divine will, make the created will aware of its feebleness and dependence.

But although the will is an activity or cause thus contingent, arbitrary, free, and indifferent, it is an activity or cause united with sensitivity and reason; and forming the unity of the soul. Will, reason, and, the sensitivity or the affections, const.i.tute mind, or spirit, or soul. Although the will is arbitrary and contingent, yet it does not follow that it _must_ act without regard to reason or feeling.

I have yet to make my appeal to consciousness; I am now only giving a scheme of psychology in order to prove the possibility of a contingent will, that we have nothing else to oppose to an absolute and universal necessity.

According to this scheme, we take the will as the _executive_ of the soul or the _doer_. It is a doer having life and power in itself, not necessarily determined in any of its acts, but a power to do or not to do. _Reason_ we take as the _lawgiver_. It is the "source and substance"

of pure, immutable, eternal, and necessary truth. This teaches and commands the executive will what ought to be done. The sensitivity or the affections, or the desire, is the seat of enjoyment: it is the capacity of pleasure and pain. Objects, in general, hold to the sensitivity the relation of the agreeable or the disagreeable, are in correlation with it; and, according to the degree of this correlation, are the emotions and pa.s.sions awakened.

Next let the will be taken as the chief characteristic of personality, or more strictly, as the personality itself. By the personality, I mean the me, or myself. The personality--the me--the will, a self-moving cause, directs itself by an act of attention to the reason, and receives the laws of its action. The perception of these laws is attended with the conviction of their rect.i.tude and imperative obligation; at the same time, there is the consciousness of power to obey or to disobey them.

Again, let the will be supposed to direct itself in an act of attention to the pleasurable emotions connected with the presence of certain objects; and the painful emotions connected with the presence of other objects; and then the desire of pleasure, and the wish to avoid pain, become rules of action. There is here again the consciousness of power to resist or to comply with the solicitations of desire. The will may direct itself to those objects which yield pleasure, or may reject them, and direct itself towards those objects which yield only pain and disgust.

We may suppose again two conditions of the reason and sensitivity relatively to each other; a condition of agreement, and a condition of disagreement. If the affections incline to those objects which the reason approves, then we have the first condition. If the affections are repelled in dislike by those objects which reason approves, then we have the second condition. On the first condition, the will, in obeying reason, gratifies the sensitivity, and vice versa. On the second, in obeying the reason, it resists the sensitivity, and vice versa.

Now if the will were always governed by the highest reason, without the possibility of resistance, it would be a necessitated will; and if it were always governed by the strongest desire, without the possibility of resistance, it would be a necessitated will; as much so as in the system of Edwards, where the strongest desire is identified with volition.

The only escape from necessity, therefore, is in the conception of a will as above defined--a conscious, self-moving power, which may obey reason in opposition to pa.s.sion, or pa.s.sion in opposition to reason, or obey both in their harmonious union; and lastly, which may act in the indifference of all, that is, act without reference either to reason or pa.s.sion. Now when the will obeys the laws of the reason, shall it be asked, what is the cause of the act of obedience? The will is the cause of its own act; a cause _per se_, a cause self-conscious and self-moving; it obeys the reason by its own _nisus_. When the will obeys the strongest desire, shall we ask, what is the cause of the act of obedience? Here again, the will is the cause of its own act. Are we called upon to ascend higher? We shall at last come to such a self-moving and contingent power, or we must resign all to an absolute necessity. Suppose, that when the will obeys the reason, we attempt to explain it by saying, that obedience to the reason awakens the strongest desire, or the sense of the most agreeable; we may then ask, why the will obeys the strongest desire? and then we may attempt to explain this again by saying, that to obey the strongest desire seems most reasonable. We may evidently, with as much propriety, account for obedience to pa.s.sion, by referring to reason; as account for obedience to reason, by referring to pa.s.sion. If the act of the will which goes in the direction of the reason, finds its cause in the sensitivity; then the act of the will which goes in the direction of the sensitivity, may find its cause in the reason. But this is only moving in a circle, and is no advance whatever. Why does the will obey the reason? because it is most agreeable: but why does the will obey because it is most agreeable?

because to obey the most agreeable seems most reasonable.

Acts of the will may be conceived of as a.n.a.logous to intuitive or first truths. First truths require no demonstration; they admit of none; they form the basis of all demonstration. Acts of the will are first movements of primary causes, and as such neither require nor admit of antecedent causes, to explain their action. Will is the source and basis of all other cause. It explains all other cause, but in itself admits of no explanation. It presents the primary and all-comprehending _fact_ of power. In G.o.d, will is infinite, primary cause, and untreated: in man, it is finite, primary cause, const.i.tuted by G.o.d's creative act, but not necessitated, for if necessitated it would not be will, it would not be power after the likeness of the divine power; it would be mere physical or secondary cause, and comprehended in the chain of natural antecedents and sequents.

G.o.d's will explains creation as an existent fact; man's will explains all his volitions. When we proceed to inquire after the characteristics of creation, we bring in the idea of infinite wisdom and goodness. But when we inquire _why_ G.o.d's will obeyed infinite wisdom and goodness, we must either represent his will as necessitated by infinite wisdom and goodness, and take with this all the consequences of an absolute necessity; or we must be content to stop short, with will itself as a first cause, not necessary, but contingent, which, explaining all effects, neither requires nor admits of any explanation itself.