A Review of Edwards's Part 8

It follows from this, that there can be no cause whatever. An infinite series of causative acts, without any first, being, according to this reasoning, the consequence of supposing a cause to cause its own acts, it must therefore follow, that a cause does not cause its own acts, but that they must be caused by some cause out of the cause. But the cause out of the cause which causes the causative acts in question, must cause these causative acts in the other cause by a causative act of its own:--but the same difficulties occur in relation to the second cause as in relation to the first; it cannot cause its own acts, and they must therefore be caused out of itself by some other cause; and so on, _ad infinitum_. We have here again the absurdity of an infinite series of causative acts; and also, the absurdity of an infinite series of causes without a first cause. Otherwise, we must come to a first cause which causes its own acts, without an act of causation; but this is impossible, according to the reasoning of Edwards. As, therefore, there cannot be a cause causing its own acts, and inasmuch as the denial of this leads to the absurdities above mentioned, we are driven to the conclusion, that there is no cause whatever. Every cause must either cause its own acts, or its acts must be caused out of itself. Neither of these is possible; therefore, there is no cause.

Take the will itself as an ill.u.s.tration of this last consequence. The will is cause; the volition, effect. But the will does not cause its own volition; the volition is caused by the motive. But the motive, as a cause, must put forth a causative act in the production of a volition.

If the motive determine the will, then there must be an act of the motive to determine the will. To determine, to cause, is to do, is to act. But what determines the act of the motive determining the act of the will or volition If it determine its own act, or cause its own act, then it must do this by a previous act, according to the principle of this reasoning; and this again by another previous act; and so on, _ad infinitum_.

Take any other cause, and the reasoning must be the same.

It may be said in reply to the above, that volition is an effect altogether peculiar. It implies selection or determination in one direction rather than in another, and therefore that in inquiring after its cause, we inquire not merely after the energy which makes it existent, but also after the cause of its particular determination in one direction rather than in another. "The question is not so much, how a spirit endowed with activity comes to _act_, as why it exerts _such_ an act, and not another; or why it acts with a particular determination?

If activity of nature be the cause why a spirit (the soul of man, for instance) acts and does not lie still; yet that alone is not the cause why its action is thus and thus limited, directed and determined." (p.

58.)

Every phenomenon or effect is particular and limited. It must necessarily be one thing and not another, be in one place and not in another, have certain characteristics and not others; and the cause which determines the phenomenon, may be supposed to determine likewise all its properties. The cause of a particular motion, for example, must, in producing the motion, give it likewise a particular direction.

Volition must have an object; something is willed or chosen; particular determination and direction are therefore inseparable from every volition, and the cause which really gives it a being, must necessarily give it character, and particular direction and determination.

Selection is the attribute of the cause, and answers to particular determination and direction in the effect. As a phenomenon or effect cannot come to exist without a particular determination, so a cause cannot give existence to a phenomenon, or effect, without selection.

There must necessarily be one object selected rather than another. Thus, if fire be thrown among various substances, it selects the combustibles, and produces phenomena accordingly. It selects and gives particular determination. We cannot conceive of cause without selection, nor of effect without a particular determination. But in what lies the selection? In the nature of the cause in correlation with certain objects. Fire is in correlation with certain objects, and consequently exhibits phenomena only with respect to them. In chemistry, under the t.i.tle of affinities, we have wonderful exhibitions of selection and particular determination. Now motive, according to Edwards, lies in the correlation of the nature of the will, or desire, with certain objects; and volition is the effect of this correlation. The selection made by will, arising from its nature, is, on the principle of Edwards, like the selection made by any other cause; and the particular determination or direction of the volition, in consequence of this, is like that which appears in every other effect. In the case of will, whatever effect is produced, is produced of necessity, by a pre-const.i.tution and disposition of will and objects, just as in the case of any other cause.

From this it appears sufficiently evident, that on Edwards's principles there is no such difference between volition and any other effect, as to shield his reasonings respecting a self-determining will, against the consequences above deduced from them. The distinction of final and efficient causes does not lie in his system. The motive is that which produces the sense of the most agreeable, and produces it necessarily, and often in opposition to reason and conscience; and this sense of the most agreeable is choice or volition. It belongs to the opposite system to make this distinction in all its clearness and force--where the efficient will is distinguished, both from the persuasions and allurements of pa.s.sion and desire, and from the laws of reason and conscience.

Thus far my argument against Edwards's a.s.sumption,--that, to make the will the cause of its own volitions, is to make it cause its volitions by an act of volition,--has been indirect. If this indirect argument has been fairly and legitimately conducted, few probably will be disposed to deny that the a.s.sumption is overthrown by its consequences. In addition to the above, however, on a subject so important, a direct argument will not be deemed superfluous.

Self-determining will means simply a will causing its own volitions; and consequently, particularly determining and directing them. Will, in relation to volition, is just what any cause is in relation to its effect. Will causing volitions, causes them just as any cause causes its effects. There is no intervention of anything between the cause and effect; between will and volition. A cause producing its phenomena by phenomena, is a manifest absurdity. In making the will a self-determiner, we do not imply this absurdity. Edwards a.s.sumes that we do, and he a.s.sumes it as if it were unquestionable.

The will, he first remarks, determines all our external actions by volitions, as the motions of the hands and feet. He next affirms, generally, that all which the will determines, it determines in this way; and then concludes, that if it determines its own volitions, they must come under the general law, and be determined by volitions.

The first position is admitted. The second, involving the last, he does not prove, and I deny that it is unquestionable.

In the first place, it cannot legitimately be taken as following from the first. The relation of will to the sequents of its volitions, is not necessarily the same as its relation to its volitions. The sequents of volitions are changes or modifications, in external nature, or in parts of the being external to the will; but the volitions are modifications of the will itself. Now if the modification of external nature by the will can be effected only by that modification of itself called volition, how does it appear that this modification of itself, if effected by itself, must be effected by a previous modification of itself? We learn from experience, that volitions have sequents in external nature, or in parts of our being, external to will; but this experience teaches us nothing respecting the production of volitions.

The acts of the will are volitions, and all the acts of wills are volitions; but this means nothing more than that all the acts of the will are acts of the will, for volition means only this--an act of the will. But has not the act of the will a cause? Yes, you have a.s.signed the cause, in the very language just employed. It is the act of the will--the will is the cause. But how does the will cause its own acts? I do not know, nor do I know how any cause exerts itself, in the production of its appropriate phenomena; I know merely the facts. The connexion between volition and its sequents, is just as wonderful and inexplicable, as the connexion between will and its volitions. How does volition raise the arm or move the foot? How does fire burn, or the sun raise the tides? And how does will cause volitions? I know not; but if I know that such are the facts, it is enough.

Volitions must have a cause; but, says Edwards, will cannot be the cause, since this would lead to the absurdity of causing volitions by volitions. But we cannot perceive that it leads to any such absurdity.

It is not necessary for us to explain how a cause acts. If the will produce effects in external nature by its acts, it is impossible to connect with this as a sequence, established either by experience or logic, that in being received as the cause of its own acts, it becomes such only by willing its own acts. It is clearly an a.s.sumption unsupported, and incapable of being supported. Besides, in denying will to be the cause of its own acts, and in supplying another cause, namely, the motive, Edwards does not escape the very difficulty which he creates; for I have already shown, that the same difficulty appertains to motive, and to every possible cause. Every cause produces effects by exertion or acting; but what is the cause of its acting? To suppose it the cause of its own acts, involves all the absurdities which Edwards attributes to self-determination. But, _In the second place_,--let us look at the connexion of cause and phenomena a little more particularly.

What is cause? It is that which is the ground of the possible, and actual existence of phenomena. How is cause known? By the phenomena. Is cause visible? No: whatever is seen is phenomenal. We observe phenomena, and by the law of our intelligence we a.s.sign them to cause. But how do we conceive of cause as producing phenomena? By a _nisus_, an effort, or energy. Is this _nisus_ itself a phenomenon? It is when it is observed.

Is it always observed? It is not. The _nisus_ of gravitation we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of gravitation. The _nisus_ of heat to consume we do not observe; we observe merely the facts of combustion.

Where then do we observe this _nisus?_ Only in will. Really, volition is the _nisus_ or effort of that cause which we call will. I do not wish to antic.i.p.ate subsequent investigations, but I am constrained here to ask every one to examine his consciousness in relation to this point. When I wish to do anything I make an effort--a _nisus_ to do it; I make an effort to raise my arm, and I raise it. This effort is simply the volition. I make an effort to lift a weight with my hand,--this effort is simply the volition to lift it,--and immediately antecedent to this effort, I recognise only my will, or really only myself. This effort--this _nisus_--this volition--whatever we call it,--is in the will itself, and it becomes a phenomenon to us, because we are causes that know ourselves. Every _nisus_, or effort, or volition, which we may make, is in our consciousness: causes, which are not self-conscious, of course do not reveal this _nisus_ to themselves, and they cannot reveal it to us because it is in the very bosom of the cause itself. What we observe in relation to all causes--not ourselves, whether they be self-conscious or not, is not the _nisus_, but the sequents of the _nisus_. Thus in men we do not observe the volition or _nisus_ in their wills, but the phenomena which form the sequents of the _nisus_. And in physical causes, we do not observe the _nisus_ of these causes, but only the phenomena which form the sequents of this _nisus_. But when each one comes to himself, it is all different. He penetrates himself--knows himself. He is himself the cause--he, himself, makes the _nisus_, and is conscious of it; and this _nisus_ to him becomes an effect--a phenomenon, the first phenomenon by which he reveals himself, but a phenomenon by which he reveals himself only to himself. It is by the sequents of this _nisus_,--the effects produced in the external visible world, that he reveals himself to others.

Sometimes the _nisus_ or volition expends itself in the will, and gives no external phenomena. I may make an effort to raise my arm, but my arm may be bound or paralyzed, and consequently the effort is in vain, and is not known without. How energetic are the efforts made by the will during a fit of the night-mare! we struggle to resist some dreadful force; we strive to run away from danger but all in vain.

It is possible for me to make an effort to remove a mountain: I may place my hand against its side, and tug, and strive: the _nisus_ or volition is the most energetic that I can make, but, save the straining of my muscles, no external expression of the energy of my will is given; I am resisted by a greater power than myself.

The most original movement of every cause is, then, this _nisus_ in the bosom of the cause itself, and in man, as a cause, the most original movement is this _nisus_ likewise, which in him we call volition. To deny such a _nisus_ would be to deny the activity, efficiency, and energy of cause. This _nisus_, by its very conception and definition, admits of no antecedent, phenomenon, or movement: it is in the substance of the cause; its first going forth to effects. A first movement or _nisus_ of cause is just as necessary a conception as first cause itself. There is no conception to oppose to this, but that of every cause having its first movement determined by some other cause out of itself--a conception which runs back in endless retrogression without arriving at a first cause, and is, indeed, the annihilation of all cause.

The a.s.sumption of Edwards, therefore, that if will determine its own volitions, it must determine them by an act of volition, is unsupported alike by the facts of consciousness and a sound logic,--while all the absurdities of an infinite series of causation of acts really fasten upon his own theory, and destroy it by the very weapons with which it a.s.sails the opposite system.

_In the third place_,--Edwards virtually allows the self-determining power of will.

Will he defines as the desire, the affections, or the sensibility. There is no personal activity out of the affections or sensitivity. Volition is as the most agreeable, and is itself the sense of the most agreeable.

But what is the cause of volition? He affirms that it cannot be will, a.s.suming that to make will the cause of its own volitions, involves the absurdity of willing volitions or choosing choices; but at the same time he affirms the cause to be the state of the affections or will, in correlation with the nature and circ.u.mstances of objects. But all natural causes are in correlation with certain objects,--as, for example, heat is in correlation with combustibles; that is, these natural causes act only under the condition of meeting with objects so const.i.tuted as to be susceptible of being acted upon by them. So, likewise, according to Edwards's representation, we may say that the cause of volition is the nature and state of the affections or the will, acting under the condition of objects correlated to it. The sense of the most agreeable or choice cannot indeed be awakened, unless there be an object presented which shall appear the most agreeable; but then its appearing most agreeable, and its awakening the sense of the most agreeable, depends not only upon "what appears in the object viewed, but also in the manner of the view, and _the state and circ.u.mstances_ of the mind that views." (p. 22.) Now "the _state_ and _circ.u.mstances_ of the mind that views, and the _manner_ of its view," is simply the mind acting from its inherent nature and under its proper conditions, and is a representation which answers to every natural cause with which we are acquainted: the state of the mind, therefore, implying of course its inherent nature, may with as much propriety be taken as the cause of volition, on Edwards's own principles, as the nature and state of heat may be taken as the cause of combustion: but by "the state, of mind,"

Edwards means, evidently, the state of the will or the affections. It follows, therefore, that he makes the state of the will or the affections the cause of volition; but as the state of the will or the affections means nothing more in reference to will than the state of any other cause means in reference to that cause,--and as the state of a cause, implying of course its inherent nature or const.i.tution, means nothing more than its character and qualities considered as a cause,--therefore he virtually and really makes will the cause of its own volitions, as much as any natural cause is the cause of its invariable sequents.

Edwards, in contemplating and urging the absurdity of determining a volition by a volition, overlooked that, according to our most common and necessary conceptions of cause, the first movement or action of cause must be determined by the cause itself, and that to deny this, is in fact to deny cause. If cause have not within itself a _nisus_ to produce phenomena, then wherein is it a cause? He overlooked, too, that in a.s.signing as the cause or motive of volition, the state of the will, he really gave the will a self-determining power, and granted the very point he laboured to overthrow.

The point in dispute, therefore, between us and Edwards, is not, after all, the self-determining power of the will. If will be a cause, it will be self-determining; for all cause is self-determining, or, in other words, is in its inherent nature active, and the ground of phenomena.

But the real point in dispute is this: "_Is the will necessarily determined, or not?_"

The inherent nature of cause may be so const.i.tuted and fixed, that the _nisus_ by which it determines itself to produce phenomena, shall take place according to invariable and necessary laws. This we believe to be true with respect to all physical causes. Heat, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, gravitation, mechanical forces in general, and the powers at work in chemical of affinities, produce their phenomena according to fixed, and, with respect to the powers themselves, necessary laws. We do not conceive it possible for these powers to produce any other phenomena, under given circ.u.mstances, than those which they actually produce. When a burning coal is thrown into a ma.s.s of dry gunpowder, an explosion must take place.

Now, is it true likewise that the cause which we call will, must, under given circ.u.mstances, necessarily produce such and such phenomena? Must its _nisus_, its self-determining energy, or its volition, follow a uniform and inevitable law? Edwards answers yes. Will is but the sensitivity, and the inherent nature of the will is fixed, so that its sense of the most agreeable, which is its most original _nisus_ or its volition, follows certain necessary laws,--necessary in relation to itself. If we know the state of any particular will, and its correlation to every variety of object, we may know, with the utmost certainty, what its volition will be at a given time, and under given circ.u.mstances.

Moral necessity and physical necessity differ only in the terms,--not in the nature of the connexion between the terms. Volition is as necessary as any physical phenomenon.

Now, if the will and the affections or sensitivity are one, then, as a mere psychological fact, we must grant that volition is necessary; for nothing can be plainer than that the desires and affections necessarily follow the correlation of the sensitivity and its objects. But if we can distinguish in the consciousness, the will as a personal activity, from the sensitivity,--if we can distinguish volition from the strongest desire or the sense of the most agreeable,--then it will not follow, because the one is necessary, the other is necessary likewise, unless a necessary connexion between the two be also an observed fact of consciousness. This will be inquired into in another part of our undertaking. What we are now mainly concerned with, is Edwards's argument against the conception of a will not necessarily determined.

This he calls a contingent determination of will. We adopt the word contingent; it is important in marking a distinction.

Edwards, in his argument against a contingent determination, mistakes and begs the question under discussion.

1. He mistakes the question. Contingency is treated of throughout as if identical with chance or no cause. "Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pa.s.s by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connexion with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be contingent or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pa.s.s without our foreknowledge, and beside our design and scope. But the word _contingent_ is used abundantly in a very different sense; not for that whose connexion with the series of things we cannot discern so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason with which its existence has any fixed and certain connexion." (p. 31.)

Thus, according to Edwards, not only is _contingent_ used in the same sense as chance and accident, in the ordinary and familiar acceptation of these words, but it is also gravely employed to represent certain phenomena, as without any ground, or reason, or cause of their existence; and it is under this last point of view that he opposes it as applied to the determination of the will. In part 2, sec. 3, he elaborately discusses the question--"whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pa.s.s without a cause of its existence;" and in sec. 4,--"whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul."

If, in calling volitions contingent,--if, in representing the determination of the will as contingent, we intended to represent a cla.s.s of phenomena as existing without "any previous ground or reason with which their existence has a fixed and certain connexion,"--as existing without any cause whatever, and therefore as existing by chance, or as really self-existent, and therefore not demanding any previous ground for their existence,--it seems to me that no elaborate argument would be required to expose the absurdity of our position. That "every phenomenon must have a cause," is unquestionably one of those primitive truths which neither require nor admit of a demonstration, because they precede all demonstration, and must be a.s.sumed as the basis of all demonstration.

By a contingent will, I do not mean a will which is not a cause. By contingent volitions, I do not mean volitions which exist without a cause. By a contingent will, I mean a will which is not a necessitated will, but what I conceive only and truly to be a _free will_. By contingent volitions, I mean volitions belonging to a contingent or free will. I do not oppose contingency to cause, but to necessity. Let it be supposed that we have a clear idea of necessity, then whatever is not necessary I call contingent.

Now an argument against contingency of will on the a.s.sumption that we intend, under this t.i.tle, to represent volitions as existing without a cause, is irrelevant, since we mean no such thing.

But an argument attempting to prove that contingency is identical with chance, or no cause, is a fair argument; but then it must be remembered that such an argument really goes to prove that nothing but necessity is possible, for we mean by contingency that which is opposed to necessity.

The argument must therefore turn upon these two points: First, is contingency a possible conception, or is it in itself contradictory and absurd? This is the main question; for if it be decided that contingency is a contradictory and absurd conception, then we are shut up to a universal and an absolute necessity, and no place remains for inquiry respecting a contingent will. But if it be decided to be a possible and rational conception, then the _second_ point will be, to determine whether the will be contingent or necessary.

The first point is the only one which I shall discuss in this place. The second properly belongs to the psychological investigations which are to follow. But I proceed to remark, 2. that Edwards, in his argument against a contingent will, really begs the question in dispute. In the first place, he represents the will as necessarily determined. This is brought out in a direct and positive argument contained in the first part of his treatise. Here necessity is made universal and absolute.

Then, in the second place, when he comes particularly to discuss contingency, he a.s.sumes that it means no cause, and that necessity is inseparable from the idea of cause. Now this is plainly a begging of the question, as well as a mistaking of it; for when we are inquiring whether there be any thing contingent, that is, any thing opposed to necessity, he _begins_ his argument by affirming all cause to be necessary, and contingency as implying no cause. If all cause be necessary, and contingency imply no cause, there is no occasion for inquiry after contingency; for it is already settled that there can be no contingency. The very points we are after, as we have seen, are these two: whether contingency be possible; and whether there be any cause, for example, will, which is contingent.

If Edwards has both mistaken and begged the question respecting a contingent will, as I think clearly appears, then of course he has logically determined nothing in relation to it.

But whether this be so or not, we may proceed now to inquire whether contingency be a possible and rational conception, or whether it be contradictory and absurd.

Necessity and contingency are then two ideas opposed to each other. They at least cannot co-exist in relation to the same subject. That which is necessary cannot be contingent at the same time, and vice versa. Whether contingency is a possible conception and has place in relation to any subject, remains to be determined.

Let us seek a definition of these opposing ideas: we will begin with necessity, because that this idea is rational and admits of actual application is not questioned. The only point in question respecting it, is, whether it be universal, embracing all beings, causes, and events.

What is necessity? Edwards defines necessity under two points of view:--

1. Viewed in relation to will.

2. Viewed irrespective of will.