A Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the Secret Sessions of the Conference Part 56

So the amendment was laid on the table.

Mr. BALDWIN:--I move that my subst.i.tute be taken up, and ask that it may be read.

It was read as follows:

_Whereas_ unhappy differences exist, which have alienated from each other portions of the people of the United States, to such an extent as seriously to disturb the peace of the nation and impair the regular and efficient action of the Government within the sphere of its const.i.tutional powers and duties;

_And whereas_, the Legislature of the State of Kentucky has made application to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the Const.i.tution of the United States;

_And whereas_, it is believed to be the opinion of the people of other States that amendments to the Const.i.tution are, or may become, necessary to secure to the people of the United States, of every section, the full and equal enjoyment of their rights and liberties, so far as the same may depend for their security and protection on the powers granted to or withheld from the General Government in pursuance of the national purposes for which it was ordained and established:

This Convention does therefore recommend to the several States to unite with Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the Const.i.tution of the United States, to be submitted to the Legislatures of the several States, or to Conventions therein, for ratification, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress, in accordance with the provision in the fifth article of the Const.i.tution.

I propose to avail myself of the privilege of a short reply to the arguments against my proposition; and in order that I may occupy as little time as possible, I have reduced my reply to writing. At the risk of repeating some of the remarks I made at the opening of the discussion, I wish to recur to the facts on which my report is based.

The resolution which I have moved to subst.i.tute, recommends to the several States to unite with Kentucky in her application for the calling of a Convention for proposing amendments to the Const.i.tution.

On the 28th day of January, seven days before the a.s.sembling of this Conference Convention, the Governor of Kentucky transmitted to the President of the United States the joint resolutions of the General a.s.sembly of that Commonwealth, "recommending a call for a Convention of the United States," with a request that the President would lay the same before Congress; and on the 5th of February, the day after the a.s.sembling of this Convention, they were, by a special message of the President, communicated to Congress, with the expression of great satisfaction in the performance of that duty, and of confidence that Congress would bestow upon those resolutions the careful consideration due to the distinguished and patriotic source from which they proceeded, as well as to the great importance of the subject which they involve. The resolution requesting the call of a Convention I have already read to the Conference.

There are, sir, but two modes provided by the people of the United States for altering the fundamental law of their Government, both of which are specified in the fifth article of the Const.i.tution:

1. Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses _shall deem it necessary_, shall PROPOSE amendments to the Const.i.tution; or,

2. On the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall _call a Convention_ for PROPOSING _amendments_, which, in either case, shall be valid as part of the Const.i.tution, when _ratified_ by the Legislatures, or by Conventions in _three-fourths_ of the States.

The first mode is recommended by the majority of the committee, in the expectation that Congress, by a two-thirds vote of both houses, will propose, on the request of this Convention, for ratification by the States, the several amendments they have reported.

The second mode is the one proposed by the Legislature of Kentucky, and which, in accordance therewith, I have moved to subst.i.tute for the recommendation of the committee.

There are now but few days remaining before the termination of the functions of the present Congress. If it were within the fair scope and interest of the const.i.tutional provision that Congress should act, in the proposing of amendments, on the recommendation of this Conference Convention, no one, I think, can reasonably expect them to consider and deliberately act on such recommendation during the few remaining days of the present Congress. Other questions, of engrossing interest, now pending before them, and the acts of necessary legislation at the close of the session, will prevent it. It must, therefore, go over to the next Congress. a.s.suming that during the term of that Congress the amendments recommended by this Convention shall, by two-thirds of both houses, be _deemed necessary_, and be proposed to the States for ratification; there would probably be no earlier final action by the requisite number of States, than in the mode proposed by Kentucky, and recommended by the resolution which I have moved to subst.i.tute for the mode of amendment reported by the committee. But the great objection, in my mind, to the mode of amendment contemplated by the majority report, is that it is not in accordance with either the letter or the spirit of the Const.i.tution.

The people of the United States intended, when they adopted the Const.i.tution under which we have for more than seventy years enjoyed a higher degree of prosperity than has fallen to the lot of any other people, that it should remain in full force and unchanged, except in one of the two modes prescribed in that sacred instrument for its own amendment.

It is a Const.i.tution which binds the people of every State, as the supreme law of the land, until it can be changed by the action, in the first instance, of those who are _sworn_ to support it. No amendments can, consistently with the letter or the spirit of the Const.i.tution, be _proposed_ by Congress, unless two-thirds of both houses, acting under the responsibility of their official oaths, shall "_deem_ them _necessary_." No interference or pressure by any extraneous body unknown to the Const.i.tution, was contemplated, or can be allowed with safety to the people, to impair the exercise of this function under all the responsibilities and official sanctions that properly appertain to it. The judgment of two-thirds of both houses of Congress in regard to the _necessity_ of the amendments, must precede their proposal to the States for _ratification_.

The Government of the United States, in its sphere of duties, is supreme. The State Governments, when they consented to its formation by the people of the United States, surrendered so much of their separate sovereignties as was essential to its strength and efficiency. To that extent we became one people. This Government, for all _national_ purposes, took the place of the State Governments, as well in regard to the _paramount allegiance_ as to the duty of protection of the people of every State in the enjoyment of all their federal rights. Its powers can neither be enlarged nor diminished, except in the _const.i.tutional_ mode, without violating the rights of the States as well as of the people.

Any attempt from without, by combinations and a.s.sociations not responsible to the people, to _coerce_ or overawe Congress, or in any way to impair the free and _deliberate_ exercise of its judgment in _proposing_ amendments "as deemed _necessary_" by Congress, is a palpable violation of the privileges of the people. They elected the members of the House of Representatives with the intention that they should freely and deliberately, under their official oaths, propose amendments, or not, to the Const.i.tution, as _they_ might _deem necessary_, and not at the dictation of _States even_, who cannot themselves propose amendments, but can only require of Congress to call a Convention of _all the States_ for that purpose. Much less can a convention of delegates from the Legislatures, or the Executive of a part only of the States--a body unknown to, and unauthorized by, the Const.i.tution--a.s.sume to exercise, or dictate to Congress the exercise of this high prerogative.

WE do not represent the people of the United States. This Government, for every purpose for which it was established, is a separate, and in some sense a foreign government to the States. It operates directly on the people, and is itself their true protector in all their Federal rights.

Any number of States, less than two-thirds, have no more right to call into action the power of Congress either to call a Convention, or to propose amendments, than the individual members of their Legislatures in their private capacities; and Congress might as well, and probably would, treat our interference with their official duties as an _usurpation_; as much so as if we should seek to interfere with the appropriate duties of the Legislatures of Virginia or Ma.s.sachusetts.

And, sir, I cannot but regard it, so far as the _free_ action of Congress should be influenced by the recommendations of this body, as in the nature of a _revolutionary proceeding_ for which there is no sufficient cause or justification. Sir, all the States are not here represented. All have not even had an opportunity to be here. And yet we are endeavoring to influence the action of Congress in a manner which may deeply affect their interests. If, under any circ.u.mstances, a body so convened, would have a right to act upon Congress, by the expression of our opinions as a Convention of States, ought not all to have an opportunity to partic.i.p.ate in our deliberations? Most certainly they ought.

But it is said some of the States are threatening to secede from the Union; others have seceded, and must be induced to come back, by the speedy action of Congress on the amendments recommended by the committee. Does the _Const.i.tution_ authorize amendments under such circ.u.mstances, with _less care_ and deliberation than in time of peace and tranquillity?

This Government, sir, cannot recognize the fact that _States_ have seceded. It is not a Government over _States_, but over the _people_ of the United States, irrespective of the State in which they live.

This Government, and not the States, protects them in their Federal rights, and requires allegiance and obedience from the people in every State, to the Const.i.tution and laws of the United States as the supreme law of the land, any thing in the laws or ordinances of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. It is the _people_ and not the States that are governed by that law, within the sphere of its const.i.tutional operation.

I have said that the course proposed by the majority of the committee is, in my judgment, not only against the letter, but the spirit of the Const.i.tution. The State of Kentucky, ever patriotic and conservative, must have so regarded it, when, instead of asking Congress to propose the amendments they desired, they requested their sister States to unite with them in an application in the mode prescribed by the Const.i.tution to Congress to call a Convention for that purpose.

Our fathers, who framed that Const.i.tution, and the people of the United States, who ratified it, set it forth in the preamble as their first great purpose "to form a more perfect Union." They intended to establish thereby a Government of perpetual obligation and of self-sustaining vigor. They did not contemplate the necessity of amendments for any other causes than such as, after calm, deliberate, undisturbed consideration should be judged necessary. They did not intend that it should be exposed to the danger of hasty action under the influence of excited pa.s.sions or timid and groundless apprehension. They would not trust the entire people even with the right of amendment, except in the mode prescribed, with all the delays incident to that mode; and then only by the action, in every stage of the proceeding, of persons bound by solemn oath to support it.

The Const.i.tution, in prescribing the modes of proposing amendments, endeavored to provide against irregular combination of a part only of the States to effect them. Hence it prohibited all agreements or compacts between the States; and it made no provision for the recognition of any action by a convention, except when called on the recommendation of two-thirds of the States applying to Congress, by separate action of their Legislatures, for that purpose.

Any interference with the duty of Congress by such a body as we are, representing only a portion of the States in any form, and some of us only the executives of the States from which we come, would be as much at variance with the Const.i.tution as with the counsel of that ill.u.s.trious American--I will not say Virginian--for WASHINGTON belonged to his whole country--in the Farewell Address which he dedicated to the people of the United States on his retirement from the public service, and which ought to be cherished in the heart of every patriot. In addition to what I have already read from that address let me read this pa.s.sage:

"All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all _combinations_ and _a.s.sociations_ under whatever plausible character, with the _real design to direct, control, counteract_, or _awe_ the regular deliberation and action of the _const.i.tuted authorities_, are destructive to this fundamental rule, and of fatal tendency."

Let me read it again. "All obstructions," &c. "All combinations," &c.

This address is replete with words of true wisdom. Let us heed them; for they are eminently adapted to the present occasion. There is no exigency which should be allowed to overawe Congress in the performance of its const.i.tutional duties. No State intervention, no combination or a.s.sociation of representatives of States in a manner unknown to the Const.i.tution, can be recognized as authoritative by those to whom, on their own responsibility, the people of the United States have conferred their national interests and the guardianship of their fundamental law. "We owe," in the language of the ill.u.s.trious statesman of Kentucky, "_a paramount_ allegiance to the Government of the United States--a subordinate one to our State."

Sir, while I am willing to perform all my const.i.tutional duties--all my fraternal duties toward the people of every section of our common country, I, for one, feel bound to abstain from any encroachment on the duties which the Const.i.tution of my country has delegated to others to be performed, in the modes, and with the responsibilities, which the _people_ for their own security have deemed it proper to prescribe.

With these opinions, I should be unfaithful to my own convictions of duty, and recreant to the trust which has devolved on me as a citizen of the United States, and by inheritance from an ancestor who took a part in the deliberations of the Convention which framed our Const.i.tution, and to whose public services, you, sir, so kindly alluded at the opening of the Conference, were I to unite with the majority of the committee in urging upon Congress the amendments they have proposed.

Entertaining as I do for the members of the committee who have concurred in that report a profound respect, it has been with a feeling of unaffected diffidence and self-distrust that I have ventured to express my sentiments on this occasion. But as I must act on my own convictions of duty, which are in harmony with those of my a.s.sociates from Connecticut, so far as in the brief period which has elapsed since the report was submitted I have had opportunity to ascertain them, I felt bound to make known to the Convention the reasons which will govern my action.[7]

[Footnote 7: The closing remarks of Mr. BALDWIN were committed to writing. I am able through the kindness of a member of his family to avail myself of a copy.]

The vote was then taken by States on the subst.i.tute proposed by Mr.

BALDWIN, and the subst.i.tute was rejected by the following vote:

AYES.--Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Ma.s.sachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, and Vermont--8.

NOES.--Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, and Kansas--13.

So the amendment was not agreed to.

The following gentlemen disagreed to the vote of their respective States:

Mr. BRONSON, of New York; Mr. GRANGER, of New York; Mr. DODGE, of New York; Mr. CORNING, of New York; Mr. ORTH, of Indiana; Mr. HACKLEMAN, of Indiana.

Mr. SEDDON:--I suppose it is now in order for me to move my subst.i.tute for the report of the majority of the committee.

Mr. TUCK:--I also have a subst.i.tute to offer. I shall not discuss it.

Mr. SEDDON:--The subst.i.tute which I propose embodies the CRITTENDEN resolutions, with the modifications suggested by Virginia. These are princ.i.p.ally confined to the first section, which is made to apply to our future as well as our present territory. I have modified the form of the subst.i.tute in several particulars, and now offer it without farther introduction. These are the amendments which I understand the delegation from Virginia is instructed to insist upon:

JOINT RESOLUTIONS

PROPOSING CERTAIN AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSt.i.tUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

WHEREAS, serious and alarming dissensions have arisen between the Northern and Southern States, concerning the rights and security of the rights of the slaveholding States, and especially their rights in the common territory of the United States; and whereas, it is eminently desirable and proper that those dissensions, which now threaten the very existence of this Union, should be permanently quieted and settled by const.i.tutional provisions, which shall do equal justice to all sections, and thereby restore to the people that peace and good will which ought to prevail between all the citizens of the United States: therefore,

_Resolved_, by this Convention, that the following articles are hereby approved and submitted to the Congress of the United States, with the request that they may, by the requisite const.i.tutional majority of two-thirds, be recommended to the respective States of the Union, to be, when ratified by conventions of three-fourths of the States, valid and operative as amendments of the Const.i.tution of the Union.

ARTICLE 1. In all the territory of the United States now held or hereafter acquired, situate north of lat.i.tude 36 30', slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, is prohibited, while such territory shall remain under territorial government. In all the territory now or hereafter acquired south of said line of lat.i.tude, slavery of the African race is hereby recognized as existing, and shall not be interfered with by Congress; but shall be protected as property by all the departments of the territorial government during its continuance; and when any territory, north or south of said line, within such boundaries as Congress may prescribe, shall contain the population requisite for a member of Congress, according to the then federal ratio of representation of the people of the United States, it shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with or without slavery, as the const.i.tution of such new State may provide.