A History of Spain Part 27

One of the interesting factors of the era of the war was that of the French influence in Spain, which was to have a p.r.o.nounced effect on the internal development of the country, and, by extension, on that of the colonies. Philip V was seventeen years of age when he ascended the throne, but, though he many times proved his valor in battle, he was in other respects a weak and irresolute character, without striking virtues or defects, fond of hunting, and exceedingly devout,--in fine, of a type such that he was inevitably bound to be led by others. These traits fitted in with the policies of Louis XIV, who fully intended to direct the affairs of Spain in his own interest. He charged Philip V never to forget that he was a Frenchman, and, indeed, with the exceptions presently to be noted, Philip was quite ready to submit to the will of his grandfather. From the first, Louis XIV surrounded the Spanish king with French councillors, some of whom occupied honorary positions only, while others filled important posts in the government of Spain, and still others, notably the French amba.s.sadors and French generals, exercised actual authority without having any official connection with the country. One of the most important of all was Madame des Ursins, maid of honor to the queen, sent to Spain by Louis XIV because as the widow of the Duke of Braciano, a Spanish grandee, she was familiar with the customs of the country. This lady won the complete confidence of the queen, who in turn was able to dominate her husband. It may be said for Madame des Ursins that she was faithful to the interests of the Spanish monarchs, though promoting the entry of French influences, at that time much to be desired in Spain. Indeed, she not infrequently sided with Philip V against the wishes of Louis XIV, which on one occasion led to her recall by the French monarch. Finding, however, that he could not control Spanish affairs without her aid, Louis allowed her to return to Spain. Despite the enormous pressure exercised against him in favor of France, Philip V occasionally rebelled. One instance of his obstinacy has already been cited respecting the case of the Catalan _fueros_. A more important issue arose out of the presumptions of Louis XIV to dispose of Philip's crown, as an avenue of escape for himself. In every year from 1706 to 1712 Louis XIV endeavored to sacrifice the interests of Spain or of Philip V in order to propitiate the allies into a grant of peace. In particular he was desirous of procuring the resignation of Philip from the throne of Spain in favor of the House of Austria, saving to Philip the Spanish dominions in Italy. Philip was obdurate when suggestions were made of his abandoning Spain, and more than once, even when the situation looked hopeless, declared his intention of dying at the head of his troops, rather than abdicate the throne to which he felt divinely ent.i.tled. Louis XIV was even disposed to compel him by force of arms to acquiesce, and several times withdrew his military support, but the Spanish king would not yield. Fortunately for Philip the allies played into his hands by demanding too much, with the result that Louis XIV on such occasions would renew his support of Philip. Nevertheless, it was the urgings of Louis XIV which prevailed upon Philip to surrender the Spanish dominions in Italy and the Low Countries as well as to renounce his claim to the throne of France. In all of these tribulations of the Spanish king credit should be given to Maria Luisa of Savoy, the spirited young queen of Spain. Not yet fourteen at the time of her marriage, in 1701, she at all times displayed a courage and ability which endeared her to the Spanish people. Though her father, the Duke of Savoy, joined the allies against France and Spain, she did not waver in her attachment to the land of her adoption. Inspired by her the Spanish people (except the Catalans) displayed an ardent spirit of nationalism for the first time in history, and were loyally devoted to the king and queen. Nevertheless, despite Spanish patriotism and Philip's obdurate resistance to Louis XIV's plans concerning the peninsula, there was the underlying truth of a profound French influence over Spain. This was best represented by men who, like Orry and Amelot, were responsible for far-reaching reforms, the effects of which will be discussed in the chapters on inst.i.tutions.

[Sidenote: The popular young queen, Maria Luisa of Savoy.]

[Sidenote: Isabel Farnesio and the resumption of a policy of imperialism in Italy.]

Unfortunately for Philip and for Spain the queen died, early in the year 1714. A young Italian abbot named Alberoni happened to be at court in that year and he suggested to Madame des Ursins that a certain Isabel Farnesio (Elizabeth Farnese) of Parma would make a suitable wife for Philip V. According to him the sweet gentleness of her character would enable Madame des Ursins to maintain her power at the Spanish court. In December of the same year the wedding took place. Thus did the lady who has received the sobriquet, the "Termagant of Spain," become the wife of Philip V. On her first meeting with Madame des Ursins she dismissed her, and proceeded to become herself the dominant influence near the crown.

Isabel Farnesio was in fact a woman of extraordinary energy and force of character, besides being so attractive as to be irresistible to the weak king, who was so violently and capriciously attached to her that he even chastised her with blows, at times, in a kind of jealous fury.

Nevertheless, she submitted to anything, provided she could retain a hold on her husband, for she was ambitious for her children and for Italy, and meant to utilize Spanish power in furtherance of her aims.

Early in 1715 she procured the elevation of Alberoni (soon to become a cardinal) to the direction of affairs in the Spanish state, as the instrument to procure her objects. The chief tenets in her policy were the breaking of the intimate relation with France and the recovery of the Italian possessions, based on the twofold desire of throwing the Austrians out of Italy (a patriotic Italian wish, possibly more attributable to Alberoni than to the queen) and of creating princ.i.p.alities for the children of her own marriage with Philip. These aims were furthered by playing upon the wishes of Philip to recover his rights to the French throne. Philip V had not willingly renounced his claim at the time Louis XIV had persuaded him to do so, and many of the events for the next few years are explained by his aspirations to obtain that crown for himself or for one of his sons. The Italian ambitions of Isabel Farnesio, however, were the enduring keynote of Spanish policy for some thirty years.

[Sidenote: Diplomatic intrigue and war in the first period of the Italian pretensions of Isabel Farnesio.]

The break with France was not long in coming. In 1715 Louis XIV died, and, contrary to the expectations of Philip, not Philip V, but the Duke of Orleans, whom the Spanish king regarded as a personal opponent, was named as regent for the sickly Louis XV, who was not expected to live very long,--though in fact he was to reign for fifty-nine years. The breach was widened by a series of treaties between England, the Protestant Netherlands, and France in the next two years with a view to the execution of the treaty of Utrecht. To a.s.sure the peace of Europe it was necessary to procure the adhesion of Philip V and Charles VI, who alone of the parties to the War of the Spanish Succession had not made peace with each other, although no hostilities had taken place for some time. Such a peace did not fit in, however, with the plans of Isabel Farnesio, and when the emperor furnished a pretext in 1717 for the renewal of hostilities a Spanish army was suddenly dispatched to Sardinia which overran that island. England as guarantor of the neutrality of Italy protested, and endeavored to effect a peace between the two contestants by an offer to Philip of Charles' renunciation of his claims to the Spanish crown, together with a promise of the duchies of Parma and Tuscany and a vague suggestion of England's willingness to restore Gibraltar and Minorca. The English proposal was rejected, and in 1718 an expedition was sent into Sicily (then in the possession of Savoy, although the already mentioned exchange with Austria had been discussed). The Spaniards were received with enthusiasm, and soon had a mastery of the island. Meanwhile, Austria entered the triple alliance, which thereby became quadruple, on the basis of the emperor's offers to renounce his pretensions to the throne of Spain and to consent to the succession of Charles, son of Isabel Farnesio and Philip V, to the duchies of Parma, Plasencia, and Tuscany in exchange for Philip's return of Sicily and Sardinia and his renunciation of all dominion in Italy and the Low Countries. These terms were offered to Philip, who refused them, despite the English amba.s.sador's insinuation of his country's willingness to return Gibraltar and Minorca if Philip would accept.

While the British government was thus negotiating for peace through diplomatic channels it also took steps in another way to insure Spanish acquiescence in the allied proposals. An English fleet under Admiral Byng was ordered to attack the Spanish fleet without previous announcement of a warlike intent, managing the affair, if possible, so as to cast the blame on the Spanish commander. Byng found the Spanish fleet in Sicilian waters, destroyed it, and landed Austrian troops in Sicily. Several months later, in December, 1718, England declared war on Spain, which was followed in January, 1719, by a declaration of war against Philip V on the part of France. Hopelessly outnumbered, Spain nevertheless displayed a surprising capacity for resistance. Defeat was inevitable, however, and late in 1719 Alberoni, whose extraordinary web of intrigues was deemed responsible for the existing situation, was dismissed from power, a condition exacted by the allies, and in 1720 peace was made on the basis of the earlier proposals of the quadruple alliance. Philip was ready to comply with these terms, but the emperor was now unwilling to grant what had been required of him. The result was a new alliance in 1721 of England, France, and Spain, of which the most noteworthy terms were England's definite promise to restore Gibraltar to Spain and an agreement for a double matrimonial alliance between the French and Spanish courts; a Spanish princess aged three was betrothed to Louis XV, then eleven years old, while a French princess was to marry Philip's eldest son, Luis. In addition the rights of Isabel's son Charles to the Italian duchies were reaffirmed. The marriage of Luis and the French princess was duly celebrated in 1722, and the Spanish princess was sent to the French court to be educated.

[Sidenote: Abdication of Philip V and reasons therefor.]

[Sidenote: Brief reign of Luis I and Philip's resumption of the throne.]

For several years Philip had been expressing a desire to abdicate. In January, 1724, he carried his previously announced intention into effect, declaring that he proposed to consecrate the remainder of his life to the service of G.o.d and the important work of maintaining his own health. There has been much speculation as to whether these were his real designs,--all the more so, since the ambitious queen at no time protested against this step. Although there is no direct evidence to that effect, it is more than probable that Philip and Isabel wanted to be ready to take advantage of the situation which might arise if Louis XV should die, as was expected. At any rate Philip's eldest son was proclaimed king, as Luis I, but the reign was of brief duration. In the same year 1724 Luis contracted smallpox and died. As there was a general disinclination to the succession of Philip's second son, Ferdinand, then a minor, the former king was asked to accept the crown again, and despite certain compunctions he felt in the matter he at length agreed to do so.

[Sidenote: Ripperda and the Austrian alliance.]

The second reign of Philip V was dominated as before by the Italian ambitions of Isabel Farnesio, with the French aspirations of the king remaining a factor. By this time the Baron of Ripperda, an adventurer who had previously been the Dutch representative at the Spanish court, had become the agent through whom Isabel hoped to achieve her ends. Few more unconscionable liars and intriguers are recorded in history than this audacious courtier, who was able to deceive even Isabel Farnesio.

It occurred to the queen that the vexed question of the Italian duchies might be settled through an emba.s.sy to Vienna. Accordingly, Ripperda was sent, with the princ.i.p.al object of procuring the betrothal of two Austrian archd.u.c.h.esses to Isabel's sons, Charles and Philip. Ripperda found Charles VI disinclined to consent to the betrothals, but lied both to the emperor and to Philip, telling each that the other accepted his pet.i.tions. His deceptions would certainly have been unmasked, had it not been for an unexpected turn in events. In 1725 the French regent, fearful lest Louis XV might die without issue, sent back the Spanish princess who had been betrothed to him, because she was still too young to marry. The natural consequence was a rupture between France and Spain, facilitating a treaty between Charles VI and Philip V. The matter of the marriage was now secondary to the political need of support.

Charles and Philip agreed to the terms proposed to the latter in 1718 by the quadruple alliance. In addition Philip guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction, whereby the succession of Charles VI's eldest daughter to his Austrian estates was to be secured, and gave extensive commercial privileges to Austria, particularly to the Ostend Company of the Catholic, or Austrian, Netherlands, enabling that company to secure trading rights in Spain and the Americas. A defensive alliance was arranged, one feature of which was the emperor's agreement to use his good offices to cause England to fulfil her promised restoration of Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain. Finally, Charles VI definitely abandoned his oft-repeated demand for the recognition of the Catalan _fueros_. For his triumphs of 1725 Ripperda was made a grandee of Spain, owing his promotion, in part at least, to his a.s.surance that the marriage alliances were practically secure. He became first minister at the Spanish court, a post which he asked for, falsely a.s.serting that Charles VI desired it. Such a tissue of lies could not be sustained indefinitely. His duplicity having been discovered he lost his position in 1726, and was imprisoned when he seemed to confess guilt by taking refuge in the English emba.s.sy. Escaping in 1728 he went to northern Africa, where he pa.s.sed the remaining nine years of his life.

[Sidenote: The acquisition of Naples for Isabel's son Charles.]

The Austrian treaties of 1725 were to have important consequences.

England, France, the Protestant Netherlands, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark immediately formed an alliance, and war seemed imminent. Spain desired it, but Austria declined to engage, much to the resentment of the Spanish court. Spain made a fruitless attempt to recapture Gibraltar, however, in 1727, but consented to peace in the same year without attaining her ends, although the definitive treaty was not signed until 1729. One factor in the agreement was the desire of Isabel Farnesio to avenge herself on Charles VI, not only for his failure to join in the recent war, but also to requite his refusal to accept the marriage projects she had proposed. Even when the emperor consented to the attainment in 1731 of Isabel's ambitions for her son concerning the three duchies of northern Italy, she did not put aside her vengeful plans. Charles of Bourbon in fact landed in Italy in that year to take possession of the duchies. A fresh step in the plans of Isabel was the treaty of 1733 with France, often called by a.n.a.logy with the later treaty of 1761-1762 the "first Family Compact." The opportunity to strike at Austria, which both France and Spain desired, was now at hand, for Austria was in the meshes of a war over the Polish succession. Spain declared war on Austria late in 1733, and in the next year overran Naples and Sicily. In 1734, too, Prince Charles was brought from his duchies to be crowned king of Naples, or the Two Sicilies. Thus had Isabel Farnesio restored the questionably desirable Italian inheritance to Spain, but the duchies were lost. France was ready to make peace in 1735; so she calmly offered Charles VI the three duchies in exchange for a recognition of Spanish Charles as king of the Two Sicilies. Spain protested, but could do nothing more than submit. These terms were accepted in 1735, although peace was not signed until three years later.

It is interesting to note that the Catalans had not yet given up hope of their _fueros_. A body of Catalan patriots visited England in 1736 to ask for the fulfilment of the earlier English promise to maintain the _fueros_, but the British government paid no attention to the pet.i.tion.

[Sidenote: The War of Jenkins' Ear.]

War was not long in making its reappearance on the Spanish horizon. For a long time there had been various causes of dispute with England, the most important of which arose out of the English contraband trade in the Spanish colonies. The _asiento_ treaty had been used by English merchants as the entering wedge for British commerce, and their violations of the law had met with reprisals at times, especially when English smugglers were caught by the more faithful of the Spanish officials in the colonies. One Englishman, named Jenkins, brought home his ear preserved in alcohol, claiming that the Spaniards had cut it off. Such acts as this, whether of actual occurrence or not, fitted in with English conceptions of Spanish cruelty, and furnished a pretext for war to the rising party of British imperialists, headed by William Pitt.

Indemnities were demanded by England and agreed to by Spain, but when the latter put in a counter-claim the British government threatened war, which was soon declared, late in 1739. This conflict, called in English histories the War of Jenkins' Ear, demonstrated that the internal reforms in Spain had not been without effect. The West Indies were the princ.i.p.al field of the struggle, but Spain was able to defend herself,--as witness the successful defence of Cartagena, which Admiral Vernon was so sure he was going to capture that he had commemorative medals struck off in advance. In Europe the most noteworthy events were the Spanish attempts to capture Gibraltar and Port Mahon, Minorca, both of which ended in failure. France soon came into the war on Spain's side, and the conflict became European when it merged into the great War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748).

[Sidenote: The War of the Austrian Succession and the acquisition of the North Italian duchies for Isabel's son Philip.]

The various princes of Europe had guaranteed Charles VI's Pragmatic Sanction one or more times, but when the emperor died, in 1740, each of them proceeded along the line of political interest. Urged on by Isabel Farnesio, Philip V renewed his pretensions to the duchies in northern Italy and to other Italian territories in Austrian hands which had formerly belonged to Spain. France, Prussia, and other states of lesser importance also made certain claims. England's interest lay with the opponent of France and Spain, wherefore she joined with Austria. In a military way the war was very nearly indecisive, and there was a general desire for peace by the year 1746. This att.i.tude received a fresh impulse by the accession of Ferdinand VI to the Spanish throne in that year, for he was a determined partisan of peace. The treaty of 1748 was entirely favorable to Isabel Farnesio in that she obtained the duchies of Parma, Plasencia, and Guastalla for her son Philip; Tuscany was no longer available, having been in other hands since the agreement of 1735. The dispute with England was settled by a recognition of commercial advantages in favor of that country, especially those growing out of the _asiento_; two years later the _asiento_ was annulled in exchange for a heavy payment by Spain. Meanwhile, the voyage of Anson around the world, 1739-1742, had in fact dealt a blow to Spain in America, revealing the Spanish secrets of the Pacific. The peace of 1748 marked the culminating point in the aspirations of Isabel Farnesio.

After more than thirty years of effort she had almost completely attained her ends. Spain had paid the bills, with little to compensate her except glory and at the cost of losses in the colonies, which though not translated into cessions of territory were to have ultimate effects to the disadvantage of Spain.

[Sidenote: Importance of the peaceful reign of Ferdinand VI.]

The reign of Ferdinand VI (1746-1759) looms little in external narrative, because it was an era of peace, but on that very account it was important in inst.i.tutions. The achievements of Charles III were made possible by the policies of economic regeneration which were so strongly to the fore in the reign of Ferdinand VI. Ferdinand, who may have been deficient enough in some respects, who took very little part himself in affairs of government, and who displayed tendencies to melancholia and even insanity, was firmly of the opinion that Spain needed peace, and at a time when Europe was engaging in another great conflict, the Seven Years' War, he declined the overtures of both France and England, the leading opponents in the struggle, even when accompanied by such tempting bait as the latter's offer of the rest.i.tution of much-desired Gibraltar and Minorca. In 1759 he died without issue, and his half-brother, Charles, son of Isabel Farnesio, came to the throne of Spain, after a long experience as a ruler in Italy. Thus did the "Termagant of Spain" achieve yet a new victory to reward her maternal ambition,--and meanwhile the Two Sicilies were not lost to her line, for that kingdom pa.s.sed to her grandson Ferdinand, the third son of Charles.

CHAPTER x.x.xII

CHARLES III AND ENGLAND, 1759-1788

[Sidenote: Greatness of the reign of Charles III and princ.i.p.al factors therein.]

Under Charles III, Spain reached the highest point she has attained since the sixteenth century. In many respects the internal situation was better at this time than in the great days of the _siglo de oro_, but Spain's relative authority in Europe was less, because of the striking advances which had been made by the other powers. One of them, England, was particularly dangerous, and it will be found that Spain's foreign policy in this reign was directed primarily toward meeting the possibility of war with that country. Other difficulties, such as those with Portugal and Morocco, particularly with the former, were cogent factors because of the relations which England bore, or was believed to bear, to them. Contrary to the impression usually to be derived from the histories of the American Revolution, Spain was intensely hostile to England throughout this reign. To oppose that country the Family Compact with France was formed, and continued to be the basis of Spain's foreign policy, although it early became manifest that France would honor the treaty only when it suited her purposes. In the end the policies of Charles III were crowned with success,--not so great as Spain could have wished, but sufficiently so to make this reign the most pleasingly satisfactory to Spaniards of any since the days of Isabella, next to whom Charles III has some claim to rank as the greatest Spanish monarch of modern times. This becomes the more worthy of belief when one investigates the sweeping character of and the success attained in the social, political, and economic reforms of the period. These were at the basis of Spain's victories in European councils, for they provided the sinews of war. Nevertheless there was one drawback. The reforms in the Americas, following the precedent of nearly three centuries, were undertaken more with a view to the production of revenues for Spain than for the contented development of the colonies themselves. Spain also ran counter to a new force in world history, which she herself was obliged by circ.u.mstances to a.s.sist in establishing itself. The spirit of world democracy was born with the American Revolution, and appeared in France soon afterward. This meant that the autocratic basis of Spanish greatness was presently to be destroyed. The success of the American Revolution was to be related in no small degree to the loss of Spain's colonial empire. The failure of the French Revolution was to produce a powerful despot who was to bring Spain, under Charles IV, to the lowest point she had reached since the days of Charles II. Nevertheless, the reign of Charles III is to be considered as something more than a brilliant moment in history without ultimate effect. The internal reforms were of permanent benefit to Spain and even to the Americas, capable of utilization under the more democratic systems of the future.

Finally, the part played by Spain in the successful issue of the American Revolution deserves to bulk large, even though she could not look with sympathy upon a movement which, she clearly saw, might bring about her own ruin.

[Sidenote: Causes of Charles III's policy of opposition to England.]

Many writers have ascribed Charles III's policy of opposition to England to his hatred of that country, growing out of certain humiliations forced upon him by an English fleet while he was king in Naples. There is no reason to believe, however, that this feeling, if indeed it did exist in unusual degree, dominated his political action, and in fact Charles was always a partisan of peace; far from plunging into war he had rather to be convinced of its necessity. There were reasons in plenty to induce him to such a course, irrespective of any personal spite he might have felt. Prior to the reign of Charles, Spain had already engaged in four wars with England (1702-1713, 1718-1720, 1727-1729, 1739-1748) in the course of half a century, and at no time in the Bourbon era had the two countries been on nearly cordial terms. The gist of the trouble lay in the British ambition to possess the greatest colonial empire and the richest commerce in the world. For the realization of these aims it seemed necessary to destroy the colonial importance of France and Spain, and any advances in wealth or military power on the part of either of those countries was regarded as detrimental to the imperialistic designs of England. With respect to Spain, British contraband trade in the Americas under the cover of the _asiento_ treaty had tended to break down the Spanish commercial monopoly, and the annulment of the _asiento_ had not put an end to the smuggling. While no territories in the Americas had been wrested from Spain under the Bourbons, the previous century had recorded many conquests by England in the Caribbean area, princ.i.p.al of which was that of Jamaica, and along the Atlantic coast strip of North America, the southern part of which had been not only claimed but also occupied by Spain in earlier days. Meanwhile, the losses of France and the aggressive character of English foreign policy under Pitt made it appear that Spain might expect to be deprived of her colonies whenever the opportunity to secure them should seem ripe to England.

[Sidenote: Continuance of England's affronts to Spain.]

[Sidenote: The Family Compact and Spain's entry into the Seven Years'

War.]

From the outset of the reign of Charles III there occurred many incidents to heighten Spain's suspicion or anger with respect to England. The exigencies of the war with France led the English to adopt many arbitrary measures against the as yet neutral power of Spain.

English vessels stopped Spanish ships on the high seas, claiming a right of search, and seized many of them, often without justification in international law; the English government occupied a bit of Spanish territory, and did not abandon it with a good grace; and there were instances when Spanish merchants in England were treated badly.

Meanwhile, British acts of aggression and smuggling in the Americas continued to take place; the English placed difficulties in the way of Spanish fishing off the coast of Newfoundland, though beyond the territorial waters of the British domain; they founded establishments in Honduras without authorization from Spain, and began to cut the valuable dyewoods there; and Gibraltar and Minorca still remained in English hands, a standing affront to Spanish pride and a danger to the peninsula. Nevertheless, the underlying factor which influenced Spain was the imperialism of England, backed up as it was by her vast resources and her almost invincible navy. Charles did not wish to bring Spain into the war, but it was clear that an overwhelming defeat for France would be almost equally disadvantageous to Spain, who might expect to receive the next shock from the English arms. France had gotten much the worst of it in the Seven Years' War when Charles III ascended the Spanish throne, wherefore Charles endeavored to mediate between that power and England. The British government's arrogant rejection of his proffer tended only to make him the more disposed to consider an alliance with France. When, therefore, the French authorities approached him with the proposal for an alliance he resolved to join with them if England should refuse to meet Spain's demands relative to the release of captured Spanish ships, the free use of the Newfoundland fisheries, and the abandonment of the English settlements in Honduras. England not only refused to give satisfaction, but also asked for an explanation of the naval preparations Spain was making.

Thereupon, Charles prepared for war. Two treaties, called jointly the Family Compact, were made with the Bourbon king of France. The first of these, signed in August, 1761, was a defensive alliance against such powers as should attack either of the two crowns. The second, dated in February, 1762, was an offensive and defensive alliance directed specifically against England. War, meanwhile, had already been declared in January.

[Sidenote: Spanish losses in the Seven Years' War.]

In the ensuing campaign France and Spain were badly beaten. Manila and Havana were taken by the English, although Spain won a notable success in the capture of Sacramento, a Portuguese colony on the Rio de la Plata,--for Portugal had entered the war on the side of England.

Twenty-seven richly laden English boats were taken at Sacramento,--significant of the profits which the English merchants were making in contraband trade, using Sacramento as a base. In 1763 a peace which was in many respects humiliating to Spain was signed at Paris.

England restored Manila and Havana, but required the cession of Florida and all other Spanish territories east of the Mississippi; Sacramento was returned to Portugal; Spain gave up all rights of her subjects to fish in Newfoundland waters; questions arising out of the English captures of Spanish ships prior to Spain's entry into the war were to be decided by the British courts of admiralty; and the English right to cut dyewoods in Honduras was acknowledged, although England agreed to the demolition of all the fortifications which British subjects might have constructed there. France, who had lost practically all her other colonies to England, now gave the scantily settled, ill-defined region of French influence west of the Mississippi, all that remained of French Louisiana, to Spain. According to the terms of the grant it was to compensate Spain for her loss of Florida, but in fact it was in order to ensure the continued alliance of Spain with France.

[Sidenote: Preparations for a renewal of the war.]

[Sidenote: Pretexts for war.]

[Sidenote: The Falkland Islands affair.]

The peace of 1763 was looked upon by France and Spain as a truce, for if England had been dangerous before, she was doubly so now. France wished revenge and the restoration of her overseas domains, while Spain's princ.i.p.al motive was a desire to save her colonies from conquest by England. Both countries therefore bent their energies to preparations for another war; in Spain the next decade and a half was a period of remarkable economic reforms tending to the regeneration of the peninsula as the basis for an army and navy. Meanwhile, steps were taken to avoid the possibility of an English descent upon the Spanish West Indies, which were regarded as the princ.i.p.al danger-point, both because of the strength of England's position in the Caribbean area, and because that region was the key to the Spanish mainland colonies of the two Americas.

Pretexts for trouble were not lacking. The English dyewood cutters of Honduras did not observe the restrictions placed upon them by the treaty of Paris, and the British government neglected to satisfy Spain's complaints in that regard; the French settlers of Louisiana refused to acknowledge their transfer to the Spanish crown, wherefore it was necessary to employ force against them, and it was believed that English agents had instigated them to resist; on the other hand England repeatedly demanded the payment of a ransom which the English conquerors of Manila had exacted from that city, but Spain refused to pay the claim. The princ.i.p.al diplomatic interest down to 1771, however, was the so-called question of the Falkland Islands (called Malouines by the French, and Maluinas by Spaniards). This group, lying some 250 miles east of the Strait of Magellan, seems to have been discovered by Spanish navigators of the sixteenth century, for a description of the islands was in the possession of the Spanish authorities at an early time. The first English voyage to this group was that of Captain Cowley, as late as 1686, but no claim could be made on this basis, for in 1748 England formally recognized the rights of Spain. Not much attention was paid to the Falklands until after the Seven Years' War, although various navigators visited them, but in 1763 a Spanish pilot, Mathei, made the first of a series of voyages to these islands. In 1764 a French expedition under Bougainville landed at one of them, and formed a settlement, and in the next year the English captain, Biron, touched at a place called Port Egmont by him, took formal possession for England, applying the name Falkland to the group, and proceeded on his way to the Pacific Ocean and around the world. Not long afterward an English settlement was made at Port Egmont, and the governor no sooner heard of the presence of the French than he ordered their withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Spanish government had lodged a complaint at the French court against the occupation of the islands by France, and an agreement was reached, whereby the French should abandon the group and a Spanish settlement there should be formed. This was done, and the English and Spanish governors began mutually to demand each other's withdrawal, the Englishman setting a time limit of six months. The Spanish government directed the captain-general of Buenos Aires to expel the English settlers, and accordingly, though not until June, 1770, these orders were carried out. When the news reached England the British Parliament voted funds in preparation for war, and made excessive demands for reparation for what was considered an insult to England as well as for the rest.i.tution of the colony. Spain, in reliance upon the Family Compact, was not inclined to avoid the issue, and matters even went so far as the retirement of the Spanish and English amba.s.sadors, when an unforeseen event occurred, changing the whole aspect of affairs. This was the fall of Choiseul, the French minister who had negotiated the Family Compact and who was believed by Spain to be ready to bring France into the war. It was on this occasion that Louis XV is reported to have said "My minister wanted war, but I do not," thus calmly disregarding the treaty with Spain. Consequently, Spain had to yield, and in 1771 the Spanish amba.s.sador to London signed a declaration disapproving the removal of the English colonists and promising to restore Port Egmont, although without prejudice to Spain's claim to the islands.[59]

[Sidenote: Revival of the Family Compact as a force in European politics.]

Spain might justly have abandoned the Family Compact after the Falkland incident, and for a time that treaty did suffer a partial eclipse.

Charles III felt that in future he could count only on his own forces, but he continued to increase and equip them, for the danger from England was as great as ever. Self-interest inevitably brought Spain and France together, and with the appearance of the warlike Aranda in France, late in the year 1773, as Spanish amba.s.sador to that court, plans with a view to meeting the common enemy were again discussed. The death of Louis XV, in May, 1774, brought matters still more to a head, for it resulted in a change of ministry in France, whereby Vergennes, believed to be an enthusiastic partisan of the Family Compact, became minister of foreign affairs. Vergennes was in fact an ardent supporter of the Franco-Spanish alliance, although his enthusiasm was tempered in moments of crisis by a clear view of what most favored France, and he did not fail to see that he might employ it as the basis for trade concessions from Spain, the better to build up the resources of France. Nevertheless, the opinion was general that Vergennes intended to adhere to the Family Compact, and consequently England planned to occupy Spain with other affairs, so as to separate her from France, or at least divert her from pursuing a common policy with the last-named country against England. Two matters were at hand, of which they might avail themselves: Spain's disputes with the sultan of Morocco; and her quarrels with Portugal over boundaries in South America.

[Sidenote: Relations with the Moslem states of the Barbary Coast.]

The never-ending wars with the Moslems of northern Africa were inherited from the preceding era, and continued to occupy Spanish troops and fleets down to the reign of Charles III. In 1767 satisfactory relations between Spain and Morocco seemed to have been reached when the latter agreed to abandon piracy and recognized Spain's t.i.tle to her establishments on the North African coast. Late in 1774, however, the sultan announced that he would no longer tolerate Christian posts in his empire, and commenced a siege of Melilla. The attack was beaten off, and it was decided to strike what was hoped might be a decisive blow against the dey of Algiers, the ally of the Moroccan sultan. An expedition of some 18,000 men was prepared, and placed under the command of General O'Reilly, reformer of the Spanish army and a man of tremendous reputation, but in the ensuing operations before Algiers O'Reilly was crushingly defeated with a loss of several thousand men. Rightly or wrongly, England was believed to have instigated the Moslem rulers to attack Spain. Years later, Charles came to an understanding with the Moslem states of the Barbary Coast. Between 1782 and 1786 treaties were made, whereby the rulers of those lands agreed once again to give up piracy and also the inst.i.tution of slavery, besides granting certain religious and commercial privileges to Spaniards in their lands. This was not the last of piracy and warfare in North Africa, however; the former endured for another generation, and the end of the latter, even in the restricted Spanish area, is not yet.