A History of Sea Power Part 29

At 3.48 British and German battle cruisers opened fire. According to Beatty's report the range at this moment was 18,500 yards. Beatty then turned to starboard, a.s.suming a course nearly parallel to that of Hipper. Almost immediately, three minutes after the first salvo, the _Lion_, the _Tiger_, and the _Princess Royal_ were hit by sh.e.l.ls. In these opening minutes the fire of the Germans seems to have been fast and astonishingly accurate. The _Lion_ was. .h.i.t repeatedly, and at four o'clock the roof of one of her turrets was blown off. It is said that the presence of mind and heroic self-sacrifice of an officer saved the ship from the fate that subsequently overwhelmed two of her consorts. By this time the range had decreased to 16,000 yards (British reckoning) and Beatty shifted his course more to the south to confuse the enemy's fire control. Apparently this move did not succeed in its purpose for at 4.06 a salvo struck the _Indefatigable_ on a line with her after turret, and exploded a magazine. As she staggered out of column and began sinking, another salvo smashed into her forward decks and she rolled over and sank like a stone.

About this time the Fifth Battle Squadron came into action, but it was not able to do effective service. The range was extreme, about 20,000 yards, and being some distance astern of the battle cruisers, on account of its inferior speed, it had to contend with the battle smoke of the squadron ahead as well as the gradually thickening atmospheric conditions. In addition the Germans frequently laid smoke screens and zigzagged. Evan-Thomas's division never saw more than two enemy ships at a time.

The shift of course taken by Beatty at four o'clock, accompanied possibly by a corresponding shift of Hipper, opened the range so far in a few minutes that fire slackened on both sides. Beatty then swung to port in order to close to effective range. At 4.15 twelve of his destroyers, acting on the general order to attack when conditions were favorable, dashed out toward the German line.

At the same instant German destroyers, to the number of fifteen accompanied by the light cruiser _Regensburg_, advanced toward the British line, both forces maneuvering to get on the bows of the opposing battle cruisers. For this purpose the British flotilla was better placed because their battle cruisers were well ahead of the Germans. The German destroyers, therefore, concentrated their efforts on the battleship division, which turned away to avoid the torpedoes. In numbers the advantage lay with the Germans, and a fiercely contested action took place between the lines conducted with superb gallantry on both sides. The Germans succeeded in breaking up the British attack at a cost of two destroyers. Two of the British destroyers also were rendered unmanageable and sank later when the High Seas Fleet arrived on the scene.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, FIRST PHASE

Action Between Battle Cruiser Forces.]

Meanwhile, at 4.26, just before the destroyers clashed, a salvo struck the _Queen Mary_, blew up a magazine, and she disappeared with practically all on board. Thus the second of Beatty's battle cruisers was sent to the bottom with tragic suddenness.

At 4.38, Commodore Goodenough, commanding the Second Light Cruiser Squadron, who was scouting ahead of the battle cruisers, reported that the German battle fleet was in sight steering north, and gave its position. Beatty at once called in his destroyers and turned his ships in succession, sixteen points to starboard, ordering Evan-Thomas to turn similarly. Thus the capital ships turned right about on the opposite course, the battleships following the cruisers as before, and all heading for the main fleet which was then about fifty miles away to the north. Commodore Goodenough at this point used his initiative in commendable fashion. Without orders he kept on to the south to establish contact with the German battle fleet and hung on its flanks near enough to report its position to the commander in chief. He underwent a heavy fire, but handled his frail ships so skillfully as to escape serious loss. At the same time the constant maneuvering he was forced to perform or a defect in the British system of communication made his reports of bearing seriously inaccurate. Whatever the cause, this error created a difficulty for the commander in chief, who, fifty miles away, was trying to locate the enemy for attack by the Grand Fleet.

_The Second Phase_

The northward run of the British advance force and the German advance force, followed by their main fleet, was uneventful. The situation was at this stage exactly reversed. Beatty was endeavoring to lead the German forces into the guns of the Grand Fleet, while ostensibly he was attempting to escape from a superior force, much as Hipper had been doing with relation to Scheer during the first phase.

Beatty's four remaining battle cruisers continued to engage the five German battle cruisers, at a range of 14,000 yards, a.s.sisted by the two leading ships of Evan-Thomas's Battle Squadron. The other two battleships engaged the head of the advancing German battle fleet at the extreme range of 19,000 yards as often as they could make out their enemy. The visibility grew worse and apparently neither side scored on the other.

As the British main fleet was reported somewhat to the east of Beatty's position, he bore toward that quarter; and Hipper, to avoid being "T-d" by his enemy, turned to the eastward correspondingly. The mistiness increased to such a degree that shortly after five o'clock Beatty lost sight of the enemy's battle cruisers and ceased fire for half an hour. Between 5.40 and six o'clock, however, conditions were better and firing was opened again by the British ships, apparently with good effect. Meanwhile clashes had already taken place between the light cruiser _Chester_, attached to the Third Battle Squadron of the main fleet, and the light cruisers of the enemy, which were far in advance of their battle cruisers.

_The Third Phase_

We have already noted that as soon as Jellicoe learned of the presence of the enemy he ordered Hood, with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, to cut off the German retreat to the Skagerrak and to support Beatty.

Hood's course had taken him well to the east of where the action was in progress. At 5.40 he saw the flashes of guns far to the northwest, and immediately changed course in that direction. Fifteen minutes later he was able to open fire on German light cruisers, with his four destroyers darting ahead to attack with torpedoes.

These light cruisers, which had just driven off the _Chester_ with heavy losses, discharged torpedoes at Hood's battle cruisers and turned away. The latter shifted helm to avoid them and narrowly missed being hit. One torpedo indeed pa.s.sed under the _Invincible_.

At this point another group of four German light cruisers appeared and Hood's destroyers advanced to attack them. The fire of the cruisers damaged two destroyers though not before one of them, the _Shark_, had torpedoed the German cruiser _Rostock_. The _Shark_ herself was in turn torpedoed and sunk by a German destroyer. At about the same time action had begun between the ships of the armored cruiser squadron under Arbuthnot and another squadron of German light cruisers.

A moment later (at 5.56) Beatty sighted the leaders of the Grand Fleet and knew that contact with his support was established. At once he changed course to about due east and put on full speed in order to head off the German line, and by taking position to the eastward, allow the battle fleet to form line astern of his battle cruisers. Such an overwhelming force was now concentrated on the German light cruisers that they turned back. Of their number the _Wiesbaden_ had been disabled by a concentration of fire and the _Rostock_ torpedoed. Hipper then made a turn of 180 with his battle cruisers in order to get back to the support of the battleships which he had left far to the rear. Then he turned round again, and continued to lead the German advance. All this time he seems to have had no suspicion that the Grand Fleet was in the neighborhood.

[Ill.u.s.tration: TYPE OF BRITISH BATTLESHIP: THE IRON DUKE

From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919

Normal displacement, 25,000 tons. Full load, 28,800.

Length (o. a.), 622-3/4 feet. Beam, 89-1/2 feet.

Mean draught, 28-1/2, feet. Max. draught, 32-3/4 feet.

Length (p. p.), 580 feet

Guns: 5 M. G.

10--13.5 inch (M. V.), Dir. Con. (1 landing) 12--6 inch, 50 cal., Dir. Con. Torpedo tubes (21 inch): 2--3 inch (anti-aircraft) 4 submerged (broadside) 4--3 pdr.]

As Beatty dashed across the front of the approaching battle fleet he sighted Hood's Third Battle Cruiser Squadron ahead of him and signaled him to take station ahead. Accordingly Hood countermarched and led Beatty's line in the _Invincible_. Evan-Thomas was by this time so far in the rear of the speedier battle cruisers that he was unable to follow with Beatty, and in order to avoid confusion with the oncoming battle fleet he turned left 90 in order to form astern of the Sixth Battle Division, by this move, however, leaving Beatty's cruisers unsupported. Meanwhile the armored cruisers of Arbuthnot were already under fire from Hipper's squadron and suffering severely. At 6.16 the _Defense_, the flagship of the squadron, blew up; the _Warrior_ was badly disabled, and the _Black Prince_ was so crippled as to be sunk during the night action. As Evan-Thomas made his turn, one of his battleships, the _Warspite_, was struck by a sh.e.l.l that jammed her steering gear in such a way as to send her head on toward the Germans. She served to shield the _Warrior_ from destruction, but suffered thirty hits from heavy projectiles before she was brought under control and taken out of action.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF JUTLAND, MAY 31, 1916

2nd and 3rd phases]

Between six and 6.15 Jellicoe received bearings from Vice Admiral Burney (of the Sixth Battle Division), Evan-Thomas, and Beatty which enabled him for the first time to plot accurately the position of the German battle fleet. This information revealed the fact that previous plotting based on bearings coming from Goodenough and others was seriously wrong. The Germans were twelve miles to the west of where they were supposed to be. Jellicoe then formed line of battle, not on the starboard wing, which was nearest the head of the German advance, but on the port wing, which was farthest away, and speed was reduced to 14 knots in order to enable the battle cruisers to take station at the head of the line. Indeed some of the ships in the rear or sixth division had to stop their engines to avoid collision during deployment. By this time the ships of the sixth division began to come under the sh.e.l.ls of the German battle fleet and they returned the fire. By half past six all sixteen of the German dreadnoughts were firing at the British lines, the slow predreadnoughts being so far to the rear as to be unable to take part. The battleship fire, however, neither at this point nor later showed the extraordinary accuracy displayed by the battle cruisers at the beginning, but this may possibly be attributed to the gathering mistiness that hung over the sea, darkened by the low-lying smoke from the host of ships.

As soon as Scheer realized that he had not only run right into the arms of the Grand Fleet, but lay in the worst tactical position imaginable with an overwhelming force concentrated on the head of his line, he turned away to escape. The battle cruisers (at 6.30) swung away sharply from east to south, the ships turning in succession. Meanwhile the torpedo flotillas tried to cover the turn by a gallant attack on the British battle line. At the same time smoke screens also were laid to cover the retirement. The _Invincible_, Hood's flagship, which was leading the British line, was at this juncture struck by a sh.e.l.l that penetrated her armor and exploded a magazine. The ship instantly broke in two and went to the bottom, and only four officers and two men were saved. Almost at the same instant the German battle cruiser _Lutzow_, Hipper's flagship, was so badly disabled by sh.e.l.ls and torpedo that she fell out of line helpless. Hipper managed, however, to board a destroyer and two hours later succeeded in shifting his flag to the _Moltke_.

[Ill.u.s.tration: TYPE OF GERMAN BATTLESHIP: THE KOENIG

From Jane, _Fighting Ships_, 1919

Normal displacement, 25,800 tons. Length (waterline), 573 feet.

Beam, 96-3/4 feet. Mean draught, 27-1/4 feet. Length (over all), 580 feet.

Guns: 2 machine.

10--12 inch, 45 cal. Torpedo tubes (19.7 inch): 14--5.9 inch, .50 cal. 4 (broadside) submerged.

(10 or 4--3.4 inch, 22 pdr.?) 1 (bow) submerged.

(2 anti-aircraft?)]

At 6.35 Scheer performed a difficult maneuver that the fleet had practiced for just the situation that existed at this time. He wheeled his battleships simultaneously to starboard, forming line again on a westerly course. Twenty minutes later, finding that he was no longer under fire from the Grand Fleet, he repeated the maneuver, the ships turning again to starboard and forming line ahead again on an easterly, then southerly course. These changes of course were made under cover of smoke screens and were not observed by the British.

By this time the Grand Fleet had formed line of battle on a southeasterly course and by 7.10 its leaders were concentrating their fire on the head of the German line, which was now caught under an overwhelming superiority of force. Unfortunately for the Germans the visibility conditions at this time were worse for them than for their enemy, for while the British ships were nearly or quite invisible, the Germans every now and then stood silhouetted against the western sky. The British fire at this time was heavy and accurate. The German fleet seemed marked for destruction.

For Scheer it was now imperative to withdraw if he could. Accordingly at this juncture he sent out a flotilla of destroyers in a desperate effort to cover the retreat of his fleet. They fired a number of torpedoes at the English battle line, and retired with the loss of one boat. Their stroke succeeded, for Jellicoe turned his whole line of battleships away to avoid the torpedoes. Beatty, holding his course at the head of the line, signaled Admiral Jerram of the _King George V_ to follow astern, but he was evidently bound to the orders of his commander in chief. For the second time that day Beatty was left unsupported in his fight at the head of the line.

Meanwhile Scheer's capital ships had simultaneously wheeled away in line to the westward under cover of the torpedo attacks and smoke screens made by the destroyers. This was the third time within an hour that they had effected this maneuver, and the skill with which the battleships managed these turns in line under a rain of fire speaks well for German seamanship. Meanwhile, to reenforce the covering movement made by the destroyers, Scheer sent out his battle cruisers in a sortie against Beatty, who was pressing hard on the head of the German line. The following account from Commander von Hase of the _Derfflinger_, which led this sortie, is interesting not only for its description of what occurred at this time but also as a picture of a personal experience of the terrific fire that the battle cruisers of both sides had to sustain throughout the greater part of the engagement. It was on them that the brunt of the fighting fell. The narrative is quoted from the pages of the _Naval and Military Record_:

"By now our Commander-in-Chief had realized the danger threatening our fleet, the van of which was enclosed in a semicircle by the hostile fleet. We were, in fact, absolutely 'in the soup' (in absoluten Wurstkessel)! There was only one way to get clear of this tactically disadvantageous position: to turn the whole fleet about and steer on an opposite course. First to evade this dangerous encirclement. But the maneuver must be un.o.bserved and executed without interference.

The battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats must cover the movement of the fleet. At about[1] 9.12 the Commander-in-Chief made the signal to alter course, and almost simultaneously made by W/T [wireless] the historic signal to the battle-cruisers and torpedo-boats: 'Charge the enemy!' (Ran an den Feind!) Without turning a hair the captain ordered 'Full speed ahead, course south-east.' Followed by the _Seydlitz, Molke_, and _Von der Tann_, we steamed at first south-east, then, from 9.15 onward, directly towards the head of the enemy's line.

[Footnote 1: There was a difference of two hours in time between the German and the English standard.]

"And now an infernal fire was opened on us, especially on the _Derfflinger_, as leading ship. Several ships were concentrating their fire upon us. I selected a target and fired as rapidly as possible. The range closed from 12,000 to 8,000 meters, and still we steamed full speed ahead into this inferno of fire, presenting a splendid target to the enemy, while he himself was very difficult to see. Salvo after salvo fell in our immediate vicinity, and sh.e.l.l after sh.e.l.l struck our ship. They were the most exciting minutes.

I could no longer communicate with Lt. von Stosch (who was in the foretop control), as the telephone and voice-pipes had been shot away, so I had to rely an my own observations to direct the fire.

At 9.13, previous to which all four 12 in. turrets were in action, a serious catastrophe occurred. A 15 in. sh.e.l.l penetrated the armor of No. 3 turret and exploded inside. The gallant turret captain, Lt.

von Boltenstern, had both his legs torn off, and with him perished practically the entire guns' crew. The explosion ignited three cartridges, flames from which reached the working chamber, where eight more cartridges were set on fire, and pa.s.sed down to the magazine, igniting still more cartridges. They burned fiercely, the flames roaring high above the turret--but they burned only, they did not explode--as our enemy's cartridges had done--and that saved the ship! Still, the effect of the burning cartridges was catastrophic; the flames killed everything within their reach.

Of the 78 men of the turret crew only five escaped, some badly wounded, by crawling out through the holes for expelling empty cartridge cases. The remaining 73 men died instantly. A few seconds after this catastrophe another disaster befell us. A 15 in. sh.e.l.l pierced the shield of No. 4 turret and burst inside, causing frightful destruction. With the exception of one man, who was blown out of the turret hatch by the blast of air, the entire crew, including all the men in the magazines and sh.e.l.l-rooms, 80 souls in all, were instantly killed. All the cartridges which had been taken out of their metal cases were ignited, so that flames were now shooting sky-high from both the after turrets....

"The enemy's shooting was splendid. Sh.e.l.l after sh.e.l.l crashed into us, and my heart stood still as I thought of what must be happening inside the ship. My thoughts were rudely disturbed. Suddenly it was to us as if the world had come to an end. A terrific roar, a mighty explosion, and then darkness fell upon us. We shook under a tremendous blow, which lifted the conning-tower bodily off its base, to which it sank back vibrating. A heavy sh.e.l.l had struck the gunnery control station about 20 inches from me. The sh.e.l.l burst, but did not penetrate because it had hit the thick armor at an angle, but huge pieces of plating were torn away.... We found, however, that all the artillery connections were undamaged. Splinters had penetrated the lookout slits of the conning-tower, wounding several people inside. The explosion had forced open the door, which jammed, and two men were unable to move it. But help from an unexpected quarter was at hand. Again we heard a terrific roar and crash, and with the noise of a thunderbolt a 15 in. sh.e.l.l exploded beneath the bridge. The blast of air swept away everything that was not firmly riveted down, and the chart-house disappeared bodily.

But the astounding thing was that this same air pressure closed the door of the conning-tower! The Englishman was polite; having first opened the door, he carefully shut it again for us. I searched with my gla.s.s for the enemy, but, although the salvos were still falling about us, we could see practically nothing of him; all that was really visible were the huge, golden-red flames from the muzzles of his guns.... Without much hope of hurting the enemy I fired salvo after salvo from the forward turrets. I could feel how our shooting was calming the nerves of the crew. Had we not fired at this moment the whole ship's company would have been overpowered by a great despair, for everyone knew that a few minutes more of this would finish us. But so long as we fired things could not be so bad with us. The medium guns fired also, but only two of the six 5.9's on one side were still in action. The fourth gun was split from end to end by a burst in the muzzle, and the third was shot to pieces...."

The battle-cruisers were recalled just in time--so it would appear--to save them from annihilation, and Com. von Hase proceeds:

"All hands were now busy quelling the fires. Thick clouds of yellow gas still poured from both after turrets, but the flooding of the magazines soon got rid of this. None of us had believed that a ship could stand so many heavy hits. Some twenty 15 in. hits were counted after the battle, and about the same number of bad hits from smaller calibers. The _Lutzow_ was out of sight (she sank later), but the _Seydlitz, Moltke_, and _Von der Tann_ were still with us. They, too, had been badly punished, the _Seydlitz_ worst of all. Flames still roared from one of her turrets, and all the other ships were burning. The bow of the _Seydlitz_ was deep in the water. Every battle-cruiser had suffered severe casualties.... But the death charge had achieved its purpose by covering the retreat of the battle fleet.... Our ship was very heavily battered, and in many places the compartments were mere heaps of debris. But vital parts were not hit, and, thanks to the strong armor, the engines, boilers, steering gear, and nearly all auxiliaries were undamaged. For a long time the engine-room was filled with noxious fumes, necessitating the use of gas masks.

The entire ship was littered with thousands of large and small sh.e.l.l splinters, among which we found two practically undamaged 15 in. sh.e.l.l caps, which were later used in the wardroom as wine coolers. The belt armour was pierced several times, but either the leaks were stopped or the inflow of water was localized in small compartments. In Wilhelmshaven we buried our dead, nearly 200 in all."

By 8 o'clock the German battleships had vanished, with the British steering westward by divisions in pursuit. But never again did the two battle fleets regain touch with each other. Occasional contact with an enemy vessel was made by other units of Jellicoe's force. About 8.20 another destroyer attack was threatened, and again Jellicoe swerved away, at the same time, however, sending the Fourth Light Cruiser Squadron and two destroyer flotillas, which succeeded in breaking up the attempt. At 8.30 he reformed his fleet in column and continued on a southwesterly course until 9 o'clock.

_Fourth Phase_

As darkness came on, Jellicoe, declining to risk his ships under conditions most favorable to torpedo attack, arranged his battleships in four squadrons a mile apart, with destroyer flotillas five miles astern, and sent a mine-layer to lay a mine field in the neighborhood of the Vyl lightship, covering the route over which the Germans were expected to pa.s.s if they attempted to get home via the Horn Reef. He then headed southeast. Beatty also drew off from pursuit with his battle cruisers. Jellicoe's plan was to avoid a general night action, but to hold such a position as to compel the Germans to fight again the following morning in order to reach their bases.

During the night (between ten and 2.35) there were several sharp conflicts, mainly between the destroyers and light cruisers of the opposing fleets, with considerable loss on both sides. On the British side, two armored cruisers, _Black Prince_ and _Warrior_, went down--both crippled by damages sustained during the day--and five destroyers. Six others were severely damaged. On the German side, the battle cruiser _Lutzow_ sank as a result of her injuries, the predreadnought battleship _Pommern_ was blown up by a torpedo, three light cruisers were sunk, and four or five other ships suffered from torpedo or mine.