A History of Sea Power Part 23

[Ill.u.s.tration: APPROACHES TO MANILA]

With this latter force the first blow of the war was struck on May 1 in Manila Bay. Dewey, largely through the influence of a.s.sistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, had been appointed to the eastern command the autumn before. On reaching his station in January, he took his squadron to Hong Kong to be close to the scene of possible hostilities. On February 25 he received a despatch from Roosevelt, then Acting Secretary: "Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in the Philippine Islands." On April 25 came the inspiring order: "Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavor." The Commodore had already purchased a collier and a supply ship for use in addition to the revenue cutter _McCulloch_, overhauled his vessels and given them a war coat of slate-gray, and made plans for a base at Mirs Bay, 30 miles distant in Chinese waters, where he would be less troubled by neutrality rules in time of war. On April 22 the _Baltimore_ arrived from San Francisco with much-needed ammunition. On the 27th Consul Williams joined with latest news of preparations at Manila, and that afternoon the squadron put to sea.

On the morning of the 30th it was off Luzon, and two ships scouted Subig Bay, which the enemy had left only 24 hours before. At 12 that night Dewey took his squadron in column through the entrance to Manila Bay, just as he had steamed past the forts on the Mississippi with Farragut 35 years before. Only three shots were fired by the guns on sh.o.r.e. The thoroughness of Dewey's preparations, the rapidity of his movements up to this point, and his daring pa.s.sage through a channel which he had reason to believe strongly defended by mines and sh.o.r.e batteries are the just t.i.tles of his fame. The entrance to Manila is indeed 10 miles wide and divided into separate channels by the islands Corregidor, Caballo, and El Fraile. The less frequented channel chosen was, as Dewey rightly judged, too deep for mining except by experts. Yet the Spanish had news of his approach the day before; they had 17 guns, including 6 modern rifles, on the islands guarding the entrance; they had plenty of gunboats that might have been fitted out as torpedo launches for night attack.

It does not detract from the American officer's accomplishment that he drew no false picture of the obstacles with which he had to deal.

At daybreak next morning, having covered slowly the 24 miles from the mouth of the bay up to Manila, the American ships advanced past the city to attack the Spanish flotilla drawn up under the Cavite batteries 6 miles beyond. Here was what an American officer described as "a collection of old tubs scarcely fit to be called men-of-war." The most serviceable was Admiral Montojo's flagship _Reina Cristina_, an unarmored cruiser of 3500 tons; the remaining half dozen were older ships of both wood and iron, some of them not able to get under way. They mounted 31 guns above 4-inch to the Americans' 53. More serious in prospect, though not in reality, was the danger from sh.o.r.e batteries and mines. The United States vessels approached in column, led by the _Olympia_, which opened fire at 5.40. In the words of Admiral Dewey's report, "The squadron maintained a continuous and precise fire at ranges varying from 5000 to 2000 yards, countermarching in a line approximately parallel to that of the Spanish fleet. The enemy's fire was vigorous, but generally ineffective. Three runs were made from the eastward and three from the westward, so that both broadsides were brought to bear." One torpedo launch which dashed out was sunk and another driven ash.o.r.e. The _Cristina_ moved out as if to ram, but staggered back under the _Olympia's_ concentrated fire. At 7.35, owing to a mistaken report that only 15 rounds of ammunition were left for the 5-inch guns, the American squadron retired temporarily, but renewed action at 11.16 and ended it an hour later, when the batteries were silenced and "every enemy ship sunk, burned or deserted."

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF MANILA, MAY 1, 1898]

As reported by Admiral Montojo, the Spanish lost 381 men. The American ships were hit only 15 times and had 7 men slightly injured. Volume and accuracy of gunfire won the day. Somewhat extravagant language has been used in describing the battle, which, whatever the perils that might naturally have been expected, was a most one-sided affair.

But it is less easy to overpraise Admiral Dewey's energetic and aggressive handling of the entire campaign.

Manila thereafter lay helpless under the guns of the squadron, and upon the arrival and landing of troops surrendered on August 13, after a merely formal defense. In the interim, Spain sent out a relief force under Admiral Camara consisting of the _Pelaya, Carlos V_ and other smaller units, before encountering which Dewey planned to leave Manila and await the arrival of two monitors then on their way from San Francisco. After getting through the Suez Ca.n.a.l, Camara was brought back (July 8) by an American threat against the coast of Spain.

Soon after the battle a number of foreign warships congregated at Manila, including 5 German ships under Admiral von Diedrichs, a force superior to Dewey's, and apparently bent on learning by persistent contravention all the rules of a blockaded port. The message finally sent to the German Admiral is reticently described by Dewey himself, but is said to have been to the effect that, if the German admiral wanted a fight, "he could have it right now."

On the day of the surrender of Manila the British and the j.a.panese ships in the harbor took a position between the American and the German squadrons. This was just after the seizure of Kiao-chau, at a time when Germany was vigorously pushing out for "a place in the sun." But for the American commander's quiet yet firm stand, with British support, the United States might have encountered more serious complications in taking over 127,000 square miles of archipelago in the eastern world, with important trade interests, a lively insurrection, and a population of 7 million.

_The Santiago Campaign_

In the Atlantic, where it was the American policy not to carry their offensive beyond Spain's West Indies possessions, events moved more slowly. Rear Admiral Sicard, in command of the North Atlantic squadron based on Key West, was retired in March for physical disability and succeeded by William T. Sampson, who stepped up naturally from senior captain in the squadron and was already distinguished for executive ability and knowledge of ordnance. Sampson's first proposal was, in the event of hostilities, a bombardment of Havana, a plan approved by all his captains and showing a confidence inspired perhaps by coastal operations in the Civil War; but this was properly vetoed by the Department on the ground that no ships should be risked against sh.o.r.e defenses until they had struck at the enemy's naval force and secured control of the sea. An earlier memorandum from Secretary Long, outlining plans for a blockade of Cuba, had been based on suggestions from Rear Admiral (then Captain) Mahan,[1] and his strategic insight may have guided this decision. On April 22, Sampson, now acting rear admiral, placed his force off Havana and established a close blockade over 100 miles on the northern coast.

[Footnote 1: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 19.]

The problem for American strategy was now Cervera's "fleet in being,"--inferior in force but a menace until destroyed or put out of action--which, as before stated, left the Cape Verde Islands on April 29, for a destination unknown. A bombardment of cities on the American coast or a raid on the North Atlantic trade routes was within the realm of possibilities. Difficulties of coaling and an inveterate tendency to leave the initiative to the enemy decided the Spanish against such a project. But its bare possibility set the whole east coast in a panic, which has been much ridiculed, but which arose naturally enough from a complete lack of instruction in naval matters and from lack of a sensible control of the press.

The result was an unfortunate division of the fleet. A so-called Flying squadron under Commodore Schley, consisting of the _Brooklyn, Ma.s.sachusetts, Texas,_ and 3 small cruisers, was held at Hampton Roads; whereas, if not thus employed, these ships might have blockaded the south side of Cuba from the beginning of the war. A northern patrol squadron, of vessels not of much use for this or any other purpose, was also organized to guard the coast from Hampton Roads north.

On May 4, with Cervera still at large, Sampson lifted his guard of Havana--unwisely in the opinion of Mahan--and took his best ships, the _New York, Indiana, Iowa,_ and two monitors, to reconnoiter San Juan, Porto Rico, where it was thought the missing fleet might first appear. Just as he was bombarding San Juan, on the morning of May 12, the Navy Department received a cable from Martinique announcing Cervera's arrival there. Havana and Cienfuegos (on the south side of Cuba and connected with Havana by rail) were considered the only two ports where the Spanish fleet could be of value to the forces on the island; and from these two ports both American squadrons were at this time a thousand miles away. Schley hastened southward, left Key West on the 19th, and was off Cienfuegos by daylight on the 21st. It was fairly quick work; but had the Spanish fleet moved thither at its usual speed of 6 knots from its last stopping-place, it would have got there first by at least 12 hours.

The Spanish admiral, finding no coal at Martinique, had left a crippled destroyer there and moved on to the Dutch island of Curacao, where on the 14th and 15th he secured with difficulty about 500 tons of fuel. Thence, in all anxiety, he made straight for the nearest possible refuge, Santiago, where he put in at daybreak on the 19th and was soon receiving congratulations on the completion of a successful cruise.

[Ill.u.s.tration: WEST INDIES

Movements in the Santiago campaign.]

By the next day Sampson, having hurried back from San Juan and coaled, was again in force off Havana. There he received news of Cervera's arrival in Santiago. Since Havana could not be uncovered, he sent instructions to Schley--at first discretionary, and then, as the reports were confirmed, more imperative--to blockade the eastern port. Though the commander of the Flying Squadron received the latter orders on the 23d, he had seen smoke in Cienfuegos harbor and still believed he had Cervera cornered there. Accordingly he delayed until evening of the next day. Then, after reaching Santiago, he cabled on the 27th that he was returning to Key West to coal, though he had a collier with him and stringent orders to the contrary; and it was not until the 29th that he actually established the Santiago Blockade. Sampson, his superior in command (though not his senior in the captains' list), later declared his conduct at this time "reprehensible"[1]--possibly too harsh a term, for the circ.u.mstances tried judgment and leadership in the extreme. Cervera found Santiago dest.i.tute of facilities for refitting. Yet the fact remains that he had 10 days in which to coal and get away. "We cannot," writes Admiral Mahan, "expect ever again to have an enemy so inept as Spain showed herself to be."[1*]

[Footnote 1: Letter to Secretary, July 10, 1898, SAMPSON-SCHLEY DOc.u.mENTS, p. 136: "Had the commodore left his station at that time he probably would have been court-martialed, so plain was his duty.... This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from his subsequent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him ample justice on this occasion." A court of inquiry later decided that Commodore Schley's service up to June 1 was characterized by "vacillation, dilatoriness, and lack of enterprise."]

[Footnote 1*: LESSONS OF THE WAR WITH SPAIN, p. 157.]

The "bottling up" of Cervera cleared the situation, and the navy could now concentrate on a task still difficult but well defined.

Sampson brought his force to Santiago on June 1, and a.s.sumed immediate command. A close blockade was inst.i.tuted such as against adequate torpedo and mine defenses would have been highly dangerous even at that day. Three picket launches were placed about a mile off sh.o.r.e, three small vessels a mile further out, and beyond these the 5 or 6 major units, under steam and headed toward the entrance in a carefully planned disposition to meet any attempt at escape.

At night a battleship stood in and played its searchlight directly on the mouth of the channel. The latter was six miles in length, with difficult turns, and at the narrowest point only 300 feet wide. Lieut. Hobson's gallant effort on June 3 to sink the collier _Merrimac_ across the channel had made its navigation even more difficult, though the vessel did not lie athwart-stream. Mine barriers and batteries on the high hills at the harbor mouth prevented forcing the channel, but the guns were mostly of ancient type and failed to keep the ships at a distance. On the other hand, bombardments from the latter did little more than to afford useful target practice.

The despatch of troops to Santiago was at once decided upon, and the subsequent campaign, if it could be fully studied, would afford interesting lessons in combined operations. On June 22, 16,000 men under General Shafter landed at Daiquiri, 15 miles east of Santiago, in 52 boats provided by the fleet, though the War Department had previously stated that the general would "land his own troops."[2]

"It was done in a scramble," writes Col. Roosevelt; and there was great difficulty in getting the skippers of army transports to bring their vessels within reasonable distance of the sh.o.r.e. Since the sole object of the campaign was to get at and destroy the enemy fleet, the navy fully expected and understood that the army would make its first aim to advance along the coast and capture the batteries at the entrance, so that the mines could be lifted and the harbor forced. Army authorities declare this would have involved division of forces on both sides of the channel and impossibilities of transportation due to lack of roads. But these difficulties applied also in a measure to the defenders, and might perhaps have been surmounted by full use of naval aid.

[Footnote 2: Goode, WITH SAMPSON THROUGH THE WAR, p. 182.]

Instead, the army set out with some confidence to capture the city itself. El Caney and San Juan Hill were seized on July 2 after a b.l.o.o.d.y struggle in which the Spanish stuck to their defenses heroically and inflicted 1600 casualties. By their own figures the Spanish on this day had only 1700 men engaged, though there were 36,500 Spanish troops in the province and 12,000 near at hand. In considerable discouragement, Shafter now spoke of withdrawal, and urged Sampson "immediately to force the entrance"[1]--in spite of the fact that the main purpose in sending troops had been to avoid this very measure. In view of threatening foreign complications and the impossibility of replacing battleships, it was imperative not to risk them against mines.

[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, p. 190.]

Food conditions were serious in Santiago, but Cervera was absolutely determined not to a.s.sume responsibility for taking his fleet out to what he regarded as certain slaughter. A night sortie, with ships issuing one by one out of an intricate channel into the glare of searchlights, he declared more difficult than one by day. Fortunately for the Americans, in view of the situation ash.o.r.e, the decision was taken out of his hands, and Governor General Blanco from Havana peremptorily ordered him to put to sea. The time of his exit, Sunday morning, July 3, was luckily chosen, for Sampson, in the _New York_, was 10 miles to eastward on his way to a conference with Shafter, and the _Ma.s.sachusetts_ was at Guantanamo for coal. The flagship _Maria Teresa_ led out at 9.35, followed 10 minutes later by the _Vizcaya_, and then by the _Colon, Oquendo_, and the destroyers _Furor_ and _Pluton_, each turning westward at top speed.

[Ill.u.s.tration: BATTLE OF SANTIAGO, JULY 3, 1898]

Simultaneously the big blockaders crowded toward them and opened a heavy fire, while stokers shoveled desperately below to get up steam.

To the surprise of other vessels, Schley's ship, the _Brooklyn_, after heading towards the entrance, swung round, not with the enemy, but to starboard, just sliding past the _Texas'_ bow. This much discussed maneuver Schley afterward explained as made to avoid blanketing the fire of the rest of the squadron. The _Oregon_, which throughout the blockade had kept plenty of steam, "rushed past the _Iowa_," in the words of Captain Robley Evans, "like an express train," in a cloud of smoke lighted by vicious flashes from her guns. In ten minutes the _Maria Teresa_ turned for sh.o.r.e, hit by 30 projectiles, her decks, enc.u.mbered with woodwork, bursting into ma.s.ses of flame. The concentration upon her at the beginning had shifted to the _Oquendo_ in the rear, which ran ash.o.r.e with guns silenced 5 minutes after the leader.

Shortly before 11, the _Vizcaya_, with a torpedo ready in one of her bow tubes, turned towards the _Brooklyn_, which had kept in the lead of the American ships. A sh.e.l.l hitting squarely in the _Vizcaya's_ bow caused a heavy explosion and she sheered away, the guns of the _Brooklyn, Oregon_, and _Iowa_ bearing on her as she ran towards the beach. The _Colon_, with a trial speed of 20 knots, and 6 miles ahead of the _Brooklyn_ and _Oregon_, appeared to stand a good chance of getting finally away. The _New York_, rushing back toward the battle, was still well astern. But the _Colon's_ speed, which had averaged 13.7 knots, slackened as her fire-room force played out; and shortly after 1 p.m. she ran sh.o.r.eward, opened her Kingston valves, and went down after surrender. She had been hit only 6 times.

In the first stage of the fight the little yacht _Gloucester_, under Lieutenant Commander Wainwright, had dashed pluckily upon the two destroyers, which were also under fire from the secondary batteries of the big ships. The _Furor_ was sunk and the _Pluton_ driven ash.o.r.e.

There is hardly a record in naval history of such complete destruction.

Of 2300 Spaniards, 1800 were rescued as prisoners from the burning wrecks or from the Cuban guerillas on sh.o.r.e, 350 met their death, and the rest escaped towards Santiago. The American loss consisted of one man killed and one wounded on the _Brooklyn_. This ship, which owing to its leading position had been the chief enemy target, received 20 hits from sh.e.l.ls or fragments, and the other vessels altogether about as many more. An examination of the half-sunken and fire-scarred Spanish hulks showed 42 hits out of 1300 rounds from the American main batteries, or 3.2 per cent, and 73 from secondary batteries. Probably these figures should be doubled to give the actual number, but even so they revealed the need of improvement in gunnery.

Sampson was right when he stated earlier in the campaign that the destruction of the Spanish fleet would end the war. Santiago surrendered a fortnight later without further fighting. An expeditionary force under General Miles made an easy conquest of Puerto Rico. On August 12, a protocol of peace was signed, by the terms of which the United States took over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (upon payment of 20 million dollars), and Cuba became independent under American protection. The war greatly strengthened the position of the United States in the Caribbean, and gave her new interests and responsibilities in the Pacific. In the possession of distant dependencies the nation found a new motive for increased naval protection and for more active concern in international affairs.

2. THE RUSSO-j.a.pANESE WAR

At the time when the United States acquired the Philippines, the Far East was a storm center of international disturbance. Russia, with the support of Germany and France, had, as already noted, combined to prevent j.a.pan from fully exploiting her victory over China. The latter country, however, had every appearance of a melon ripe for cutting; and under guise of security for loans, indemnity for injuries, railroad and treaty-port concessions, and special spheres of influence, each European nation endeavored to mark out its prospective share. Russia, in return for protecting China against j.a.pan, gained a short-cut for her Siberian Railway across Northern Manchuria, with rail and mining concessions in that province and prospects of getting hold of both Port Arthur and Kiao-chau. But, at an opportune moment for Germany, two German missionaries were murdered in 1897 by Chinese bandits. Germany at once seized Kiao-chau, and in March, 1898, extorted a 99-year lease of the port, with exclusive development privileges throughout the peninsula of Shantung.

"The German Michael," as Kaiser Wilhelm said at a banquet on the departure of his fleet to the East, had "firmly planted his shield upon Chinese soil"; and "the gospel of His Majesty's hallowed person,"

as Admiral Prince Heinrich a.s.serted in reply, "was to be preached to every one who will hear it and also to those who do not wish to hear." "Our establishment on the coast of China," writes ex-Chancellor van Bulow, "was in direct and immediate connection with the progress of the fleet, and a first step into the field of world politics... giving us _a place in the sun_ in Eastern Asia."[1]

[Footnote 1: From London _Spectator_, Dec. 26, 1897, quoted in Morse, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE, Vol. III, p. 108.]

[Ill.u.s.tration: THEATER OF OPERATIONS, RUSSO-j.a.pANESE WAR]

Thus forestalled at Kiao-chau, Russia at once pushed through a 25-year lease of Port Arthur, and proceeded to strengthen it as a fortified port and naval base. England, though preoccupied with the Boer War, took Wei-hai-wai as a precautionary measure, "for as long a time as Port Arthur shall remain a possession of Russia."[1]

France secured a new base in southern China on Kw.a.n.g-chau Bay, and Italy tried likewise but failed. Aroused by the foreign menace, the feeling of the Chinese ma.s.ses burst forth in the summer of 1900 in the ma.s.sacres and uprisings known as the Boxer Rebellion. In the combined expedition to relieve the legations at Peking j.a.panese troops displayed superior deftness, discipline, and endurance, and gained confidence in their ability to cope with the armies of European powers.

[Footnote 1: _Ibid._, III, 118.]

In the period following, Germany in Shantung and Russia in Manchuria pursued steadily their policy of exploitation. Against it, the American Secretary of State John Hay advanced the policy of the _Open Door_, "to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative ent.i.ty... and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."[1] To this the powers gave merely lip-service, realizing that her fixed policy of isolation would restrain the United States from either diplomatic combinations or force. "The open hand," wrote Hay in discouragement, "will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinese as the raised club,"[2] nor was it so efficacious in dealing with other nations concerned. j.a.pan, however, had strained every energy to build up her army and navy for a conflict that seemed inevitable, and was ready to back her opposition to European advances by force if need be. In 1902 she protected herself against a combination of foes by defensive alliance with England. She demanded that Russia take her troops out of Manchuria and recognize j.a.panese predominance in Korea. Russia hoped to forestall hostilities until she could further strengthen her army and fleet in the East, but when the transfer of ships reached the danger point, j.a.pan declared war, February 8, 1904, and struck viciously that same night.

[Footnote 1: NOTE TO THE EUROPEAN POWERS, July 3, 1900.]

[Footnote 2: Thayer, LIFE OF HAY, II, 369.]

As in the Spanish-American War, control of the sea was vital, since j.a.pan must depend upon it to move her troops to the continental theater of war. Nor could she hold her army pa.s.sive while awaiting the issue of a struggle for sea control. Delay would put a greater relative strain on her finances, and give Russia, handicapped by long communications over the single-track Siberian Railway, a better chance to ma.s.s in the East her troops and supplies. j.a.pan's plan was therefore to strike hard for naval advantage, but to begin at once, in any event, the movement of troops overseas. At the outbreak of war her fleet of 6 battleships and 6 armored cruisers, with light cruiser and destroyer flotillas, was a.s.sembled at Sasebo near the Straits of Tsushima, thoroughly organized for fighting and imbued with the spirit of war. j.a.pan had an appreciable naval superiority, but was handicapped by the task of protecting her transports and by the necessity--which she felt keenly--of avoiding losses in battle which would leave her helpless upon the possible advent of Russia's Baltic reserves.

Russia's main naval strength in the East consisted of 7 battleships and 3 armored cruisers, presenting a combined broadside of 100 guns against j.a.pan's 124. The support of the Black Sea fleet was denied by the att.i.tude of England, which would prevent violation of the agreement restricting it from pa.s.sing the Dardanelles. The Baltic fleet, however, was an important though distant reserve force, a detachment from which was actually in the Red Sea on its way east at the outbreak of war.

Just as clearly as it was j.a.pan's policy to force the fighting on land, so it should have been Russia's to prevent j.a.pan's movement of troops by aggressive action at sea. This called for concentration of force and concentration of purpose. But neither was evident in the Russian plan of campaign, which betrayed confusion of thought and a traditional leaning toward the defensive--acceptance on the one hand of what has been called "fortress fleet" doctrine, that fleets exist to protect bases and can serve this purpose by being shut up in them; and on the other hand of exaggerated "fleet in being" theory, that the mere presence of the Russian fleet, though inactive, would prevent j.a.pan's use of the sea. Thus in October, 1903, Witjeft, chief of the Port Arthur naval staff, declared that a landing of j.a.panese troops either in the Liao-tung or the Korean Gulf was "impossible so long as our fleet is not destroyed." Just as Russia's total force was divided between east and west, so her eastern force was divided between Vladivostok and Port Arthur, with the j.a.panese in central position between. Three armored cruisers were in the northern port, and 7 battleships in the other; and all Russia's efforts after war broke out were vainly directed toward remedying this faulty disposition before it began. The whole Russian fleet in the East, moreover, was, it is said, badly demoralized and unready for war, owing chiefly to bureaucratic corruption and to the fact that not merely its strategical direction but its actual command was vested in the Viceroy, Alexieff, with headquarters on sh.o.r.e.

_Operations Around Port Arthur_