A History of Indian Philosophy Part 62

The question is sometimes asked, how the maya becomes a.s.sociated with Brahman. But Vedanta thinks this question illegitimate, for this a.s.sociation did not begin in time either with reference to the cosmos or with reference to individual persons.

In fact there is no real a.s.sociation, for the creation of illusion does not affect the unchangeable truth. Maya or illusion is no real ent.i.ty, it is only false knowledge (_avidya_) that makes the appearance, which vanishes when the reality is grasped and found.

Maya or avidya has an apparent existence only so long as it lasts, but the moment the truth is known it is dissolved. It is not a real ent.i.ty in a.s.sociation with which a real world-appearance has been brought into permanent existence, for it only has existence so long as we are deluded by it (_prat.i.tika-satta_).

Maya therefore is a category which baffles the ordinary logical division of existence and non-existence and the principle of excluded middle. For the maya can neither be said to be "is" nor "is not" (_tattvanyatvabhyam anirvacaniya_). It cannot be said that such a logical category does not exist, for all our dream and illusory cognitions demonstrate it to us. They exist as they are perceived, but they do not exist since they have no other independent existence than the fact of their perception. If it has any creative function, that function is as illusive as its own nature, for the creation only lasts so long as the error lasts.

Brahman, the truth, is not in any way sullied or affected by a.s.sociation with maya, for there can be no a.s.sociation of the real with the empty, the maya, the illusory. It is no real a.s.sociation but a mere appearance.

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In what sense is the world-appearance false?

The world is said to be false--a mere product of maya. The falsehood of this world-appearance has been explained as involved in the category of the indefinite which is neither _sat_ "is"

nor _asat_ "is not." Here the opposition of the "is" and "is not"

is solved by the category of time. The world-appearance is "is not," since it does not continue to manifest itself in all times, and has its manifestation up to the moment that the right knowledge dawns. It is not therefore "is not" in the sense that a "castle in the air" or a hare's horn is "is not," for these are called _tuccha_, the absolutely non-existent. The world-appearance is said to be "is" or existing, since it appears to be so for the time the state of ignorance persists in us. Since it exists for a time it is _sat_ (is), but since it does not exist for all times it is _asat_ (is not). This is the appearance, the falsehood of the world-appearance (_jagat-prapanca_) that it is neither _sat_ nor _asat_ in an absolute sense. Or rather it may also be said in another way that the falsehood of the world-appearance consists in this, that though it appears to be the reality or an expression or manifestation of the reality, the being, _sat_, yet when the reality is once rightly comprehended, it will be manifest that the world never existed, does not exist, and will never exist again. This is just what we find in an illusory perception; when once the truth is found out that it is a conch-sh.e.l.l, we say that the silver, though it appeared at the time of illusory perception to be what we saw before us as "this" (this is silver), yet it never existed before, does not now exist, and will never exist again. In the case of the illusory perception of silver, the "this" (pointing to a thing before me) appeared as silver; in the case of the world-appearance, it is the being (_sat_), the Brahman, that appears as the world; but as in the case when the "this" before us is found to be a piece of conch-sh.e.l.l, the silver is at once dismissed as having had no existence in the "this"

before us, so when the Brahman, the being, the reality, is once directly realized, the conviction comes that the world never existed. The negation of the world-appearance however has no separate existence other than the comprehension of the ident.i.ty of the real. The fact that the real is realized is the same as that the world-appearance is negated. The negation here involved refers both to the thing negated (the world-appearance) and the

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negation itself, and hence it cannot be contended that when the conviction of the negation of the world is also regarded as false (for if the negation is not false then it remains as an ent.i.ty different from Brahman and hence the unqualified monism fails), then this reinstates the reality of the world-appearance; for negation of the world-appearance is as much false as the world-appearance itself, and hence on the realization of the truth the negative thesis, that the world-appearance does not exist, includes the negation also as a manifestation of world-appearance, and hence the only thing left is the realized ident.i.ty of the truth, the being. The peculiarity of this illusion of world-appearance is this, that it appears as consistent with or inlaid in the being (_sat_) though it is not there. This of course is dissolved when right knowledge dawns. This indeed brings home to us the truth that the world-appearance is an appearance which is different from what we know as real ([email protected]@na_); for the real is known to us as that which is proved by the [email protected], and which will never again be falsified by later experience or other means of proof.

A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted; but since at the dawn of right knowledge this world-appearance will be found to be false and non-existing, it cannot be regarded as real [Footnote ref l]. Thus Brahman alone is true, and the world-appearance is false; falsehood and truth are not contrary ent.i.ties such that the negation or the falsehood of falsehood will mean truth.

The world-appearance is a whole and in referring to it the negation refers also to itself as a part of the world-appearance and hence not only is the positive world-appearance false, but the falsehood itself is also false; when the world-appearance is contradicted at the dawn of right knowledge, the falsehood itself is also contradicted.

Brahman differs from all other things in this that it is self-luminous (_svaprakas'a_) and has no form; it cannot therefore be the object of any other consciousness that grasps it. All other things, ideas, emotions, etc., in contrast to it are called [email protected]'ya_ (objects of consciousness), while it is the [email protected]@ta_ (the pure consciousness comprehending all objects). As soon as anything is comprehended as an expression of a mental state ([email protected]_), it is said to have a form and it becomes [email protected]'ya, and this is the characteristic of all objects of consciousness that they cannot reveal themselves apart from being manifested as objects of consciousness through a mental state.

[Footnote 1: See _Advaitasiddhi, Mithyatvanirukti_.]

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Brahman also, so long as it is understood as a meaning of the [email protected] text, is not in its true nature; it is only when it shines forth as apart from the a.s.sociations of any form that it is svaprakas'a and [email protected]@ta. The knowledge of the pure Brahman is devoid of any form or mode. The notion of [email protected]'yatva_ (objectivity) carries with it also the notion of [email protected]_ (materiality) or its nature as non-consciousness (_ajnanatva_) and non-selfness (_anatmatva_) which consists in the want of self-luminosity of objects of consciousness.

The relation of consciousness (_jnana_) to its objects cannot be regarded as real but as mere illusory impositions, for as we shall see later, it is not possible to determine the relation between knowledge and its forms. Just as the silver-appearance of the conch-sh.e.l.l is not its own natural appearance, so the forms in which consciousness shows itself are not its own natural essence.

In the state of emanc.i.p.ation when supreme bliss (_ananda_) shines forth, the ananda is not an object or form of the illuminating consciousness, but it is the illumination itself. Whenever there is a form a.s.sociated with consciousness, it is an extraneous illusory imposition on the pure consciousness. These forms are different from the essence of consciousness, not only in this that they depend on consciousness for their expression and are themselves but objects of consciousness, but also in this that they are all finite determinations (_paricchinna_), whereas consciousness, the abiding essence, is everywhere present without any limit whatsoever.

The forms of the object such as cow, jug, etc. are limited in themselves in what they are, but through them all the pure being runs by virtue of which we say that the cow is, the jug is, the pot is. Apart from this pure being running through all the individual appearances, there is no other cla.s.s (_jati_) such as cowness or jugness, but it is on this pure being that different individual forms are illusorily imposed ([email protected] sadarthekalpitam, pratyekam tadanubiddhatvena [email protected]_). So this world-appearance which is essentially different from the Brahman, the being which forms the material cause on which it is imposed, is false ([email protected]@[email protected]@[email protected] --as Citsukha has it).

The nature of the world-appearance, phenomena.

The world-appearance is not however so illusory as the perception of silver in the conch-sh.e.l.l, for the latter type of worldly illusions is called _pratibhasika,_ as they are contradicted by other

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later experiences, whereas the illusion of world-appearance is never contradicted in this worldly stage and is thus called _vyavaharika_ (from _vyavahara_, practice, i.e. that on which is based all our practical movements). So long as the right knowledge of the Brahman as the only reality does not dawn, the world-appearance runs on in an orderly manner uncontradicted by the acc.u.mulated experience of all men, and as such it must be held to be true.

It is only because there comes such a stage in which the world-appearance ceases to manifest itself that we have to say that from the ultimate and absolute point of view the world-appearance is false and unreal. As against this doctrine of the Vedanta it is sometimes asked how, as we see the reality (_sattva_) before us, we can deny that it has truth. To this the Vedanta answers that the notion of reality cannot be derived from the senses, nor can it be defined as that which is the content of right knowledge, for we cannot have any conception of right knowledge without a conception of reality, and no conception of reality without a conception of right knowledge. The conception of reality comprehends within it the notions of unalterability, absoluteness, and independence, which cannot be had directly from experience, as this gives only an appearance but cannot certify its truth.

Judged from this point of view it will be evident that the true reality in all our experience is the one self-luminous flash of consciousness which is all through identical with itself in all its manifestations of appearance. Our present experience of the world-appearance cannot in any way guarantee that it will not be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all experience is the being (_sat_) and not its forms. This being that is a.s.sociated with all our experience is not a universal genus nor merely the individual appearance of the moment, but it is the being, the truth which forms the substratum of all objective events and appearances (_ekenaiva sarvanugatena sarvatra [email protected]_).

Things are not existent because they possess the genus of being (_sat_) as Nyaya supposes, but they are so because they are themselves but appearance imposed on one identical being as the basis and ground of all experience. Being is thus said to be the basis ([email protected]@thana_) on which the illusions appear. This being is not different with different things but one in all appearances. Our perceptions of the world-appearance could have been taken as a guarantee of their reality, if the reality which is supposed of them

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could be perceived by the senses, and if inference and s'ruti (scriptures) did not point the other way. Perception can of course invalidate inference, but it can do so only when its own validity has been ascertained in an undoubted and uncontested manner.

But this is not the case with our perceptions of the world-appearance, for our present perceptions cannot prove that these will never be contradicted in future, and inference and s'ruti are also against it. The mere fact that I perceive the world-appearance cannot prove that what I perceive is true or real, if it is contradicted by inference. We all perceive the sun to be small, but our perception in this case is contradicted by inference and we have hence to admit that our perceptions are erroneous. We depend (_upajivya_) indeed for all our transactions on perception, but such dependence cannot prove that that on which we depend is absolutely valid. Validity or reality can only be ascertained by proper examination and enquiry ([email protected]_), which may convince us that there is no error in it. True it is that by the universal testimony of our contemporaries and by the practical fruition and realization of our endeavours in the external world, it is proved beyond doubt that the world-appearance before us is a reality.

But this sort of examination and enquiry cannot prove to us with any degree of satisfaction that the world-appearance will never be contradicted at any time or at any stage. The Vedanta also admits that our examination and enquiry prove to us that the world-appearance now exists as it appears; it only denies that it cannot continue to exist for all times, and a time will come when to the emanc.i.p.ated person the world-appearance will cease to exist. The experience, observation, and practical utility of the objects as perceived by us cannot prove to us that these will never be contradicted at any future time. Our perception of the world-appearance cannot therefore disprove the Vedanta inference that the world-appearance is false, and it will demonstrate itself to be so at the time when the right knowledge of Brahman as one dawns in us. The testimony of the [email protected] also contradicts the perception which grasps the world-appearance in its manifold aspect.

Moreover we are led to think that the world-appearance is false, for it is not possible for us to discover any true relation between the consciousness ([email protected]_) and the objects of consciousness ([email protected]'ya_). Consciousness must be admitted to have some kind of

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connection with the objects which it illumines, for had it not been so there could be any knowledge at any time irrespective of its connections with the objects. But it is not possible to imagine any kind of connection between consciousness and its objects, for it can neither be contact ([email protected]_) nor inherence (_samavaya_); and apart from these two kinds of connections we know of no other. We say that things are the objects of our consciousness, but what is meant by it is indeed difficult to define. It cannot be that objectivity of consciousness means that a special effect like the jnatata of [email protected] is produced upon the object, for such an effect is not admissible or perceivable in any way; nor can objectivity also mean any practical purpose (of being useful to us) a.s.sociated with the object as Prabhakara thinks, for there are many things which are the objects of our consciousness but not considered as useful (e.g. the sky). Objectivity also cannot mean that the thing is the object of the thought-movement ([email protected]_) involved in knowledge, for this can only be with reference to objects present to the perceiver, and cannot apply to objects of past time about which one may be conscious, for if the thing is not present how can it be made an object of thought-movement?

Objectivity further cannot mean that the things project their own forms on the knowledge and are hence called objects, for though this may apply in the case of perception, it cannot be true of inference, where the object of consciousness is far away and does not mould consciousness after its own form. Thus in whatever way we may try to conceive manifold things existing separately and becoming objects of consciousness we fail. We have also seen that it is difficult to conceive of any kind of relation subsisting between objects and consciousness, and hence it has to be admitted that the imposition of the world-appearance is after all nothing but illusory.

Now though all things are but illusory impositions on consciousness yet for the illumination of specific objects it is admitted even by Vedanta that this can only take place through specific sense-contact and particular mental states ([email protected]_) or modes; but if that be so why not rather admit that this can take place even on the a.s.sumption of the absolute reality of the manifold external world without? The answer that the Vedanta gives to such a question is this, that the phenomenon of illumination has not to undergo any gradual process, for it is the work of one

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flash like the work of the light of a lamp in removing darkness; so it is not possible that the external reality should have to pa.s.s through any process before consciousness could arise; what happens is simply this, that the reality (_sat_) which subsists in all things as the same identical one reveals the object as soon as its veil is removed by a.s.sociation with the [email protected] (mental mould or state). It is like a light which directly and immediately illuminates everything with which it comes into relation. Such an illumination of objects by its underlying reality would have been continuous if there were no veils or covers, but that is not so as the reality is hidden by the veil of ajnana (nescience). This veil is removed as soon as the light of consciousness shines through a mental mould or [email protected], and as soon as it is removed the thing shines forth. Even before the formation of the [email protected] the illusory impositions on the reality had still been continuing objectively, but it could not be revealed as it was hidden by ajnana which is removed by the action of the corresponding [email protected]; and as soon as the veil is removed the thing shines forth in its true light. The action of the senses, eye, etc. serves but to modify the [email protected] of the mind, and the [email protected] of the mind once formed, the corresponding ajnana veil which was covering the corresponding specific part of the world-appearance is removed, and the illumination of the object which was already present, being divested of the veil, shows itself forth. The illusory creations were there, but they could not be manifested on account of the veil of nescience. As soon as the veil is removed by the action of the [email protected] the light of reality shows the corresponding illusory creations. So consciousness in itself is the ever-shining light of reality which is never generated but ever exists; errors of perception (e.g. silver in the conch-sh.e.l.l) take place not because the [email protected] consisting of the defect of the eye, the glaze of the object and such other elements that contributed to the illusion, generated the knowledge, but because it generated a wrong [email protected] It is because of the generation of the wrong [email protected] that the manifestation is illusory. In the illusion "this is silver" as when we mistake the conch-sh.e.l.l for the silver, it is the _cit,_ consciousness or reality as underlying the object represented to us by "this" or "_idam_" that is the basis ([email protected]@thana_) of the illusion of silver. The cause of error is our nescience or non-cognition (_ajnana_) of it in the form of the conch-sh.e.l.l, whereas the right knowledge is the cognition of it as conch-sh.e.l.l. The

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basis is not in the content of my knowledge as manifested in my mental state ([email protected]_), so that the illusion is not of the form that the "knowledge is silver" but of "this is silver." Objective phenomena as such have reality as their basis, whereas the expression of illumination of them as states of knowledge is made through the _cit_ being manifested through the mental mould or states. Without the [email protected] there is no illuminating knowledge.

Phenomenal creations are there in the world moving about as shadowy forms on the unchangeable basis of one cit or reality, but this basis, this light of reality, can only manifest these forms when the veil of nescience covering them is temporarily removed by their coming in touch with a mental mould or mind-modification ([email protected]_). It is sometimes said that since all illumination of knowledge must be through the mental states there is no other ent.i.ty of pure consciousness apart from what is manifested through the states. This Vedanta does not admit, for it holds that it is necessary that before the operation of the mental states can begin to interpret reality, reality must already be there and this reality is nothing but pure consciousness. Had there been no reality apart from the manifesting states of knowledge, the validity of knowledge would also cease; so it has to be admitted that there is the one eternal self-luminous reality untouched by the characteristics of the mental states, which are material and suffer origination and destruction. It is this self-luminous consciousness that seems to a.s.sume diverse forms in connection with diverse kinds of a.s.sociations or limitations (_upadhi_). It manifests _ajnana_ (nescience) and hence does not by itself remove the ajnana, except when it is reflected through any specific kind of [email protected] There is of course no difference, no inner and outer varieties between the reality, the pure consciousness which is the essence, the basis and the ground of all phenomenal appearances of the objective world, and the consciousness that manifests itself through the mental states. There is only one identical pure consciousness or reality, which is at once the basis of the phenomena as well, is their interpreter by a reflection through the mental states or [email protected]

The phenomena or objects called the drs'ya can only be determined in their various forms and manifestations but not as to their ultimate reality; there is no existence as an ent.i.ty of any relation such as [email protected] (contact) or samavaya (inherence)

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between them and the pure consciousness called the [email protected]; for the truth is this, that the [email protected] (perceiver) and the [email protected]'ya (perceived) have one identical reality; the forms of phenomena are but illusory creations on it.

It is sometimes objected that in the ordinary psychological illusion such as "this is silver," the knowledge of "this" as a thing is only of a general and indefinite nature, for it is perceived as a thing but its special characteristics as a conch-sh.e.l.l are not noticed, and thus the illusion is possible. But in Brahman or pure consciousness there are neither definite nor indefinite characteristics of any kind, and hence it cannot be the ground of any illusion as the piece of conch-sh.e.l.l perceived indefinitely as a mere "this" can be. The answer of Vedanta is that when the Brahman stands as the ground ([email protected]@thana_) of the world-appearance its characteristic as sat or real only is manifested, whereas its special character as pure and infinite bliss is never noticed; or rather it may be said that the illusion of world-appearance is possible because the Brahman in its true and correct nature is never revealed to us in our objective consciousness; when I say "the jug is,"

the "isness," or "being," does not shine in its purity, but only as a characteristic of the jug-form, and this is the root of the illusion.

In all our experiences only the aspect of Brahman as real shines forth in a.s.sociation with the manifold objects, and therefore the Brahman in its true nature being unknown the illusion is made possible. It is again objected that since the world-appearance can serve all practical purposes, it must be considered as real and not illusory. But the Vedanta points out that even by illusory perceptions practical effects are seen to take place; the illusory perception of a snake in a rope causes all the fear that a real snake could do; even in dreams we feel happy and sad, and dreams may be so bad as to affect or incapacitate the actual physical functions and organs of a man. So it is that the past impressions imbedded in us continuing from beginningless time are sufficient to account for our illusory notions, just as the impressions produced in actual waking life account for the dream creations.

According to the good or bad deeds that a man has done in previous lives and according to the impressions or potencies ([email protected]_) of his past lives each man has a particular kind of world-experience for himself and the impressions of one cannot affect the formation of the illusory experience of the other. But

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the experience of the world-appearance is not wholly a subjective creation for each individual, for even before his cognition the phenomena of world-appearance were running in some unknowable state of existence (_svena adhyastasya [email protected] [email protected] tatprat.i.tyabhavepi tadadhyasasya purvam sattvat [email protected] vyavaharikapadarthasya ajnatasattvabhyupagamat_). It is again sometimes objected that illusion is produced by malobserved similarity between the ground ([email protected]@thana_) and the illusory notion as silver in "this is silver," but no such similarity is found between the Brahman and the world-appearance.

To this Vedanta says that similarity is not an indispensable factor in the production of an illusion (e.g. when a white conch is perceived as yellow owing to the defect of the eye through the influence of bile or _pitta_). Similarity helps the production of illusion by rousing up the potencies of past impressions or memories; but this rousing of past memories may as well be done by [email protected]@[email protected]_--the unseen power of our past good or bad deeds.

In ordinary illusion some defect is necessary but the illusion of this world-appearance is beginningless, and hence it awaits no other [email protected] (defect) than the avidya (nescience) which const.i.tutes the appearance. Here avidya is the only [email protected] and Brahman is the only [email protected]@thana or ground. Had there not been the Brahman, the self-luminous as the [email protected]@thana, the illusory creations could not have been manifested at all The cause of the direct perception of illusion is the direct but indefinite perception of the [email protected]@thana.

Hence where the [email protected]@thana is hidden by the veil of avidya, the a.s.sociation with mental states becomes necessary for removing the veil and manifesting thereby the self-luminous [email protected]@thana.

As soon as the [email protected]@thana, the ground, the reality, the blissful self-luminous Brahman is completely realized the illusions disappear.

The disappearance of the phenomena means nothing more than the realization of the self-luminous Brahman.

The Definition of Ajnana (nescience).

Ajnana the cause of all illusions is defined as that which is beginningless, yet positive and removable by knowledge (_anadibhavarupatve sati jnananivartyatvam_). Though it manifests itself in all ordinary things (veiled by it before they become objects of perception) which have a beginning in time, yet it itself has no beginning, for it is a.s.sociated with the pure consciousness which

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is beginningless. Again though it has been described as positive (_bhavarupa_) it can very well const.i.tute the essence of negation (_abhava_) too, for the positivity (_bhavatva_) does not mean here the opposite of abhava (negation) but notes merely its difference from abhava ([email protected]@natvamatram [email protected]_). Ajnana is not a positive ent.i.ty (_bhava_) like any other positive ent.i.ty, but it is called positive simply because it is not a mere negation (_abhava_).

It is a category which is believed neither to be positive in the ordinary sense nor negative, but a third one which is different both from position as well as from negation. It is sometimes objected that ajnana is a mere illusory imagination of the moment caused by defect ([email protected]_) and hence it cannot be beginningless (_anadi_); but Vedanta holds that the fact that it is an imagination or rather imposition, does not necessarily mean that it is merely a temporary notion produced by the defects; for it could have been said to be a temporary product of the moment if the ground as well as the illusory creation a.s.sociated with it came into being for the moment, but this is not the case here, as the cit, the ground of illusion, is ever-present and the ajnana therefore being ever a.s.sociated with it is also beginningless. The ajnana is the indefinite which is veiling everything, and as such is different from the definite or the positive and the negative. Though it is beginningless yet it can be removed by knowledge, for to have a beginning or not to have it does not in any way determine whether the thing is subject to dissolution or not for the dissolution of a thing depends upon the presence of the thing which can cause it; and it is a fact that when knowl