A History of Indian Philosophy Part 59

416

induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical collocations, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things--the direct apprehension that should be called the [email protected]

[email protected] in this sense is the same as pramiti or prama, the phenomenon of apprehension. [email protected] may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the prama. For prama or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circ.u.mstances.

The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific att.i.tude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field ([email protected]_). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate cla.s.s-notion as Nyaya holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memory [Footnote ref 1].

Prabhakara rejected the [email protected] conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (_cit_) and a material part, the buddhi; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (_pradars'akatva_) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (_anubhuti_) has of prompting us to action in the external world; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhakara did not enquire.

k.u.marila declared that jnana (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in producing consciousness (_jnatata_) of objective things. Jnana itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the jnatata or consciousness of things.

Movement with k.u.marila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration

__________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: [email protected] considered nirvikalpa as the dim knowledge of the first moment of consciousness, which, when it became clear at the next moment, was called savikalpa.]

417

was sometimes the result. Jnana was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyaya supposed. Nyaya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accomplishment of a physical movement. k.u.marila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhakara gives. Later knowledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous movement. For what is called [email protected] or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more [Footnote ref 1]. The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating circ.u.mstances leading to cognition of things that is called jnana [Footnote ref 2].

Here k.u.marila distinguishes knowledge as movement from knowledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijnanavada Buddhism, [email protected], and [email protected] was manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijnanavada denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. [email protected] admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of knowledge and pure intelligence; Prabhakara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective a.s.sertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known, k.u.marila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only relative, either referring to one's being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later

[Footnote 1: See _Nyayaratnamala_, [email protected]@[email protected]]

[Footnote 2: See _Nyayamanjari_ on [email protected], _S'lokavarttika_ on [email protected], and Gaga [email protected]@ta's [email protected]@[email protected]_ on [email protected]]

418

uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was regarded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable, reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind.

Vedanta Literature.

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the _Brahma-sutras_ were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the S'unyavada Buddhism (of course according to [email protected]'s interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. [email protected] revived the monistic teaching of the [email protected] by his commentary on the [email protected]@dukya [email protected] in verse called [email protected]@dukyakarika_. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of [email protected] (788--820 A.D.). [email protected]'s commentary on the _Brahma-sutras_ is the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedantism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus anandagiri, a disciple of [email protected], wrote a commentary called [email protected]_, and Govindananda wrote another commentary named _Ratna-prabha_.

Vacaspati Mis'ra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote another commentary on it called the _Bhamati._ Amalananda (1247--1260 A.D.) wrote his _Kalpataru_ on it, and [email protected] (1550 A.D.) son of [email protected] of Kanci wrote his _Kalpataruparimala_ on the _Kalpataru._ Another disciple of [email protected], Padmapada, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known as _Pancapadika_. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of [email protected]'s bhasya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sutra. Madhava (1350), in his [email protected],_ recites an interesting story about it. He says that Sures'vara received [email protected]'s permission to write a varttika on the bhasya.

But other pupils objected to [email protected] that since Sures'vara was formerly a great [email protected] ([email protected]@dana Misra was called Sures'vara after his conversion to Vedantism) he was not competent to write

419

a good _varttika_ on the [email protected] Sures'vara, disappointed, wrote a treatise called [email protected]_ Padmapada wrote a @tika but this was burnt in his uncle's house. [email protected], who had once seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapada wrote it down.

Prakas'atman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapada's _Pancapadika_ known as [email protected] [email protected]@dananda wrote his _Tattvadipana,_ and the famous [email protected]@mhas'rama Muni (1500) wrote his [email protected]'ika_ on it. Amalananda and Vidyasagara also wrote commentaries on _Pancapadika,_ named [email protected]_ and [email protected]_ respectively, but the [email protected]_ had by far the greatest reputation.

[email protected] who is generally identified by some with Madhava (1350) wrote his famous work [email protected]@mgraha_ [Footnote ref 1], elaborating the ideas of [email protected]_; [email protected] wrote also another excellent work named _Jivanmuktiviveka_ on the Vedanta doctrine of emanc.i.p.ation. Sures'vara's (800 A.D.) excellent work [email protected]_ is probably the earliest independent treatise on [email protected]'s philosophy as expressed in his [email protected] It has been commented upon by Jnanottama Mis'ra.

[email protected] also wrote another work of great merit known as _Pancadas'i,_ which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Vedanta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of [email protected]'s [email protected] is [email protected]@sepas'ariraka_, written by Sarvajnatma Muni (900 A.D.). This has also been commented upon by Ramatirtha. [email protected] (1190 A.D.) wrote his [email protected]@[email protected]@dakhadya_, the most celebrated work on the Vedanta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after [email protected], wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an independent work on Vedanta dialectic known as _Tattvadipika_ which has also a commentary called _Nayanaprasadini_ written by Pratyagrupa. [email protected] Mis'ra and Raghunatha also wrote commentaries on [email protected]@[email protected]@dakhadya._ A work on Vedanta epistemology and the princ.i.p.al topics of Vedanta of great originality and merit known as [email protected]_ was written by Dharmarajadhvarindra (about 155OA.D.). His son [email protected]@snadhvarin wrote his [email protected]_ on it and Amaradasa his [email protected]_ The [email protected]_ with these two commentaries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental principles of Vedanta. Another work of supreme importance

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: See [email protected]'s article in the _Indian Antiquary_, 1916.]

420

(though probably the last great work on Vedanta) is the _Advaitasiddhi_ of Madhusudana Sarasvati who followed Dharmarajadhvarindra.

This has three commentaries known as [email protected]_, [email protected]@thales'opadhyayi_ and _Siddhivyakhya_. Sadananda Vyasa wrote also a summary of it known as _Advaitasiddhisiddhantasara_.

Sadananda wrote also an excellent elementary work named _Vedantasara_ which has also two commentaries _Subodhini_ and _Vidvanmanoranjini_. The _Advaitabrahmasiddhi_ of Sadananda Yati though much inferior to _Advaitasiddhi_ is important, as it touches on many points of Vedanta interest which are not dealt with in other Vedanta works. The _Nyayamakaranda_ of anandabodha [email protected]@tarakacaryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very well, as also some other important points of Vedanta interest.

_Vedantasiddhantamuktavali_ of Prakas'ananda discusses many of the subtle points regarding the nature of ajnana and its relations to cit, the doctrine of [email protected]@[email protected]@stivada_, etc., with great clearness.

_Siddhantales'a by [email protected] is very important as a summary of the divergent views of different writers on many points of interest. _Vedantatattvadipika_ and _Siddhantatattva_ are also good as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedanta system.

_Bhedadhikkara_ of [email protected]'rama Muni also is to be regarded as an important work on the Vedanta dialectic.

The above is only a list of some of the most important Vedanta works on which the present chapter has been based.

Vedanta in [email protected]

It is useless I think to attempt to bring out the meaning of the Vedanta thought as contained in the _Brahma-sutras_ without making any reference to the commentary of [email protected] or any other commentator. There is reason to believe that the _Brahma-sutras_ were first commented upon by some [email protected]@nava writers who held some form of modified dualism [Footnote ref 1]. There have been more than a half dozen [email protected]@nava commentators of the _Brahma-sutras_ who not only differed from [email protected]'s interpretation, but also differed largely amongst themselves in accordance with the different degrees of stress they laid on the different aspects of their dualistic creeds. Every one of them claimed that his interpretation was the only one that was faithful to the sutras and to

___________________________________________________________________

[Footnote 1: This point will be dealt with in the 2nd volume, when I shall deal with the systems expounded by the [email protected]@nava commentators of the _Brahma-sutras_.]

421

the [email protected] Should I attempt to give an interpretation myself and claim that to be the right one, it would be only just one additional view. But however that may be, I am myself inclined to believe that the dualistic interpretations of the _Brahma-sutras_ were probably more faithful to the sutras than the interpretations of S'ankara.

The _S'rimadbhagavadgita_, which itself was a work of the Ekanti (singularistic) [email protected]@navas, mentions the _Brahma-sutras_ as having the same purport as its own, giving cogent reasons [Footnote ref 1].

Professor Jacobi in discussing the date of the philosophical sutras of the Hindus has shown that the references to Buddhism found in the _Brahma-sutras_ are not with regard to the Vijnana-vada of Vasubandhu, but with regard to the S'unyavada, but he regards the composition of the _Brahma-sutras_ to be later than Nagarjuna.

I agree with the late Dr S.C. [email protected] in holding that both the Yogacara system and the system of Nagarjuna evolved from the _Prajnaparamita_ [Footnote ref 2]. Nagarjuna's merit consisted in the dialectical form of his arguments in support of S'unyavada; but so far as the essentials of S'unyavada are concerned I believe that the Tathata philosophy of [email protected] and the philosophy of the _Prajnaparamita_ contained no less.

There is no reason to suppose that the works of Nagarjuna were better known to the Hindu writers than the _Mahayana sutras_.

Even in such later times as that of Vacaspati Mis'ra, we find him quoting a pa.s.sage of the _S'alistambha sutra_ to give an account of the Buddhist doctrine of prat.i.tyasamutpada [Footnote ref 3].

We could interpret any reference to S'unyavada as pointing to Nagarjuna only if his special phraseology or dialectical methods were referred to in any way. On the other hand, the reference in the _Bhagavadgita_ to the _Brahma-sutras_ clearly points out a date prior to that of Nagarjuna; though we may be slow to believe such an early date as has been a.s.signed to the _Bhagavadgita_ by Telang, yet I suppose that its date could safely be placed so far back as the first half of the first century B.C. or the last part of the second century B.C. The _Brahma-sutras_ could thus be placed slightly earlier than the date of the _Bhagavadgita_.

[Footnote 1: "Brahmasutrapadais'caiva [email protected]"

_Bhagavadgita_. The proofs in support of the view that the _Bhagavadgita_ is a [email protected]