A History of Indian Philosophy Part 54

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thought. Of course it is true that [email protected] had approached nearer to this view than Nyaya, but it had separated the content of knowledge and its essence so irrevocably that it threatened to break the integrity of thought in a manner quite unwarranted by common sense experience, which does not seem to reveal this dual element in thought. Anyhow the unification of the content of thought and its essence had to be made, and this could not be done except by what may be regarded as a makeshift--a transcendent illusion running on from beginningless time. These difficulties occurred because [email protected] soared to a region which was not directly illuminated by the light of common sense experience. The Nyaya position is of course much worse as a metaphysical solution, for it did not indeed try to solve anything, but only gave us a schedule of inferential results which could not be tested by experience, and which were based ultimately on a one-sided and uncritical a.s.sumption. It is an uncritical common sense experience that substances are different from qualities and actions, and that the latter inhere in the former. To base the whole of metaphysics on such a tender and fragile experience is, to say the least, building on a weak foundation. It was necessary that the importance of the self-revealing thought must be brought to the forefront, its evidence should be collected and trusted, and an account of experience should be given according to its verdict.

No construction of metaphysics can ever satisfy us which ignores the direct immediate convictions of self-conscious thought. It is a relief to find that a movement of philosophy in this direction is ushered in by the [email protected] system. The [email protected] sutras_ were written by Jaimini and the commentary ([email protected]_) on it was written by S'abara. But the systematic elaboration of it was made by k.u.marila, who preceded the great [email protected], and a disciple of k.u.marila, Prabhakara.

The [email protected] Literature.

It is difficult to say how the sacrificial system of worship grew in India in the [email protected] This system once set up gradually began to develop into a net-work of elaborate rituals, the details of which were probably taken note of by the priests. As some generations pa.s.sed and the sacrifices spread over larger tracts of India and grew up into more and more elaborate details, the old rules and regulations began to be collected probably as tradition

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had it, and this it seems gave rise to the [email protected] literature. Discussions and doubts became more common about the many intricacies of the sacrificial rituals, and regular rational enquiries into them were begun in different circles by different scholars and priests. These represent the beginnings of [email protected] (lit. attempts at rational enquiry), and it is probable that there were different schools of this thought. That Jaimini's [email protected] sutras_ (which are with us the foundations of [email protected]) are only a comprehensive and systematic compilation of one school is evident from the references he gives to the views in different matters of other preceding writers who dealt with the subject. These works are not available now, and we cannot say how much of what Jaimini has written is his original work and how much of it borrowed. But it may be said with some degree of confidence that it was deemed so masterly a work at least of one school that it has survived all other attempts that were made before him. Jaimini's [email protected] sutras_ were probably written about 200 B.C. and are now the ground work of the [email protected] system. Commentaries were written on it by various persons such as [email protected] (alluded to in _Nyayaratnakara_ verse 10 of _S'lokavarttika_), Bhavadasa {_Pratijnasutra_ 63}, Hari and [email protected] (mentioned in _S'astradipika_). It is probable that at least some of these preceded S'abara, the writer of the famous commentary known as the [email protected]_. It is difficult to say anything about the time in which he flourished. Dr [email protected] Jha would have him about 57 B.C. on the evidence of a current verse which speaks of King Vikramaditya as being the son of S'abarasvamin by a [email protected] wife. This [email protected] of S'abara is the basis of the later [email protected] works. It was commented upon by an unknown person alluded to as Varttikakara by Prabhakara and merely referred to as "[email protected]" (as they say) by k.u.marila. Dr [email protected] Jha says that Prabhakara's commentary [email protected]_ on the [email protected]_ was based upon the work of this Varttikakara. This [email protected]_ of Prabhakara had another commentary on [email protected]_ by S'alikanatha Mis'ra, who also wrote a compendium on the Prabhakara interpretation of [email protected] called [email protected]_. Tradition says that Prabhakara (often referred to as Nibandhakara), whose views are often alluded to as "gurumata," was a pupil of k.u.marila. k.u.marila [email protected]@ta, who is traditionally believed to be the senior contemporary of [email protected] (788 A.D.), wrote his celebrated independent

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exposition of S'abara's [email protected] in three parts known as _S'lokavarttika_ (dealing only with the philosophical portion of S'abara's work as contained in the first chapter of the first book known as Tarkapada), _Tantravarttika_ (dealing with the remaining three chapters of the first book, the second and the third book) and [email protected]@tika_ (containing brief notes on the remaining nine books) [Footnote ref 1]. k.u.marila is referred to by his later followers as [email protected]@ta, [email protected]@tapada, and Varttikakara. The next great [email protected] scholar and follower of k.u.marila was [email protected]@dana Mis'ra, the author of _Vidhiviveka, [email protected]@ni_ and the commentator of _Tantravarttika,_ who became later on converted by [email protected] to Vedantism. Parthasarathi Mis'ra (about ninth century A.D.) wrote his _S'astradipika, Tantraratna,_ and _Nyayaratnamala_ following the footprints of k.u.marila. Amongst the numerous other followers of k.u.marila, the names of Sucarita Mis'ra the author of _Kas'ika_ and Somes'vara the author of _Nyayasudha_ deserve special notice. [email protected]@[email protected] [email protected]@ta wrote an excellent commentary on the _Tarkapada_ of _S'astradipika_ called the [email protected]_ and Somanatha wrote his _Mayukhamalika_ on the remaining chapters of _S'astradipika_. Other important current [email protected] works which deserve notice are such as _Nyayamalavistara_ of Madhava, _Subodhini, [email protected]'a_ of [email protected] [email protected]@ta, [email protected]_ of Vacaspati Mis'ra, [email protected]@sa_ by [email protected]@[email protected], [email protected]'a_ by Anantadeva, Gaga [email protected]@ta's [email protected]@[email protected],_ etc. Most of the books mentioned here have been consulted in the writing of this chapter. The importance of the [email protected] literature for a Hindu is indeed great. For not only are all Vedic duties to be performed according to its maxims, but even the [email protected] literatures which regulate the daily duties, ceremonials and rituals of Hindus even at the present day are all guided and explained by them. The legal side of the [email protected] consisting of inheritance, proprietory rights, adoption, etc. which guide Hindu civil life even under the British administration is explained according to the [email protected] maxims. Its relations to the Vedanta philosophy will be briefly indicated in the next chapter. Its relations with [email protected] have also been pointed out in various places of this chapter. The views of the two schools of [email protected] as propounded by Prabhakara and k.u.marila on all the important topics have

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[Footnote 1: Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada S'astri says, in his introduction to _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_, that "k.u.marila preceded [email protected] by two generations."]

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also been pointed out. Prabhakara's views however could not win many followers in later times, but while living it is said that he was regarded by k.u.marila as a very strong rival [Footnote ref 1]. Hardly any new contribution has been made to the [email protected] philosophy after k.u.marila and Prabhakara. The [email protected] sutras_ deal mostly with the principles of the interpretation of the Vedic texts in connection with sacrifices, and very little of philosophy can be gleaned out of them. S'abara's contributions are also slight and vague. Varttikakara's views also can only be gathered from the references to them by k.u.marila and Prabhakara. What we know of [email protected] philosophy consists of their views and theirs alone.

It did not develop any further after them. Works written on the subject in later times were but of a purely expository nature. I do not know of any work on [email protected] written in English except the excellent one by Dr [email protected] Jha on the Prabhakara [email protected] to which I have frequently referred.

The [email protected]@nya doctrine of Nyaya and the [email protected]@nya doctrine of [email protected]

The doctrine of the self-validity of knowledge ([email protected]@nya_) forms the cornerstone on which the whole structure of the [email protected] philosophy is based. Validity means the cert.i.tude of truth. The [email protected] philosophy a.s.serts that all knowledge excepting the action of remembering ([email protected]_) or memory is valid in itself, for it itself certifies its own truth, and neither depends on any other extraneous condition nor on any other knowledge for its validity. But Nyaya holds that this self-validity of knowledge is a question which requires an explanation.

It is true that under certain conditions a piece of knowledge is produced in us, but what is meant by saying that this knowledge is a proof of its own truth? When we perceive anything as blue, it is the direct result of visual contact, and this visual contact cannot certify that the knowledge generated is true, as the visual contact is not in any touch with the knowledge

[Footnote 1: There is a story that k.u.marila, not being able to convert Prabhakara, his own pupil, to his views, attempted a trick and pretended that he was dead. His disciples then asked Prabhakara whether his burial rites should be performed according to k.u.marila's views or Prabhakara's.

Prabhakara said that his own views were erroneous, but these were held by him only to rouse up k.u.marila's pointed attacks, whereas k.u.marila's views were the right ones. k.u.marila then rose up and said that Prabhakara was defeated, but the latter said he was not defeated so long as he was alive. But this has of course no historic value.]

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it has conditioned. Moreover, knowledge is a mental affair and how can it certify the objective truth of its representation? In other words, how can my perception "a blue thing" guarantee that what is subjectively perceived as blue is really so objectively as well? After my perception of anything as blue we do not have any such perception that what I have perceived as blue is really so. So this so-called self-validity of knowledge cannot be testified or justified by any perception. We can only be certain that knowledge has been produced by the perceptual act, but there is nothing in this knowledge or its revelation of its object from which we can infer that the perception is also objectively valid or true. If the production of any knowledge should certify its validity then there would be no invalidity, no illusory knowledge, and following our perception of even a mirage we should never come to grief. But we are disappointed often in our perceptions, and this proves that when we practically follow the directions of our perception we are undecided as to its validity, which can only be ascertained by the correspondence of the perception with what we find later on in practical experience. Again, every piece of knowledge is the result of certain causal collocations, and as such depends upon them for its production, and hence cannot be said to rise without depending on anything else.

It is meaningless to speak of the validity of knowledge, for validity always refers to objective realization of our desires and attempts proceeding in accordance with our knowledge. People only declare their knowledge invalid when proceeding practically in accordance with it they are disappointed. The perception of a mirage is called invalid when proceeding in accordance with our perception we do not find anything that can serve the purposes of water (e.g. drinking, bathing). The validity or truth of knowledge is thus the attainment by practical experience of the object and the fulfilment of all our purposes from it (_arthakriyajnana_ or _phalajnana_) just as perception or knowledge represented them to the perceiver. There is thus no self-validity of knowledge ([email protected]@nya_), but validity is ascertained by [email protected]_ or agreement with the objective facts of experience [Footnote ref l].

It is easy to see that this Nyaya objection is based on the supposition that knowledge is generated by certain objective collocations of conditions, and that knowledge so produced can

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[Footnote 1: See _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 160-173.]

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only be tested by its agreement with objective facts. But this theory of knowledge is merely an hypothesis; for it can never be experienced that knowledge is the product of any collocations; we have a perception and immediately we become aware of certain objective things; knowledge reveals to us the facts of the objective world and this is experienced by us always. But that the objective world generates knowledge in us is only an hypothesis which can hardly be demonstrated by experience. It is the supreme prerogative of knowledge that it reveals all other things. It is not a phenomenon like any other phenomenon of the world. When we say that knowledge has been produced in us by the external collocations, we just take a perverse point of view which is unwarranted by experience; knowledge only photographs the objective phenomena for us; but there is nothing to show that knowledge has been generated by these phenomena. This is only a theory which applies the ordinary conceptions of causation to knowledge and this is evidently unwarrantable. Knowledge is not like any other phenomena for it stands above them and interprets or illumines them all. There can be no validity in things, for truth applies to knowledge and knowledge alone. What we call agreement with facts by practical experience is but the agreement of previous knowledge with later knowledge; for objective facts never come to us directly, they are always taken on the evidence of knowledge, and they have no other certainty than what is bestowed on them by knowledge. There arise indeed different kinds of knowledge revealing different things, but these latter do not on that account generate the former, for this is never experienced; we are never aware of any objective fact before it is revealed by knowledge. Why knowledge makes different kinds of revelations is indeed more than we can say, for experience only shows that knowledge reveals objective facts and not why it does so. The rise of knowledge is never perceived by us to be dependent on any objective fact, for all objective facts are dependent on it for its revelation or illumination. This is what is said to be the self-validity ([email protected]@ya_) of knowledge in its production (_utpatti_). As soon as knowledge is produced, objects are revealed to us; there is no intermediate link between the rise of knowledge and the revelation of objects on which knowledge depends for producing its action of revealing or illuminating them. Thus knowledge is not only independent

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of anything else in its own rise but in its own action as well ([email protected] [email protected] [email protected]@m jnanasya_). Whenever there is any knowledge it carries with it the impression that it is certain and valid, and we are naturally thus prompted to work ([email protected]_} according to its direction. There is no indecision in our mind at the time of the rise of knowledge as to the correctness of knowledge; but just as knowledge rises, it carries with it the certainty of its revelation, presence, or action. But in cases of illusory perception other perceptions or cognitions dawn which carry with them the notion that our original knowledge was not valid. Thus though the invalidity of any knowledge may appear to us by later experience, and in accordance with which we reject our former knowledge, yet when the knowledge first revealed itself to us it carried with it the conviction of certainty which goaded us on to work according to its indication. Whenever a man works according to his knowledge, he does so with the conviction that his knowledge is valid, and not in a pa.s.sive or uncertain temper of mind. This is what [email protected] means when it says that the validity of knowledge appears immediately with its rise, though its invalidity may be derived from later experience or some other data (_jnanasya [email protected]@nyam [email protected] [email protected]@m [email protected]