A History of Indian Philosophy Part 50

movement which is within the purview of sense-cognition [Footnote ref 1].

The production of knowledge is thus no transcendental occurrence, but is one which is similar to the effects produced by the conglomeration and movements of physical causes. When I perceive an orange, my visual or the tactual sense is in touch not only with its specific colour, or hardness, but also with the universals a.s.sociated with them in a relation of inherence and also with the object itself of which the colour etc. are predicated. The result of this sense-contact at the first stage is called _alocanajnana_ (sense-cognition) and as a result of that there is roused the memory of its previous taste and a sense of pleasurable character ([email protected]_) and as a result of that I perceive the orange before me to have a certain pleasure-giving character [Footnote ref 2]. It is urged that this appreciation of the orange as a pleasurable object should also be regarded as a direct result of perception through the action of the memory operating as a concomitant cause (sahakari). I perceive the orange with the eye and understand the pleasure it will give, by the mind, and thereupon understand by the mind that it is a pleasurable object. So though this perception results immediately by the operation of the mind, yet since it could only happen in a.s.sociation with sense-contact, it must be considered as a subsidiary effect of sense-contact and hence regarded as visual perception. Whatever may be the successive intermediary processes, if the knowledge is a result of sense-contact and if it appertains to the object with which the sense is in contact, we should regard it as a result of the perceptual process.

Sense-contact with the object is thus the primary and indispensable condition of all perceptions and not only can the senses be in contact with the objects, their qualities, and the universals a.s.sociated with them but also with negation. A perception is erroneous when it presents an object in a character which it does not possess ([email protected]_) and right knowledge (_prama_) is that which presents an object with a character which it really has

[Footnote 1:

_Na khalvatindriya s'aktirasmabhirupagamyate yaya saha na karyyasya [email protected]

Nyayamanjari_, p. 69.]

[Footnote 2:

_Sukhadi manasa buddhva kapitthadi ca [email protected]@sa tasya karanata tatra manasaivavagamyate...

...[email protected] [email protected]@sajam jnanam tadupadeyadijnanaphalamiti [email protected]@rtas'cetasi sthitam sukhasadhanatvajnanamupadeyajnanam.

_Nyayamanjari_, pp. 69-70; see also pp. 66-71.]

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(_tadvati tatprakarakanubhava_) [Footnote ref 1]. In all cases of perceptual illusion the sense is in real contact with the right object, but it is only on account of the presence of certain other conditions that it is a.s.sociated with wrong characteristics or misapprehended as a different object. Thus when the sun's rays are perceived in a desert and misapprehended as a stream, at the first indeterminate stage the visual sense is in real contact with the rays and thus far there is no illusion so far as the contact with a real object is concerned, but at the second determinate stage it is owing to the similarity of certain of its characteristics with those of a stream that it is misapprehended as a stream [Footnote ref 2]. Jayanta observes that on account of the presence of the defect of the organs or the rousing of the memory of similar objects, the object with which the sense is in contact hides its own characteristics and appears with the characteristics of other objects and this is what is meant by illusion [Footnote ref 3]. In the case of mental delusions however there is no sense-contact with any object and the rousing of irrelevant memories is sufficient to produce illusory notions [Footnote ref 4]. This doctrine of illusion is known as _viparitakhyati_ or _anyathakhyati._ What existed in the mind appeared as the object before us ([email protected] parisphurato'rthasya bahiravabhasanam_) [Footnote ref 5]. Later [email protected] as interpreted by Pras'astapada and S'ridhara is in full agreement with Nyaya in this doctrine of illusion (_bhrama_ or as [email protected] calls it _viparyaya_) that the object of illusion is always the right thing with which the sense is in contact and that the illusion consists in the imposition of wrong characteristics [Footnote ref 6].

I have pointed out above that Nyaya divided perception into two cla.s.ses as nirvikalpa (indeterminate) and savikalpa (determinate) according as it is an earlier or a later stage. Vacaspati says, that at the first stage perception reveals an object as a particular; the perception of an orange at this _avikalpika_ or _nirvikalpika_ stage gives us indeed all its colour, form, and also the universal of orangeness a.s.sociated with it, but it does not reveal

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[Footnote 1: See Udyotakara's _Nyayavarttika_, p. 37, and [email protected]'a's [email protected],_ p. 401, _Bibliotheca Indica_.]

[Footnote 2: "[email protected] maricin uccavacamuccalato nirvikalpena [email protected] [email protected] viparyyeti, savikalpako'sya pratyayo bhranto jayate tasmadvijnanasya uvabhicaro narthasya,_ Vacaspati's _Tatparyatika_," p. 87.]

[Footnote 3: _Nyayamanjari,_ p. 88.]

[Footnote 4: _Ibid._ pp. 89 and 184.]

[Footnote 5: _Ibid._ p. 184.]

[Footnote 6: _Nyayakandali,_ pp. 177-181, "[email protected]@na [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]'yamanurundhata [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]@h._"]

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it in a subject-predicate relation as when I say "this is an orange."

The avikalpika stage thus reveals the universal a.s.sociated with the particular, but as there is no a.s.sociation of name at this stage, the universal and the particular are taken in one sweep and not as terms of relation as subject and predicate or substance and attribute (_jatyadisvarupavagahi na tu [email protected] mitho [email protected]@[email protected] yavat_) [Footnote ref 1]. He thinks that such a stage, when the object is only seen but not a.s.sociated with name or a subject-predicate relation, can be distinguished in perception not only in the case of infants or dumb persons that do not know the names of things, but also in the case of all ordinary persons, for the a.s.sociation of the names and relations could be distinguished as occurring at a succeeding stage [Footnote ref 2].

S'ridhara, in explaining the [email protected] view, seems to be largely in agreement with the above view of Vacaspati. Thus S'ridhara says that in the nirvikalpa stage not only the universals were perceived but the differences as well. But as at this stage there is no memory of other things, there is no manifest differentiation and unification such as can only result by comparison. But the differences and the universals as they are in the thing are perceived, only they are not consciously ordered as "different from this" or "similar to this,"

which can only take place at the savikalpa stage [Footnote ref 3].

Vacaspati did not bring in the question of comparison with others, but had only spoken of the determinate notion of the thing in definite subject-predicate relation in a.s.sociation with names. The later Nyaya writers however, following [email protected]'a, hold an altogether different opinion on the subject. With them nirvikalpa knowledge means the knowledge of mere predication without any a.s.sociation with the subject or the thing to which the predicate refers.

But such a knowledge is never testified by experience. The nirvikalpa stage is thus a logical stage in the development of perceptual cognition and not a psychological stage. They would

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[Footnote 1: [email protected]_, p. 81, also _ibid._ p. 91, "[email protected] [email protected]_"]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid._ p.84, "_tasmadvyutpannasyapi [email protected] [email protected] vinaiva [email protected]_"]

[Footnote 3: _Nyayakandali,_p. 189 ff., "[email protected] savikalpakamicchata [email protected], tacca na samanyamatram [email protected]@nati bhedasyapi pratibhasanat napi [email protected]@namatram samanyakarasyapi [email protected] vyaktyantaradars'ane pratisandhanacca, kintu [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]@nati yadi [email protected] samanyamayam [email protected]@h [email protected] vivicya na pratyeti vastvantara.n.u.sandhanavirahat, [email protected]@[email protected] [email protected] vivicyate, [email protected]@[email protected] [email protected]_"]

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not like to dispense with it for they think that it is impossible to have the knowledge of a thing as qualified by a predicate or a quality, without previously knowing the quality or the predicate ([email protected]@[email protected] prati hi [email protected]@[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]@m_) [Footnote ref 1]. So, before any determinate knowledge such as "I see a cow," "this is a cow" or "a cow" can arise it must be preceded by an indeterminate stage presenting only the indeterminate, unrelated, predicative quality as nirvikalpa, unconnected with universality or any other relations ([email protected] [email protected]@tyanavagahi [email protected] [email protected]_) [Footnote ref 2].

But this stage is never psychologically experienced (_atindriya_) and it is only a logical necessity arising out of their synthetic conception of a proposition as being the relationing of a predicate with a subject. Thus Vis'vanatha says in his Siddhantamuktavali, "the cognition which does not involve relationing cannot be perceptual for the perception is of the form 'I know the jug'; here the knowledge is related to the self, the knower, the jug again is related to knowledge and the definite content of jugness is related to the jug. It is this content which forms the predicative quality ([email protected]@natavacchedaka_) of the predicate 'jug'

which is related to knowledge. We cannot therefore have the knowledge of the jug without having the knowledge of the predicative quality, the content [Footnote ref 3]." But in order that the knowledge of the jug could be rendered possible, there must be a stage at which the universal or the pure predication should be known and this is the nirvikalpa stage, the admission of which though not testified by experience is after all logically indispensably necessary. In the proposition "It is a cow," the cow is an universal, and this must be intuited directly before it could be related to the particular with which it is a.s.sociated.

But both the old and the new schools of Nyaya and [email protected] admitted the validity of the savikalpa perception which the Buddhists denied. Things are not of the nature of momentary particulars, but they are endowed with cla.s.s-characters or universals and thus our knowledge of universals as revealed by the perception of objects is not erroneous and is directly produced by objects. The Buddhists hold that the error of savikalpa perception consists in the attribution of jati (universal), [email protected] (quality),

[Footnote 1: [email protected]_ p. 812.]

[Footnote 2: _Ibid_. p. 809.]

[Footnote 3: _Siddhantamuktavali_ on [email protected] karika_, 58.]

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kriya (action), nama (name), and dravya (substance) to things [Footnote ref 1]. The universal and that of which the universal is predicated are not different but are the same identical ent.i.ty. Thus the predication of an universal in the savikalpa perception involves the false creation of a difference where there was none. So also the quality is not different from the substance and to speak of a thing as qualified is thus an error similar to the former. The same remark applies to action, for motion is not something different from that which moves. But name is completely different from the thing and yet the name and the thing are identified, and again the percept "man with a stick" is regarded as if it was a single thing or substance, though "man" and "stick" are altogether different and there is no unity between them. Now as regards the first three objections it is a question of the difference of the Nyaya ontological position with that of the Buddhists, for we know that Nyaya and [email protected] believe jati, [email protected] and kriya to be different from substance and therefore the predicating of them of substance as different categories related to it at the determinate stage of perception cannot be regarded as erroneous. As to the fourth objection Vacaspati replies that the memory of the name of the thing roused by its sight cannot make the perception erroneous. The fact that memory operates cannot in any way vitiate perception. The fact that name is not a.s.sociated until the second stage through the joint action of memory is easily explained, for the operation of memory was necessary in order to bring about the a.s.sociation. But so long as it is borne in mind that the name is not identical with the thing but is only a.s.sociated with it as being the same as was previously acquired, there cannot be any objection to the a.s.sociation of the name. But the Buddhists further object that there is no reason why one should identify a thing seen at the present moment as being that which was seen before, for this ident.i.ty is never the object of visual perception. To this Vacaspati says that through the help of memory or past impressions ([email protected]_) this can be considered as being directly the object of perception, for whatever may be the concomitant causes when the main cause of sense-contact is

[Footnote 1: _Nyayamanjari_, pp. 93-100, "_Panca caite kalpana bhavanti jatikalpana, [email protected], kriyakalpana, namakalpana dravyakalpana ceti, tas'ca kvacidabhede'pi bhedakalpanat kvacicca bhede'pyabhedakalpanat kalpana ucyante._" See Dharmakirtti's theory of Perception, pp. 151-4.

See also pp. 409-410 of this book.]

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present, this perception of ident.i.ty should be regarded as an effect of it. But the Buddhists still emphasize the point that an object of past experience refers to a past time and place and is not experienced now and cannot therefore be identified with an object which is experienced at the present moment. It has to be admitted that Vacaspati's answer is not very satisfactory for it leads ultimately to the testimony of direct perception which was challenged by the Buddhists [Footnote ref 1]. It is easy to see that early [email protected] could not dismiss the savikalpa perception as invalid for it was the same as the nirvikalpa and differed from it only in this, that a name was a.s.sociated with the thing of perception at this stage. As it admits a gradual development of perception as the progressive effects of causal operations continued through the contacts of the mind with the self and the object under the influence of various intellectual (e.g. memory) and physical (e.g. light rays) concomitant causes, it does not, like Vedanta, require that right perception should only give knowledge which was not previously acquired. The variation as well as production of knowledge in the soul depends upon the variety of causal collocations.

Mind according to Nyaya is regarded as a separate sense and can come in contact with pleasure, pain, desire, antipathy and will. The later Nyaya writers speak of three other kinds of contact of a transcendental nature called [email protected]@na, [email protected]@na_ and _yogaja_ (miraculous). The contact [email protected]@na is that by virtue of which by coming in contact with a particular we are transcendentally (_alaukika_) in contact with all the particulars (in a general way) of which the corresponding universal may be predicated. Thus when I see smoke and through it my sense is in contact with the universal a.s.sociated with smoke my visual sense is in transcendental contact with all smoke in general. [email protected]@na contact is that by virtue of which we can a.s.sociate the perceptions of other senses when perceiving by any one sense. Thus when we are looking at a piece of sandal wood our visual sense is in touch with its colour only, but still we perceive it to be fragrant without any direct contact of the object with the organ of smell. The sort of transcendental contact (_alaukika [email protected]_) by virtue of which this is rendered

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[Footnote 1: [email protected]_, pp. 88-95.]

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possible is called [email protected]@na. But the knowledge acquired by these two contacts is not counted as perception [Footnote ref l].

Pleasures and pains (_sukha_ and [email protected]_) are held by Nyaya to be different from knowledge (jnana). For knowledge interprets, conceives or illumines things, but sukha etc. are never found to appear as behaving in that character. On the other hand we feel that we grasp them after having some knowledge. They cannot be self-revealing, for even knowledge is not so; if it were so, then that experience which generates sukha in one should have generated the same kind of feeling in others, or in other words it should have manifested its nature as sukha to all; and this does not happen, for the same thing which generates sukha in one might not do so in others. Moreover even admitting for argument's sake that it is knowledge itself that appears as pleasure and pain, it is evident that there must be some differences between the pleasurable and painful experiences that make them so different, and this difference is due to the fact that knowledge in one case was a.s.sociated with sukha and in another case with [email protected], This shows that sukha and [email protected] are not themselves knowledge.

Such is the course of things that sukha and [email protected] are generated by the collocation of certain conditions, and are manifested through or in a.s.sociation with other objects either in direct perception or in memory. They are thus the qualities which are generated in the self as a result of causal operation. It should however be remembered that merit and demerit act as concomitant causes in their production.

The yogins are believed to have the [email protected] of the most distant things beyond our senses; they can acquire this power by gradually increasing their powers of concentration and perceive the subtlest and most distant objects directly by their mind. Even we ourselves may at some time have the notions of future events which come to be true, e.g. sometimes I may have the intuition that "To-morrow my brother will come,"