A History of Indian Philosophy Part 25

The Doctrine of Momentariness and the Doctrine of Causal Efficiency (Arthakriyakaritva).

It appears that a thing or a phenomenon may be defined from the Buddhist point of view as being the combination of diverse characteristics [Footnote ref 1]. What we call a thing is but a conglomeration of diverse characteristics which are found to affect, determine or influence other conglomerations appearing as sentient or as inanimate bodies. So long as the characteristics forming the elements of any conglomeration remain perfectly the same, the conglomeration may be said to be the same. As soon as any of these characteristics is supplanted by any other new characteristic, the conglomeration is to be called a new one [Footnote ref 2]. Existence or being of things means the work that any conglomeration does or the influence that it exerts on other conglomerations. This in Sanskrit is called _arthakriyakaritva_ which literally translated means--the power of performing actions and purposes of some kind [Footnote ref 3]. The criterion of existence or being is the performance of certain specific actions, or rather existence means that a certain effect has been produced in some way (causal efficiency).

That which has produced such an effect is then called existent or _sat_.

Any change in the effect thus produced means a corresponding change of existence. Now, that selfsame definite specific effect

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[Footnote 1: Compare _Milindapanha,_ II. I. 1--The Chariot Simile.]

[Footnote 2: Compare _Tarkarahasyadipika_ of [email protected], A.S.'s edition, pp. 24, 28 and _Nyayamanjari,_ V.S. edition, pp. 445, etc., and also the paper on [email protected]@[email protected]_ by Ratnakirtti in _Six Buddhist Nyaya tracts_.]

[Footnote 3: This meaning of the word "arthakriyakaritva" is different from the meaning of the word as we found in the section "sautrantika theory of perception." But we find the development of this meaning both in Ratnakirtti as well as in Nyaya writers who referred to this doctrine.

With Vinitadeva (seventh century A.D.) the word "_arthakriyasiddhi_"

meant the fulfilment of any need such as the cooking of rice by fire (_arthas'abdena prayojanamucyate [email protected] [email protected] darupakadi tasya [email protected] [email protected]@h_--the word _artha_ means need; the need of man such as cooking by logs, etc.; _siddhi_ of that, means accomplishment).

With Dharmottara who flourished about a century and a half later _arthasiddhi_ means action ([email protected]@thiti) with reference to undesirable and desirable objects ([email protected]_). But with Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.) the word _arthakriyakaritva_ has an entirely different sense.

It means with him efficiency of producing any action or event, and as such it is regarded as the characteristic definition of existence _sattva_). Thus he says in his [email protected]@[email protected],_ pp. 20, 21, that though in different philosophies there are different definitions of existence or being, he will open his argument with the universally accepted definition of existence as _arthakriyakaritva_ (efficiency of causing any action or event). Whenever Hindu writers after Ratnakirtti refer to the Buddhist doctrine of _arthakriyakaritva_ they usually refer to this doctrine in Ratnakirtti's sense.]

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which is produced now was never produced before, and cannot be repeated in the future, for that identical effect which is once produced cannot be produced again. So the effects produced in us by objects at different moments of time may be similar but cannot be identical. Each moment is a.s.sociated with a new effect and each new effect thus produced means in each case the coming into being of a correspondingly new existence of things. If things were permanent there would be no reason why they should be performing different effects at different points of time. Any difference in the effect produced, whether due to the thing itself or its combination with other accessories, justifies us in a.s.serting that the thing has changed and a new one has come in its place.

The existence of a jug for example is known by the power it has of forcing itself upon our minds; if it had no such power then we could not have said that it existed. We can have no notion of the meaning of existence other than the impression produced on us; this impression is nothing else but the power exerted by things on us, for there is no reason why one should hold that beyond such powers as are a.s.sociated with the production of impressions or effects there should be some other permanent ent.i.ty to which the power adhered, and which existed even when the power was not exerted. We perceive the power of producing effects and define each unit of such power as amounting to a unit of existence. And as there would be different units of power at different moments, there should also be as many new existences, i.e. existents must be regarded as momentary, existing at each moment that exerts a new power.

This definition of existence naturally brings in the doctrine of momentariness shown by Ratnakirtti.

Some Ontological Problems on which the Different Indian Systems Diverged.

We cannot close our examination of Buddhist philosophy without briefly referring to its views on some ontological problems which were favourite subjects of discussion in almost all philosophical circles of India. These are in brief: (1) the relation of cause and effect, (2) the relation of the whole (_avayavi_) and the part (_avayava_), (3) the relation of generality (_samanya_) to the specific individuals, (4) the relation of attributes or qualities and the substance and the problem of the relation of inherence, (5) the

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relation of power (_s'akti_) to the power-possessor (_s'aktiman_). Thus on the relation of cause and effect, [email protected] held that cause alone was permanent, real, and all effects as such were but impermanent illusions due to ignorance, [email protected] held that there was no difference between cause and effect, except that the former was only the earlier stage which when transformed through certain changes became the effect. The history of any causal activity is the history of the transformation of the cause into the effects.

Buddhism holds everything to be momentary, so neither cause nor effect can abide. One is called the effect because its momentary existence has been determined by the destruction of its momentary antecedent called the cause. There is no permanent reality which undergoes the change, but one change is determined by another and this determination is nothing more than "that happening, this happened." On the relation of parts to whole, Buddhism does not believe in the existence of wholes. According to it, it is the parts which illusorily appear as the whole, the individual atoms rise into being and die the next moment and thus there is no such thing as "whole [Footnote ref 1]. The Buddhists hold again that there are no universals, for it is the individuals alone which come and go. There are my five fingers as individuals but there is no such thing as fingerness ([email protected]_) as the abstract universal of the fingers. On the relation of attributes and substance we know that the Sautrantika Buddhists did not believe in the existence of any substance apart from its attributes; what we call a substance is but a unit capable of producing a unit of sensation.

In the external world there are as many individual simple units (atoms) as there are points of sensations. Corresponding to each unit of sensation there is a separate simple unit in the objective world. Our perception of a thing is thus the perception of the a.s.semblage of these sensations. In the objective world also there are no substances but atoms or reals, each representing a unit of sensation, force or attribute, rising into being and dying the next moment. Buddhism thus denies the existence of any such relation as that of inherence (_samavaya_) in which relation the attributes are said to exist in the substance, for since there are no separate substances there is no necessity for admitting the relation of inherence. Following the same logic Buddhism also does not

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believe in the existence of a power-possessor separate from the power.

Brief survey of the evolution of Buddhist Thought.

In the earliest period of Buddhism more attention was paid to the four n.o.ble truths than to systematic metaphysics. What was sorrow, what was the cause of sorrow, what was the cessation of sorrow and what could lead to it? The doctrine of [email protected]_ was offered only to explain how sorrow came in and not with a view to the solving of a metaphysical problem. The discussion of ultimate metaphysical problems, such as whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed after death or not, were considered as heresies in early Buddhism. Great emphasis was laid on sila, samadhi and panna and the doctrine that there was no soul. The Abhidhammas hardly give us any new philosophy which was not contained in the Suttas. They only elaborated the materials of the suttas with enumerations and definitions. With the evolution of Mahayana scriptures from some time about 200 B.C. the doctrine of the non-essentialness and voidness of all _dhammas_ began to be preached.

This doctrine, which was taken up and elaborated by Nagarjuna, aryyadeva, k.u.marajiva and Candrakirtti, is more or less a corollary from the older doctrine of Buddhism. If one could not say whether the world was eternal or non-eternal, or whether a Tathagata existed or did not exist after death, and if there was no permanent soul and all the dhammas were changing, the only legitimate way of thinking about all things appeared to be to think of them as mere void and non-essential appearances. These appearances appear as being mutually related but apart from their appearance they have no other essence, no being or reality.

The Tathata doctrine which was preached by [email protected] oscillated between the position of this absolute non-essentialness of all dhammas and the Brahminic idea that something existed as the background of all these non-essential dhammas. This he called tathata, but he could not consistently say that any such permanent ent.i.ty could exist. The Vijnanavada doctrine which also took its rise at this time appears to me to be a mixture of the S'unyavada doctrine and the Tathata doctrine; but when carefully examined it seems to be nothing but S'unyavada, with an attempt at explaining all the observed phenomena. If everything was

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non-essential how did it originate? Vijnanavada proposes to give an answer, and says that these phenomena are all but ideas of the mind generated by the beginningless vasana (desire) of the mind. The difficulty which is felt with regard to the Tathata doctrine that there must be some reality which is generating all these ideas appearing as phenomena, is the same as that in the Vijnanavada doctrine. The Vijnanavadins could not admit the existence of such a reality, but yet their doctrines led them to it. They could not properly solve the difficulty, and admitted that their doctrine was some sort of a compromise with the Brahminical doctrines of heresy, but they said that this was a compromise to make the doctrine intelligible to the heretics; in truth however the reality a.s.sumed in the doctrine was also non-essential. The Vijnanavada literature that is available to us is very scanty and from that we are not in a position to judge what answers Vijnanavada could give on the point. These three doctrines developed almost about the same time and the difficulty of conceiving s'unya (void), tathata, (thatness) and the alayavijnana of Vijnanavada is more or less the same.

The Tathata doctrine of [email protected] practically ceased with him. But the S'unyavada and the Vijnanavada doctrines which originated probably about 200 B.C. continued to develop probably till the eighth century A.D. Vigorous disputes with S'unyavada doctrines are rarely made in any independent work of Hindu philosophy, after k.u.marila and [email protected] From the third or the fourth century A.D. some Buddhists took to the study of systematic logic and began to criticize the doctrine of the Hindu logicians. [email protected] the Buddhist logician (500 A.D.) probably started these hostile criticisms by trying to refute the doctrines of the great Hindu logician Vatsyayana, in his [email protected]

In a.s.sociation with this logical activity we find the activity of two other schools of Buddhism, viz. the Sarvastivadins (known also as [email protected]) and the Sautrantikas. Both the [email protected] and the Sautrantikas accepted the existence of the external world, and they were generally in conflict with the Hindu schools of thought [email protected] and [email protected] which also admitted the existence of the external world. Vasubandhu (420-500 A.D.) was one of the most ill.u.s.trious names of this school.

We have from this time forth a number of great Buddhist thinkers such as Yas'omitra (commentator of Vasubandhu's work),

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Dharmmakirtti (writer of Nyayabindu 635 A.D.), Vinitadeva and S'antabhadra (commentators of Nyayabindu), Dharmmottara (commentator of Nyayabindu 847 A.D.), Ratnakirtti (950 A.D.), [email protected]@dita As'oka, and Ratnakara S'anti, some of whose contributions have been published in the _Six Buddhist Nyaya Tracts_, published in Calcutta in the _Bibliotheca Indica_ series. These Buddhist writers were mainly interested in discussions regarding the nature of perception, inference, the doctrine of momentariness, and the doctrine of causal efficiency (_arthakriyakaritva_) as demonstrating the nature of existence. On the negative side they were interested in denying the ontological theories of Nyaya and [email protected] with regard to the nature of cla.s.s-concepts, negation, relation of whole and part, connotation of terms, etc. These problems hardly attracted any notice in the non-Sautrantika and [email protected] schools of Buddhism of earlier times. They of course agreed with the earlier Buddhists in denying the existence of a permanent soul, but this they did with the help of their doctrine of causal efficiency. The points of disagreement between Hindu thought up to [email protected] (800 A.D.) and Buddhist thought till the time of [email protected] consisted mainly in the denial by the Buddhists of a permanent soul and the permanent external world.

For Hindu thought was more or less realistic, and even the Vedanta of [email protected] admitted the existence of the permanent external world in some sense. With [email protected] the forms of the external world were no doubt illusory, but they all had a permanent background in the Brahman, which was the only reality behind all mental and the physical phenomena. The Sautrantikas admitted the existence of the external world and so their quarrel with Nyaya and [email protected] was with regard to their doctrine of momentariness; their denial of soul and their views on the different ontological problems were in accordance with their doctrine of momentariness. After the twelfth century we do not hear much of any new disputes with the Buddhists. From this time the disputes were mainly between the different systems of Hindu philosophers, viz. Nyaya, the Vedanta of the school of [email protected] and the Theistic Vedanta of Ramanuja, Madhva, etc.

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CHAPTER VI

THE JAINA PHILOSOPHY

The Origin of Jainism.

Notwithstanding the radical differences in their philosophical notions Jainism and Buddhism, which were originally both orders of monks outside the pale of Brahmanism, present some resemblance in outward appearance, and some European scholars who became acquainted with Jainism through inadequate samples of Jaina literature easily persuaded themselves that it was an offshoot of Buddhism, and even Indians unacquainted with Jaina literature are often found to commit the same mistake. But it has now been proved beyond doubt that this idea is wrong and Jainism is at least as old as Buddhism. The oldest Buddhist works frequently mention the Jains as a rival sect, under their old name Nigantha and their leader Nataputta Varddhamana Mahavira, the last prophet of the Jains. The canonical books of the Jains mention as contemporaries of Mahavira the same kings as reigned during Buddha's career.

Thus Mahavira was a contemporary of Buddha, but unlike Buddha he was neither the author of the religion nor the founder of the sect, but a monk who having espoused the Jaina creed afterwards became the seer and the last prophet ([email protected]) of Jainism[Footnote ref 1]. His predecessor Pars'va, the last [email protected] but one, is said to have died 250 years before Mahavira, while Pars'va's predecessor [email protected]@tanemi is said to have died 84,000 years before Mahavira's [email protected] The story in _Uttaradhyayanasutra_ that a disciple of Pars'va met a disciple of Mahavira and brought about the union of the old Jainism and that propounded by Mahavira seems to suggest that this Pars'va was probably a historical person.

According to the belief of the orthodox Jains, the Jaina religion is eternal, and it has been revealed again and again in every one of the endless succeeding periods of the world by innumerable Tirthankaras. In the present period the first [email protected] was @[email protected] and the last, the 24th, was Vardhamana Mahavira. All

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[Footnote 1: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E. R.E._]

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[email protected] have reached [email protected] at their death, and they neither care for nor have any influence on worldly affairs, but yet they are regarded as "G.o.ds" by the Jains and are worshipped [Footnote ref 1].

Two Sects of Jainism [Footnote ref 2].

There are two main sects of Jains, S'vetambaras (wearers of white cloths) and Digambaras (the naked). They are generally agreed on all the fundamental principles of Jainism. The tenets peculiar to the Digambaras are firstly that perfect saints such as the [email protected] live without food, secondly that the embryo of Mahavira was not removed from the womb of Devananda to that of Tris'ala as the S'vetambaras contend, thirdly that a monk who owns any property and wears clothes cannot reach [email protected], fourthly that no woman can reach [email protected] [Footnote ref 3]. The Digambaras deny the canonical works of the S'vetambaras and a.s.sert that these had been lost immediately after Mahavira. The origin of the Digambaras is attributed to S'ivabhuti (A.D. 83) by the S'vetambaras as due to a schism in the old S'vetambara church, of which there had already been previous to that seven other schisms. The Digambaras in their turn deny this, and say that they themselves alone have preserved the original practices, and that under Bhadrabahu, the eighth sage after Mahavira, the last [email protected], there rose the sect of Ardhaphalakas with laxer principles, from which developed the present sect of S'vetambaras (A.D. 80). The Digambaras having separated in early times from the S'vetambaras developed peculiar religious ceremonies of their own, and have a different ecclesiastical and literary history, though there is practically no difference about the main creed.

It may not be out of place here to mention that the Sanskrit works of the Digambaras go back to a greater antiquity than those of the S'vetambaras, if we except the canonical books of the latter. It may be noted in this connection that there developed in later times about 84 different schools of Jainism differing from one another only in minute details of conduct. These were called _gacchas_, and the most important of these is the Kharatara Gaccha, which had split into many minor gacchas. Both sects of Jains have

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[Footnote 1: See "_Digumbara Jain Iconography (1. A, x.x.xii [1903] p. 459"

of J. Burgess, and Buhler's "Specimens of Jina sculptures from Mathura,"

in _Epigraphica Indica_, II. pp. 311 etc. See also Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]

[Footnote 2: See Jacobi's article on Jainism, _E.R.E._]