A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels Volume Iv Part 6

At this time our allies of Tlascala arrived under the command of Xicotencatl the younger, who was accompanied by his two brothers. Some of the warriors of Huexotzinco and Cholula came along with the Tlascalans, but not in any great numbers[12], yet the alacrity of our allies was such that they joined us a day previous to that which was appointed by Cortes.

They marched in with great military parade, each of the chiefs carrying a standard with their national device, a white spread eagle, and they were all in high spirits, shouting out, Castilla! Castilla! Tlascala! Tlascala!

From the arrival of their van, till the rear came in, took up three hours.

Cortes received them with great courtesy, promising to make them all rich on their return to their native country, and dismissed them with many compliments to their respective quarters.

Cortes made the following arrangement of our land army for the investment of Mexico, distributing our forces in three separate divisions, under the respective commands of Alvarado, De Oli, and Sandoval, reserving to himself to act where his presence might be most necessary, and taking in the mean time the command of the fleet. Pedro de Alvarado, under whom I served, had 150 infantry, 30 cavalry, 18 musketeers and crossbow-men, and 8000 Tlascalans, and was ordered to take post at Tacuba, having three captains under his command, his brother Jorge de Alvarado, Pedro Guttierrez, and Andres de Monjara, having each a company of 50 infantry, with a third of the musketeers and crossbow-men, the cavalry being commanded by Alvarado in person.--Christoval de Oli commanded the second division, having under him Andres de Tapia, Francisco Verdugo, and Francisco de Lugo, with 175 infantry, 30 cavalry, 20 musketeers and crossbows, and 8000 of our Indian allies. This division was ordered to take post at Cuyoacan or Cojohuacan.--The third division, under the command of Gonzalo de Sandoval, who had under him captains Luis Marin and Pedro de Ircio, consisted of 150 infantry, 24 cavalry, 14 musketeers and crossbows, and above 8000 Indian warriors, was to take post at Iztapalapa.

The division of Alvarado and De Oli were ordered to march from Tezcuco by the right, going round the northern side of the lake, and the third, under Sandoval, by the left, to the south end of the lake; and his march being much shorter, he was ordered to remain in Tezcuco until Cortes should sail out with the fleet[13].

Before setting out on their march, Alvarado and De Oli directed our Indian allies to go on a day before us, that we might not be interrupted by their numbers, and ordered them to wait for us when they reached the Mexican territory. While on their march, Chichimecatl remarked that Xicotencatl, the commander in chief of the Tlascalans was absent; and it was found that he had secretly gone off from Tezcuco for Tlascala on the preceding night, in order to take possession of the territory and property of Chichimecatl, thinking this a good opportunity during the absence of that chief and his warriors, and being in no apprehension of any opposition, now that Maxicatzin was dead. Chichimecatl returned immediately to Tezcuco, to inform Cortes of what had taken place; and our general sent five chiefs of Tezcuco and two Tlascalan chiefs, to request Xicotencatl to return. He answered, that if his old father and Maxicatzin had listened to him, they would not have been now domineered over by Cortes and the Spaniards, and absolutely refused to go back. On this haughty answer being reported to Cortes, he immediately sent off an alguazil with four hors.e.m.e.n and five Tezcucan chiefs, ordering them to seize and hang Xicotencatl wherever they could find him. Alvarado interceded strongly for his pardon, but ineffectually; for though Cortes seemed to relent, the party who arrested Xicotencatl in a town subject to Tezcuco, hung him up by private orders from Cortes, and some reported that this was done with the approbation of the elder Xicotencatl, father to the Tlascalan general. This affair detained us a whole day, and on the next the two divisions of Alvarado and De Oli marched by the same route, halting for the night at Aculma or Alcolman, a town belonging to the state of Tezcuco, where a very ruinous quarrel was near taking place between our two commanders and their divisions. De Oli had sent some persons before to take quarters for his troops, and had appropriated every house in the place for his men, marking them by setting up green boughs on the terraces; so that when Alvarado arrived with his division, we had not a single house for us to lodge in.

Our soldiers were much irritated at this circ.u.mstance, and stood immediately to their arms to fight with those of De Oli, and the two commanders even challenged each other; but several of the more prudent of the officers on both sides interposed, and a reconciliation was effected, yet Alvarado and De Oli were never afterwards good friends. An express was sent off immediately to apprize Cortes of this misunderstanding, who wrote to all the people of any influence in the two divisions, greatly condemning the circ.u.mstances of this disagreement, which might have produced fatal consequences to our whole army, and earnestly recommended a reconcilement. We continued our march for two days more, by several Mexican cities, which were abandoned by their inhabitants; and pa.s.sing through Coat.i.tlan, Tenajoccan and Itzcapuzalco, where our allies waited for us, we proceeded for Tacuba, otherwise called Tlacopan.

[1] According to Clavigero, II. 135, the Spanish force at this time amounted to forty cavalry, divided into four troops, and 550 infantry, in nine companies: But he swells the auxiliary force of the Tlascalans to 110,000 men.--E.

[2] In the very imperfect maps of Diaz and Clavigero, Tezcuco is placed near the mouth of a rivulet which discharges itself into the lake of Mexico: In the former, the buildings are represented as extending two miles and a half along the rivulet, and coming close to the edge of the lake; but the map of Clavigero has no scale. In the map given by Humboldt, Tezcuco is placed on a rising ground, near two miles from the edge of the lake. But the lake has since the time of Cortes been much diminished in extent by a grand drain, insomuch that Mexico, formerly insulated, is now a mile and a half from the lake.--E.

[3] On this occasion Diaz mentions the inhabitants of Chalco, Tlalmalanco, Mecameca, and Chimaloacan, as the allies of the Spaniards; but these states do not appear to have submitted to the Spaniards till afterwards. Cortes employed the interval, from his arrival at Tezcuco in the end of December 1520, to the investment of Mexico, at the end of May 1521, five months, in detaching a great number of the native states from their dependence upon Mexico.--E.

[4] From the circ.u.mstance of the gold, it is probable Yuste and his companions had been slain on their retreat from Mexico, not on their way there as stated in the text. From this and other similar incidents, of parties of Spaniards having been slain in different places after the retreat from Mexico, it is highly probable that several detached parties made their escape, who missed forming a junction with Cortes.

He, it will be recollected, made a detour round the west and south sides of the lake; and it is probable that they had turned to the east, as the nearest and most direct way to Tlascala and Villa Rica.--E.

[5] Clavigero, II. 146, exaggerates the armed escort to 30,000 Tlascalan warriors, commanded by three chiefs, Chichimecatl, Ayotecatl, and Teotlipil. Diaz calls the two last, Teuleticle and Teatical; but though his facts are fully more to be depended upon, Clavigero may be accounted better versant in Mexican orthography.--E.

[6] Clavigero, II. 146, quotes Diaz as saying that it extended six miles from front to rear. This may very likely have been the case, but Diaz nowhere specifies the length of the line.--E.

[7] Clavigero says, 350 Spanish infantry, 25 hors.e.m.e.n, and 30,000 Tlascalans, with six small cannon.--E.

[8] Clavigero, II. 147, says that Cortes endeavoured at this time, but in vain, to come to an amicable agreement with the court of Mexico.--E.

[9] In this expedition Cortes appears, by the information of Clavigero, II. 152, to have crossed the southern mountains of the Mexican vale, and to have reduced Huastepec, Jautepec, Quauhnahuac, and other towns belonging to the Tlahuicas, who were subject to the Mexican empire; thus judiciously using his endeavours to strengthen his own party and to weaken that of the Mexicans, before proceeding to a.s.sail the capital of that powerful empire.--E.

[10] This beautiful city was the largest in the vale of Mexico, after the capital and the royal residences of Tezcuco and Tlacopan, and was famous for its floating gardens, whence it derived its name, signifying flower gardens in the Mexican language.--Clavig. II. 155.

[11] Diaz mentions a poem circulated at the time, as beginning in reference to the melancholy of Cortes on this occasion, somewhat in the following strain:

In Tacuba was Cortes, with many a gallant chief; He thought upon his losses, and bow'd his head with grief.

[12] Clavigero, II. 159, carries the number of allies which joined Cortes on this occasion, to more than 200,000 men. In his enumeration of the several divisions of the army appointed for the investment of Mexico, Diaz makes the Indian allies very little more than 24,000 warriors.--E.

[13] Diaz mentions, that about this time intelligence came to Tezcuco, that three of our soldiers who had been left by Pizarro to search for mines in the country of the Zapotecas had been put to death by the Mexicans, one only, named Barrientos, having escaped to Chinantla, where he was protected by the natives.--E.

SECTION XIII.

_Narrative of Occurrences from the commencement of the Siege of Mexico to its Reduction, and the Capture of Guatimotzin_.

Having thus, by the occupation of Tacuba, commenced the investment of the great and populous city of Mexico, we soon found the enemy around us in great numbers; and as the first operation, it was determined on the following day, that our divisions should march to Chapoltepec to destroy the aqueduct at that place, by which the city of Mexico was supplied with fresh water. We set out accordingly with our allies, and although the enemy attacked us on our march, we repelled them and succeeded in our object of cutting off the pipes, so that from that time the city of Mexico was deprived of fresh water. It was now determined to endeavour to penetrate to the city of Mexico by the causeway of Tacuba, or at least to attempt getting possession of the first bridge on that causeway; but on our arrival there, the prodigious number of boats which covered the water on both sides, and the mult.i.tude of Mexican troops which thronged the causeway to oppose us, was perfectly astonishing. By the first flight of arrows which they discharged against us, three of our men were slain and thirty wounded; yet we advanced to the bridge, the enemy retiring before us, as if by a concerted stratagem, so that we were exposed on both flanks, on a narrow road only twenty feet wide, as a b.u.t.t for the innumerable arrows of the Mexicans in the canoes, and neither our musquetry nor crossbows were of any avail against the people in the canoes, as they were effectually protected by high wooden screens. The horses of our cavalry were all wounded, and when at any time they made a charge upon the enemy, they were almost immediately stopt by barriers and parapets which the enemy had drawn across the causeway for the purpose, and from whence they defended themselves with long lances. Likewise, when the infantry advanced along the causeway, instead of abiding our attack, the enemy threw themselves into the water and escaped by swimming or into their canoes, returning incessantly to the attack. We were thus engaged for more than an hour to no useful purpose, the enemy continually increasing in number, by reinforcements from every part of the lake; and our allies, instead of being serviceable, only enc.u.mbered the causeway and hindered our movements.

Finding that we were unable any longer to resist the mult.i.tude of enemies who a.s.sailed us perpetually from the water, and almost with entire impunity, we determined to retreat to our quarters in Tacuba, having eight of our men slain and above fifty wounded, and were closely followed up and much hara.s.sed by the enemy during our retreat. De Oli laid the blame of the disaster of this day on the rashness of Alvarado.

Next day[1], though we were all extremely solicitous for the two captains to remain together, De Oli proceeded with his division to take possession of Cojohuacan, according to the orders he had received from Cortes; but this separation was a.s.suredly extremely ill judged; as, if the enemy had known the smallness of our numbers at the two stations, they might have fallen upon and destroyed us separately, during the four or five days that we remained divided before the arrival of Cortes with the brigantines. In all that time we never ventured to make any more attempts against the Mexican causeways, but the enemy frequently sent bodies of their troops to the main land to make attacks on our quarters, on which occasions we always drove them away.

Sandoval with his division did not leave Tezcuco until the fourth day after the feast of Corpus Christi[2], when he marched through a friendly country by the south side of the lake, and arrived without interruption in front of Iztapalapa. Immediately on his arrival, he commenced an attack on the enemy, and burnt many of the houses in that part of the town which stood on the firm land; but fresh bodies of Mexican warriors came over in canoes and by the causeway of Iztapalapa to relieve their friends in the town, and made a determined resistance against Sandoval. While the engagement was going on, a smoke was observed to arise from a hill above the town, which was answered by similar signals at many other points around the lake, which were afterwards found to have been made to apprize the enemy of the appearance of our flotilla on the lake. On this, the efforts of the enemy against Sandoval were much relaxed, as their canoes and warriors were recalled to oppose our naval force; and Sandoval was thus enabled to take up his quarters in a part of the town of Iztapalapa; between which and Cojohuacan the only means of communication was by a causeway or mound dividing the lake of Chalco from that of Mexico or Tezcuco, which pa.s.sage was at that time impracticable in the face of the enemy.

"Before proceeding to the narrative of the siege of Mexico, it may be proper to give some account of the situation of the city of Mexico, and the mounds or causeways by which it communicated with the land at the several posts which were occupied by Cortes for its investment[3]. The city of Mexico was built partly on an island and partly in the water, at the west side of a considerable salt lake, named sometimes the lake of Tezcuco, and sometimes the lake of Mexico, and appears to have been about a mile from the firm land. It communicated with the land by three mounds or causeways; that of Tepejacac on the north, about three miles long, measuring from the great temple in centre of Mexico; that usually called of Iztapalapa on the south, nearly five miles in length; and that of Tacuba or Tlacopan on the west, about two miles long, likewise measuring from the temple; but at least a mile may be abstracted from each of these measurements, on account of the extent of the city from the great temple to the commencement of the causeways. About the middle of the southern causeway called that of Iztapalapa, another causeway branched off obliquely to the south-east, to the town of Cojohuacan; and at the place where these two causeways united stood the town of Xoloc, partly on the sides of the causeways, but chiefly in the water intersected by ca.n.a.ls and ditches. Besides these three grand causeways for communicating with the land, there was a smaller mound about two miles south from the causeway of Tacuba, from a town named Chapoltepec, along which the aqueduct, or pipes, for supplying Mexico with fresh water was carried; but this appears to have been too narrow for allowing any pa.s.sage, at least the Spaniards do not seem to have availed themselves of it, in their long and arduous endeavours to force their way into Mexico. Near the south-west angle of the salt lake of Mexico, it communicated by a narrow neck or strait with the fresh water lake of Chalco; and at their junction a mound or causeway had been constructed across, to prevent the admixture of the salt and fresh lakes, having a town called Mexicaltzinco at the eastern extremity of this mound. Iztapalapa stood in the western end of the peninsula, between the lakes of Mexico and Chalco, but on the borders and in the waters of the former. The whole fertile vale of Mexico or Anahuac, around these two lakes, and some others to the north of the great lake, was thickly planted with cities, towns, and villages, and highly cultivated, containing and giving subsistence to a prodigious population. The extent of this extraordinary valley, elevated nearly 8000 feet above the level of the sea, is about 50 miles from north to south, and forty miles from east to west; being surrounded on every side by ridges of lofty mountains, some of them perpetually covered with snow, and rising to about 10,000 feet in perpendicular elevation above the ocean."

When Cortes brought out his fleet of brigantines upon the lake, he went in the first place to attack an insular rock close beside Mexico, on which a vast number of the inhabitants of that city and other places in the neighbourhood had taken shelter. Immediately on perceiving his intentions, their whole force collected from every part of the lake, and proceeded against him in not less than 4000 large canoes full of warriors. On perceiving this immense number of boats coming to attack him, Cortes withdrew with his brigantines into an open part of the lake, ordering his captains to wait patiently for a breeze of wind which then began to blow.

As the enemy supposed that this movement proceeded from fear, they immediately closed up around the flotilla with shouts of triumph. The wind now sprung up, and the whole fleet made sail through the throng of canoes, plying their oars at the same time, and run down and overset great numbers of the Mexican canoes, compelling all the rest to fly for shelter to the recesses and shallows on the borders of the lake. After this, Cortes made sail to Cojohuacan[4], where he was again attacked by the Mexicans, both by means of their canoes on the water, and from their temples on the land: But Cortes brought four guns to bear upon them, by which he did considerable execution. During this action his powder magazine blew up, owing to some mismanagement of the gunners, by which many of his people were wounded. This unfortunate accident obliged him to detach his smallest brigantine to Sandoval for a supply of ammunition. He remained at Cojohuacan for two days with the flotilla, repairing the injury his ship had sustained from the explosion.

When we were a.s.sured that the flotilla was out upon the lake, Alvarado marched out with our division to the causeway of Tacuba, as far as the bridge, in which we were constantly engaged with the enemy to very little purpose, except that we repaired the pa.s.ses in our rear as we advanced, and did not now suffer the cavalry to come upon the causeway, as we had found by experience that they were of very little service, and besides that their horses were exposed to much danger. Finding that he could not sufficiently annoy the enemy in his present post at Iztapalapa, where the Mexicans had possession of the houses which were built in the water, Sandoval advanced by a causeway to a more commanding situation[5]. When this was noticed from Mexico, a large detachment of warriors came over in canoes, with orders to cut the causeway in the rear of our troops. Cortes observed this, and immediately made sail with his vessels to the relief of Sandoval, giving orders at the same time to De Oli to march a body of troops by the causeway for the same purpose. Having relieved Sandoval by these means, Cortes ordered him to remove with his division from Iztapalapa to Tepeaquilla or Tepejacac, where the church of our Lady of Guadalupe now stands, in which many wonderful miracles have been performed.

As it was impossible for our troops to advance on the causeways, unless their flanks were secured from attacks by water, the flotilla was appointed to this service in three divisions, one of which was attached to each of the three detachments of our land force: Four brigantines being allotted to Alvarado, six to De Oli, and two to Sandoval[6]; twelve in all, the thirteenth having been found too small for service, and was therefore laid up, and her crew distributed to the rest, as twenty men had been already severely wounded in the several vessels. Alvarado now led our division to attack the causeway of Tacuba, placing two brigantines on each flank for our protection. We drove the enemy before us from several of their bridges and barricades; but after fighting the whole day, we were obliged to retreat to our quarters at night, almost all of us wounded by the incessant showers of stones and arrows of the enemy. We were continually a.s.sailed on the causeway, by fresh troops of warriors, carrying different banners or devices; and our brigantines were excessively annoyed from the terraces of the houses which stood in the water; and as we could not leave a party to keep possession of what we had acquired during the day, the enemy repossessed themselves of the bridges at night, and repaired and strengthened their parapets and other defences.

In some places they deepened the water, digging pits in the shallow places, and placing the canoes in ambush, which they secured against the approach of our brigantines by means of pallisades under water. Every day we were employed in the same manner, driving the enemy before us, and every night we returned to our quarters to bind up our wounds. The cavalry were of no service, on account of the barricades defended by long lances; and the soldiers even did not choose to risk their horses, as their price at this time was from eight hundred to a thousand crowns. One Juan, a soldier from Catalonia, used to heal our wounds by charms and prayers, which by the mercy of G.o.d recovered us very fast; and this being observed by our allies, all their wounded men applied to Juan, who had more business on his hands than he was able for. But whether whole or wounded, we were obliged to go out daily against the enemy, as otherwise our companies would have been reduced to less than half their strength. Our ensign was disabled almost every day, as he could not at the same time carry his colours and defend himself from the enemy. We were abundantly supplied with corn, but were much in want of refreshments for the wounded men; our chief resource being _tunas_ or Indian figs, cherries while in season, and a plant called _quilities_ by the natives. The situation of the other two attacks was precisely similar to ours. Every day, when we marched to the attack, a signal was made from the great temple of Tlaltelolco, the great division of Mexico nearest Tacuba, on which the enemy rushed out against us, and were continually relieved by fresh troops, marching out in succession.

Finding that we gained nothing by these daily attacks, we changed our plan of operations. On our causeway there was a small open s.p.a.ce, on which stood some buildings for religious worship, where we formed a lodgment, and established a post, leaving our cavalry and allies to secure our rear in Tacuba, whence we were supplied with provisions. Though very badly lodged in this place, as every shower of rain came in upon us, we maintained this post and advanced a little towards the city every day, filling up the trenches which intersected the causeway, and pulling down the houses on each side, and using their materials to strengthen our defences. We found it extremely difficult to set the houses on fire, nor could the flames communicate from house to house, as all the houses were separated by ca.n.a.ls and ditches. During this operation we were subjected to great danger, as the enemy destroyed us from their terraces when we endeavoured to swim over from the causeway to these detached houses.

In this manner we gained some ground every day, which we secured by parapets and other defences, and preserved during the night. Every evening at sunset, the company which was first for duty, was entrusted with the advanced post, to which they sent forty men; the second company sent an equal number at midnight, and the relieved guard did not quit their post, but had to remain sleeping on the ground; the third company did the same the same two hours before day-break, and the second now lay down to sleep, so that we now had 120 men on guard. Sometimes our whole detachment had to remain under arms the whole night, especially on the following occasion: We learnt from some of our prisoners, that the Mexicans intended to force our post by a great effort, which would have frustrated the other two attacks. For this purpose, all the warriors of nine towns around the lake, including those of Tacuba, Izcapuzalco, and Tenajocan, were by a joint attack upon our rear to carry off our baggage and destroy our bakery in Tacuba, while the Mexicans were to a.s.sail us in front on the causeway. We immediately communicated this intelligence to our cavalry and allies at headquarters, warning them to keep on the alert.

In pursuance of this plan, we were attacked both in front and rear for several successive nights, from midnight to day-break. Sometimes the enemy came on with a prodigious noise of shouting and military instruments, and at other times stole upon us in profound silence; but their night attacks were never made with so much resolution as those during the day. Yet we were hara.s.sed to death with continual watching, fatigue, and wounds, and constantly exposed to cold winds and almost incessant rain. Our post was reduced to a mere splash of mud and water, and our only food was maize and miserable herbs. When we complained, the only comfort given us by our officers, was that such is the fortune of war. Yet all our efforts, fatigues, and privations, were of little avail; as the parapets we destroyed and the ditches we filled up during the day, were uniformly replaced next night by the enemy.

The destruction of the aqueduct of Chapoltepec, from which so much had been expected, by cutting off the water which supplied the city of Mexico, was unavailing, neither could we starve them into a surrender, as they were regularly supplied with every thing they wanted by means of their canoes from the towns around the lake. In order to prevent this, two of our brigantines were ordered to cruize every night on the lake, to intercept these supplies. This measure answered the purpose in some degree, but not effectually, as some of the canoes escaped into the city every night. At this time the Mexicans laid a plan to surprise our two cruizing brigantines. Having concealed thirty of their largest piraguas among some tall reeds on the borders of the lake, they sent several canoes, as if carrying provisions, to decoy our vessels into the snare, and even fixed a number of large wooden piles under water at the place to which our vessels were to be inveigled. On the appearance of the decoy-canoes, our two vessels made immediately towards them, the canoes rowing away towards the ambush followed by our brigantines. As soon as they arrived at the place, the thirty piraguas immediately surrounded them, and wounded every officer, soldier, and mariner on board, by their first flight of arrows. Our vessels could not move on account of the piles, and the enemy continued the a.s.sault with the utmost vigour. One of the captains, named Portilla, was slain, and Captain Pedro Barba, the commander of our crossbows, died of his wounds. This ambush completely succeeded, as the two brigantines fell into the hands of the enemy. They belonged to the princ.i.p.al division of our flotilla, which was commanded by Cortes in person, who was much exasperated by the loss; but he soon repayed the enemy in their own way.

He constantly sent out some vessels every night to scour the lake, and on one occasion they brought in some prisoners of consequence, from whom he learnt that the enemy had formed another ambuscade of forty large piraguas and as many canoes. He now laid a plan to turn their schemes against themselves; for which purpose he sent six vessels one night with m.u.f.fled oars, to conceal themselves in a water-cut at the edge of the lake, covered with bushes and tall reeds, about a quarter of a league from the ambushment of the enemy. A single brigantine was then sent out early in the morning, as if in search of the canoes which carried provisions to Mexico, and having the prisoners on board to point out the place where the enemies fleet lay concealed. The enemy sent as before some loaded canoes to decoy the brigantine towards the ambush, and our vessel pursued them until near the place, where it lay-to, as if fearful to approach. The Mexican fleet now sallied out upon them, and our brigantine rowed away towards the place where the six others were concealed, closely followed up by the enemy. When arrived near enough, the brigantine fired two shots as a signal, on which the other vessels pushed out against the enemy, running down many of their vessels, dispersing all the rest, and making a great number of prisoners. This sickened them at ambushments, and from henceforwards they did not attempt to cross the lake in their canoes so openly.

Our three divisions of the land army continued to pursue their plan for gradually advancing along the causeways. Always as we gained ground, we pulled down the houses on each side, filling up the ditches or ca.n.a.ls which intersected the causeways, and strengthening our posts; in which, and in all the operations of the war, we were excellently seconded by our brave Tlascalan allies. On our attack, the Mexicans broke down one of the bridges in the rear of their own barricades and parapets, leaving one narrow pa.s.sage at a place where the water was very deep as a decoy, and even dug trenches and pitfalls where the water was more shallow, placing pallisades in the deep water to prevent the approach of our vessels, and constructing parapets on both sides of the breach. They had also a number of canoes in readiness to sally out upon us on a concerted signal. When all these preparations were in readiness, they made a combined attack upon us in three several directions. One body advanced towards our rear from the side of Tacuba, a second directly on our front along the causeway from the city, and the third by the ruins of the houses which we had destroyed.

We repulsed the enemy on all sides; and one party of us, having forced them from the works at the broken bridge, crossed the water up to our necks at the place they had left open for us, and rashly pushed on to an open place where there were some large temples and towers. We were here a.s.sailed on all sides by fresh troops from the houses and terraces, and those whom we pursued faced about and fought us in front. We now found it necessary to retreat, which we did with the utmost order till we came to the pa.s.s at the broken bridge, which was occupied by the enemy in canoes; and as the others pressed upon our rear, we were forced to throw ourselves into the lake and to get over any way we could. Those who could not swim got entangled among the concealed ditches and pits in the shallow water, where the enemy closed in upon us, wounding the whole party, and even taking five of our soldiers alive. The vessels which came to our relief were unable to approach, on account of the pallisades, and they lost two of their soldiers on this occasion. It was wonderful we were not all destroyed at this dangerous pa.s.s. At one time I was laid hold of by a number of the enemy; but G.o.d gave me strength to disengage my arm, and with the a.s.sistance of my good sword, I extricated myself from their grasp.

Though wounded, I escaped to the dry ground, where I fainted and remained for some time insensible, owing to my great exertions and the loss of blood. When the enemy had me in their clutches, I recommended myself to the aid of G.o.d and his blessed Mother, and they heard my prayer: Glory be to them for all their mercies! From the time that we had cleared the flanks of our post by the destruction of the houses, Alvarado had brought a part of his cavalry thither; and one of them, who had crossed along with us at the broken bridge, lost both his horse and his own life. Fortunately all the rest were then with Alvarado in Tacuba; for if they had been with us they must have all been destroyed from the tops of the houses and temples, as the action took place almost within the city of Mexico. The enemy was much elated by the success of this day, and continued to a.s.sail our posts day and night. Cortes was much displeased at the defeat we had sustained, which he attributed to our having neglected his orders; which were always to fill up the cuts in the causeway as we advanced, by means of timber and rubbish.

In the s.p.a.ce of four days, counting from our late defeat, we filled up the great aperture at the broken bridge, and established our advanced post at this place, but lost six of our soldiers in the course of this operation.

The enemy established a post directly in front of us, which they secured by a ditch and parapet, so as to protect themselves from our shot. They made a large fire in front of their post, by which they were concealed from our view, except when they had occasion to renew the fire, which was sometimes extinguished by the frequent heavy rains which prevailed at this season. They kept profound silence on guard, except when interrupted by loud whistling, which they used as signals. Every morning we marched against the enemy, with whom we fought during the whole day, and retreated to our post towards evening, covered with wounds. Before retreating, we sent back our allies, whose numbers embarra.s.sed us in the narrow causeway, and then fell back step by step, flanked by our armed brigantines, and firing on the enemy as they pressed upon us during the retreat.

About this time, the inhabitants of the cities on the lake grew weary of the long protracted warfare, and sent deputations to our general, offering to submit themselves to his authority, and declaring that they had been constrained by the Mexicans to persist hitherto in their hostilities against us. Cortes received them very graciously, and a.s.sured them of his protection, providing that they should conduct themselves properly for the future, and give him their a.s.sistance by supplying canoes and provisions to our army, and in the construction of barracks for the troops. They readily promised all this, but performed very badly. Cortes had huts built for his detachment[7]; but the rest of us remained exposed to the weather, which was exceedingly severe and distressing, as it rained almost incessantly during June, July, and August.

Our detachment on the causeway of Tacuba continued our approach towards Mexico, filling up every ditch and ca.n.a.l as we advanced by means of the materials of the houses which we destroyed; and we every day gained possession of temples or houses, which stood apart from each other, and of the bridges by which they communicated. To avoid jealousy, our three companies took the duties of working and fighting alternately, our allies giving most important a.s.sistance in pulling down the houses and filling up the ditches and cross-cuts of the causeway. Every evening the whole of our men stood to their arms, and we sent off our allies before us, before retreating to our post for the night. During all this time, Sandoval, who carried on his approach from Tepejacac, was obliged to sustain continual attacks from the enemy; as likewise was Cortes, who now commanded at the third attack.

On his side there was an out-post of the Mexicans, at a place where one of the apertures in the causeway was too deep to be forded, and which had been strongly fortified by the enemy. He made a successful attack on this place, where he commanded in person, although the enemy made a brave resistance both by land and water; but he was obliged to retire at night without filling up the ditch, and he lost four Spaniards killed, and had above thirty wounded, the pa.s.s being commanded from the terraces of several houses in the water, and his brigantines were unable to get forward to protect his flanks, owing to the piles which the enemy had fixed under water. Guatimotzin and his Mexicans defended themselves with amazing bravery and resolution, trusting to wear us out and destroy us by continual a.s.saults. On the 21st of June, the anniversary of the day of our first entry into Mexico, the enemy a.s.sailed us at every point of all our three attacks, both by land and water, in front, flanks, and rear, about two hours before day. The number fit for duty at our post on the causeway of Tacuba was 120 men, and all the allies attached to our detachment, were as usual off the causeway during the night. It was with the utmost difficulty that we were able to resist and repulse the enemy, of whom a great number were killed and wounded, losing two of our own soldiers. The enemy repeated their a.s.saults on all the posts for two other nights successively; and on the third morning, just at day-break, they concentrated their whole force and made a desperate attack on our post. If our allies had been with us we should have been all lost. On this occasion our cavalry saved our rear, and our brigantines did signal service by clearing our flanks. After a most severe and long doubtful contest, we beat off the enemy and made four of their chiefs prisoners, eight of our soldiers being slain in this tough affair. I fear my readers may be tired of this constant repet.i.tion of battles, which my duty of historian compels me to relate: But if I were to give an account of every action which took place during the ninety-three days in which we were engaged in the siege of this great, strong, and populous city, every day and night of which time brought a perpetual succession of battles and a.s.saults, my work would be without end, and would more resemble Amadis de Gaul and other romances of chivalry than a true history, which it really is.

Cortes became impatient of delay, and proposed in a council of war to make a general a.s.sault on the city, marching at once by all the three causeways, and uniting our whole force in the great square, whence we could command all the streets leading to that centre of Mexico. Some of the members of the council objected greatly to this plan, giving the preference to our present system of advancing gradually, filling up the ditches as we proceeded, and destroying the houses to make roads and defences of their materials. They alleged that if we were to succeed in forcing our way into the great square, we should in our turn be besieged in the heart of the city, exactly as we had been before our flight from Mexico, and be involved in much greater difficulties than now; as the enemy would be enabled to environ us with their whole force by land and water, and would cut off all possibility of our retreat, by cutting through the causeways.

But Cortes, after hearing all these well founded reasons, still adhered to his own plan, and issued orders for the whole army, including the allies, to attack the city next day, and to use our utmost efforts to get possession of the great square. On the next morning therefore, having recommended ourselves to G.o.d in the solemn service of the ma.s.s, all our three detachments marched to attack the posts of the enemy on their several fronts. In our attack commanded by Alvarado, most of the Spaniards were wounded at the first ditch and parapet of the enemy; one Spaniard was slain, and above a thousand of our allies were killed or wounded. In the attack commanded by Cortes in person, he carried every thing before him at first, and having driven the enemy from a post where the water was very deep and the causeway very narrow, he imprudently pushed on after the enemy followed by the Indian allies. The enemy induced him by frequent halts and feigned resistance to continue the pursuit, having even narrowed the causeway on purpose, and Cortes negligently omitted to fill up the deep ditch which he had pa.s.sed. When the enemy perceived that our general had fallen into the snare which they had laid for him, they attacked him with fresh troops in front, while numerous canoes filled with warriors issued out at an appointed signal and a.s.sailed him both on the flanks and rear, his brigantines being unable to approach for his defence by the pallisades under water. Retreat became now indispensably necessary, which was at first conducted with perfect regularity; but when they came to the narrow part of the causeway, which was all covered with mud and water, the retreat changed to an absolute flight, our people flying from the enemy with their utmost speed, without even attempting to defend themselves.

Cortes used every effort to rally his men, but all in vain, and was wounded in the leg at the narrow pa.s.s by some of the enemy from the canoes.

At this pa.s.s, six of our horses were killed, and seventy-two Spaniards were carried off alive. At this moment six Mexican chiefs seized Cortes, but by the will of G.o.d, Christoval de Olea, that valiant soldier, and another brave man named Lerma flew to the rescue of our general. De Olea killed four of the chiefs with his own hand, and gallantly lost his life in defence of Cortes, while Lerma narrowly escaped. Other brave soldiers arrived at this moment to his aid, among whom was Quinones the captain of his guards. By these men he was lifted out of the water and hurried off from among a crowd of the enemy. At this critical moment, Guzman his majordomo, brought up a horse on which our wounded general was mounted.

The enemy followed up their success with increasing ardour, Cortes and the shattered remains of his troops, retreating to their quarters with the utmost difficulty, pursued to the last by the Mexicans.

After our first attack, in which we defeated the enemy and drove them from their post, we were met by fresh bodies of the enemy, marching in great parade, bearing rich plumes of feathers and ornamented standards. On coming near, they threw down before us five bleeding heads, saying these were the heads of Cortes and his officers, and that we should soon meet the same fate. They then marched up, and fought us hand to hand with the utmost valour, insomuch that we were at length compelled to retreat. As usual, we gave orders to our allies to clear the way, by retreating before us; but the sight of the b.l.o.o.d.y heads had done this effectually, and not a man of them remained on the causeway to impede our flight. Our cavalry made several charges this day, but our great safety depended upon two guns which raked the whole causeway, and were admirably managed by Pedro Morena, an excellent officer, whose services this day were singularly useful, as the whole causeway was crowded by the enemy. Before we arrived at our quarters, and while pursued by the enemy, we heard the shrill timbals and mournful sound of the great drum from the summit of the temple of the G.o.d of war. The priests were then sacrificing the hearts of ten of our companions to their accursed idols, and the sound of their dismal drum, which might be heard at almost three leagues off, might be imagined to be the music of the infernal deities. Soon after this, the horn of Guatimotzin was heard, giving notice to the Mexican officers either to make prisoners of their enemies, or to die in the attempt. It is utterly impossible to describe the fury with which they a.s.sailed us on hearing this dreadful signal, though the remembrance is still as lively as if now pa.s.sing before me: I can only say, that it was the good pleasure of G.o.d that we got back in safety to our post; praised be his mercy now and for ever. Amen! We were ignorant of the fate of our other detachments.

Sandoval was more than half a league from us, and Cortes still farther.

The melancholy sight of the heads of our countrymen, and the loss of one of our brigantines in which three of our soldiers were slain, filled us with melancholy, and we almost thought that we had reached the last hour of our lives. Our captured vessel was afterwards recovered by Captain Xaramillo. In the action of this day, Captain Caravajal, a most gallant officer, had the honour of being the first who broke through the enemies pallisades with his vessel: He now lives in La Puebla, and has been ever since entirely deaf, having lost his hearing this day by excessive exertion.

Most of the soldiers in the detachment of Cortes were wounded, a good many slain, and a great number taken prisoners, so that on his arrival in his quarters, where he was immediately attacked, his men were little able to defend themselves. To add to their distress, the enemy threw into their post four bleeding heads, saying they were those of Alvarado, Sandoval, and two other officers, in order to impress the soldiers of Cortes with the belief that the two other detachments had been as roughly handled as their own. On beholding this horrid spectacle, Cortes was severely agitated, and his heart sunk within him; yet he kept up appearances, encouraging his men to stand to their arms and defend their post against the enemy. He now sent Tapia with three others on horseback to our quarters, to ascertain our situation. They were attacked on their way by several bodies of the enemy, who had been sent out by Guatimotzin to obstruct our communications; but they forced their way through, and found us engaged with the Mexicans.

On his side, Sandoval went on victoriously till the defeat of Cortes, when the enemy sent a powerful reinforcement against him, by whom he was very vigorously a.s.sailed; and in the first a.s.sault they killed two of his men and wounded all the rest, Sandoval himself receiving three wounds, one of which was on the head. As they had done at the other posts, they threw down six bleeding heads, pretending they were the heads of Cortes and his princ.i.p.al officers, and threatening Sandoval and his men with a similar fate. Sandoval was not to be intimidated, and encouraged his men to behave themselves bravely; yet, seeing no chance of ultimate success, he brought his people back to their quarters, many of them being wounded, but having only two slain. After this, though severely wounded himself, he left the command of his quarters with Captain Luis Marin, and set out on horseback to have an interview with Cortes. Like Tapia, he was frequently attacked by the enemy on the road, yet made his way to Cortes, whom he addressed with condolence and astonishment, asking the occasion of his severe misfortune. Cortes laid the blame on Alderate, for neglecting to fill up the bad pa.s.s where the enemy threw his men into confusion; but the treasurer denied the charge, saying that Cortes had not given any such orders, but hurried on his men after the feigned retreat of the enemy. In fact Cortes was much blamed for his rashness, and for not sending the allies soon enough out of his way. About this time, Cortes was agreeably surprised by the arrival of two of his brigantines, which he had given over for lost. Cortes requested Sandoval to visit our quarters at Tacuba, being unable to go there himself, as he was apprehensive the brunt of the attack might now fall upon our post. Sandoval arrived about the hour of vespers, when he found us occupied in repelling the enemy, some of them having attacked us by the causeway, and others from the ruined houses. I and several other soldiers were at this time up to our middles in the water, engaging the enemy in defence of a brigantine which had run aground, and of which the enemy were endeavouring to gain possession. Just as Sandoval arrived, we got her afloat by a great exertion, after the enemy had slain two of her crew and badly wounded all the rest. The enemy continued their attack with the utmost violence, and Sandoval received a blow on the face with a stone. He called out to us to retreat; and as we did not fall back as fast as he wished, he repeated his orders, asking us if we wished to have all the cavalry destroyed. We then retreated to our post, and though the two guns under Moreno frequently swept the causeway, the execution they made did not prevent the enemy from pursuing us to our works.