A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels Volume Xviii Part 6

The first Punic war was occasioned by a desire on the part of the Carthaginians to enlarge and secure their acquisitions in Sicily, and to preserve their dominion of the sea, and by a determination on the part of the Romans to check the progress of the Carthaginians in that island, so immediately adjoining the continent of Italy. An opportunity soon occurred, which seemed to promise to each the accomplishment of their respective objects: the Mamertines, being hard pursued by Hiero king of Syracuse, and shut up in Messina, the only city which remained to them, were divided in opinion; some were for accepting the protection offered them by Hannibal, who at that time commanded the Carthaginian army in Sicily; others were for calling in the aid of the Romans. Both these powers gladly accepted the proffered opportunity of extending their conquests, and checking their rival.

The consul Appius Claudius, was ordered by the senate to proceed to Sicily: previously to his departure, he despatched Caius Claudius, a legionary tribune, with a few vessels to Rhegium, princ.i.p.ally, it would seem, to reconnoitre the naval force of the Carthaginians. The consul himself soon followed with a small fleet, hired princ.i.p.ally from the Tarentines, Locrians, and Neapolitans. This fleet being attacked by the Carthaginian fleet, which was not only much more numerous, but better equipped and manned, and a violent storm rising during the engagement, which dashed many of the Roman vessels in pieces among the rocks, was completely worsted. The Carthaginians, however, restored most of the vessels they captured, only expostulating with the Romans on the infraction of the treaty at that time subsisting between the two republics. This loss was in some measure counterbalanced by Claudius capturing, on his voyage back to Rhegium, a Carthaginian quinquireme, the first which fell into the possession of the Romans, and which served them for a model. According to other historians, however, a Carthaginian galley, venturing too near the sh.o.r.e, was stranded, and taken by the Romans; and after the model of this galley, the Romans built many of their vessels.

Claudius was not in the least discouraged by his defeat, observing that he could not expect to learn the art of navigation without paying dear for it; but having repaired his fleet, he sailed again for Sicily, and eluding the vigilance of the Carthaginian admiral, arrived safe in the port of Messina.

After the alliance formed between the Romans and Hiero king of Syracuse, and the capture of Agrigentium, they resolved to use all their efforts for the entire subjugation of Sicily. As, however, the Carthaginians were extremely powerful by sea, they could not hope to accomplish this object, unless they were able to cope with them on that element. They resolved, therefore, no longer to trust in any degree to hired vessels, but to build and equip a formidable fleet of their own. Powerfully actuated by this resolution, they began the arduous undertaking with that ardour and spirit of perseverance, which so eminently distinguished them; they deemed it absolutely necessary to have 120 ships. Trees were immediately cut down in the forests, and the timber brought to the sea sh.o.r.e: and the whole fleet, according to Polybius, was not only built, but perfectly equipped and ready for sea, in two months from the time the trees were felled. Of the 120 vessels of which it was composed, 100 had five benches of rowers, and 20 of them had three benches.

There was, however, another difficulty to be overcome. It was absolutely necessary that the men, who were to navigate and fight these ships, should possess some knowledge of their art; but it was in vain to expect that with the Carthaginians, so powerful and watchful at sea, the Roman ships would be permitted to cruise safely long enough to make them practised sailors and fighters. To obviate this difficulty, they had recourse, according to Polybius, to a singular but tolerably effectual mode. "While some men were employed in building the galleys, others, a.s.sembling those who were to serve in the fleet, instructed them in the use of the oar after the following manner: they contrived benches on the sh.o.r.e in the same fashion and order as they were to be in the galleys, and placing their seamen, with their oars, in like manner on the benches, an officer, by signs with his hand, instructed them how to dip their oars all at the same time, and how to recover them out of the water. By this means they became acquainted with the management of the oar; and as soon as the vessels were built and equipped, they spent some time in practising on the water, what they had learnt ash.o.r.e."

The necessity of possessing a fleet adequate to cope with that of the Carthaginians became more and more apparent; for though the Romans had obtained possession of all the inland cities in Sicily, the Carthaginians compensated for this by having the ascendancy by sea, and in the cities on the coast. The Roman fleet was commanded by Cornelius Scipio, who put to sea with seventeen ships, in order to secure at Messina reception and security for the whole fleet; but his enterprise was unfortunate; for, being deceived by false information, he entered the port of Lipara, where he was blockaded by the enemy, and obliged to surrender. This partial loss, however, was soon counterbalanced by a naval victory; for the remainder of the Roman fleet, amounting to 103 sail, being encountered by a Carthaginian fleet under Hannibal, who despising the Romans, had advanced to the contest with only fifty galleys, succeeded in capturing or destroying the whole of them.

In the mean time, the senate had appointed Duilius commander of the fleet; and his first object was to survey it accurately, and, if possible, to improve the construction or equipment of the vessels, if they appeared defective, either for the purpose of sailing or fighting. It seemed to him, on examining them, that they could not be easily and quickly worked during an engagement, being much heavier and more unwieldy than those of the Carthaginians. As this defect could not be removed, he tried whether it could not be compensated; and an engineer in the fleet succeeded in this important object, by inventing that machine which was afterwards called _corvus_.

The immediate purpose which this machine was to serve is clearly explained by all the ancient authors who mention it: its use was to stop the enemy's ships as soon as the Roman vessels came up with them, and thus to give them an opportunity of boarding them; but the construction and mode of operation of these machines it is not easy to ascertain from the descriptions of ancient authors. Polybius gives the following description of them: "They erected on the prow of their vessels a round piece of timber, about one foot and a half in diameter, and about twelve feet long, on the top of which a block or pully was fastened. Round this piece of timber a stage or platform was constructed, four feet broad, and about eighteen feet long, which was strongly fastened with iron. The entrance was lengthways, and it could be moved about the piece of timber, first described, as on a spindle, and could be hoisted within six feet of the top. Round this there was a parapet, knee high, which was defended with upright bars of iron, sharpened at the end. Towards the top there was a ring, through which a rope was fastened, by means of which they could raise and lower the engine at pleasure. With this machine they attacked the enemy's vessels, sometimes on their bow, and sometimes on their broadside. When they had grappled the enemy with these iron spikes, if the ships happened to swing broadside to broadside, then the Romans boarded them from all parts; but when they were obliged to grapple them on the bow, they entered two and two, by the help of this engine, the foremost defending the forepart, and those who followed the flanks, keeping the boss of their bucklers level with the top of the parapet."

From this description of the corvus, it is evident that it had two distinct uses to serve: in the first place, to lay hold of and entangle the enemy's ships; and, secondly, after it had accomplished this object, it served as a means of entering the enemy's vessels, and also as a protection while the boarding was taking place. With respect to the question, whether the _harpagones_ or ma.n.u.s ferraeae; were the same with the _corvi_, it appears to us that the former were of much older invention, as they certainly were much more simple in their construction; and that, probably, the engineer who invented the corvi, borrowed his idea of them from the harpagones, and in fact incorporated the two machines in one engine. The harpagones were undoubtedly grappling irons, but of such light construction that they could be thrown by manual force; but they were of no other service; whereas the corvi were worked by machinery, and served, as we have shown, not only to grapple, but to a.s.sist and protect the boarders. We have been thus particular in our account of the corvus, because it may fairly be regarded as having essentially contributed to the establishment of the Roman naval power over that of the Carthaginians.

After Duilius had made a trial of the efficacy of this machine, he sailed in quest of the enemy. The Carthaginians, despising the Romans as totally inexperienced in naval affairs, did not even take the trouble or precaution to draw up their ships in line of battle, but trusting entirely to their own superior skill, and to the greater lightness of their ships, they bore down on the Romans in disorder. They, however, were induced, for a short time, to slacken their advance at the sight of the corvi; but not giving the Romans credit for any invention which could counterbalance their want of skill, experience, and self-confidence, they again pushed forward and attacked the Romans. They soon suffered, however, the consequences of their rashness: the Romans, by means of their corvi, grappled their ships so closely and steadily, that the fight resembled much more a land than a sea battle; and thus feeling themselves, as it were, on their own element, while their enemies seemed to themselves no longer to be fighting in ships, the confidence of the former rose, while that of the latter fell, from the same cause, and nearly in the same proportion. The result was, that the Romans gained a complete victory. The loss of the Carthaginians is variously related by the Roman writers: this is extraordinary, since they must have had access to the best possible authority; the inscription of the Columna Rostrata of Duilius, which is still preserved at Rome. According to this inscription, Duilius fitted out a fleet in sixty days, defeated the Carthaginians, commanded by Hannibal, at sea, took from them thirty ships, with all their rigging, and the septireme which carried the admiral himself; sunk thirty, and took several prisoners of distinction. When Hannibal saw the Romans about to enter his septireme, he leaped into a small boat and escaped.

A circ.u.mstance occurred during this engagement which clearly manifested the ardour and perseverance, by means of which the Romans had already become expert, not only in the management of their ships, but also in the use of their corvi. It has already been noticed that the Carthaginians bore down on them in disorder, each ship endeavouring to reach them as soon as possible, without waiting for the rest: among the foremost was Hannibal.

After the defeat of this part of the fleet, the rest, amounting to 120, having come up, endeavoured to avoid the fate of their companions by rowing as quickly as possible round the Roman ships, so as not to allow them to make use of the corvi. But the Romans proved themselves to be even more expert seamen than their enemies; for, though their vessels were much heavier, they worked them with so much ease, celerity, and skill, that they presented the machines to the enemy on whatever side they approached them.

The vanquished Hannibal was disgraced by his country; whereas the victorious Roman was honoured and rewarded by the senate, who were fully sensible of all the advantages derived by a naval victory over the Carthaginians. The high and distinguished honour of being attended, when he returned from supper, with music and torches, which was granted for once only to those who triumphed, was continued to Duilius during life. To perpetuate the memory of this victory, medals were struck, and the pillar, to which we have already alluded, was erected in the forum. This pillar, called Columna Rostrata, from the beaks of the ships which were fastened to it, was discovered in the year 1560, and placed in the capital.

In the year after this splendid victory the Romans resolved to attempt the reduction of Corsica and Sardinia; for this purpose L. Cornelius Scipio sailed with a squadron under his command. He easily succeeded in reducing Corsica; but it appears, from an inscription on a stone which was dug up in the year 1615, in Rome, that he encountered a violent storm off the coast of that island, in which his fleet was exposed to imminent danger. The words of the inscription are, "He took the city of Aleria and conquered Corsica, and built a temple to the tempests, with very good reason." This storm is not mentioned in any of the ancient authors. Scipio was obliged to be more cautious in his attempts on Sardinia, but afterwards the Romans succeeded in gaining possession of this island.

The Romans having thus acquired Corsica and Sardinia, and all the maritime towns of Sicily, determined to invade, or at least to alarm, the African dominions of Carthage. Accordingly Sulpicius, who commanded their fleet, circulated a report that he intended to sail for the coasts of Africa: this induced the Carthaginians to put to sea; but after the hostile fleets had approached each other, and were about to engage, a storm arose and separated them, and obliged them both to take shelter in the ports of Sardinia. As soon as it abated, Sulpicius put to sea again, surprised the Carthaginians, and captured or destroyed most of their ships.

Five years after the victory of Duilius, the Romans were able to put to sea a fleet of 330 covered gallies. Ten of these were sent to reconnoitre the enemy, but approaching too near, they were attacked and destroyed. This unfortunate event did not discourage the consul Attilius Regulus, who commanded: on the contrary, he resolved to wipe off this disgrace by signalizing his consulship in a remarkable manner. He was ordered by the senate to cross the Mediterranean, and invade Carthage. The Roman fleet, which consisted of 330 galleys, on board of each of which were 120 soldiers and 300 rowers, was stationed at Messina: from this port they took their departure, stretching along the coast of Sicily, till they doubled Cape Pachynum, after which they sailed directly to Ecnomos. The Carthaginian fleet consisted of 360 sail, and the seamen were more numerous, as well as more skilful and experienced, than those of the Romans: it rendezvoused at Heraclea, not far from Ecnomos. Between these two places the hostile fleets met, and one of the most obstinate and decisive battles ensued that are recorded in ancient history. As Polybius has given a very particular account of the manner in which the respective fleets were drawn up, and of all the incidents of the battle, we shall transcribe it from him, because the issue of it may justly be regarded as having proved the Roman superiority at sea, and because the details of this accurate historian will afford us a clear insight into the naval engagements of the ancients.

As there were 330 ships, and each ship had on board 300 rowers, and 120 soldiers, the total number of men in the fleet amounted 140,000. The whole fleet was formed into four divisions: the first was called the first legion; the second, the second; and the third, the third legion. The fourth division had a different name; they were called triarians: the triarii who were on board this division, being old soldiers of approved valour, who, in land battles, formed the third line of the legion, and hence obtained their appellation. The first division was drawn up on the right, the second on the left, and the third in the rear of the other two, in such a manner that these three divisions formed a triangle, the point of which was the two gallies, in which were the consuls, in front of their respective squadrons, parallel to the third legion, which formed the base of the triangle, and in the rear of the whole fleet; the triarian division was drawn up, but extended in such a manner as to out-flank the extremes of the base. Between the triarian division and the other part of the squadron, the transports were drawn up, in order that they might be protected from the enemy, and their escape accelerated and covered in case of a defeat; on board of the transports were the horses, and baggage of the army.

According to Polybius, the seamen and troops on board the Carthaginian fleet amounted to 150,000 men. Their admiral waited to see the disposition of the Roman fleet before he formed his own in order of battle; he divided it into four squadrons, drawn up in one line; one of these was drawn up very near the sh.o.r.e, the others stretched far out to sea, apparently for the purpose of out-flanking the Romans. The light vessels were on the right, under the command of Hanno; the squadron on the left, which was formed of heavier vessels, was under the command of Hamilcar.

It is evident from this description of the order of battle of the Carthaginians, that their line, being so much extended, could easily be broken; the Romans perceiving this, bore down on the middle with their first and second divisions. The Carthaginians did not wait the attack, but retired immediately with the intention of drawing the Romans after them, and thus by separating, weakening their fleet. The Romans, thinking the victory was their own, pushed after the flying enemy, thus weakening their third division, and at the same time exposing themselves to an attack while they were scattered. The Carthaginians, perceiving that their manoeuvre had so far succeeded, tacked about, and engaged with their pursuers. But the Romans, by means of their corvi, which they were now very skilful in using, grappled with the enemy, and as soon as they had thus rendered the engagement similar to a land battle, they overcame them.

While these things were going on between Hamilcar with the left wing of the Carthaginian fleet, and the first and second divisions of the Romans, Hanno, with his light vessels, which formed the right wing, attacked the triarians, and the ships which were drawn up near the sh.o.r.e, attacked the third legion and the transports. These two attacks were conducted with so much spirit and courage, that many of the triarians, transports, and third legion were driven on sh.o.r.e, and their defeat would probably have been decisive, had not the Roman first and second divisions, which had defeated and chased to a considerable distance the Carthaginians opposed to them, returned most opportunely from the chace, and supported them. The Carthaginians were no longer able to withstand their enemies, but sustained a signal defeat; thirty of their vessels having been sunk, and sixty-three taken. The immediate result of this victory was, that the Romans landed in Africa without opposition.

The next victory obtained by the Romans over the Carthaginians was achieved soon after the defeat and captivity of Regulus, and was justly regarded by them as an ample compensation for that disaster. It was a wise and politic maxim of the Roman republic never to appear cast down by defeat, but, on the contrary, to act in such a case with more than their usual confidence and ardour. Acting on this maxim they equipped a fleet and sent it towards Africa, immediately after they learnt the defeat of Regulus. The Carthaginians, who were endeavouring to take all possible advantage of their victory, by expelling the Romans from Africa, as soon as the news arrived of the sailing of this fleet, abandoned the seige of Utica, before which they had sat down,--refitted their old ships, built several new ones, and put to sea. The hostile fleets met near Cape Herme, the most northern point of Africa, a little to the north-east of Carthage. They were again unsuccessful on what they had formerly justly regarded as their own element. One hundred and four of their ships were captured, and 15,000 men, soldiers, and rowers, were killed in the action.

This victory, however, proved of little benefit to the Romans in their grand enterprise of establishing a firm and permanent footing, in Africa; for, in consequence of their inability to obtain a regular supply of provisions for their army, they were obliged soon afterwards to evacuate Clupea and Utica, the princ.i.p.al places they held there, and to re-embark their troops for Italy.

In order to make up for this hard necessity, they resolved to land in Sicily on their return, and, if possible, reduce some cities which the Carthaginians still retained in that island. Such was the plan of the consuls, but it was vehemently opposed by the pilots of the fleet, who represented to them, that as the season was far advanced, the most prudent measure would be to sail directly for Italy, and not go round the northern coast of Sicily, as the consuls wished. The latter, however, persisted in their resolution; the consequences were extremely fatal; a most violent storm arose, during which the greater part of the fleet was destroyed or rendered completely useless, either foundering, or being driven on sh.o.r.e.

All the sea coast from Camarina to Pachynum, was covered with dead bodies of men and horses, as well as with the wrecks of the ships. The exact number of ships that were lost is differently represented by different authors, but according to the most accurate account, out of 370 which composed the fleet, only eighty escaped. Besides the destruction of these vessels, a numerous army was lost, with all the riches of Africa, which had been ama.s.sed and deposited in Clupea, by Regulus, and which was in the act of being conveyed to Rome.

The Carthaginians, animated by the news of this event, resolved to attempt the subjugation of Sicily, Africa being now liberated from the enemy. But the Romans, by incredible efforts, fitted out a new fleet in the short s.p.a.ce of three months, consisting of 120 ships; which, with the old vessels which had escaped, made up a fleet of 250 sail. With these, they pa.s.sed over to Sicily, where they were successful in reducing the Carthaginian capital in that island.

The next year they sent to sea a fleet of 260 ships to attempt the reduction of Lilibaeum, but this place being found too strong, the consuls directed their course to the eastern coast of Africa, on which they carried on a predatory warfare. Having filled their ships with the spoils, they were returning to Italy, when they narrowly escaped shipwreck. On the coast of Africa, there were two sand-banks, called the Greater and Lesser Syrtes, which were very much dreaded by the ancients, on account of their frequently changing places; sometimes being easily visible, and at other times considerably below the water. On the Lesser Syrtes the Roman fleet grounded; fortunately it was low water, and moderate weather at the time, so that on the return of flood tide, the vessels floated off, with little or no damage, but the consuls were dreadfully alarmed.

This, however, was only a prelude to real disaster: the fleet arrived safe at Panormus, where they remained a short time. On their departure for Italy, the wind and weather were favourable till they reached Cape Palinurus; here a dreadful storm arose, in which 160 galleys, and a considerable number of transports, were lost. This second storm seems to have so dispirited the Roman senate, that they resolved to confine their efforts to land, and accordingly a decree was issued, that, as it seemed the will of the G.o.ds that the Romans should not succeed against their enemy by sea, no more than fifty vessels should in future be equipped; and that these should be employed exclusively in protecting the coasts of Italy, and in transporting troops to Sicily.

This decree, however, was not long acted upon; for the Carthaginians, perceiving that the Romans no longer dared to meet them at sea, made such formidable preparations for invading Sicily, by equipping a fleet of 200 sail, and raising an army of 30,000 men, besides 140 elephants, that the Romans, being reduced to the alternative of either losing that valuable island, or of again encountering their enemy at sea, resolved on the latter measure. Accordingly a new fleet was built, consisting of 240 galleys, and sixty smaller vessels, and Lilibaeum was besieged by sea and land. This city was deemed impregnable, and as it was the only place of retreat for the Carthaginian armies in Sicily, it was defended with the utmost obstinacy.

During this siege, two bold and successful enterprises were undertaken for the purpose of supplying the garrison with provisions. The Romans had shut up the port so closely, that the governor could have no communication with Carthage: nevertheless, Hannibal, the son of Hamilcar, resolved to enter it with a supply of provisions. With this intention, he anch.o.r.ed with a few vessels under an island near the coast, and as soon as a strong south wind arose, he set all sail, and plied his oars with so much vigour and alacrity, that he pa.s.sed safely through the midst of the Roman fleet, and landed 10,000 men and a considerable quant.i.ty of provisions. Having succeeded thus far, and being convinced that the Romans would be on the alert to prevent his sudden escape, he resolved to intimidate them, if possible, by the open boldness of the attempt; and in this also he succeeded.

Shortly afterwards the harbour was again so closely blockaded, that the senate of Carthage were quite uninformed of the state and resources of the garrison. In this emergency, a Rhodian, of the name of Hannibal, undertook to enter the harbour, and to come back to Carthage with the requisite and desired intelligence. The Roman fleet lay at anchor, stretched across the mouth of the harbour. Hannibal, following the example of his namesake, with a very light galley of his own, concealed himself near one of the islands which lie opposite to Lilibaeum. Very early in the morning, before it was light, with a favourable wind blowing rather strong, he succeeded in getting through the Roman fleet, and entered the port. The consul, mortified at this second enterprise, ordered ten of his lightest vessels to lie as close as possible to each other, across the mouth of the harbour; and that they might not be taken by surprise and unprepared, he further directed that the men should constantly have their oars in their hands, stretched out, so as to be ready to plunge them into the water at a moment's warning. The skill and experience of the Rhodian, however, and the extreme lightness and celerity of his vessel, rendered all these precautions unavailing; for, not content with securing his escape, he mocked the Romans, by often lying to till they came near him, and then rowing round them. The Carthaginian senate were now able to have frequent communication with the garrison by means of this Rhodian: his success, and the recompence which rewarded it, induced several Carthaginians to make the same attempt. They were all successful except one, who, not knowing the force and direction of the currents, was carried by them ash.o.r.e, and fell into the power of the Romans. The Rhodian still continued to pa.s.s between the besieged and Carthage; but his good fortune was near an end. The Romans had fitted out the Carthaginian galley which they had captured, and "waited with impatience for a fresh insult from the Rhodian: it was not long before he entered the port in the night time, according to custom, and was preparing to sail out in broad day, not knowing that the Romans were now masters of a galley which was as good a sailer as his own. He weighed anchor with great confidence, and sailed out of the port in sight of the enemy's fleet, but was greatly surprized to see the Romans pursue him close, and at length come up with him, notwithstanding the lightness of his vessel. He had now no way left but to engage them, which he did with an undaunted bravery; but the Romans, who were all chosen men, soon put an end to the dispute. The Rhodian vessel was boarded and taken with all her crew.

The Romans being now in possession of two light galleys, shut up the port so effectually, that no Carthaginian ever after attempted to enter it."

The following year the Romans were obliged to convert the siege into a blockade, in consequence of the Carthaginians having succeeded in destroying all their works. One of the consuls was P. Claudius Pulcher, an obstinate and ambitious man, who, contrary to the advice of those who were better skilled in maritime affairs, and better acquainted with the Carthaginians than he was, determined to surprize Drepanon, where the Carthaginian admiral was posted. Claudius had under his command a fine and formidable fleet of 120 galleys; with these he sailed from before Lilibaeum in the night time, having taken on board a great number of the best troops employed in the blockade of that place. At break of day, Asdrubal, the Carthaginian admiral, was surprized to perceive the hostile fleet approaching Drepanon: he formed his plan immediately, preferring an immediate engagement to the certainty of being shut up in the harbour.

Accordingly, with ninety ships, he sailed out, and drew them up behind some rocks which lay near the harbour. As the Romans had not perceived him come out, they continued to sail on without forming themselves into line of battle, when as they were about to enter the harbour, the Carthaginians attacked them, with such celerity and vigour, that, being taken quite unprepared, they were thrown into confusion. Claudius might still have saved his fleet by immediate flight, but this he absolutely refused to do, notwithstanding the strong and urgent remonstrances of his officers. By great exertions the Roman fleet was formed into line of battle, on a lee sh.o.r.e, and close to rocks and shoals. It was on this occasion, that the Romans' veneration for auguries was so dreadfully shocked, by Claudius exclaiming, when the sacred chickens refused to feed, "If they will not feed, let them drink," at the same time ordering them to be thrown into the sea. The bad omen, and the sacrilegious insult, added to the situation in which they were placed, and their want of confidence in Claudius, seemed to have paralysed the efforts of the Romans: they fought feebly: the enemy boarded their ships without difficulty or resistance; so that ninety vessels were either taken or driven ash.o.r.e, 8,000 of their seamen and soldiers were killed, and 20,000 taken prisoners. As soon as Claudius perceived the probable result of the battle, he fled precipitately with thirty vessels. The Carthaginians did not lose a single ship or man on this occasion. This was the most signal and disastrous defeat which the Romans had suffered at sea since the commencement of the war. According to Polybius, Claudius was tried, condemned, and very severely punished.

The other consul, Lucius Pullus, was not more successful, though his want of success did not, as in the case of Claudius, arise from ignorance and obstinacy. He was ordered to sail from Syracuse with a fleet of 120 galleys, and 800 transports, the latter laden with provisions and stores for the army before Lilibaeum. As the army was much pressed for necessaries, and the consul himself was not ready to put to sea directly, he sent the quaestors before him with a small squadron. The Carthaginians, who were very watchful, and had the best intelligence of all the Romans were doing, having learnt that the consul was at sea with a large fleet, sent 100 galleys to cruize off Heraclea. As soon as the squadron under the quaestors came in sight, the Carthaginian admiral, though he mistook it for the consular fleet, yet resolved to engage it: but the quaestors, having received orders not to hazard a battle if they could possibly avoid, took refuge behind some rocks, where they were attacked by the enemy. The Romans defended themselves so well with balistae and other engines, which they had erected on the rocks, that the Carthaginian admiral, after having captured a few transports, was obliged to draw off his fleet.

In the mean time, the light vessels, employed on the lookout, informed him that the whole consular fleet were directing their course for Lilibaeum: his obvious plan was to engage this fleet before it could join that of the quaestors; he therefore steered his course to meet them. But the consul was equally averse with the quaestors to hazard the supply of the army by a battle, and he, therefore, also took shelter near some rocks. The Carthaginian admiral was afraid to attack him in this position, but resolved to watch him: while thus employed his pilots observed certain indications of an approaching storm, which induced him to take shelter on the other side of Cape Pachynum. He had scarcely doubled the cape, when the storm arose with such violence that the whole Roman fleet was destroyed.

According to Polybius, not one vessel, not even a plank, was saved out of a fleet which consisted of 120 galleys and 800 transports.

Two such losses occurring during the same consulate, induced the Romans again to resolve to desist from all naval enterprizes and preparations, so that for some time no public fleet was equipped. This resolution, however, yielded to the conviction that they could not hope even to retain their possessions in Sicily, or even to secure their commerce on the coasts of Italy, if they did not endeavour to cope with the Carthaginians by sea. But as the senate thought it would appear derogatory to their dignity and consistency to equip a public fleet, after they had a second time resolved solemnly and officially not to do so, they pa.s.sed a decree, by which all the Roman citizens who were able and so disposed, were permitted to build, equip, and arm vessels at their own expence; with these ships they were directed to land on the coast of Africa, for the purpose of pillage, the fruit of which was to be their own private gain. The senate even went further to evade, by a pitiful subterfuge their own decree, for they lent the few ships which still remained to the republic, to private citizens, on condition that they should keep them in repair, and make them good if they were lost. By these measures a very considerable fleet was equipped, which committed great depredations on the coast of Africa. Emboldened by their predatory warfare, they resolved to attempt a more arduous enterprize. One of the most celebrated of the Carthaginian harbours was that of Hippo; besides the port there was a citadel, and large a.r.s.enals for naval stores, &c. As the inhabitants were much engaged in commerce, there were in the town always a considerable quant.i.ty of merchandize. This port the privateer squadron determined to enter. The inhabitants, aware of their design, stretched a very strong chain across the harbour mouth; but it did not avail; for the Roman ships broke through it, took possession of the town and ships, burnt most of them, and returned safe with an immense booty.

This success was quickly followed by another, for as they were re-entering Panormus, they fell in with a Carthaginian fleet loaded with provisions for Hamilcar, who commanded in Sicily, and captured several of the transports.

These advantages began to inspire the Romans with renewed confidence and hopes that their naval disasters were at an end, and that the G.o.ds had at length permitted them to become masters of the sea, when the privateer fleet, after having gained a considerable victory over a Carthaginian squadron, near the coast of Africa, was almost totally destroyed in a storm.

For a few years afterwards, the Romans seem to have desisted entirely from maritime enterprizes; but in the year of the city 516, they changed their plan, as it was indeed evident that unless they were masters at sea, they must be content to lose the island of Sicily. In order, however, that the Roman armies might not suffer by their losses at sea, it was decreed that the new fleet should be manned with hired troops. There was still another difficulty to overcome; the protracted war with Carthage, and the heavy and repeated losses which they had suffered during it, had nearly exhausted the Roman treasury; from it therefore could not possibly be drawn the sums requisite for the proper and effective equipment of such a fleet as would be adequate to meet that of the enemy. This difficulty was removed by the patriotism of all ranks and cla.s.ses of the citizens. The senators set the example; the most wealthy of whom built, each at his own cost, a quinquereme: those who were not so wealthy joined together, three or four of them fitting out a single galley. By these means a fleet of 200 large vessels was made ready for any expedition, the state having bound themselves to repay the individuals whenever her finances were adequate to such an expence. This fleet was not only very numerous and well equipped, but most of the vessels which composed it were built on an entirely new model, which combined an extraordinary degree of celerity with strength.

The model was taken from that light Rhodian galley, which we have already mentioned, as having been employed by its owner, Hannibal, in conveying intelligence between Carthage and Lilibaeum, and which was afterwards captured by the Romans. The command of this fleet was given to the consul Lutatius: and the great object to be accomplished was the reduction of Lilibaeum, which still held out. The first step of the consul was to occupy all the sea-ports near this place: the town of Drepanon, however, resisting his efforts, he resolved rather to decide its fate, and that of Sicily in general, by a sea battle, than to undertake a regular siege.

The Carthaginians soon gave him an opportunity of acting in this manner, for they sent to sea a fleet of 400 vessels, under the command of Hanno. In the building and equipment of this fleet, the senate of Carthage had nearly exhausted all their means; but though their fleet was numerically much greater than that of Rome, in some essential respects it was inferior to it. Most of the seamen and troops on board it were inexperienced and undisciplined; and the ships themselves were not to be compared, with regard to the union of lightness and strength, with the Roman vessels, as they were now built. Besides, the Romans trusted entirely to themselves-- the Carthaginians, in some measure, to their allies or to hired seamen. The Romans, though firm and determined, were not rashly confident; whereas the Carthaginians even yet regarded their adversaries with feelings of contempt.

The hostile fleets met off Hiera, one of the Aeolian islands. The Carthaginian admiral's first object was to reach Eryx, a city which had lately been taken by Hamilcar, there to unload his vessels, and after having taken on board Hamilcar and the best of his troops, to sail again in quest of the Roman fleet. But the consul prevented this design from being carried into execution, by coming up with the Carthaginians, as we have just stated, off Hiera, while they were steering for Eryx. As the wind was favourable for the Romans, they were extremely anxious to commence the engagement immediately; but before they had formed into order of battle, it changed, blew hard, and a heavy sea arose. The determination of the consul to engage was for a short time shaken by this circ.u.mstance, but he reflected that though the sea was rough, the enemy's ships were heavily laden, and therefore would suffer more from it than his ships would; while if, on the other hand, he delayed the engagement till the Carthaginians reached Eryx, they would then have lighter vessels, as well as a greater number of experienced seamen and soldiers on board of them. These considerations determined him to fight immediately, and accordingly he gave orders for the line of battle to be formed. The battle was of very short duration, and terminated decidedly in favour of the Romans. The loss of the Carthaginians is variously stated, but, according to Polybius, who is the best authority for every thing relating to the Punic wars, the Romans sunk fifty of their vessels, and captured seventy, with all their crews. The remainder would probably have been either captured or destroyed, had not the wind again changed, and enabled them to save themselves by flight.

The consequences of this defeat, in the capitulation of Hamilcar, which, in a manner, determined the fate of Sicily, were so disheartening to the Carthaginians, that they were obliged to submit to a disadvantageous and dishonorable peace. Among other terms, it was stipulated that they should evacuate all the places they held in Sicily, and entirely quit that island; that they should also abandon all the small islands that lie between Italy and Sicily; and that they should not approach with their ships of war, either the coasts of Italy or any of the territories belonging to the Romans or their allies.

Soon after the conclusion of the first Punic war, a circ.u.mstance occurred which nearly renewed the hostilities. The Carthaginians were engaged in a b.l.o.o.d.y and arduous contest with their Mercenaries, and the Roman merchants supplied the latter with military stores and provisions. While engaged in this unlawful enterprize, several of them were captured by the Carthaginians, and their crews detained as prisoners of war. The senate of Carthage, however, were not then in a condition to offend the Romans; they therefore restored both the ships and their crews. During this war between the Carthaginians and the Mercenaries, the latter having obtained possession of Sardinia, (which though formerly conquered by the Romans, had been restored to the Carthaginians,) offered to put the Romans in possession of it. At first the senate refused to occupy it; but they soon changed their mind, and accepted the offer, and moreover obliged the Carthaginians to pay the expence of the armament by which it was occupied, and the further sum of 1200 talents.

Sicily, which immediately after the conclusion of the Punic war, was made a Roman province, and Sardinia, were the first territories which the Romans possessed out of Italy. In conformity with our plan, we shall enquire into the advantages they brought to the commerce of the Romans, before we proceed to the naval occurrences of the second Punic war.

Sicily was anciently called Sicania, Trinacria, and Triquetra; its three promontories are particularly celebrated in the cla.s.sic authors; viz.

Lilibaeum on the side of Africa; Pachynum on the side of Greece, and Pelorum towards Italy. Its vicinity to the continent of Italy, and the resemblance of their opposite sh.o.r.es, gave rise to an opinion among the ancients that it was originally joined to Italy. Pliny particularly mentions their separation, as a circ.u.mstance beyond all doubt. The dangers which were supposed to beset mariners in their pa.s.sage through the narrow strait which divides it from Italy, on one side of which was Sylla, and on the other Charybdis, sufficiently point out the ignorance and inexperience of the ancients in the construction and management of their ships.

The princ.i.p.al town on the eastern coast of Sicily, opposite Greece, was Messana, now called Messina: it was the first which the Romans possessed in the island: it was one of the most wealthy and powerful cities in ancient Sicily. Taurominium stood near Mount Taurus, on the river Taurominius; the coast in its vicinity was anciently called Coproea, because the sea was supposed to throw up there the wrecks of such vessels as were swallowed up by Charybdis. The hills near this city were famous for the excellent grapes they produced. On a gulph in the Ionian Sea, called Catana, stood a city of the same name; it was one of the richest and most powerful cities in the island.

But by far the most celebrated city in this island for its advantageous situation, the magnificence of its buildings, its commerce, and the wealth of its inhabitants, was Syracuse. According to Thucydides, in his time it might justly be compared to Athens, even when that city was at the height of its glory; and Cicero describes it as the greatest and most wealthy of all the cities possessed by the Greeks. Its walls were eighteen miles in circ.u.mference, and within them were in fact four cities united into one. It seems also to have possessed three harbours: the great harbour was nearly five thousand yards in circ.u.mference, and the entrance to it five hundred yards across; it was formed on one side by a point of the island Ortygia, and on the other by another small island, on each of which were forts. The second harbour was divided from the greater by an island of inconsiderable extent; both these were surrounded with warehouses, a.r.s.enals, and other buildings of great magnificence. The river Anapis emptied itself into the great harbour; at the mouth of this river was the castle of Olympia. The third harbour stood a little above the division of the city called Acradina. The island of Ortygia, which formed one of the divisions, was joined to the others by a bridge.

The other maritime towns of consequence were Agrigentum, Lilibaeum, and Drepanum; though the first stood at a short distance from the sea, yet being situated between and near two rivers, it conveniently imported all sorts of provisions and merchandize. Lilibaeum was famous for its port, which was deemed a safe retreat for ships, either in case of a storm, or to escape from an enemy. During the wars between the Romans and Carthaginians, the former repeatedly attempted to render it inaccessible and useless by throwing large stones into it, but they were always washed away by the violence of the sea, and the rapidity of the current. Drepanum, which had an excellent harbour, was much resorted to by foreign ships, and possessed a very considerable commerce.

The Greeks were the first who colonized Sicily; and they founded Syracuse and other towns. About the same period the Phoenicians settled on the coast for the purposes of commerce; but they seem to have retired soon after the Greek colonies began to flourish and extend themselves. The Carthaginians, who generally pushed their commerce into all the countries with which their parent state had traded, seem to have visited Italy as merchants or conquerors at a very early period; but when their first visit took place in either character is not known. The treaty between them and the Romans, (to which we have had occasion to refer more than once,) which was formed in the year after the expulsion of the Tarquins, expressly stipulated that the Romans, who should touch at Sardinia, or that part of Sicily which belonged to the Carthaginians, should be received there in the same manner as the Carthaginians themselves. They must, however, soon afterwards have been driven out of the island; for at the time of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, (which happened about thirty years after the expulsion of the Tarquins,) Gelon, the king of Syracuse, expressly states that they no longer possessed any territory there, in a speech which he made to the amba.s.sadors of Athens and Sparta, the Cathaginians having united with Xerxes, and he having offered to ally himself with the Greeks. The circ.u.mstances and even the very nature of the victory which Gelon gained over the Carthaginians, which ended in their expulsion from Sicily, cannot accurately be ascertained: but from a comparison of the princ.i.p.al authorities on this point, it would, appear that it was a naval victory; or at least that the Carthaginian fleet was defeated as well as their army.

Their loss by sea was enormous, amounting to nearly the whole of their ships of war and transports, the former consisting of 2000 and the latter of 3000.

Such is a short sketch of the island of Sicily, so far as its commercial facilities and its history are concerned previously to its conquest by the Romans. It was peculiarly valuable to them on account of its extreme fertility in corn; and by this circ.u.mstance it seems to have been distinguished in very early times; for there can be no doubt that by its being represented by the poets as the favourite residence of the G.o.ddess Ceres, the fertility of the island in corn, as well as its knowledge of agriculture, were intended to be represented. When Gelon offered to unite with the Greeks in their war with Xerxes, one of his proposals was that he would furnish the whole Greek army with corn, during all the time of hostilities, if they would appoint him commander of their forces. In the latter period of the Roman republic, it became their princ.i.p.al dependence for a regular supply of corn.

Sardinia seems to have been as little explored by and known to the ancients, as it is to the moderns. The treaty between the Carthaginians and Romans, the year after the expulsion of the Tarquins, proves that the former nation possessed it at that time. Calaris, the present Cagliari, was the princ.i.p.al town in it. From the epithet applied to it by Horace, in one of his odes, _Opima_, it must have been much more fertile in former times than it is at present; and Varro expressly calls it one of the granaries of Rome. Its air, then, as at present, was in most parts very unwholsome; and it is a remarkable circ.u.mstance that the character of the Sardi, who, after the complete reduction of the island by Tiberius Semp.r.o.nius Gracchus, were brought to Rome in great numbers, and sold as slaves, and who were proverbial for their worthlessness, is still to be traced in the present inhabitants; for they are represented as extremely barbarous, and so treacherous, and inhospitable, that they have been called the Malays of the Mediterranean. The island of Corsica, which, indeed, generally followed the fate of Sardinia, was another of the fruits of the first Punic war which the Romans reaped, in some degree favourable to their commerce. It possessed a large and convenient harbour, called Syracusium. The Carthaginians must have reduced it at an early period, since, according to Herodotus, the Cyrnians (the ancient name for the inhabitants), were one of the nations that composed the vast army, with which they invaded Sicily in the time of Gelon.