A Forgotten Empire (Vijayanagar) Part 10

Having for a few days rested his troops, the Sultan crossed the river, advanced (according to Nuniz) to within nine miles of Raichur, and there entrenched himself, leaving the river about five miles in his rear.[215] Firishtah, however, differs, and says that the Muhammadan forces crossed directly in face of the Hindu army encamped on the opposite bank.

On Sat.u.r.day morning, May 19, in the year A.D. 1520, according to my deductions, the forces became engaged, and a decisive pitched battle was fought. Krishna Deva, making no attempt to outflank his adversary, ordered an advance to his immediate front of his two forward divisions. Their attack was so far successful that they drove the Muhammadans back to their trenches. The Sultan had apparently deployed his force over too wide an area, expecting that the Raya would do the same; but finding himself weak in the centre he opened fire from the guns that he had previously held in reserve, and by this means caused great loss in the close ranks of the Hindus. The Raya's troops fell back in face of this formidable bombardment, and at once their enemies charged them. The retreat was changed to a rout, and for a mile and a half to their direct front the Mussulman cavalry chased the flying forces belonging to Krishna Deva's first line. The king himself, who commanded the second line, began to despair of victory, but rallied his troops, collected about him a number of his n.o.bles, and determined to face death with the bravery that had always characterised him. Mounting his horse, he ordered a forward movement of the whole of his remaining divisions, and charged the now disordered ranks of the Mussulmans. This resulted in complete success, for the enemy, scattered and unable to form, fled before his impetuous onslaught. He drove them the whole way back to, and into, the river, where terrific slaughter took place, and their entire army was put to flight.

The Raya then crossed the river and seized the Shah's camp, while the Shah himself, by the counsel and help of Asada Khan, a man who afterwards became very famous, escaped only with his life, and fled from the field on an elephant.

While being driven back towards the river, Salabat Khan, the Shah's general, made a valiant attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day. He had for his bodyguard 500 Portuguese "renegades," and with him these men threw themselves into the advancing ranks of the Hindus, where they "did such wonderful deeds" that ever after they were remembered. They penetrated the king's host, and cut their way forwards till they almost reached his person. Here Salabat Khan lost his horse, but at once mounted another and pressed on. The little force was, however, surrounded and annihilated, and the general, being a second time overthrown, horse and all, was made prisoner.

The spoil was great and the result decisive. For years afterwards the "Moors" cherished a wholesome dread of Krishna Raya and his valiant troops, and the Sultan, panic-stricken, never again during his enemy's lifetime ventured to attack the dominions of Vijayanagar. Krishna Deva, flushed with victory, returned at once to the attack of Raichur, and the fortress was after a short time captured.

Its fall was due in great measure to the a.s.sistance rendered by some Portuguese, headed by Christovao de Figueiredo, who with their arquebusses picked off the defenders from the walls, and thus enabled the besiegers to approach close to the lines of fortification and pull down the stones of which they were formed. Driven to desperation, and their governor being slain, the garrison surrendered.

Date of the Battle.

Now as to the date of this battle.

I am bold enough to believe, and defend my belief, that when Nuniz fixed the day of the great fight as the new moon day of the month of May, A.D. 1522, he made a mistake in the year, and should have written "1520."

The chronicler states that Krishna Deva was prepared to give battle on a Friday, but was persuaded by his councillors to postpone his attack till the following day, Friday being unlucky. The battle accordingly took place on the Sat.u.r.day, which was the new moon day.

Before proceeding to examine the month and day, let us consider the year A.D. of the battle.

Paes describes two grand festivals at the capital of which he was an eye-witness, and at which Christovao de Figueiredo was present. He fixes definitely the days on which these occurred. The first was the nine-days MAHANAVAMI festival, and the second was the festival of the New Year's Day. Paes states that on the occasion when he was present the MAHANAVAMI began on September 12 ("ESTAS FESTAS SE COMECAO A DOSE DAS DE SETEBRO E DURAO NOVE DIAS"[216]), and the latter began on October 12 ("ENTRAMDO O MES D OUTUBRO A OMZE DIAS AMDADOS D ELE ... NESTE DIU COMECAO O ANNO, E DIA D ANNO BOM ... COMECAO O ANNO NESTE MES COM A LUA NOVA, E ELLES NAO CONTAO O MES SE NAO DE LUA A LUA").[217] Previously to this, when writing about Raichur, Paes has described that place[218] as a city "that formerly belonged to the king of Narsymga (I.E. Vijayanagar); there has been much war over it, and THIS KING took it from the Ydallcao" (Adil Shah). The chronicler, therefore, was present at these feasts on an occasion subsequent to the date of Krishna Deva's conquest of Raichur.

Now the MAHANAVAMI festival begins in these tracts on the 1st of the month of Asvina, and the New Year's Day in the time of Paes was evidently celebrated on the 1st of the month Karttika, as was often the case in former years both days being the days following the moment of new moon. In what year, then, during the reign of Krishna Deva Raya, did the 1st of Asvina and the 1st of Karttika fall respectively on September 12 and on October 12? I have worked these dates out for all the years of the reign, and I find that in no year except A.D. 1520 did this occur. In 1521 the MAHANAVAMI fell on September 2, and the New Year's Day on October 1; in 1522 the former fell on September 20, and the latter on October 20. This shows that Paes a.s.sisted at the festivals of A.D. 1520, and that therefore the battle and capture of Raichur must have taken place before the month of September in that year.

This again throws fresh light on the magnificent reception accorded to Christovao de Figueiredo by the king, and the latter's exceptional kindness to the Portuguese at the time of these feasts.[219] Krishna Raya cherished an especial fondness for Christovao on account of his invaluable aid at the siege of the city, and for the fact that but for him the war might have lasted much longer.

Let us now turn to the other Portuguese writers, and see whether they confirm our date, 1520, for the fall of Raichur.

The decision of this question turns mainly on the date when the Portuguese obtained the mainlands opposite the island of Goa, consisting of the tracts called Salsette, Ponda, and Bardes. It seems certain that this capture of the mainlands took place by Krishna Deva's connivance shortly after the fall of Raichur, at a time when Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, the governor-general, was away at the Red Sea, and when Ruy de Mello was governor of Goa. Now Sequeira left Goa for the Red Sea on February 13, A.D. 1520, and arrived again before Diu in India on February 9, 1521.

Castanheda tells us (and he is a good authority, since he was in India in 1529) that while Sequeira was absent at the Red Sea war broke out between the king of Vijayanagar and the Adil Shah,[220]

at the close of which the latter was defeated and put to flight, while the Hindus took Raichur and other places

"so that many of the TANADARIS[221] near Goa on the mainland were left undefended. And since the king of Narsinga was very rich, and had no need of these lands, and wanted that all the horses that came to Goa should come to him and none to the HIDALCAO, he sent to say to Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa, that he had taken Belgaum by force of arms from the Hidalcao, with all the land appertaining to it as far as the sea, in which were TANADARIS yielding more than 500,000 gold pardaos, of which he desired to make a present to the king of Portugal ... and that he wanted all the horses that came to Goa. He therefore said that the captain of Goa could enter and take possession of the TANADARIS."

This was immediately done, and Ruy de Mello took possession of the mainland of Goa, including Salsette, in ten days.

Correa, who was in India at the time, having gone thither in 1512 or 1514, mentions[222] that de Sequeira left Goa for the Red Sea in January 1520, and that "at that time" (NESTE TEMPO -- the expression is unfortunately vague) war broke out between Vijayanagar and Bij.a.pur. After its close the Hindu king sent a message to "Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa," in the absence of the governor-general, regarding the mainlands of Goa. Correa does not mention distinctly the year in which this occurred, but the edition of 1860 at the head of the page has the date "1521." This, however, must be an error on the part of the editor, for in May 1521 Sequeira was not absent, and therefore the year referred to cannot be 1521; while in May 1522 Dom Duarte de Menezes, and not Sequeira, was governor-general.[223]

Sequeira sailed for Portugal January 22, A.D. 1522.

Barros relates the departure of de Sequeira from India for the Red Sea on February 13, 1520, and states that in his absence Ruy de Mello was governor of Goa, under Sequeira's lieutenant, Aleixo de Menezes. Ruy de Mello seized the mainland of Goa after the battle of Raichur,[224] and at that time de Sequeira was absent at the Red Sea. His description of the siege of Raichur and the great battle in the vicinity clearly seems to have been taken from the chronicle of Nuniz. It follows the latter blindly, even in the misspelling of names, and therefore is really of no greater value. When, however, Barros comes to deal with the acquisition of the mainlands of Goa,[225]

he is dependent on other information, and gives a much more detailed account. The time is clearly fixed. After the battle and flight of the Adil Shah the feeling between the two adversaries was naturally highly strained, and this "enabled Ruy de Mello, captain of Goa, to take the mainlands of Goa." Sequeira was at the Red Sea and Menezes at Cochin. A very important pa.s.sage for my present purpose occurs a little later on in Barros's work:[226] --

"Diogo Lopes de Sequeira, AS soon as he arrived at Goa (from the Red Sea), all necessary arrangements having been made for the government of the city, AND PRINc.i.p.aLLY OF THE MAINLANDS, WHICH HE FOUND THAT RUY DE MELLO HAD TAKEN ... went to Cochin;"

and thence to Diu, where he arrived on February 9, 1521.[227] Another pa.s.sage farther on in the narrative of Barros also establishes the fact that Ruy de Mello took the lands during Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea.[228]

Faria y Souza, a Spanish writer, whose work was first published a century after these events, confirms the period, February 1520 to February 1521, as that of Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea, and he writes: --

"While the governor[229] was in the Red Sea, the King Crisnao Rao of Bisnaga covered the plains and hills and stopped the flow of the rivers[230] with an army of thirty-five thousand horse, seven hundred and thirty-three thousand foot, and five hundred and eighty-six elephants carrying castles with four men in each, and twelve thousand watermen ... and baggage in such quant.i.ties that the courtesans alone numbered more than twenty thousand."[231]

Souza also states, as does Nuniz, that after the defeat of the Adil Shah, Krishna Deva Raya demanded that, as the price of peace, the former should visit him and kiss his foot; and that, taking advantage of the Adil Shah's difficulties, Ruy de Mello seized the mainlands of Goa.[232] It is clear, therefore, that both authors are writing of the same event.

Osorio, a later writer, confirms the story in most of its details, stating that after the defeat of the Adil Shah, Krishna Raya sent to Ruy de Mello ("Roderigo Melos"), captain of Goa, offering the mainlands, and promising after the return of Sequeira to send a regular emba.s.sy to conclude a solemn treaty. De Mello accordingly took the mainlands.

Lafitau[233] also states that the war took place during Sequeira's absence at the Red Sea, and that the mainlands were taken after the Adil Shah's defeat.[234]

Turning to Firishtah, I find a difference. He states that the battle of Raichur took place in Hijra 927 (December 22, 1520, to December 1, 1521, A.D.), which, if it was fought in May, as Nuniz declares, makes the date May 1521. That he is speaking of the same affair is obvious from the details given. He mentions, for instance, the vast host const.i.tuting the Hindu army, the Shah's force advancing to the river Krishna, the too hasty crossing of the river, the gallant fight of the Muhammadans, their defeat and rout, the fact of the Adil Shah's forces being driven to the river and perishing in large numbers while attempting to re-cross it, the Shah's narrow escape, and his dependence on Asada Khan. All this leaves no room for doubt. The only difference is that, whereas we learn from the other authorities that the fortress of Raichur was in the hands of the Muhammadans, Firishtah states that the war arose because the Adil Shah "made preparations for marching to recover Mudkul and Roijore from the Roy of Beejanuggur," as if the latter were then in possession of those places. As to Firishtah's date, I believe it to be wrong by one year, for the reasons given above. It must be remembered that he wrote many years after the event.

Having thus, I hope satisfactorily, established the fact that the date given by Nuniz for the battle of Raichur is wrong by two years, and should be 1520, I turn to examine the day and month. It was the new moon day of May, according to Nuniz, and a Sat.u.r.day. Krishna Deva Raya was ready for battle on the Friday, but postponed his attack to the next day since Friday was considered an unlucky day.

The moment of the occurrence of new moon in May 120 was 2.27 A.M. on the morning of Thursday, May 17. We do not know whether Nuniz ascertained his facts from native almanacks or the calculations of the astrologers, or whether he spoke from observations made by himself or by some one who was present; but Nuniz was an ordinary person, not a skilled astronomer, so far as we can tell, and he may well have called the day on which the crescent of the new moon first made its appearance just after sunset the "new moon day." This first appearance actually took place on the Sat.u.r.day following. The first day of the Muhammadan month Jamada' l akhir, corresponding to the heliacal rising of the moon on that occasion, was Sat.u.r.day, May 19.

I therefore believe that this great battle took place on Sat.u.r.day, May 19, A.D. 1520,[235] a date almost synchronous with the of the "Field of the Cloth of Gold."

The Number of Troops Engaged.

When we total up the list given by Nuniz of the columns that marched from Vijayanagar for the campaign, the amount is so huge that we pause in natural doubt as to whether the story could by any possibility be true: 703,000 foot, 32,600 horse, and 551 elephants, BESIDES the camp followers, merchants, &c., and "an infinitude of people" who joined him at a place close to Raichur! It certainly demands a large strain on our credulity.

Let every one form his own opinion. I can only call attention to the fact that large armies seem to have always been the rule in India, and that certainly Krishna Raya had the power to raise immense numbers of troops,[236] though whether so many as is stated is another question. His power to do so lay in his mode of government. Allusion has already been made to this, and Nuniz gives us interesting details. The whole empire was divided into provinces and estates, held by chiefs bound to keep up ma.s.ses of troops fit for immediate service. It is, of course, natural to suppose that in this great war the king would have put forth all his strength.

To prove that immense armies were often employed by Indian kings, we have only to refer to a succession of writers. Barros notes the great power of the sovereign of Vijayanagar and his almost incredible richness, and is at pains to give an account of how these enormous forces were raised, "lest his tale should not be believed."

In the second volume of Scott's "History of the Dekhan," a translation is given of a journal kept by a Bondela officer in the reign of Aurangzib, an officer who served under "Dulput Roy" in A.D. 1690. Writing about Vijayanagar in former days, at the height of its grandeur and importance, he says, "They kept an army of 30,000 horse, a million of infantry, and their wealth was beyond enumeration."

Conti, who was in India about a century earlier than the war in question, told Bracciolini that the Vijayanagar army consisted of "a million of men and upwards."

Abdur Razzak (1442 A.D.) tells the same story, putting the number at 1,100,000 with 1000 elephants.

Twenty years later Nikitin states that the Kulbarga forces marching to attack the Hindus amounted to 900,000 foot, 190,000 horse, and 575 elephants.

The Sultan himself, independently of his n.o.bles, took the field with 300,000 men, and even when he only went out on a hunting expedition he took with him a train of 10,000 horse, 500,000 foot, and 200 elephants. He states that the Malik ul Tujar alone had an army of 200,000 employed in the siege of one city. The Hindus fought almost nude, and were armed with shield and sword.

Even so far back as the time of Alexander the Great (about B.C. 320) the army of Magadha was computed by the Greeks as consisting of 600,000 foot. 30,000 cavalry, and 9000 elephants, though Quintus Curtius makes a much more modest estimate.

Lord Egerton of Tatton states[237] that an army of Hindu confederated states, mustered for the defence of Northern indict against the Muhammadan invasion in 1192 A.D., amounted, "according to the most moderate estimate," to 300,000 horse, 3000 elephants, and a great number of infantry.

In A.D. 1259 a Mogul emba.s.sy was received at Delhi by an escort of 50,000 horse, and was led past lines of infantry numbering as many as 200,000 in their ranks.

It will be remembered how Muhammad Taghlaq of Delhi[238] raised, according to Firishtah, an army of 370,000 men for the conquest of Persia, and when he wanted to destroy the inhabitants of a certain tract of country, he "ordered out his army as if he were going hunting," surrounded the tract, and then, pressing inwards towards the centre, slaughtered all the inhabitants therein. This implies that he took, when merely hunting, immense numbers of men with him. Shahab-ud-Din, indeed, declared that Muhammad Taghlaq had an army of 900,000 horse;[239] and Nuniz, on the opening page of his chronicle, says that this Sultan invaded the Balaghat with 800,000 horse.[240]

This estimate was, of course, only according to the tradition extant in 1535.

Faria y Souza, writing in the seventeenth century, estimated the forces of Bahadur, king of Cambay, in 1534, as 100,000 horse, 415,000 foot, and 600 elephants.

As late as 1762 the Mahrattas are said to have had an army of 100,000 horse.