A Budget of Paradoxes Volume I Part 6

"Man being the servant and interpreter of nature, can do and understand so much, and so much only, as he has observed in fact or in thought of the course of nature: beyond this he neither knows anything nor can do anything."

This aphorism is placed by Sir John Herschel[119] at the head of his _Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy_: a book containing notions of discovery far beyond any of which Bacon ever dreamed; and this because it was written {81} after discovery, instead of before. Sir John Herschel, in his version, has avoided the translation of _re vel mente observaverit_, and gives us only "by his observation of the order of nature." In making this the opening of an excellent sermon, he has imitated the theologians, who often employ the whole time of the discourse in stuffing matter into the text, instead of drawing matter out of it. By _observation_ he (Herschel) means the whole course of discovery, observation, hypothesis, deduction, comparison, etc. The type of the Baconian philosopher as it stood in his mind, had been derived from a n.o.ble example, his own father, William Herschel,[120] an inquirer whose processes would have been held by Bacon to have been vague, insufficient, compounded of chance work and sagacity, and too meagre of facts to deserve the name of induction. In another work, his treatise on Astronomy,[121] Sir John Herschel, after noting that a popular account can only place the reader on the threshold, proceeds to speak as follows of all the higher departments of science. The italics are his own:

"Admission to its sanctuary, and to the privileges and feelings of a votary, is only to be gained by one means--_sound and sufficient knowledge of mathematics, the great instrument of all exact inquiry, without which no man can ever make such advances in this or any other of the higher departments of science as can ent.i.tle him to form an independent opinion on any subject of discussion within their range_."

How is this? Man can know no more than he gets from observation, and yet mathematics is the great instrument of all exact inquiry. Are the results of mathematical deduction results of observation? We think it likely that {82} Sir John Herschel would reply that Bacon, in coupling together _observare re_ and _observare mente_, has done what some wags said Newton afterwards did in his study-door--cut a large hole of exit for the large cat, and a little hole for the little cat.[122] But Bacon did no such thing: he never included any deduction under observation. To mathematics he had a dislike. He averred that logic and mathematics should be the handmaids, not the mistresses, of philosophy. He meant that they should play a subordinate and subsequent part in the dressing of the vast ma.s.s of facts by which discovery was to be rendered equally accessible to Newton and to us. Bacon himself was very ignorant of all that had been done by mathematics; and, strange to say, he especially objected to astronomy being handed over to the mathematicians. Leverrier and Adams, calculating an unknown planet into visible existence by enormous heaps of algebra, furnish the last comment of note on this specimen of the goodness of Bacon's views.

The following account of his knowledge of what had been done in his own day or before it, is Mr. Spedding's collection of casual remarks in Mr. Ellis's several prefaces:

"Though he paid great attention to astronomy, discussed carefully the methods in which it ought to be studied, constructed for the satisfaction of his own mind an elaborate theory of the heavens, and listened eagerly for the news from the stars brought by Galileo's telescope, he appears to have been utterly ignorant of the discoveries which had just been made by Kepler's calculations. Though he complained in 1623 of the want of compendious methods for facilitating arithmetical computations, especially with regard to the doctrine of Series, and fully recognized the importance of them as an aid to physical inquiries--he does not say a word about Napier's Logarithms, which had been published only nine years before and reprinted more than once in the {83} interval. He complained that no considerable advance had made in geometry beyond Euclid, without taking any notice of what had been done by Archimedes and Apollonius. He saw the importance of determining accurately the specific gravity of different substances, and himself attempted to form a table of them by a rude process of his own, without knowing of the more scientific though still imperfect methods previously employed by Archimedes, Ghetaldus,[123] and Porta. He speaks of the [Greek: heureka] of Archimedes in a manner which implies that he did not clearly apprehend either the nature of the problem to be solved or the principles upon which the solution depended. In reviewing the progress of mechanics, he makes no mention of Archimedes himself, or of Stevinus,[124] Galileo, Guldinus,[125] or Ghetaldus. He makes no allusion to the theory of equilibrium. He observes that a ball of one pound weight will fall nearly as fast through the air as a ball of two, without alluding to the theory of the acceleration of falling bodies, which had been made known by Galileo more than thirty years before. He proposes an inquiry with regard to the lever--namely, whether in a balance with arms of different length but equal weight the distance from the fulcrum has any effect upon the inclination,--though the theory of the lever was as well understood in his own time as it is now. In making an experiment {84} of his own to ascertain the cause of the motion of a windmill, he overlooks an obvious circ.u.mstance which makes the experiment inconclusive, and an equally obvious variation of the same experiment which would have shown him that his theory was false. He speaks of the poles of the earth as fixed, in a manner which seems to imply that he was not acquainted with the precession of the equinoxes; and in another place, of the north pole being above and the south pole below, as a reason why in our hemisphere the north winds predominate over the south."

Much of this was known before, but such a summary of Bacon's want of knowledge of the science of his own time was never yet collected in one place. We may add, that Bacon seems to have been as ignorant of Wright's[126] memorable addition to the resources of navigation as of Napier's addition to the means of calculation. Mathematics was beginning to be the great instrument of exact inquiry: Bacon threw the science aside, from ignorance, just at the time when his enormous sagacity, applied to knowledge, would have made him see the part it was to play. If Newton had taken Bacon for his master, not he, but somebody else, would have been Newton.[127]

ON METEOROLOGICAL OBSERVATORIES.

There is an attempt at induction going on, which has yielded little or no fruit, the observations made in the meteorological observatories. This attempt is carried on in a manner which would have caused Bacon to dance for joy; for he lived in times when Chancellors did dance. {85} Russia, says M. Biot,[128] is covered by an army of meteorographs, with generals, high officers, subalterns, and privates with fixed and defined duties of observation. Other countries have also their systematic observations. And what has come of it? Nothing, says M. Biot, and nothing will ever come of it; the veteran mathematician and experimental philosopher declares, as does Mr. Ellis, that no single branch of science has ever been fruitfully explored in this way. There is no _special object_, he says. Any one would suppose that M. Biot's opinion, given to the French Government upon the proposal to construct meteorological observatories in Algeria (_Comptes Rendus_, vol. xli, Dec. 31, 1855), was written to support the mythical Bacon, modern physics, against the real Bacon of the _Novum Organum_. There is no _special object_. In these words lies the difference between the two methods.

[In the report to the Greenwich Board of Visitors for 1867 Mr. Airy,[129]

speaking of the increase of meteorological observatories, remarks, "Whether the effect of this movement will be that millions of useless observations will be added to the millions that already exist, or whether something may be expected to result which will lead to a meteorological theory, I cannot hazard a conjecture." This _is_ a conjecture, and a very obvious one: if Mr. Airy would have given 2-3/4d. for the chance of a meteorological theory formed by ma.s.ses of observations, he would never have said what I have quoted.]

BASIS OF MODERN DISCOVERY.

Modern discoveries have not been made by large collections of facts, with subsequent discussion, separation, and {86} resulting deduction of a truth thus rendered perceptible. A few facts have suggested an _hypothesis_, which means a _supposition_, proper to explain them. The necessary results of this supposition are worked out, and then, and not till then, other facts are examined to see if these ulterior results are found in nature.

The trial of the hypothesis is the _special object_: prior to which, hypothesis must have been started, not by rule, but by that sagacity of which no description can be given, precisely because the very owners of it do not act under laws perceptible to themselves.[130] The inventor of hypothesis, if pressed to explain his method, must answer as did Zerah Colburn,[131] when asked for his mode of instantaneous calculation. When the poor boy had been bothered for some time in this manner, he cried out in a huff, "G.o.d put it into my head, and I can't put it into yours."[132]

{87} Wrong hypotheses, rightly worked from, have produced more useful results than unguided observation. But this is not the Baconian plan.

Charles the Second, when informed of the state of navigation, founded a Baconian observatory at Greenwich, to observe, observe, observe away at the moon, until her motions were known sufficiently well to render her useful in guiding the seaman. And no doubt Flamsteed's[133] observations, twenty or thirty of them at least, were of signal use. But how? A somewhat fanciful thinker, one Kepler, had hit upon the approximate orbits of the planets by trying one hypothesis after another: he found the _ellipse_, which the Platonists, well despised of Bacon, and who would have despised him as heartily if they had known him, had investigated and put ready to hand nearly 2000 years before.[134] The sun in the focus, the motions of the planet more and more rapid as they approach the sun, led Kepler--and Bacon would have reproved him for his rashness--to imagine that a force residing in the sun might move the planets, a force inversely as the distance. Bouillaud,[135] upon a fanciful a.n.a.logy, rejected the inverse distance, {88} and, rejecting the force altogether, declared that if such a thing there were, it would be as the inverse _square_ of the distance.

Newton, ready prepared with the mathematics of the subject, tried the fall of the moon towards the earth, away from her tangent, and found that, as compared with the fall of a stone, the law of the inverse square did hold for the moon. He deduced the ellipse, he proceeded to deduce the effect of the disturbance of the sun upon the moon, upon the a.s.sumed theory of _universal_ gravitation. He found result after result of his theory in conformity with observed fact: and, by aid of Flamsteed's observations, which amended what mathematicians call his _constants_, he constructed his lunar theory. Had it not been for Newton, the whole dynasty of Greenwich astronomers, from Flamsteed of happy memory, to Airy whom Heaven preserve,[136] might have worked away at nightly observation and daily reduction, without any remarkable result: looking forward, as to a millennium, to the time when any man of moderate intelligence was to see the whole explanation. What are large collections of facts for? To make theories _from_, says Bacon: to try ready-made theories _by_, says the history of discovery: it's all the same, says the idolater: nonsense, say we!

Time and s.p.a.ce run short: how odd it is that of the three leading ideas of mechanics, time, s.p.a.ce, and matter, the first two should always fail a reviewer before the third. We might dwell upon many points, especially if we attempted a more descriptive account of the valuable edition before us.

No one need imagine that the editors, by their uncompromising attack upon the notion of Bacon's influence common even among mathematicians and experimental philosophers, have lowered the glory of the great man whom it was, many will think, their business to defend through thick and thin. They have given a clearer notion of his {89} excellencies, and a better idea of the power of his mind, than ever we saw given before. Such a correction as theirs must have come, and soon, for as Hallam says--after noting that the _Novum Organum_ was _never published separately in England_, Bacon has probably been more read in the last thirty years--now forty--than in the two hundred years which preceded. He will now be more read than ever he was. The history of the intellectual world is the history of the worship of one idol after another. No sooner is it clear that a Hercules has appeared among men, than all that imagination can conceive of strength is attributed to him, and his labors are recorded in the heavens. The time arrives when, as in the case of Aristotle, a new deity is found, and the old one is consigned to shame and reproach. A reaction may afterwards take place, and this is now happening in the case of the Greek philosopher. The end of the process is, that the opposing deities take their places, side by side, in a Pantheon dedicated not to G.o.ds, but to heroes.

THE REAL VALUE OF BACON'S WORKS.

Pa.s.sing over the success of Bacon's own endeavors to improve the details of physical science, which was next to nothing, and of his method as a whole, which has never been practised, we might say much of the good influence of his writings. Sound wisdom, set in sparkling wit, must instruct and amuse to the end of time: and, as against error, we repeat that Bacon is soundly wise, so far as he goes. There is hardly a form of human error within his scope which he did not detect, expose, and attach to a satirical metaphor which never ceases to sting. He is largely indebted to a very extensive reading; but the thoughts of others fall into his text with such a close-fitting compactness that he can make even the words of the Sacred Writers pa.s.s for his own. A saying of the prophet Daniel, rather a hackneyed quotation in our day, _Multi pertransibunt, et augebitur scientia_, stands in the t.i.tle-page of the first edition {90} of Montucla's _History of Mathematics_ as a quotation from Bacon--and it is not the only place in which this mistake occurs. When the truth of the matter, as to Bacon's system, is fully recognized, we have little fear that there will be a reaction against the man. First, because Bacon will always live to speak for himself, for he will not cease to be read: secondly, because those who seek the truth will find it in the best edition of his works, and will be most ably led to know what Bacon was, in the very books which first showed at large what he _was not_.

THE CONGREGATION OF THE INDEX, ON COPERNICUS.

In this year (1620) appeared the corrections under which the Congregation of the Index--i.e., the Committee of Cardinals which superintended the _Index_ of forbidden books--proposed to allow the work of Copernicus to be read. I insert these conditions in full, because they are often alluded to, and I know of no source of reference accessible to a twentieth part of those who take interest in the question.

By a decree of the Congregation of the Index, dated March 5, 1616, the work of Copernicus, and another of Didacus Astunica,[137] are suspended _donec corrigantur_, as teaching:

"Falsam illam doctrinam Pythagoricam, divinae que Scripturae omnino adversantem, de mobilitate Terrae et immobilitate Solis."[138]

But a work of the Carmelite Foscarini[139] is:

{91}

"Omnino prohibendum atque d.a.m.nandum," because "ostendere conatur praefatam doctrinam ... consonam esse veritati et non adversari Sacrae Scripturae."[140]

Works which teach the false doctrine of the earth's motion are to be corrected; those which declare the doctrine conformable to Scripture are to be utterly prohibited.

In a "Monitum ad Nicolai Copernici lectorem, ejusque emendatio, permissio, et correctio," dated 1620 without the month or day, permission is given to reprint the work of Copernicus with certain alterations; and, by implication, to read existing copies after correction in writing. In the preamble the author is called _n.o.bilis astrologus_; not a compliment to his birth, which was humble, but to his fame. The suspension was because:

"Sacrae Scripturae, ejusque verae et Catholicae interpretationi repugnantia (quod in homine Christiano minime tolerandum) non _per hypothesin_ tractare, sed _ut verissima_ adstruere non dubitat!"[141]

And the corrections relate:

"Locis in quibus non _ex hypothesi_, sed _a.s.serendo_ de situ et motu Terrae disputat."[142]

That is, the earth's motion may be an hypothesis for elucidation of the heavenly motions, but must not be a.s.serted as a fact.

(In Pref. circa finem.) "_Copernicus._ Si forta.s.se erunt [Greek: mataiologoi], qui c.u.m omnium Mathematum ignari sint, tamen de illis judicium sibi summunt, propter aliquem loc.u.m scripturae, male ad suum propositum detortum, ausi fuerint meum {92} hoc inst.i.tutum reprehendere ac insectari: illos nihil moror adeo ut etiam illorum judicium tanquam temerarium contemnam. Non enim obscurum est Lactantium, celebrem alioqui scriptorem, sed Mathematic.u.m parum, admodum pueriliter de forma terrae loqui, c.u.m deridet eos, qui terram globi formam habere prodiderunt. Itaque non debet mirum videri studiosis, si qui tales nos etiam videbunt.

Mathemata Mathematicis scribuntur, quibus et hi nostri labores, si me non fallit opinio, videbuntur etiam Reipub. ecclesiasticae conducere aliquid....

_Emend._ Ibi _si forta.s.se_ dele omnia, usque ad verb.u.m _hi nostri labores_ et sic accommoda--_Coeterum hi nostri labores_."[143]

All the allusion to Lactantius, who laughed at the notion of the earth being round, which was afterwards found true, is to be struck out.

(Cap. 5. lib. i. p. 3) "_Copernicus._ Si tamen attentius rem consideremus, videbitur haec quaestio nondum absoluta, et ideireo minime contemnenda.

_Emend._ Si tamen attentius rem consideremus, nihil refert an Terram in medio Mundi, an extra Medium existere, quoad solvendas coelestium motuum apparentias existimemus."[144]

{93}

We must not say the question is not yet settled, but only that it may be settled either way, so far as mere explanation of the celestial motions is concerned.

(Cap. 8. lib. i.) "Totum hoc caput potest expungi, quia ex professo tractat de veritate motus Terrae, dum solvit veterum rationes probantes ejus quietem. c.u.m tamen problematice videatur loqui; ut studiosis satisfiat, seriesque et ordo libri integer maneat; emendetur ut infra."[145]

A chapter which seems to a.s.sert the motion should perhaps be expunged; but it may perhaps be problematical; and, not to break up the book, must be amended as below.

(p. 6.) "_Copernicus._ Cur ergo hesitamus adhuc, mobilitatem illi formae suae a natura congruentem concedere, magisquam quod totus labatur mundus, cujus finis ignoratur, scirique nequit, neque fateamur ipsius cotidianae revolutionis in coelo apparentiam esse, et in terra veritatem? Et haec perinde se habere, ac si diceret Virgilia.n.u.s aeneas: Provehimur portu ...

_Emend._ Cur ergo non possum mobilitatem illi formae suae concedere, magisque quod totus labatur mundus, cujus finis ignoratur scirique nequit, et quae apparent in coelo, perinde se habere ac si ..."[146]

{94}