A Budget of Paradoxes Volume I Part 5

OF GILBERT'S DE MAGNETE.

De Magnete magneticisque corporibus, et de magno magnete tellure. By William Gilbert. London, 1600, folio.--There is a second edition; and a third, according to Watt.[91]

Of the great work on the magnet there is no need to speak, though it was a paradox in its day. The posthumous work of Gilbert, "De Mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova" (Amsterdam, 1651, 4to)[92] is, as the t.i.tle indicates, confined to the physics of the globe and its atmosphere. It has never excited attention: I should hope it would be examined with our present lights.

OF GIOVANNI BATISTA PORTA.

Elementorum Curvilineorium Libri tres. By John Baptista Porta. Rome, 1610, 4to.[93]

This is a ridiculous attempt, which defies description, except that it is all about lunules. Porta was a voluminous writer. His printer announces fourteen works printed, and four to come, besides thirteen plays printed, and eleven waiting. His name is, and will be, current in treatises on physics for more reasons than one.

{69}

CATALDI ON THE QUADRATURE.

Trattato della quadratura del cerchio. Di Pietro Antonio Cataldi.

Bologna, 1612, folio.[94]

Rheticus,[95] Vieta, and Cataldi are the three untiring computers of Germany, France, and Italy; Napier in Scotland, and Briggs[96] in England, come just after them. This work claims a place as beginning with the quadrature of Pellegrino Borello[97] of Reggio, who will have the circle to be exactly 3 diameters and 69/484 of a diameter. Cataldi, taking Van Ceulen's approximation, works hard at the finding of integers which nearly represent the ratio. He had not then the _continued fraction_, a mode of representation which he gave the next year in his work on the square root.

He has but twenty of Van Ceulen's thirty places, which he takes from Clavius[98]: and any one might be puzzled to know whence the Italians got the result; Van Ceulen, in 1612, not having been translated from Dutch. But Clavius names his comrade Gruenberger, and attributes the approximation to them {70} jointly; "Lud. a Collen et Chr. Gruenbergerus[99] invenerunt,"

which he had no right to do, unless, to his private knowledge, Gruenberger had verified Van Ceulen. And Gruenberger only handed over twenty of the places. But here is one instance, out of many, of the polyglot character of the Jesuit body, and its advantages in literature.

OF LANSBERGIUS.

Philippi Lausbergii Cyclometriae Novae Libri Duo. Middleburg, 1616, 4to.[100]

This is one of the legitimate quadratures, on which I shall here only remark that by candlelight it is quadrature under difficulties, for all the diagrams are in red ink.

A TEXT LEADING TO REMARKS ON PRESTER JOHN.

Recherches Curieuses des Mesures du Monde. By S. C. de V. Paris, 1626, 8vo (pp. 48).[101]

It is written by some Count for his son; and if all the French n.o.bility would have given their sons the same kind of instruction about rank, the old French aristocracy would have been as prosperous at this moment as the English peerage and squireage. I sent the tract to Capt. Speke,[102]

shortly after his arrival in England, thinking he might like {71} to see the old names of the Ethiopian provinces. But I first made a copy of all that relates to Prester John,[103] himself a paradox. The tract contains, _inter alia_, an account of the four empires; of the great Turk, the great Tartar, the great Sophy, and the great Prester John. This word _great_ (_grand_), which was long used in the phrase "the great Turk," is a generic adjunct to an emperor. Of the Tartars it is said that "c'est vne nation prophane et barbaresque, sale et vilaine, qui mangent la chair demie crue, qui boiuent du laict de jument, et qui n'vsent de nappes et seruiettes que pour essuyer leurs bouches et leurs mains."[104] Many persons have heard of Prester John, and have a very indistinct idea of him. I give all that is said about him, since the recent discussions about the Nile may give an interest to the old notions of geography.

"Le grand Prestre Jean qui est le quatriesme en rang, est Empereur d'Ethiopie, et des Abyssins, et se vante d'estre issu de la race de Dauid, comme estant descendu de la Royne de Saba, Royne d'Ethiopie, laquelle estant venue en Hierusalem pour voir la sagesse de Salomon, enuiron l'an du monde 2952, s'en retourna grosse d'vn fils qu'ils nomment Moylech, duquel ils disent estre descendus en ligne directe. Et ainsi il se glorifie d'estre le plus ancien Monarque de la terre, disant que son Empire a dure plus de trois mil ans, ce que nul autre Empire ne peut dire. Aussi met-il en ses tiltres ce qui s'ensuit: Nous, N. Souuerain en mes Royaumes, vniquement ayme de Dieu, colomne de la foy, sorty de la race de Inda, etc.

Les limites de cet Empire touchent a la mer Rouge, et aux montagnes d'Azuma vers {72} l'Orient, et du coste de l'Occident, il est borne du fleuue du Nil, qui le separe de la Nubie, vers le Septentrion il a l'aegypte, et au Midy les Royaumes de Congo, et de Mozambique, sa longueur contenant quarante degre, qui font mille vingt cinq lieues, et ce depuis Congo ou Mozambique qui sont au Midy, iusqu'en aegypte qui est au Septentrion, et sa largeur contenant depuis le Nil qui est a l'Occident, iusqu'aux montagnes d'Azuma, qui sont a l'Orient, sept cens vingt cinq lieues, qui font vingt neuf degrez. Cet empire a sous soy trente grandes Prouinces, scavoir, Medra, Gaga, Alchy, Cedalon, Mantro, Finazam, Barnaquez, Ambiam, Fungy, Angote, Cigremaon, Gorga, Cafatez, Zastanla, Zeth, Barly, Belangana, Tygra, Gorgany, Barganaza, d'Ancut, Dargaly, Ambiacatina, Caracogly, Amara, Maon (_sic_), Guegiera, Bally, Dobora et Macheda. Toutes ces Prouinces cy dessus sont situees iustement sous la ligne equinoxiale, entres les Tropiques de Capricorne, et de Cancer. Mais elles s'approchent de nostre Tropique, de deux cens cinquante lieues plus qu'elles ne font de l'autre Tropique. Ce mot de Prestre Jean signifie grand Seigneur, et n'est pas Prestre comme plusieurs pense, il a este tousiours Chrestien, mais souuent Schismatique: maintenant il est Catholique, et reconnaist le Pape pour Souuerain Pontife.

I'ay veu quelqu'vn des ses Euesques, estant en Hierusalem, auec lequel i'ay confere souuent par le moyen de nostre trucheman: il estoit d'vn port graue et serieux, succiur (_sic_) en son parler, mais subtil a merueilles en tout ce qu'il disoit. Il prenoit grand plaisir au recit que je luy faisais de nos belles ceremonies, et de la grauite de nos Prelats en leurs habits Pontificaux, et autres choses que je laisse pour dire, que l'Ethiopien est ioyoux et gaillard, ne ressemblant en rien a la salete du Tartare, ny a l'affreux regard du miserable Arabe, mais ils sont fins et cauteleux, et ne se fient en personne, soupconneux a merueilles, et fort devotieux, ils ne sont du tout noirs comme l'on croit, i'entens parler de ceux qui ne sont pas sous la ligne Equinoxiale, ny trop proches {73} d'icelle, car ceux qui sont dessous sont les Mores que nous voyons."[105]

It will be observed that the author speaks of his conversation with an Ethiopian bishop, about that bishop's sovereign. Something must have pa.s.sed between the two which satisfied the writer that the bishop acknowledged his own sovereign under some t.i.tle answering to Prester John.

{74}

CONCERNING A TRACT BY FIENUS.

De Cometa anni 1618 dissertationes Thomae Fieni[106] et Liberti Fromondi[107] ... Equidem Thomae Fieni epistolica quaestio, An verum sit Coelum moveri et Terram quiescere? London, 1670, 8vo.

This tract of Fienus against the motion of the earth is a reprint of one published in 1619.[108] I have given an account of it as a good summary of arguments of the time, in the _Companion to the Almanac_ for 1836.

{75}

ON SNELL'S WORK.

Willebrordi Snellii. R. F. Cyclometricus. Leyden, 1621, 4to.

This is a celebrated work on the approximative quadrature, which, having the suspicious word _cyclometricus_, must be noticed here for distinction.[109]

ON BACON'S NOVUM ORGANUM.

1620. In this year, Francis Bacon[110] published his _Novum Organum_,[111]

which was long held in England--but not until the last century--to be the work which taught Newton and all his successors how to philosophize. That Newton never mentions Bacon, nor alludes in any way to his works, pa.s.sed for nothing. Here and there a paradoxer ventured not to find all this teaching in Bacon, but he was p.r.o.nounced blind. In our day it begins to be seen that, great as Bacon was, and great as his book really is, he is not the philosophical father of modern discovery.

But old prepossession will find reason for anything. A learned friend of mine wrote to me that he had discovered proof that Newton owned Bacon for his master: the proof was that Newton, in some of his earlier writings, used the {76} phrase _experimentum crucis_, which is Bacon's. Newton may have read some of Bacon, though no proof of it appears. I have a dim idea that I once saw the two words attributed to the alchemists: if so, there is another explanation; for Newton was deeply read in the alchemists.

I subjoin a review which I wrote of the splendid edition of Bacon by Spedding,[112] Ellis,[113] and Heath.[114] All the opinions therein expressed had been formed by me long before: most of the materials were collected for another purpose.

The Works of Francis Bacon. Edited by James Spedding, R. Leslie Ellis, and Douglas D. Heath. 5 vols.[115]

No knowledge of nature without experiment and observation: so said Aristotle, so said Bacon, so acted Copernicus, Tycho Brahe,[116] Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Harvey, etc., before Bacon wrote.[117] No derived knowledge _until_ experiment and observation are concluded: so said Bacon, and no one else. We do not mean to say that he laid down his principle in these words, or that he carried it to the utmost extreme: we mean that Bacon's ruling idea was the {77} collection of enormous ma.s.ses of facts, and then digested processes of arrangement and elimination, so artistically contrived, that a man of common intelligence, without any unusual sagacity, should be able to announce the truth sought for. Let Bacon speak for himself, in his editor's English:

"But the course I propose for the discovery of sciences is such as leaves but little to the acuteness and strength of wits, but places all wits and understandings nearly on a level. For, as in the drawing of a straight line or a perfect circle, much depends on the steadiness and practice of the hand, if it be done by aim of hand only, but if with the aid of rule or compa.s.s little or nothing, so it is exactly with my plan.... For my way of discovering sciences goes far to level men's wits, and leaves but little to individual excellence; because it performs everything by the surest rules and demonstrations."

To show that we do not strain Bacon's meaning, we add what is said by Hooke,[118] whom we have already mentioned as his professed disciple, and, we believe, his only disciple of the day of Newton. We must, however, remind the reader that Hooke was very little of a mathematician, and spoke of algebra from his own idea of what others had told him:

"The intellect is not to be suffered to act without its helps, but is continually to be a.s.sisted by some method or engine, which shall be as a guide to regulate its actions, so as that it shall not be able to act amiss. Of this engine, no man except the incomparable Verulam hath had any thoughts and he indeed hath promoted it to a very good pitch; but there is yet somewhat more to be added, which he seemed to want time to complete. By this, as by that {78} art of algebra in geometry, 'twill be very easy to proceed in any natural inquiry, regularly and certainly.... For as 'tis very hard for the most acute wit to find out any difficult problem in geometry without the help of algebra ... and altogether as easy for the meanest capacity acting by that method to complete and perfect it, so will it be in the inquiry after natural knowledge."

Bacon did not live to mature the whole of this plan. Are we really to believe that if he had completed the _Instauratio_ we who write this--and who feel ourselves growing bigger as we write it--should have been on a level with Newton in physical discovery? Bacon asks this belief of us, and does not get it. But it may be said, Your business is with what he _did_ leave, and with its consequences. Be it so. Mr. Ellis says: "That his method is impracticable cannot, I think, be denied, if we reflect not only that it never has produced any result, but also that the process by which scientific truths have been established cannot be so presented as even to appear to be in accordance with it." That this is very true is well known to all who have studied the history of discovery: those who deny it are bound to establish either that some great discovery has been made by Bacon's method--we mean by the part peculiar to Bacon--or, better still, to show that some new discovery can be made, by actually making it. No general talk about _induction_: no reliance upon the mere fact that certain experiments or observations have been made; let us see where _Bacon's induction_ has been actually used or can be used. Mere induction, _enumeratio simplex_, is spoken of by himself with contempt, as utterly incompetent. For Bacon knew well that a thousand instances may be contradicted by the thousand and first: so that no enumeration of instances, however large, is "sure demonstration," so long any are left.

The immortal Harvey, who was _inventing_--we use the word in its old sense--the circulation of the blood, while {79} Bacon was in the full flow of thought upon his system, may be trusted to say whether, when the system appeared, he found any likeness in it to his own processes, or what would have been any help to him, if he had waited for the _Novum Organum_. He said of Bacon, "He writes philosophy like a Lord Chancellor." This has been generally supposed to be only a sneer at the _sutor ultra crepidam_; but we cannot help suspecting that there was more intended by it. To us, Bacon is eminently the philosopher of _error prevented_, not of _progress facilitated_. When we throw off the idea of being _led right_, and betake ourselves to that of being _kept from going wrong_, we read his writings with a sense of their usefulness, his genius, and their probable effect upon purely experimental science, which we can be conscious of upon no other supposition. It amuses us to have to add that the part of Aristotle's logic of which he saw the value was the book on _refutation of fallacies_.

Now is this not the notion of things to which the bias of a practised lawyer might lead him? In the case which is before the Court, generally speaking, truth lurks somewhere about the facts, and the elimination of all error will show it in the residuum. The two senses of the word _law_ come in so as to look almost like a play upon words. The judge can apply the law so soon as the facts are settled: the physical philosopher has to deduce the law from the facts. Wait, says the judge, until the facts are determined: did the prisoner take the goods with felonious intent? did the defendant give what amounts to a warranty? or the like. Wait, says Bacon, until all the facts, or all the obtainable facts, are brought in: apply my rules of separation to the facts, and the result shall come out as easily as by ruler and compa.s.ses. We think it possible that Harvey might allude to the legal character of Bacon's notions: we can hardly conceive so acute a man, after seeing what manner of writer Bacon was, meaning only that he was a lawyer and had better stick to his business. We do ourselves believe that Bacon's philosophy {80} more resembles the action of mind of a common-law judge--not a Chancellor--than that of the physical inquirers who have been supposed to follow in his steps. It seems to us that Bacon's argument is, there can be nothing of law but what must be either perceptible, or mechanically deducible, when all the results of law, as exhibited in phenomena, are before us. Now the truth is, that the physical philosopher has frequently to conceive law which never was in his previous thought--to educe the unknown, not to choose among the known. Physical discovery would be very easy work if the inquirer could lay down his this, his that, and his t'other, and say, "Now, one of these it must be; let us proceed to try which." Often has he done this, and failed; often has the truth turned out to be neither this, that, nor t'other. Bacon seems to us to think that the philosopher is a judge who has to choose, upon ascertained facts, which of known statutes is to rule the decision: he appears to us more like a person who is to write the statute-book, with no guide except the cases and decisions presented in all their confusion and all their conflict.

Let us take the well-known first aphorism of the _Novum Organum_: