Zoonomia Volume I Part 8

Vallisneria. Other flowers of the cla.s.ses of monecia and diecia, and polygamia, discharge the fecundating farina, which floating in the air is carried to the stigma of the female flowers, and that at considerable distances. Can this be effected by any specific attraction? or, like the diffusion of the odorous particles of flowers, is it left to the currents of winds, and the accidental miscarriages of it counteracted by the quant.i.ty of its production?

2. This leads us to a curious enquiry, whether vegetables have ideas of external things? As all our ideas are originally received by our senses, the question may be changed to, whether vegetables possess any organs of sense? Certain it is, that they possess a sense of heat and cold, another of moisture and dryness, and another of light and darkness; for they close their petals occasionally from the presence of cold, moisture, or darkness.

And it has been already shewn, that these actions cannot be performed simply from irritation, because cold and darkness are negative quant.i.ties, and on that account sensation or volition are implied, and in consequence a sensorium or union of their nerves. So when we go into the light, we contract the iris; not from any stimulus of the light on the fine muscles of the iris, but from its motions being a.s.sociated with the sensation of too much light on the retina: which could not take place without a sensorium or center of union of the nerves of the iris with those of vision. See Botanic Garden, Part I. Canto 3. l. 440. note.

Besides these organs of sense, which distinguish cold, moisture, and darkness, the leaves of mimosa, and of dionaea, and of drosera, and the stamens of many flowers, as of the berbery, and the numerous cla.s.s of syngenesia, are sensible to mechanic impact, that is, they possess a sense of touch, as well as a common sensorium; by the medium of which their muscles are excited into action. Lastly, in many flowers the anthers, when mature, approach the stigma, in others the female organ approaches to the male. In a plant of collinsonia, a branch of which is now before me, the two yellow stamens are about three eights of an inch high, and diverge from each other, at an angle of about fifteen degrees, the purple style is half an inch high, and in some flowers is now applied to the stamen on the right hand, and in others to that of the left; and will, I suppose, change place to-morrow in those, where the anthers have not yet effused their powder.

I ask, by what means are the anthers in many flowers, and stigmas in other flowers, directed to find their paramours? How do either of them know, that the other exists in their vicinity? Is this curious kind of storge produced by mechanic attraction, or by the sensation of love? The latter opinion is supported by the strongest a.n.a.logy, because a reproduction of the species is the consequence; and then another organ of sense must be wanted to direct these vegetable amourettes to find each other, one probably a.n.a.logous to our sense of smell, which in the animal world directs the new-born infant to its source of nourishment, and they may thus possess a faculty of perceiving as well as of producing odours.

Thus, besides a kind of taste at the extremities of their roots, similar to that of the extremities of our lacteal vessels, for the purpose of selecting their proper food: and besides different kinds of irritability residing in the various glands, which separate honey, wax, resin, and other juices from their blood; vegetable life seems to possess an organ of sense to distinguish the variations of heat, another to distinguish the varying degrees of moisture, another of light, another of touch, and probably another a.n.a.logous to our sense of smell. To these must be added the indubitable evidence of their pa.s.sion of love, and I think we may truly conclude, that they are furnished with a common sensorium belonging to each bud and that they must occasionally repeat those perceptions either in their dreams or waking hours, and consequently possess ideas of so many of the properties of the external world, and of their own existence.

SECT. XIV.

OF THE PRODUCTION OF IDEAS.

I. _Of material and immaterial beings. Doctrine of St. Paul._ II. 1.

_Of the sense of touch. Of solidity._ 2. _Of figure. Motion. Time.

Place. s.p.a.ce. Number._ 3. _Of the penetrability of matter._ 4. _Spirit of animation possesses solidity, figure, visibility, &c. Of Spirits and angels._ 5. _The existence of external things._ III. _Of vision._ IV.

_Of hearing._ V. _Of smell and taste._ VI. _Of the organ of sense by which we perceive heat and cold, not by the sense of touch._ VII. _Of the sense of extension, the whole of the locomotive muscles may be considered as one organ of sense._ VIII. _Of the senses of hunger, thirst, want of fresh air, suckling children, and l.u.s.t._ IX. _Of many other organs of sense belonging to the glands. Of painful sensations from the excess of light, pressure, heat, itching, caustics, and electricity._

I. Philosophers have been much perplexed to understand, in what manner we become acquainted with the external world; insomuch that Dr. Berkly even doubted its existence, from having observed (as he thought) that none of our ideas resemble their correspondent objects. Mr. Hume a.s.serts, that our belief depends on the greater distinctness or energy of our ideas from perception; and Mr. Reid has lately contended, that our belief of external objects is an innate principle necessarily joined with our perceptions.

So true is the observation of the famous Malbranch, "that our senses are not given us to discover the essences of things, but to acquaint us with the means of preserving our existence," (L. I. ch. v.) a melancholy reflection to philosophers!

Some philosophers have divided all created beings into material and immaterial: the former including all that part of being, which obeys the mechanic laws of action and reaction, but which can begin no motion of itself; the other is the cause of all motion, and is either termed the power of gravity, or of specific attraction, or the spirit of animation.

This immaterial agent is supposed to exist in or with matter, but to be quite distinct from it, and to be equally capable of existence, after the matter, which now possesses it, is decomposed.

Nor is this theory ill supported by a.n.a.logy, since heat, electricity, and magnetism, can be given to or taken from a piece of iron; and must therefore exist, whether separated from the metal, or combined with it.

From a parity of reasoning, the spirit of animation, would appear to be capable of existing as well separately from the body as with it.

I beg to be understood, that I do not wish to dispute about words, and am ready to allow, that the powers of gravity, specific attraction, electricity, magnetism, and even the spirit of animation, may consist of matter of a finer kind; and to believe, with St. Paul and Malbranch, that the ultimate cause only of all motion is immaterial, that is G.o.d. St. Paul says, "in him we live and move, and have our being;" and, in the 15th chapter to the Corinthians, distinguishes between the psyche or living spirit, and the pneuma or reviving spirit. By the words spirit of animation or sensorial power, I mean only that animal life, which mankind possesses in common with brutes, and in some degree even with vegetables, and leave the consideration of the immortal part of us, which is the object of religion, to those who treat of revelation.

II. 1. _Of the Sense of Touch._

The first idea we become acquainted with, are those of the sense of touch; for the foetus must experience some varieties of agitation, and exert some muscular action, in the womb; and may with great probability be supposed thus to gain some ideas of its own figure, of that of the uterus, and of the tenacity of the fluid, that surrounds it, (as appears from the facts mentioned in the succeeding Section upon Instinct.)

Many of the organs of sense are confined to a small part of the body, as the nostrils, ear, or eye, whilst the sense of touch is diffused over the whole skin, but exists with a more exquisite degree of delicacy at the extremities of the fingers and thumbs, and in the lips. The sense of touch is thus very commodiously disposed for the purpose of encompa.s.sing smaller bodies, and for adapting itself to the inequalities of larger ones. The figure of small bodies seems to be learnt by children by their lips as much as by their fingers; on which account they put every new object to their mouths, when they are satiated with food, as well as when they are hungry.

And puppies seem to learn their ideas of figure princ.i.p.ally by the lips in their mode of play.

We acquire our tangible ideas of objects either by the simple pressure of this organ of touch against a solid body, or by moving our organ of touch along the surface of it. In the former case we learn the length and breadth of the object by the quant.i.ty of our organ of touch, that is impressed by it: in the latter case we learn the length and breadth of objects by the continuance of their pressure on our moving organ of touch.

It is hence, that we are very slow in acquiring our tangible ideas, and very slow in recollecting them; for if I now think of the tangible idea of a cube, that is, if I think of its figure, and of the solidity of every part of that figure, I must conceive myself as pa.s.sing my fingers over it, and seem in some measure to feel the idea, as I formerly did the impression, at the ends of them, and am thus very slow in distinctly recollecting it.

When a body compresses any part of our sense of touch, what happens? First, this part of our sensorium undergoes a mechanical compression, which is termed a stimulus; secondly, an idea, or contraction of a part of the organ of sense is excited; thirdly, a motion of the central parts, or of the whole sensorium, which is termed sensation, is produced; and these three const.i.tute the perception of solidity.

2. _Of Figure, Motion, Time, Place, s.p.a.ce, Number._

No one will deny, that the medulla of the brain and nerves has a certain figure; which, as it is diffused through nearly the whole of the body, must have nearly the figure of that body. Now it follows, that the spirit of animation, or living principle, as it occupies this medulla, and no other part, (which is evinced by a great variety of cruel experiments on living animals,) it follows, that this spirit of animation has also the same figure as the medulla above described. I appeal to common sense! the spirit of animation acts, Where does it act? It acts wherever there is the medulla above mentioned; and that whether the limb is yet joined to a living animal, or whether it be recently detached from it; as the heart of a viper or frog will renew its contractions, when p.r.i.c.ked with a pin, for many minutes of time after its exsection from the body.--Does it act any where else?--No; then it certainly exists in this part of s.p.a.ce, and no where else; that is, it hath figure; namely, the figure of the nervous system, which is nearly the figure of the body. When the idea of solidity is excited, as above explained, a part of the extensive organ of touch is compressed by some external body, and this part of the sensorium so compressed exactly resembles _in figure_ the figure of the body that compressed it. Hence, when we acquire the idea of solidity, we acquire at the same time the idea of FIGURE; and this idea of figure, or motion of _a part_ of the organ of touch, exactly resembles _in its figure_ the figure of the body that occasions it; and thus exactly acquaints us with this property of the external world.

Now, as the whole universe with all its parts possesses a certain form or figure, if any part of it moves, that form or figure of the whole is varied: hence, as MOTION is no other than a perpetual variation of figure, our idea of motion is also a real resemblance of the motion that produced it.

It may be said in objection to this definition of motion, that an ivory globe may revolve on its axis, and that here will be a motion without change of figure. But the figure of the particle _x_ on one side of this globe is not the _same_ figure as the figure of _y_ on the other side, any more than the particles themselves are the same, though they are _similar_ figures; and hence they cannot change place with each other without disturbing or changing the figure of the whole.

Our idea of TIME is from the same source, but is more abstracted, as it includes only the comparative velocities of these variations of figure; hence if it be asked, How long was this book in printing? it may be answered, Whilst the sun was pa.s.sing through Aries.

Our idea of PLACE includes only the figure of a group of bodies, not the figures of the bodies themselves. If it be asked where is Nottinghamshire, the answer is, it is surrounded by Derbyshire, Lincolnshire and Leicestershire; hence place is our idea of the figure of one body surrounded by the figures of other bodies.

The idea of s.p.a.cE is a more abstracted idea of place excluding the group of bodies.

The idea of NUMBER includes only the particular arrangements, or distributions of a group of bodies, and is therefore only a more abstracted idea of the parts of the figure of the group of bodies; thus when I say England is divided into forty counties, I only speak of certain divisions of its figure.

Hence arises the certainty of the mathematical sciences, as they explain these properties of bodies, which are exactly resembled by our ideas of them, whilst we are obliged to collect almost all our other knowledge from experiment; that is, by observing the effects exerted by one body upon another.

3. _Of the Penetrability of Matter._

The impossibility of two bodies existing together in the same s.p.a.ce cannot be deduced from our idea of solidity, or of figure. As soon as we perceive the motions of objects that surround us, and learn that we possess a power to move our own bodies, we experience, that those objects, which excite in us the idea of solidity and of figure, oppose this voluntary movement of our own organs; as whilst I endeavour to compress between my hands an ivory ball into a spheroid. And we are hence taught by experience, that our own body and those, which we touch, cannot exist in the same part of s.p.a.ce.

But this by no means demonstrates, that no two bodies can exist together in the same part of s.p.a.ce. Galilaeo in the preface to his works seems to be of opinion, that matter is not impenetrable; Mr. Michel, and Mr. Boscowich in his Theoria. Philos. Natur. have espoused this hypothesis: which has been lately published by Dr. Priestley, to whom the world is much indebted for so many important discoveries in science. (Hist. of Light and Colours, p.

391.) The uninterrupted pa.s.sage of light through transparent bodies, of the electric aether through metallic and aqueous bodies, and of the magnetic effluvia through all bodies, would seem to give some probability to this opinion. Hence it appears, that beings may exist without possessing the property of solidity, as well as they can exist without possessing the properties, which excite our smell or taste, and can thence occupy s.p.a.ce without detruding other bodies from it; but we cannot become acquainted with such beings by our sense of touch, any more than we can with odours or flavours without our senses of smell and taste.

But that any being can exist without existing in s.p.a.ce, is to my ideas utterly incomprehensible. My appeal is to common sense. _To be_ implies a when and a where; the one is comparing it with the motions of other beings, and the other with their situations.

If there was but one object, as the whole creation may be considered as one object, then I cannot ask where it exists? for there are no other objects to compare its situation with. Hence if any one denies, that a being exists in s.p.a.ce, he denies, that there are any other beings but that one; for to answer the question, "Where does it exist?" is only to mention the situation of the objects that surround it.

In the same manner if it be asked--"When does a being exist?" The answer only specifies the successive motions either of itself, or of other bodies; hence to say, a body exists not in time, is to say, that there is, or was, no motion in the world.

4. _Of the Spirit of Animation._

But though there may exist beings in the universe, that have not the property of solidity; that is, which can possess any part of s.p.a.ce, at the same time that it is occupied by other bodies; yet there may be other beings, that can a.s.sume this property of solidity, or disrobe themselves of it occasionally, as we are taught of spirits, and of angels; and it would seem, that THE SPIRIT OF ANIMATION must be endued with this property, otherwise how could it occasionally give motion to the limbs of animals?--or be itself stimulated into motion by the obtrusions of surrounding bodies, as of light, or odour?

If the spirit of animation was always necessarily penetrable, it could not influence or be influenced by the solidity of common matter; they would exist together, but could not detrude each other from the part of s.p.a.ce, where they exist; that is, they could not communicate motion to each other.

_No two things can influence or affect each other, which have not some property common to both of them_; for to influence or affect another body is to give or communicate some property to it, that it had not before; but how can one body give that to another, which it does not possess itself?--The words imply, that they must agree in having the power or faculty of possessing some common property. Thus if one body removes another from the part of s.p.a.ce, that it possesses, it must have the power of occupying that s.p.a.ce itself: and if one body communicates heat or motion to another, it follows, that they have alike the property of possessing heat or motion.

Hence the spirit of animation at the time it communicates or receives motion from solid bodies, must itself possess some property of solidity.

And in consequence at the time it receives other kinds of motion from light, it must possess that property, which light possesses, to communicate that kind of motion; and for which no language has a name, unless it may be termed Visibility. And at the time it is stimulated into other kinds of animal motion by the particles of sapid and odorous bodies affecting the senses of taste and smell, it must resemble these particles of flavour, and of odour, in possessing some similar or correspondent property; and for which language has no name, unless we may use the words Saporosity and Odorosity for those common properties, which are possessed by our organs of taste and smell, and by the particles of sapid and odorous bodies; as the words Tangibility and Audibility may express the common property possessed by our organs of touch, and of hearing, and by the solid bodies, or their vibrations, which affect those organs.

5. Finally, though the figures of bodies are in truth resembled by the figure of the part of the organ of touch, which is stimulated into motion; and that organ resembles the solid body, which stimulates it, in its property of solidity; and though the sense of hearing resembles the vibrations of external bodies in its capability of being stimulated into motion by those vibrations; and though our other organs of sense resemble the bodies, that stimulate them, in their capability of being stimulated by them; and we hence become acquainted with these properties of the external world; yet as we can repeat all these motions of our organs of sense by the efforts of volition, or in consequence of the sensation of pleasure or pain, or by their a.s.sociation with other fibrous motions, as happens in our reveries or in sleep, there would still appear to be some difficulty in demonstrating the existence of any thing external to us.

In our dreams we cannot determine this circ.u.mstance, because our power of volition is suspended, and the stimuli of external objects are excluded; but in our waking hours we can compare our ideas belonging to one sense with those belonging to another, and can thus distinguish the ideas occasioned by irritation from those excited by sensation, volition, or a.s.sociation. Thus if the idea of the sweetness of sugar should be excited in our dreams, the whiteness and hardness of it occur at the same time by a.s.sociation; and we believe a material lump of sugar present before us. But if, in our waking hours, the idea of the sweetness of sugar occurs to us, the stimuli of surrounding objects, as the edge of the table, on which we press, or green colour of the gra.s.s, on which we tread, prevent the other ideas of the hardness and whiteness of the sugar from being exerted by a.s.sociation. Or if they should occur, we voluntarily compare them with the irritative ideas of the table or gra.s.s above mentioned, and detect their fallacy. We can thus distinguish the ideas caused by the stimuli of external objects from those, which are introduced by a.s.sociation, sensation, or volition; and during our waking hours can thus acquire a knowledge of the external world. Which nevertheless we cannot do in our dreams, because we have neither perceptions of external bodies, nor the power of volition to enable us to compare them with the ideas of imagination.

III. _Of Vision._

Our eyes observe a difference of colour, or of shade, in the prominences and depressions of objects, and that those shades uniformly vary, when the sense of touch observes any variation. Hence when the retina becomes stimulated by colours or shades of light in a certain form, as in a circular spot; we know by experience, that this is a sign, that a tangible body is before us; and that its figure is resembled by the miniature figure of the part of the organ of vision, that is thus stimulated.

Here whilst the stimulated part of the retina resembles exactly the visible figure of the whole in miniature, the various kinds of stimuli from different colours mark the visible figures of the minuter parts; and by habit we instantly recall the tangible figures.

Thus when a tree is the object of sight, a part of the retina resembling a flat branching figure is stimulated by various shades of colours; but it is by suggestion, that the gibbosity of the tree, and the moss, that fringes its trunk, appear before us. These are ideas of suggestion, which we feel or attend to, a.s.sociated with the motions of the retina, or irritative ideas, which we do not attend to.