World's War Events Volume II Part 27

This purpose--the preservation of a strict neutrality in order that later we might be of use in the great task of mediation--dominated all the President's early speeches.

[Sidenote: Invasion of Belgium stirs American opinion.]

The spirit of neutrality was not easy to maintain. Public opinion was deeply stirred by the German invasion of Belgium and by reports of atrocities there. The Royal Belgian Commission, which came in September, 1914, to lay their country's cause for complaint before our National Government, was received with sympathy and respect. The President in his reply reserved our decision in the affair. It was the only course he could take without an abrupt departure from our most treasured traditions of non-interference in Old World disputes. But the sympathy of America went out to the Belgians in the heroic tragedy, and from every section of our land money contributions and supplies of food and clothing poured over to the Commission for Relief in Belgium, which was under the able management of our fellow-countrymen abroad.

Still, the thought of taking an active part in this European war was very far from most of our minds. The nation shared with the President the belief that by maintaining a strict neutrality we could best serve Europe at the end as impartial mediators.

[Sidenote: Complication on the seas imperils American neutrality.]

But in the very first days of the war our Government foresaw that complications on the seas might put us in grave risk of being drawn into the conflict. No neutral nation could foretell what violations of its vital interests at sea might be attempted by the belligerents. And so, on August 6, 1914, our Secretary of State dispatched an identical note to all the powers then at war, calling attention to the risk of serious trouble arising out of this uncertainty of neutrals as to their maritime rights, and proposing that the Declaration of London be accepted by all nations for the duration of the war.

[Sidenote: German Government stirs opinion hostile to United States.]

[Sidenote: American policy not inconsistent with American traditions.]

In the first year of the war the Government of Germany stirred up among its people a feeling of resentment against the United States on account of our insistence upon our right as a neutral nation to trade in munitions with the belligerent powers. Our legal right in the matter was not seriously questioned by Germany. She could not have done so consistently, for as recently as the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 both Germany and Austria sold munitions to the belligerents. Their appeals to us in the present war were not to observe international law, but to revise it in their interest. And these appeals they tried to make on moral and humanitarian grounds. But upon "the moral issue" involved, the stand taken by the United States was consistent with its traditional policy and with obvious common sense.

For, if, with all other neutrals, we refused to sell munitions to belligerents, we could never in time of a war of our own obtain munitions from neutrals, and the nation which had acc.u.mulated the largest reserves of war supplies in time of peace would be a.s.sured of victory.

The militarist State that invested its money in a.r.s.enals would be at a fatal advantage over the free people who invested their wealth in schools. To write into international law that neutrals should not trade in munitions would be to hand over the world to the rule of the nation with the largest armament factories. Such a policy the United States of America could not accept.

[Sidenote: Controversy about German submarine war zone.]

[Sidenote: The sinking of the _Lusitania_.]

But our princ.i.p.al controversy with the German Government, and the one which rendered the situation at once acute, rose out of their announcement of a sea zone where their submarines would operate in violation of all accepted principles of international law. Our indignation at such a threat was soon rendered pa.s.sionate by the sinking of the _Lusitania_. This attack upon our rights was not only grossly illegal; it defied the fundamental concepts of humanity.

[Sidenote: Murder of noncombatants not to be settled by litigation.]

Aggravating restraints on our trade were grievances which could be settled by litigation after the war, but the wanton murder of peaceable men and of innocent women and children, citizens of a nation with which Germany was at peace, was a crime against the civilized world which could never be settled in any court.

Our Government, however, inspired still by a desire to preserve peace if possible, used every resource of diplomacy to force the German Government to abandon such attacks. This diplomatic correspondence, which has already been published, proves beyond doubt that our Government sought by every honorable means to preserve faith in that mutual sincerity between nations which is the only basis of sound diplomatic interchange.

[Sidenote: Bad faith of the Imperial German Government.]

But evidence of the bad faith of the Imperial German Government soon piled up on every hand. Honest efforts on our part to establish a firm basis of good neighborliness with the German people were met by their Government with quibbles, misrepresentations, and counter-accusations against their enemies abroad.

And meanwhile in this country official agents of the Central Powers--protected from criminal prosecution by diplomatic immunity--conspired against our internal peace and placed spies and agents provocateurs throughout the length and breadth of our land, and even in high positions of trust in departments of our Government.

[Sidenote: German agents in Latin America, in j.a.pan and the West Indies.]

While expressing a cordial friendship for the people of the United States, the Government of Germany had its agents at work both in Latin America and j.a.pan. They bought or subsidized papers and supported speakers there to rouse feelings of bitterness and distrust against us in those friendly nations, in order to embroil us in war. They were inciting to insurrection in Cuba, in Haiti, and in Santo Domingo; their hostile hand was stretched out to take the Danish Islands; and everywhere in South America they were abroad sowing the seeds of dissension, trying to stir up one nation against another and all against the United States.

[Sidenote: a.s.saults on the Monroe Doctrine.]

In their sum these various operations amounted to direct a.s.sault upon the Monroe Doctrine. And even if we had given up our right to travel on the sea, even if we had surrendered to German threats and abandoned our legitimate trade in munitions, the German offensive in the New World, in our own land and among our neighbors, was becoming too serious to be ignored.

[Sidenote: Recall of the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador.]

So long as it was possible, the Government of the United States tried to believe that such activities, the evidence of which was already in a large measure at hand, were the work of irresponsible and misguided individuals. It was only reluctantly, in the face of overwhelming proof, that the recall of the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador and of the German Military and Naval Attaches was demanded.

Proof of their criminal violations of our hospitality was presented to their Governments. But these Governments in reply offered no apologies nor did they issue reprimands. It became clear that such intrigue was their settled policy.

In the meantime the attacks of the German submarines upon the lives and property of American citizens had gone on; the protests of our Government were now sharp and ominous, and this nation was rapidly being drawn into a state of war.

The break would have come sooner if our Government had not been restrained by the vain hope that saner counsels might still prevail in Germany. For it was well known to us that the German people had to a very large extent been kept in ignorance of many of the secret crimes of their Government against us.

[Sidenote: Tension relieved by _Suss.e.x_ agreement.]

And the presence of a faction of German public opinion less hostile to this country was shown when their Government acquiesced to some degree in our demands at the time of the _Suss.e.x_ outrage, and for nearly a year maintained at least a pretense of observing the pledge they had made to us. The tension was abated.

While the war spirit was growing in some sections of our nation, there was still no widespread desire to take part in the conflict abroad; for the tradition of non-interference in Europe's political affairs was too deeply rooted in our national life to be easily overthrown.

Moreover, two other considerations strengthened our Government in its efforts to remain neutral in this war. The first was our traditional sense of responsibility toward all the republics of the New World.

Throughout the crisis our Government was in constant communication with the countries of Central and South America.

[Sidenote: Opinion in Central and South America.]

They, too, preferred the ways of peace. And there was a very obvious obligation upon us to safeguard their interests with our own.

The second consideration, which had been so often developed in the President's speeches, was the hope that by keeping aloof from the bitter pa.s.sions abroad, by preserving untroubled here the holy ideals of civilized intercourse between nations, we might be free at the end of this war to bind up the wounds of the conflict, to be the restorers and rebuilders of the wrecked structure of the world.

[Sidenote: German compliance not in good faith.]

All these motives held us back, but it was not long until we were beset by further complications. We soon had reason to believe that the recent compliance of the German Government had not been made to us in good faith, and was only temporary, and by the end of 1916 it was plain that our neutral status had again been made unsafe through the ever-increasing aggressiveness of the German autocracy. There was a general agreement here with the statement of our President on October 26, 1916, that this conflict was the last great war involving the world in which we would remain neutral.

[Sidenote: Peace move on behalf of the Central powers.]

It was in this frame of mind, fearing we might be drawn into the war if it did not soon come to an end, that the President began the preparation of his note, asking the belligerent powers to define their war aims. But before he had completed it the world was surprised by the peace move of the German Government--an identical note on behalf of the German Empire, Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, sent through neutral powers on December 12, 1916, to the Governments of the Allies proposing negotiations for peace.

While expressing the wish to end this war--"a catastrophe which thousands of years of common civilization was unable to prevent and which injures the most precious achievements of humanity"--the greater portion of the note was couched in terms that gave small hope of a lasting peace.

Boasting of German conquests, "the glorious deeds of our armies," the note implanted in neutral minds the belief that it was the purpose of the Imperial German Government to insist upon such conditions as would leave all Central Europe under German dominance and so build up an empire which would menace the whole liberal world.

[Sidenote: A veiled threat to neutral nations.]

Moreover, the German proposal was accompanied by a thinly veiled threat to all neutral nations; and from a thousand sources, official and unofficial, the word came to Washington that unless the neutrals use their influence to bring the war to an end on terms dictated from Berlin, Germany and her allies would consider themselves henceforth free from any obligations to respect the rights of neutrals.

The Kaiser ordered the neutrals to exert pressure on the Entente to bring the war to an abrupt end, or to beware of the consequences. Clear warnings were brought to our Government that if the German peace move should not be successful, the submarines would be unleashed for a more intense and ruthless war upon all commerce.

[Sidenote: The President's note to the belligerents.]

On the 18th of December the President dispatched his note to all the belligerent powers, asking them to define their war aims. There was still hope in our minds that the mutual suspicions between the warring powers might be decreased, and the menace of future German aggression and dominance be removed, by finding a guaranty of good faith in a league of nations.

There was a chance that by the creation of such a league as part of the peace negotiations the war could now be brought to an end before our nation was involved. Two statements issued to the press by our Secretary of State, upon the day the note was dispatched, threw a clear light on the seriousness with which our Government viewed the crisis.

From this point events moved rapidly. The powers of the Entente replied to the German peace note. Neutral nations took action on the note of the President, and from both belligerents replies to this note were soon in our hands.