Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him Part 23

He [Wilson] has promised me nothing definitely, but as I have said, if any other man than he talked to me as he did, I would feel a.s.sured. If I talked to another man as he talked to me it would mean that that man was going to get permission to fight. But I was talking to Mr. Wilson.

His words may mean much, they may mean little. He has, however, left the door open.

Of course, what ultimately happened is clear to everyone, civilian and soldier, who pauses a moment to reflect; as plans for the conduct of the war matured, it became continually clearer that it must be a professional war, conducted by professionals with complete authority over subordinates.

There could be no experimenting with volunteer commanders, no matter how great their valour, how pure their motives, or how eminent their positions in the nation. To make an exception of Colonel Roosevelt would have been to strike at the heart of the whole design. Military experts and the majority of Congressional opinion were at one in this matter, though Congress put upon the President the responsibility of making the final decision, together with whatever obloquy this would entail. It was purely as a step in the interest of waging the war with greatest effectiveness that the President announced the decision adverse to the Colonel's wishes.

Personally it would have been pleasanter for the President to grant the Colonel's request, but President Wilson has never adopted "the easiest way."

A great deal of criticism was heaped upon the President for what appeared to the outside as his refusal to send General Leonard Wood to France.

Although a fierce storm of criticism beat upon him, the President displayed no resentment, nor, indeed, did he seem to notice what his critics were saying.

As a matter of fact, the President played no part in the movement to keep General Wood from realizing his ambition to lead his division to France.

Mr. George Creel in his book, "The War, The World and Wilson," has succinctly summarized this incident; has told how the name of General Wood did not appear in any of the lists of officers received from General Pershing; how the President took this as a plain indication that General Pershing did not desire General Wood in France (the absence of so eminent a name from the lists was certainly not an oversight 011 the part of the Commanding General in France); how President Wilson was determined to support General Pershing in every detail so long as General Pershing in the President's opinion was meeting the requirements of the great responsibility laid upon him; how the President was insistent that General Pershing should not be embarra.s.sed by political considerations of any kind in the discharge of his great military duty; how the unfortunate feature of the whole matter was that the recall of General Wood did not come until "after he had taken his brigade to New York preparatory to sailing for the other side"; how "General March treated the circ.u.mstance as one of military routine entirely, utterly failing to realize its political importance"; how "instead of informing General Wood at once that he had not been chosen to go to France, General March followed the established procedure and waited for the completion of the training period before issuing orders to the division commanders"; how "General Wood left Camp Funston in advance of his division and without waiting to receive his orders"; how General March sent these orders to New York; how "in consequence there was an appearance of eleventh-hour action, an effect of jerking General Wood from the very deck of the transport"; how "General Wood carried his complaint to the President and was told plainly that the list would not be revised in the personal interest of any soldier or politician."

I discussed the matter with General Wood immediately upon the conclusion of his conference with the President. Walking into my office after his interview, the General informed me that his talk with the President was most agreeable and satisfactory and that he was certain, although the President did not intimate it to him, that the reason for his being held in America could not be attributed to the President. Turning to me, the General said: "I know who is responsible for this. It is that man Pershing." I a.s.sured the General that there was nothing in the President's att.i.tude toward him that was in the least degree unfriendly, and reminded him how the President had retained him as Chief of Staff when he a.s.sumed office in 1913. The General, very much to my surprise, intimated that back of Pershing's att.i.tude toward him was political consideration. I tried to rea.s.sure him and, indeed, I resented this characterization of General Pershing as an unjust and unwarranted imputation upon the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces.

I myself felt that General Wood was being unfairly treated, although I did not admit this to him in our interview. I took the liberty of saying this to the President over the telephone from my house that evening. I tried to convince the President that there was a feeling rapidly spreading throughout the country that Wood was being unfairly treated and that it was not just that the Administration, which I knew was blameless in the matter, should be compelled to bear the responsibility of the whole thing and pay what I was certain would be a great price in the loss of popular esteem.

The President in his reply to my statement showed irritation at what I said in General Wood's behalf, and used very emphatic language in conveying to me the idea that he would not interfere in having the list, upon which General Wood's name appeared, revised. I urged that if General Wood was not to be sent to France, he should be given a chance to go to Italy. Our conversation over the telephone in reference to the Wood matter was as follows: "I trust, Governor, that you can see your way clear to send General Wood either to France or to Italy."

Without a moment's hesitation, the President said: "I am sorry, but it cannot be done."

Whereupon, I said: "It is not fair that the Administration should be carrying the burden of this whole affair. If General Pershing or the General Staff is responsible for holding General Wood in this country, surely they have good reason, and the public ought to be apprised of it, and thus remove the suspicion that we are playing politics."

The President quickly interrupted me and said: "I am not at all interested in any squabble or quarrel between General Pershing and General Wood. The only thing I am interested in is winning this war. I selected General Pershing for this task and I intend to back him up in every recommendation he makes."

When I tried to emphasize the feeling of dissatisfaction throughout the country over the Wood incident, he replied that the responsibility of winning the war was upon General Pershing and himself and not upon the critics who thought that General Wood was being badly treated. I then said: "But it is not fair to you to have it said that by reason of some feeling that you may have against Wood you are keeping him on this side."

The President replied: "I am sorry, but I do not care a d.a.m.n for the criticism of the country. It would not be fair to Pershing if I tried to escape what appears to be my responsibility. I do not intend to embarra.s.s General Pershing by forcing his hand. If Pershing does not make good, I will recall him, but it must not be said that I have failed to support him at every turn."

His att.i.tude toward Wood and Roosevelt was consistently maintained, in supporting the General Staff and the War Department throughout the war.

The only thing that seemed to interest him was how quickly and effectively to do the job and to find the man who could do it.

CHAPTER x.x.xIII

WILSON, THE WARRIOR

The President had but one object: to throw all the nation's energy into the scale for the defeat of Germany. Because he did not bl.u.s.ter and voice daily hymns of hate against Germany, he was singularly misunderstood by some of his fellow-citizens, who, in their own boiling anger against the enemy, would sometimes peevishly inquire: "Does he really hate Germany?"

The President was too much occupied with deeds to waste time in word- vapouring. By every honourable means he had sought to avoid the issue, but a truculent and fatuous foe had made war necessary, and into that war the peace-loving President went with the grim resolution of an iron warrior.

In his att.i.tude before and during the war his motto might have been the familiar words of Polonius:

Beware of entrance to a quarrel; but being in, Bear't, that the opposed may beware of thee.

Occasionally, as at Baltimore, on April 6, 1918, the public heard from him brief, ringing speeches of warlike resolution:

Germany has once more said that force and force alone shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether Right as America conceives it or Dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is therefore but one response possible from us. Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish Dominion down in the dust.

Months after hostilities had ended, there appeared from time to time in the newspapers, without his or my knowledge of proposed publication, utterances of his to military men during the conflict which showed his warrior heart and his extraordinary ability to grasp a technical military problem such as his dispatch to Admiral Sims, his address to the officers of the Atlantic Fleet, and his interview with Marshal Joffre in the White House. Perhaps it is not generally known that Mr. Wilson, who has constantly read and loved the philosophic poetry of Wordsworth, has also been an intense admirer of Shakespeare's warrior-hero, Henry the Fifth, and has frequently read aloud to friends, with exclamations of admiration, the stirring speeches of Henry in the Shakespearean play.

The cable message to Admiral Sims is as follows:

FROM THE PRESIDENT FOR ADMIRAL SIMS, American Emba.s.sy, London, July 5, 1917.

_Strictly confidential_.

From the beginning of the war, I have been greatly surprised at the failure of the British Admiralty to use Great Britain's great naval superiority in an effective way. In the presence of the present submarine emergency they are helpless to the point of panic. Every plan we suggest they reject for some reason of prudence. In my view, this is not a time for prudence but for boldness even at the cost of great losses. In most of your dispatches you have quite properly advised us of the sort of aid and cooperation desired from us by the Admiralty. The trouble is that their plans and methods do not seem to us efficacious. I would be very much obliged to you if you would report to me, confidentially, of course, exactly what the Admiralty has been doing, and what they have accomplished, and add to the report your own comments and suggestions, based upon independent thought of the whole situation, without regard to the judgments of any one on that side of the water. The Admiralty was very slow to adopt the protection or convoy and it is not now, I judge [protecting] convoys on adequate scale within the danger zone, seeming to keep small craft with the grand fleet. The absence of craft for convoy is even more apparent on the French coast than on the English coast and in the Channel. I do not see how the necessary military supplies and supplies of food and fuel oil are to be delivered at British ports in any other way within the next few months than under adequate convoy. There will presently not be ships or tankers enough and our shipbuilding plans may not begin to yield important results in less than eighteen months.

I believe that you will keep these instructions absolutely and entirely to yourself, and that you will give me such advice as you would give if you were handling and if you were running a navy of your own.

(Signed) WOODROW WILSON.

For sheer audacity, there is not much that can be compared with his address to the officers of the Atlantic Fleet on August 11, 1917:

Now, the point that is constantly in my mind, gentlemen, is this: This is an unprecedented war and, therefore, it is a war in one sense for amateurs. n.o.body ever before conducted a war like this and therefore n.o.body can pretend to be a professional in a war like this. Here are two great navies, not to speak of the others a.s.sociated with us, our own and the British, outnumbering by a very great margin the navy to which we are opposed and yet casting about for a war in which to use our superiority and our strength, because of the novelty of the instruments used, because of the unprecedented character of the war, because, as I said just now, n.o.body ever before fought a war like this, in the way that this is being fought at sea, or on land either, for that matter. The experienced soldier--experienced in previous wars--is a back number so far as his experience is concerned; not so far as his intelligence is concerned. His experience does not count, because he never fought a war as this is being fought, and therefore he is an amateur along with the rest of us. Now, somebody has got to think this war out. Somebody has got to think out the way not only to fight the submarine, but to do something different from what we are doing.

We are hunting hornets all over the farm and letting the nest alone.

None of us know how to go to the nest and crush it; and yet I despair of hunting for hornets all over the sea when I know where the nest is and know that the nest is breeding hornets as fast as I can find them.

I am willing for my part, and I know you are willing because I know the stuff you are made of--I am willing to sacrifice half the navy Great Britain and we together have to crush out that nest, because if we crush it the war is won. I have come here to say that I do not care where it comes from, I do not care whether it comes from the youngest officer or the oldest, but I want the officers of this navy to have the distinction of saying how this war is going to be won. The Secretary of the Navy and I have just been talking over plans for putting the planning machinery of the Navy at the disposal of the brains of the Navy and not stopping to ask what rank those brains have, because, as I have said before and want to repeat, so far as experience in this kind of war is concerned we are all of the same rank. I am not saying that I do not expect the admirals to tell us what to do, but I am saying that I want the youngest and most modest youngster in the service to tell us what we ought to do if he knows what it is. Now I am willing to make any sacrifice for that. I mean any sacrifice of time or anything else. I am ready to put myself at the disposal of any officer in the Navy who thinks he knows how to run this war. I will not undertake to tell you whether he does or not, because I know that I do not, but I will undertake to put him in communication with those who can find out whether his idea will work or not. I have the authority to do that and I will do it with the greatest pleasure.

We have got to throw tradition to the wind. Now, as I have said, gentlemen, I take it for granted that nothing that I say here will be repeated and therefore I am going to say this: Every time we have suggested anything to the British Admiralty the reply has come back that virtually amounted to this, that it had never been done that way, and I felt like saying: "Well, nothing was ever done so systematically as nothing is being done now." Therefore I should like to see something unusual happen, something that was never done before; and inasmuch as the things that are being done to you were never done before, don't you think it is worth while to try something that was never done before against those who are doing them to you. There is no other way to win, and the whole principle of this war is the kind of thing that ought to hearten and stimulate America. America has always boasted that she could find men to do anything. She is the prize amateur nation of the world. Germany is the prize professional nation of the world. Now when it comes to doing new things and doing them well, I will back the amateur against the professional every time, because the professional does it out of the book and the amateur does it with his eyes open upon a new world and with a new set of circ.u.mstances. He knows so little about it that he is fool enough to try to do the right thing. The men that do not know the danger are the rashest men, and I have several times ventured to make this suggestion to the men about me in both arms of the service. Please leave out of your vocabulary altogether the word "prudent." Do not stop to think about what is prudent for a moment. Do the thing that is audacious to the utmost point of risk and daring, because that is exactly the thing that the other side does not understand, and you will win by the audacity of method when you cannot win by circ.u.mspection and prudence.

I think that there are willing ears to hear this in the American Navy and the American Army because that is the kind of folk we are. We get tired of the old ways and covet the new ones.

So, gentlemen, besides coming down here to give you my personal greeting and to say how absolutely I rely on you and believe in you, I have come down here to say also that I depend on you, depend on you for brains as well as training and courage and discipline.

When Marshal Joffre visited the President in the spring of 1917, he was surprised, as he afterward said to Secretary Daniels, "to find that President Wilson had such a perfect mastery of the military situation. He had expected to meet a scholar, a statesman, and an idealist; he had not expected to meet a practical strategist fully conversant with all the military movements.

"In answer to my question as to whether it would be feasible to send in advance of his army the general who was to command American troops in France, the President said at once that it could be arranged."

The President and Marshal Joffre considered together a number of technical military problems. General Joffre gave the President his expert opinion as to what should be done in every instance and was surprised at the promptness with which in each case the President said: "It shall be done."

A little incident at the White House at the luncheon given by the President to the members of the Democratic National Committee throws light upon the fighting qualities of the man. He asked Mr. Angus W. McLean, a warm and devoted friend from North Carolina, who was seated near him at the table, what the Scots down in North Carolina were saying about the war. Mr. McLean replied he could best answer the question by repeating what a friend of the President's father and an ardent admirer of the President had said about the President's att.i.tude a few days previous. "I am afraid our President is not a true Scot, he doesn't show the fighting spirit characteristic of the Scots." The President promptly replied: "You tell our Scotch friend, McLean, that he does not accurately interpret the real Scottish character. If he did, he would understand my att.i.tude. The Scotsman is slow to begin to fight but when once he begins he never knows when to quit."

Two capital policies which contributed enormously to the winning of the war received their impulse from Woodrow Wilson--the unification of command of the Allied armies on the western front and the attack of submarines at their base in the North Sea. On November 18, 1918, Colonel House let it be known in London that he had received a cable from President Wilson stating emphatically that the United States Government considered unity of plan and control between the Allies and the United States to be essential in order to win the war and achieve a just and lasting peace.

It was Woodrow Wilson, a civilian, who advised, urged, and insisted that a mine barrage be laid across the North Sea to check German submarine activities at their source. Naval experts p.r.o.nounced the plan impossible: it would take too long to lay the barrage, and, when laid, it would not hold. A great storm would sweep it away. But the President insisted that the thing could be done, and that nothing else could check the submarine devastation amounting by July, 1917, to 600,000 tons a month of destroyed shipping. The President's audacity and persistence prevailed, and it is not too much to say that his plan ended the submarine menace.

It will be recalled that European newspapers carried a story of a farewell reception to Mr. Bonar Law, in which he paid his compliments to his chief, Mr. Lloyd George, saying, in substance, that he had seen Lloyd George discouraged only once. It was on the morning when the news came of the great German offensive in March, 1918. Mr. Lloyd George told Mr. Bonar Law that morning that only a vast increase in American reinforcements could save the Allies. A cable was immediately framed, asking Mr. Wilson to send the number of reinforcements necessary. Mr. Bonar Law stated in his speech that an affirmative answer was received from Mr. Wilson the same day.

A prominent Englishman, discussing the President's work in connection with the war, while criticizing what he characterized as the President's ignorance of European conditions, said: "I feel ashamed to be criticizing President Wilson for anything when I remember his practical services in prosecuting the war. No other man in any country gave such firm and instant support to every measure for making operations effective. His decisions were fearless and prompt and he stood by them like a rock. In sending troops promptly and in sending plenty of them, in cooperating in the naval effort, in insisting on the unity of command under Foch, in backing the high command in the field, and in every other practical detail Mr. Wilson had big, clear conceptions and the courage to carry them out."

Those who were critical of the President's conduct of the war forget the ringing statement that came from Lloyd George when the great offensive was on, when he said: "The race is now between Von Hindenburg and Wilson." And Wilson won.

The most important speech made by the President during the war was delivered at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York City, on September 27, 1918, opening the campaign for the Fourth Liberty Loan.