William of Germany Part 18

While on the way to Morocco the Emperor put in at Lisbon to pay a visit to the King of Portugal, and with the latter attended a meeting of the Geographical Society. From Lisbon he went to Gibraltar, and from thence, after a few hours' stay, he started for Tangier.

The Morocco incident, as it is often too lightly called, should rather be regarded as a phase in the world's economic history and an occurrence of moment for the future peace of all nations than the mere game on the diplomatic chess-board many writers appear to consider it.

According to French critics, and they may be taken as representative of the feeling everywhere prevalent during the seven years the incident lasted, its origin was a matter of alliances and the balance of power. Germany, according to these writers, wanted to preserve the position of hegemony in Europe she had obtained under Bismarck, and consequently felt annoyed by the Triple Entente, which robbed her of her traditional friend Russia and set up an effective counterpoise to the Triple Alliance of which Germany was the leading Power, and on which she could, or believed she could, rely for support in case of war with France. In going, therefore, to Tangier, at the moment when her defeat by j.a.pan rendered Russia for the time being of little or no account in the considerations of diplomacy, the Emperor, according to these writers, in reality was making a determined attempt to break the Entente combination and protect his Empire from political isolation or inferiority.

It is quite possible that such were the motives of the Emperor's action, but if so he was building better than he knew. The vicissitudes of the Moroccan episode are described briefly below, yet some remarks of a general nature as to the whole episode considered in its historical perspective may be permitted in advance. But first, what is historical perspective? It may perhaps be defined as that view of history which shows in its true proportions the relative importance of an event to other events which strongly and permanently leave their mark on the character and development of the period or generation in which they occur. Regarded from this standpoint the Morocco incident can claim an exceptional position, for it was the first occasion in modern diplomatic history on which a Great Power officially proclaimed _urbi et orbi_ the doctrine of the "open door," the doctrine of equal economic treatment for all nations for the benefit of all nations, and was willing to go to war in support of it.

It was not, of course, the first time the demand for the open door had been made; loudly and bloodily, too; since most wars from those of Greece and Rome to the war between Russia and j.a.pan of recent years were waged with the intention, or in the hope, of opening, by conquest or contract, territory of the enemy to the mercantile enterprise of the victors. But this was the open door in a very selfish and restricted sense, and though many isolated events had occurred of late years, the international agreements regarding China among them, proving that the idea of the open door was gaining strength as a right common to all nations, it was not until the Emperor went to Tangier that a Great Power risked a great war in order to exemplify and enforce it.

The Emperor and his advisers were probably not moved by any altruistic sentiments in the matter, and their sole reason for action may have been to see that German subjects should not be excluded from Moroccan markets. It may also be that Germany was resolved that if there was to be a seizure of Morocco she should get her share of the territory to be distributed, notwithstanding her refusal, revealed by the late Foreign Secretary, Kiderlen-Waechter, in the Reichstag's confidential committee, to accede to Mr. Chamberlain's proposal, made some time before the incident, for a part.i.tion of the Shereefian Empire. But the acquisition of territory does not seem to have been the mainspring of her policy, while from the beginning to the end of the incident, however theatrical and questionable her diplomatic conduct may have been at moments during the negotiations, she was throughout consistent and successful in her demand for economic equality all round. This is a great gain for the future, for, with the world nearly all parcelled out, economic considerations, which are almost in all cases adjustable, are now the most weighty factors in international relations.

Apart from this view of the incident, it is clear that Germany was pursuing her claim to a "place in the sun," and she did so to the unconcealed annoyance of nations which up to then had never thought of her in a role she appeared to be aspiring to, that of a Mediterranean Power. To these nations she seemed an intruder in a sphere to which she neither naturally nor rightfully belonged. Evidently she had no political or historical claims in Morocco, while her commercial interests were less than 10 per cent of Morocco trade.

A narration of the incident may, for the sake of convenience, though involving some antic.i.p.ation of the future, be dealt with in three sections: from the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904, and the Emperor's visit to Tangier in March, 1905, to the Act of Algeciras a year subsequently; from the Act of Algeciras to the Franco-German Agreement of 1909; and from that to the--let it be hoped--final settlement by the Franco-German Agreement of November 5, 1911.

The Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 gave France a free hand in Morocco in consideration of France giving England a similar position in Egypt and the Nile Valley. The state of things in Morocco at this time was one of discord and rebellion. In the midst of it, the Sultan, El Ha.s.san, died, and was succeeded by Abdul Aziz, a minor. On coming of age Abdul Aziz showed his inability to rule, the country fell again into disorder and Abdul turned for help to France. Meantime England and France had been negotiating without the knowledge of Germany, and in April, 1904, the Anglo-French Agreement was signed. It was accompanied by an official declaration that France had no intention of changing the political status of Morocco, but only contemplated a policy there of "pacific penetration and reforms." Thereupon Prince von Bulow, the German Chancellor, stated in the Reichstag that the German Government had no reason to a.s.sume that the Agreement was directed against any Power and that "it appeared to be an attempt by England and France to come to a friendly understanding respecting their colonial differences."

"From the standpoint of German interests," continued the Chancellor, "we have no objections to raise to it." No parliamentary reference was made to Morocco until March, 1905, when the Chancellor spoke of the approaching visit of the Emperor to Tangier, and it became evident that the Emperor and his advisers had come to the conclusion that, as France seemed about a.s.suming a full protectorate over Morocco, as she had tried to do in Tunis, and that this, in accordance with French policy, would result in the exclusion of other nationals from commerce and the development of the country, Germany must take action. Prince von Bulow explained that "his Majesty had, in the previous year, declared to the King of Spain that Germany pursued no policy of territorial acquisition in Morocco." He continued:

"Independent of the visit, and independent of the territorial question, is the question whether we have economic interests to protect in Morocco. That we have certainly. We have in Morocco, as in China, a considerable interest in the maintenance of the open door, that is the equal treatment of all trading nations."

And he concluded by saying:

"So far as an attempt is being made to alter the international status of Morocco, or to control the open door in the economic development of the country, we must see more closely than before that our economical interests are not endangered. Our first step, accordingly, is to put ourselves into communication with the Sultan."

The visit came off as announced, and the Emperor, on arriving at Tangier, made a speech which caused a sensation in every diplomatic chancellery; indeed, in all parts of the world. The Emperor's speech, which was addressed to the German colonists on March 31, 1905, was as follows:--

"I rejoice to make acquaintance with the pioneers of Germany in Morocco and to be able to say to them that they have done their duty. Germany has great commercial interests there. I will promote and protect trade, which shows a gratifying development, and make it my care to secure full equality with all nations. This is only possible when the sovereignty of the Sultan and the independence of the country are preserved. Both are for Germany beyond question, and for that I am ready at all times to answer. I think my visit to Tangier announces this clearly and emphatically, and will doubtless produce the conviction that whatever Germany undertakes in Morocco will be negotiated exclusively with the Sultan."

The result of these unmistakable declarations was that the Sultan rejected proposals made to him by the French, and shortly afterwards, on the advice of Germany, came forward with suggestions for a European conference. M. Delca.s.se, the French Foreign Minister, opposed the proposal, and for a time war between France and Germany appeared inevitable; but France was not in a military position to ignore Germany's threatening language, M. Delca.s.se had to resign, the French Cabinet under M. Rouvier agreed to the conference, and it met at Algeciras in January, 1906. At the conference Great Britain, in consonance with the Entente, supported France; Austria adhered loyally to her Triplice engagements and proved the "brilliant second" to Germany the Emperor subsequently described her; Italy, on the other hand, gave her Teutonic ally only lukewarm support.

In fairness, however, should be quoted here the explanation of Italy's att.i.tude given by Chancellor von Bulow when discussing the conference in Parliament next year. The impression is general, both in and out of Germany, that Italy is only a half-hearted political ally. It is based on the temperamental difference between the Latin and the Teutonic races, on the popular sympathy between the French and Italian peoples, and to the supposedly reluctant support lent by Italy to Germany during the critical time of the conference, the extra-tour, as Prince Bulow, using a metaphor of the ballroom, termed it, she took with France on that occasion. Prince Bulow now endeavoured to dissipate or correct the impression, at any rate, as regarded Algeciras. "Italy,"

he said,

"found herself in a difficult position there. Various agreements between Italy and France regarding Morocco had come into existence anterior to the conference, but Germany was satisfied that they were not inconsistent with Italy's Triplice engagements; in fact, Germany had, several years ago, officially told Italy she must use her own judgment and act on her own responsibility in dealing with her French neighbour in Africa and the Mediterranean."

When it was settled that a conference should be held, Italy, the Chancellor continued, "gave Germany timely information as to the extent to which her support of Germany could go, and as a matter of fact she supported Germany's views in the bank and police questions."

So far the German official explanation, but the impression of Italian lukewarmness as a member of the Triplice has lost none of its universality thereby. How well or ill founded the impression is, it will be for the future to disclose.

The summoning of the conference had been a triumph for German diplomacy, but its results were disappointing to her; for while the proceedings showed that among all nations she could only fully rely on the sympathy and support of Austria, they ended in an acknowledgment by Germany of the special position of France in Morocco. The Act of Algeciras, which was dated April 7, 1906, stated that the signatory Powers recognized that "order, peace, and prosperity" could only be made to reign in Morocco

"by means of the introduction of reforms based upon the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence of his Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his States, and economic liberty without any inequality."

Then followed six Declarations regarding the organization of the police, smuggling, the establishment of a State bank, the collection of taxes, and the finding of new sources of revenue, customs, and administrative services and public works. For the organization of the police, French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers were to be placed at the disposal of the Sultan by the French and Spanish Governments. Tenders for public works were to be adjudicated on impartially without regard to the nationality of the bidder. The effect of the Act was to give international recognition to the special position of France and Spain in Morocco, while safeguarding the economic interests of other Powers.

The att.i.tude taken up by Germany relative to the conference was set forth in a speech delivered by Prince von Bulow in the Reichstag in December, 1905. It was based, he explained, on the provisions of the Madrid Convention of 1880, in which all the Great Powers and the United States had taken part. The Chancellor claimed that Germany sought no special privileges in Morocco, but favoured a peaceful and independent development of the Shereefian Empire. He denied that German rights could be abrogated by an Anglo-French Agreement, and pointing out that Morocco in 1880 had granted all the signatories to the Madrid Convention most-favoured-nation treatment, claimed that if France desired to make good her demand for special privileges, she ought to have the consent of the special signatories to the Madrid pact. Germany had a right to be heard in any new settlement of Moroccan conditions; she could not allow herself to be treated as a _quant.i.te negligeable_, nor be left out of account when a country lying on two of the world's greatest commercial highways was being disposed of. She had a commercial treaty with Morocco, conferring most-favoured-nation rights, and it did not accord with her honour to give way.

The Act of Algeciras, however, proved to have brought only temporary relief to European tension. Disturbances continued in Morocco, French subjects were murdered at Marakesch in 1907, and France occupied the province of Udja with troops until satisfaction should be given. Owing to riots at Casablanca in 1908, in which French as well as Spanish and Italian labourers were killed, she decided to occupy the place, and sent a strong military and naval force thither. A French warship bombarded the town, and by June, 1908, the French army of occupation numbered 15,000 men. Meanwhile internal commotions and intrigues had led to the deposition of Abdul Aziz and his replacement on the throne by his brother, Muley Hafid, with the support of Germany. France and Spain refused to recognize the new ruler unless he gave guarantees that he would respect the Act of Algeciras. Muley gave the required guarantees, and in March, 1909, France "declared herself wholly attached to the integrity and independence of the Shereefian Empire and decided to safeguard economic equality in Morocco." Germany on her side declared she was pursuing in Morocco only economic interests and, "recognizing that the special political interests of France in Morocco are closely bound up in that country with the consolidation of order and of internal peace," was "resolved not to impede those interests."

The German idea of not impeding French special political interests in Morocco was disclosed little more than two years later by the dispatch of the German gunboat _Panther_ (of "Well done, _Panther_!" fame) on July 3, 1911, to the "closed" port of Agadir on the south Moroccan coast.

It was as dramatic a coup as the Emperor's visit to Tangier and caused as much alarm. The fact is that the march of French troops to Fez, which had taken place a few months before, convinced the Emperor and his Government that France, relying on the support of her Entente friend England, was bent on the Tunisification of Morocco. The Emperor, Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg, and Foreign Secretary Kiderlen-Waechter met at the Foreign Office on May 21st, and it was decided to send a ship of war, as at once a hint and a demonstration, to Agadir or other Moroccan port. Germany, of course, in accordance with diplomatic strategy, did not disclose the real springs of her action, though they must have been patent to all the world. She notified the Powers of the dispatch of her warship, explaining that the sending of the _Panther_, which "happened to be in the neighbourhood," was owing to the representations of German firms, as a temporary measure for the protection of German proteges in that region, and taken "in view of the possible spread of disorders prevailing in other parts of Morocco."

In France, on the other hand, it was a.s.serted that the step was not in conformity with the spirit of the Franco-German Agreement of 1909, in which Germany resolved not to impede French special interests, that there were no Germans at Agadir, and that only nine months previously Germany had angrily protested at the calling of a French cruiser at the same port. The reference was to the visit of the French cruiser _Du Chaylu_ in November, 1910, when the captain paid a visit to the local pasha. The German Foreign Secretary eventually said Germany had no objection to France using her police rights even in a closed port, and the admission was taken as a fresh renunciation on the part of Germany of any right to interference. Feeling ran high for a time both in France and Germany, while the German action added to the sentiment of hostility to Germany in England, and English political circles perceived in it a design on Germany's part of acquiring a port on the Moroccan coast. The word "compensation," which afterwards was to prove the solution of Franco-German differences was now first mentioned by Germany.

After England's determination to support France had been made plain by ministerial statements, the entire Morocco episode was closed by the Franco-German Agreement signed on November 5, 1911, as "explanatory and supplementary" to the Franco-German Agreement of 1909. The effect of the new Agreement was practically to give France as free a hand in Morocco as England has in Egypt, with the reservation that "the proceedings of France in Morocco leave untouched the economic equality of all nations." The Agreement further gives France "entire freedom of action" in Morocco, including measures of police. The rights and working area of the Morocco State bank were left as they stood under the Act of Algeciras. The sovereignty of the Sultan is a.s.sumed, but not explicitly declared. The compensation to Germany for her agreement to "put no hindrances in the way of French administration" and for the "protective rights" she recognizes as "belonging to France in the Shereefian Empire" was the cession by France to Germany of a large portion of her Congo territory in mid-Africa, with access to the Congo and its tributaries, the Sanga and Ubangi.

While the ground-idea of Germany's policy of economic expansion, and the source of all her trouble with England, is her insistence on her "place in the sun," the difficulty attending it for other nations is to determine the place's nature and extent, so that every one shall be comfortable and prosperous all round.

The alterations in conditions among civilized nations during the last half-century, more especially in all that relates to international intercourse--political, financial, commercial, social--makes it reasonable to suppose that changes must follow in the conduct of their foreign policies. The fact also, recognized by no country more clearly than by Germany, that the profitable regions of the earth are already appropriated makes an economic policy for her all the more advisable.

An economic policy, moreover, is, notwithstanding her apparent militarism, most in harmony with the peaceful and industrious character of her people. Unfortunately, the stage in progress where the political and commercial interests of all nations have become defined and adjusted has not yet been reached, though the numerous agreements between the Great Powers of recent years go far towards clearing the way for so desirable a consummation. Unfortunately, too, it is in the very process of finding bases for such agreements that international jealousies and misunderstandings arise; and hence in securing peace, governments and peoples are at all times nowadays most in jeopardy of war. This consideration alone might very well be used to justify nations in keeping their military and naval forces strong and ready. Perhaps some day such forms of force will not be wanted, though admittedly the great majority of people still refuse to believe that the changes which have occurred have altered the fundamental att.i.tude of countries to each other, and remain firmly convinced that to-day, as yesterday and the day before, great nations are moved by an irresistible desire to add to their territories and in every way aggrandize themselves, by diplomacy if possible, and if diplomacy fails, by force.

It is, of course, impossible to say with certainty what the real designs of the Emperor and his Government in this regard were during the Morocco episode, or are now. Some believe that their designs have always aimed, and still aim, at depriving Great Britain of her position of superiority in respect of territory, maritime dominion, and trade. Others hold that they seek and will have, _coute que coute_, new territory for Germany's increasing population, and look with greedy eyes towards South America and even Holland. Others yet again represent them as incessantly on the watch to seize a harbour here or there as a coaling station for warships and a basis of attack.

But an unbiased survey of the annals of the Emperor's reign hitherto does not bear out any of these a.s.sertions. A policy of territorial expansion as such, mere earth-hunger, cannot be proved against him.

Prince Bismarck was no colonial enthusiast, though he pa.s.ses for being the founder of Germany's present colonial policy; and even to-day the colonial party in Germany, though a very noisy, is not a very large or influential one. Samoa--East Africa--Kiao-tschau--the Carolines--Heligoland--the Cameroons: how can the acquisition of comparatively insignificant and unprofitable places like these be used for proving that the might of Germany is or has been directed towards territorial conquest?

What, it may however be asked, of the Morocco adventure? Of the speech at Tangier? Of the sending of the _Panther_ to Agadir? Of the demand for compensation in Central Africa? Until the Morocco question arose, all the quarrels amongst the Powers regarding territory were caused by the territorial ambition of France, or Russia, or Italy--not of Germany; and it was not until France showed openly, by sending her troops to Fez, and thus ignoring the Act of Algeciras, that Germany put forward claims for territorial compensation in connection with Morocco. The visit of the Emperor to Tangier in 1905, a year after the Anglo-French Agreement, was doubtless an unpleasant surprise for both England and France. And not without good cause; for England and France are naturally and historically Mediterranean Powers--the one as guardian of the route to her Eastern possessions, the other as the owners of a large extent of Mediterranean coast; while England, in addition, was justified in seeing with uneasiness the possibility of a German settlement at Tangier or elsewhere on the Morocco seaboard. But the Tangier visit and all that followed it was the consequence, not of an adventurous policy of territorial conquest, but of a legitimate, and not wholly selfish, desire for economic expansion.

Taken, then, as a whole, the Emperor's foreign policy has been, as it is to-day, almost entirely economic and commercial. The same might, no doubt, be said in a general way of all civilized Occidental governments, but there never has yet been a country of which the foreign policy was so completely directed by the economic and mercantile spirit as modern Germany. The foreign policy of England has also been commercial, but it has been influenced at times by n.o.ble sentiment and splendid imagination as well. The first question the German statesman, in whose vocabulary of state-craft the word imagination does not occur, asks himself and other nations when any event happens abroad to demand imperial attention is--how does it affect Germany's economic and commercial interests, future as well as present? What is Germany going to get out of it? The manner in which on various occasions during the reign the question has been propounded has excited criticism bordering on indignation abroad, but it should be recognized that it has invariably been answered in the long run by Germany in the spirit of compromise and conciliation.

However, all civilized nations nowadays see that war is the least satisfactory method of adjusting national quarrels, and the tendency is happily growing among them to pursue a commercial, an economic policy, a policy of peace. This is true Weltpolitik, true world-policy. Time was when wars were the unavoidable result of conditions then prevailing; but conditions have greatly altered, and war, as there is abundant evidence to show, is to-day, in almost every case, avoidable by all civilized peoples. Formerly war deranged and disturbed at any rate for the time being, the commerce and industries of the countries engaged in it; to-day, as Mr. Norman Angell demonstrates, it deranges and disturbs commerce and industry all over the world. The derangement and disturbance may, it is true, be only temporary; but there is, as always, the loss of life among the youth of the countries engaged in war to be remembered. Granted that it is pleasant and honourable to die for one's country. Let us hope the time is coming when it will be equally pleasant and honourable to live for it.

We have done with Morocco, but to round off the record for 1905 mention should be made of an incident in the Emperor's life which was a source of great pleasure to him after his return from his journey thither. The marriage of his eldest son, the Crown Prince, took place in the Chapel Royal of the Berlin palace on June 15, 1905, to the young d.u.c.h.ess Cecile of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, whose character has been alluded to elsewhere and whom all Germans look forward with pleasure to seeing one day their Empress. The marriage naturally was attended by rejoicings in Berlin similar to those shown when the Emperor was married in 1881. Their chief popular feature, now as then, was the formal entry into the capital, and its chief domestic feature a grand wedding breakfast at the Emperor's palace. On the occasion of the latter, the Emperor, rising from his seat and using the familiar _Du_ and _Dich_ (thou and thee), addressed his newly-made daughter-in-law as follows:--

"My dear daughter Cecilie,--Let me, on behalf of my wife and my whole House, heartily welcome you as a member of my House and my family circle. You have come to us like a Queen of Spring amid roses and garlands, and under endless acclamations of the people such as my Residence city has not known for long. A circle of n.o.ble guests has a.s.sembled to celebrate this high and joyful festival with us, but not only those present, but also those who are, alas, no more, are with us in spirit: your ill.u.s.trious father and my parents.

"A hundred thousand beaming faces have enthusiastically greeted you; they have, however, not merely shone with pleasure, but whoever can look deeper into the heart of man could have seen in their eyes the question--a question which can only be answered by your whole life and conduct, the question, How will it turn out?

"You and your husband are about to found a home together.

The people has its examples in the past to live up to. The examples which have preceded you, dear Cecilie, have been already eloquently mentioned--Queen Louise and other Princesses who have sat on the Prussian throne. They are the standards according to which the people will judge your life, while you, my dear son, will be judged according to the standard Providence set up in your ill.u.s.trious great-grandfather.

"You, my daughter, have been received by us with open arms and will be honoured and cherished. To both of you I wish from my heart G.o.d's richest blessings. Let your home be founded on G.o.d and our Saviour. As He is the most impressive personality which has left its illuminating traces on the earth up to the present time, which finds an echo in the hearts of mankind and impels them to imitate it, so may your career imitate His, and thus will you also fulfil the laws and follow the traditions of our House.

"May your home be a happy one and an example for the younger generation, in accordance with the fine sentence which William the Great once wrote down as his confession of faith; 'My powers belong to the world and my country.' Accept my blessing for your lives. I drink to the health of the young married couple."

The record of this memorable year may be closed with mention of an inst.i.tution which is not only a special care of the Emperor's, but is also a landmark in the relation of Germany and America which may prove to be the forerunner, if it has not already done so, of similar interchange of ideas and information between nations which only require mutually to understand each other in order to be the best of friends.

The system of an annual exchange of professors between America and Germany was suggested, it is believed, to the Emperor in this year by Herr Althoff, the Prussian Minister of Education. The Emperor took up the idea with enthusiasm, and after discussing it with Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, President of Columbia University, who was invited to Wilhelmshohe for the purpose, had it finally elaborated by the Prussian Ministry of Education which now superintends its working.

The original idea of an exchange only between Harvard and Berlin University professors was, thanks to the liberality of an American citizen, Mr. Speyer, extended almost simultaneously by the establishment of what are known as "Roosevelt" professorships. The holders of these positions, unlike the original "exchange" professors between Harvard and Berlin only, may be chosen by the trustees of Columbia University from any American university and can exchange duties for two terms, instead of one in the place of the exchange professors, with the professors of any German University. Harvard professors have been succesively: Francis G. Peabody, Theodore W.

Richards, William H. Scofield, William M. Davis, George F. Moore, H.

Munsterberg, Theobald Smith, Charles S. Minog; and Roosevelt professors: J.W. Burgess, Arthur T. Hadley, Felix Adler, Benj. Ide Wheeler, C. Alphonso Smith, Paul S. Reinsch, and William H. Sloane.

Writing to the German Amba.s.sador in Washington, Baron Speck von Sternburg, in November, 1905, the Emperor said:

"Express my fullest sympathy with the movement regarding the exchange of professors. We are very well satisfied with Professor Peabody, the first exchange professor, and thankful to have him. He comes to me in my house, an honourable and welcome guest. My hearty thanks also to Mr.

Speyer, for his fine gift for the erection of a professorship in Berlin. The exchange of the learned is the best means for both nations to know the inner nature of each other, and from thence spring mutual respect and love, which are securities for peace."

The idea of the exchange, as described by Professor John W. Burgess, of Columbia University, the first Roosevelt professor to Germany, is